
Copyright N°_ 






COPYKIGHT DEPOSIT. 



HISTORY 



OF THE 



Army of the Cumberland 

ITS 

ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS, AND BATTLES 

WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF 

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE fl. THOMAS 



CB,„LV MOM HIS PR.V.TK M.L.TAKY «»»" «» "™^ «» O™" 
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY HIM 



BY 



THOMAS B. A 7 AN HORNE, TL S. A. 

ILLUSTRATED WITH 

CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE MAPS 

COMPILED BY 

EDWARD pUGEE 

LATE SUPERINTENDENT MKOUmCAI ENGINEER'S O^XCE, HEADQUARTERS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND 



TTrO VOLUMES AND ATLAS 



VOL. II 



CINCINNATI 
ROBERT CLARKE & CO 

1875 






C , H 



I according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, 
Tims. B. VAX HORNE AND EDWARD RUGER. 
In tho Office of the Librarian of Congress, at "Washington. 



ped by OGDEN, Campbell & Co., Cincinnati. 



CONTENTS VOL. II. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 



Campaign in East Tennessee, and Minor Operations in the Depart- 
ment or the Cumberland 1 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

General View of the Status of the Conflict at the Close of 1868. 8 



CHAPTER XXV. 

Operations in the Department during January, February, and 

March, 1864, and Preparations for Aggression 13 



CHAPTER XXVI. 
The Turning of Dalton 41 

CHAPTER XXVII. 
Battle of Resaca ..~- 64 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Advance to the Etowah River — The Turning of Alatoona — Bat- 
tles near New Hope Church 71 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

Operations near Kenesaw Mountain, including the Battle at 
Kulp's House, Assault of the Mountain, and the Flank Move- 
ment 86 

(iii) 






: BNTS. 



(II M'N K XXX. 
amav! ■ i re-. Battle of Peachtkbe Creek 109 



- 



CHAPTEB XXXI. 

123 



OHAPTEK XXXII. 
Tin: Pi urxMovEMI ST8,C1 , m,na. in. mn thi: Battle of Jonesboro and 

I MI OV A .IAN 1A 

OHAPTEK XXXIII. 

■1 LW ,, or the Opposing Armies to the North, and the Evolu- 
. .1 New Campaigns 1°^ 

OHAPTEB XXXIV. 

The Remstasoi G kai. Hood's advance from the Tennessee 

Kivlk. . rr.Mi.\ atim; in the Battle of Franklin 186 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

i.i: ,.]■ N ami vi i. i.k, a\i> Trust it of the Routed Enemy 222 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 
Operations having Relation more or less intimate with 

i Hi: Main A KMT DURING NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER .... 270 

CHAPTER XXXVII. 

M \k< ii to the ^i.a. and the Capture of the Citt of Savannah, 
.iv 278 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

i thkougb the carolina^, from savannah to goldsboro and 
Raleigh — The Battles op Avertsboro and Bentonville 306 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 

\i George Stoneman's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee and 
N'.kth Carolina 337 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XL. 
General J. H. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Alabama and 
Georgia ... 

CHAPTER XLT. 
Capture ok the Confederate President 

CHAPTER XLII. 

The Dissolution oe the Army-Summary of its Achievements 369 

CHAPTER XLIII. 

377 
The Dead and their Disposition 



APPENDIX. 

Organization of Department of the Cumberland 381 

Organization of Department of the Ohio 3 &> 

List of Officers of Army of the Cumberland who were Killed 

in Action or Died of Wounds or Disease during the War... o8G 
The Engineer Service in the Army of the Cumberland 439. 



HISTORY 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE AND MINOR OPERATIONS IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

General Burnside had been informed that he should have 
help as soon as practicable, when first it was known that Gen- 
eral Longstreet had been sent against him. General Grant 
said to him that he could hardly conceive the necessity of re- 
treating from East Tennessee. But as the issue at Chatta- 
nooga, though glorious in its coming, had been delayed, it 
became imperative at once to make effort to raise the siege of 
Knoxville. 

November 29th, General Howard marched from Parker's 
Gap to Cleveland, taking the lead in the movement upon 
Knoxville. He was followed immediately by General Sher- 
man's three divisions, under General F. P. Blair, and General 
Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps. On the 30th; Gen- 
eral Granger left Chattanooga with two divisions of the Fourth 
Corps for the same destination. 

Brigadier-General Elliot, who had recently been appointed 

chief of cavalry in the Department of the Cumberland, and 

who had concentrated the troops of his first division at Sparta, 

moved in conjunction with the infantry forces. Colonel 

VOL. II — 1 



2 CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 

brigade moved to the head of the column, and on the 

December, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania and Tenth Ohio 

dry lefl Chattanooga fior Kingston. Colonel Spears' bri- 

{ )., Al had been previo .sly Btationedon the north bank of 

i ver above Chattanooga, also moved toward 

K noxv ij era! Sherman's command embraced more than 

• divisions of infantry, while five were left to garrison 

Chattam ?a. Supplies tor the troops in motion were .sent up 

the river on the steamer Dunbar, but the main dependence 

- upon the country. 

the 30th, General Howard advanced from Cleveland to 
Charleston, on the Hiawassee river. As he approached the 
town, tli- enemy's cavalry retreated toward Athens. They 
had previously partially destroyed the railroad bridge, andhad 
made efforl to destroy the pontoons also. But a large num- 
ber of Hi" boats were saved, and during the following night 
the railroad bridge was repaired and planked over, so that in 
the morning the Eleventh Corps passed over, followed by the 
The head of column reached Athens the next 
evening. The inarch of the infantry was resumed on the 2d 
and Colonel Long hurried on to Loudon to save the bridge, if 
possible. He, however, found the enemy in such force that he 
could not make a dash, as had been anticipated. The town 
was well fortified, and was held by infantry and artillery, un- 
der General Vaughan, and he could only skirmish until Gen- 
eral Howard should get up. The latter reached the position 
on the 3d, hut the enemy had evacuated it the night previous, 
having first destroyed the bridge, three locomotives, and from 
sixty to seventy-five cars containing commissary stores, cloth- 
ing, and ammunition. The pontoon bridge had also been 
partially destroyed. Notwithstanding the immense destruc- 
tion of supplies, three days' rations were found uninjured. 
i this point, Colonel Long was sent with picked men 
ommunicate with General Burnside. On the 4th, Colonel 
Becker's brigade crossed the river, skirmished with the cav- 
alry, and took possession of four rifled cannon, which the 
enemy could remove, and captured a flag. Here General 
Boward Pound about thirty wagons partially destroyed, 
which he repaired for use in forming a temporary bridge, 



CAMPAIGN IX EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. S 

in anticipation of crossing the Little Tennessee river at Davis' 
ford. The route by this ford was not the one which had been 
designated, but it was ascertained that time could be saved, 
and the march shortened by advancing upon it rather than 
upon the road to Morgantown, and General Sherman permit- 
ted General Howard to use it. 

Before leaving Loudon, General Howard received an order 
to command the left wing of the army, while the center and 
righ twere placed respectively under Generals Granger and 
Blair. These divisions of the army were to act independently, 
but to march to each other's support when called by the noise 
of battle. 

December 5th, General Howard crossed the Little Tennes- 
see river, at Davis' ford, by means of an extemporized bridge 
formed of wagons and movable trestles, and reached Louis- 
ville at dark. At night, the three heads of column communi- 
cated at Marysville. Here information was received that 
Longstreet had raised the siege of Knoxville, and retreated 
eastward. He assaulted Fort Sanders, the key to the position, 
on the 29th, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Aware, sub- 
sequently, of the proximity of Sherman's army, he sought 
safety in timely retreat. All the forces were now ordered to 
halt, and the day following, General Sherman met General 
Burnside at Knoxville. It was then agreed that the Fourth 
Corps should remain and the other forces return to Chatta- 
nooga. 

The countermarch was commenced on the 7th. A halt was 
made at Athens, with the various columns so disposed as to 
cover a movement of Colonel Long, who had gone toward 
North Carolina to cut off one of Longstreet's trains. Upon 
his return, the infantry forces marched to Chattanooga. How- 
ard's corps and Davis' division resumed their old relations in 
the Army of the Cumberland, and Sherman's divisions returned 
to the West. 

Though the march to East Tennessee involved no serious 
fiffhtina: with Lone-street's command, which was lost to Gen- 
eral Bragg in his emergency at Chattanooga, it nevertheless 
thoroughly accomplished its object, as it forced the former 
from Knoxville toward the East, in what proved to be per- 



4 CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 

paratien from the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. 
hard march, as the troops commenced it immediately 
after engagements, and Sherman's forces after a 

march from the West. The Latter had « stripped for the 
- a1 Bridgeport, and they, with many from other com- 
mand8j ,, jtitute of suitable clothing for a winter cam- 

paign. Besides, their supplies were drawn mainly from the 
try, and in a hurried movement this source is exceed- 
. precarious. Supplies were sent up the river in boats it 
;,.. but the army was not always near the river; and, on 
the whole, tin' circumstances were such as none but veteran 
asily overcome. The mills were seized in ad- 
d inn night and day ; and a broad belt of country in 
march and countermarch paid exhaustive contributions. 
e were some excesses which were reprehensible, especially 
: iarch was through a region whose inhabitants were 
mainly loyal. General Davis' division, by its order on the 
h and its restraint from pillage, elicited special praise 
from General Sherman. In this commendable and conspicu- 
ous bearing, this division represented the Army of the Cum- 
berland, which, throughout its existence, was systematically 
i lined from pillage and irresponsible foraging. 
The objects now were to hold all the territory which bad 
gained, to maintain and perfect communications, rein- 
force, recuperate, and reorganize the army, and accumulate 
supplies and material, all looking to offensive movements, as 
early as practicable. The enemy was in no condition for ag- 
i on a grand scale, but great vigilance and skillful dis- 
ions were necessary to maintain communications and pre- 
cavalry raids and guerrilla depredations. 

i the withdrawal of the troops from Ringgold, General 

>ker resumed the occupation of Lookout valley. General 

( Jrufl was directed, with his two brigades, to stop on the way 

and bury the national dead on the battle-field of Chicka- 

mauga,^ and then to take position on the railroad between 

War's visage, despite the glory of heroism and victory, and all the 
gentle courtesies which enemies may extend at all times, except when 

rage of battle brooks no restraint, is grim and forbidding; but when 
the ordinary usages of civilized and Christian nations in the conduct of 



CAMPAIGN IX EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 5 

"Whitesides and Bridgeport. Colonel Watkins' brigade of 
the First division of cavalry was directed to take post at Ross- 
ville ; and the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was 
sent to Caperton's ferry, to guard and observe at that point. 
A pioneer brigade, composed of detachments from various 
regiments, Colonel G. P. Buell commanding, was employed in 
the construction of a double-track macadamized road over the 
nose of Lookout Mountain, to serve as a communication 
between Lookout valley and Chattanooga, without depend- 
ence upon pontoon bridges. Beyond this primary use, this 
road was essential to overland communications with Bridge- 
port. The repair of the railroad commanded immediate atten- 
tion, but as two long and high bridges were to be built — one 
over the Tennessee river at Bridgeport, and the one over Fall- 
ing "Water, near "Whitesides — much time was required. 

When the army returned from East Tennessee, the Eleventh 
Corps went into camp at "Whitesides ; two brigades of Davis' 
division, east of Missionary Eidge, near Rossville ; and the 
third at the mouth of the North Chickamauga. General Elli- 
ott was ordered to establish his headquarters at Athens, and 
post pickets at Calhoun, Columbus, and Tellico Plains. 

During the months of November and December, there were 
several brilliant contests in resisting the enemy's cavalry, re- 
pressing guerrillas, and scouting to the front to ascertain the 
strength and movements of the enemy. And in most cases the 
national troops were victorious. 

November 2d, Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, command- 
war are ignored, then are its features forbidding in the extreme. The car- 
nage and suffering are appalling when cool reflection and the kindly- 
sympathies have play ; but all strong terms are inadequate to express the 
wanton barbarities of war, either in cruelty to the living or dishonor to 
the dead, and on both counts the leaders of the rebellion must be con- 
victed. Andersonville and other prisons, where starvation and want of 
room for captives entailed the intensest suffering and fearful mortality, 
And Chickamauga, with its hundreds of unburied dead, give proof of the 
most revolting inhumanity. General Bragg accepted an exchange of pris- 
oners who were wounded, but he denied burial to multitudes of the slain. 
The national dead upon that part of the field occupied by General Long- 
street were buried ; but very many on their right, where General Polk 
-commanded, lay upon the ground for two months. 



g CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 

in g at Nashville, sent a mixed command, under Lieutenant- 
nel Sculley, Vn^ Middle Tennessee Infantry, to look 
Hawkins, and other guerrilla chiefs, near Piner's fac- 
Sculleymel them, and having routed the party, pur- 
sued to Centerville. At this point, as he was crossing the 
. Hawkins attacked in turn, but was again routed, and 
i partisans were dispersed. His loss was from fifteen to 
twenty killed, and Bixty-six prisoners. 

member Ith, Major Fitzgibbon, of the Fourteenth Mich- 
igan [nfantry, foughl near Lawrenceburg the guerrilla bands 
,oper, Kirk, Williams, and Scott. After a hand-to-hand 
Fitzgibbon defeated them, killing eight, wounding 
. and capturing twenty-four men. Among the captured 
were a captain and two lieutenants. The victor had three 
, slightly wounded, and eight horses killed. 

( in the 13th, Captain Cutler, with one company of mounted 
infantry from the garrison at Clarksville, and a section of 
Whitmore's battery, had a contest with Captain Gray's com. 
pany of guerrillas, near Palmyra. He killed two, wounded 
Mid captured one. The same day, fifteen prisoners were 
captured near Lebanon, and forty by Missener, near Columbia. 
On the L6th, General Payne sent parties from Gallatin and 
ha Vergne. Five guerrillas were killed, and twenty-six were 
captured, also horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs, which had been 
collected for the Confederate army. 

The H'Xt day, Colonel Coburn sent an expedition from 
Murfreesboro against the enemy's irregular cavalry. A de- 
tachment of the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry captured nineteen 
guerrillas and twenty horses, without loss. 

(in the 21st, an expedition was sent down the Tennessee 
river, which destroyed nine boats for local use, some of them 
being Bixty feet long. They were wrested from the enemy. 

On the 26th, the First Tennessee Cavalry and Ninth Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Brownlow, attacked Colonel 
Mm ray. at Sparta. He killed one man, wounded two, and 
captured ten. Extensive salt-works were destroyed, and some 
horses and ammunition were taken. 

The same day, Captain Brixie's scouts encountered a party 



CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 7 

of guerrillas near Batlisheba Springs, capturing fifteen or 
twenty, and dispersing the remainder. 

December 12th, Colonel Watkins, with two hundred and 
fifty men, from the Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, made 
a dash upon Lafayette, Georgia, and captured a colonel of the 
Georgia home guard, six officers of the signal corps, and 
thirty horses and mules, and returned to his camp at Rossville, 
without loss. On the 27th, the colonel sent Major Willing, 
with one hundred and fifty men from the same regiments, to 
McLemore's Cove and Lafayette. The major captured one 
lieutenant, sixteen men, and thirty-eight horses and mules. 

On the 15th, General Dodge captured a small party of cav- 
alry, under command of Major Joe Fontaine, General Roddy's 
adjutant, not far from Pulaski, Tennessee. This party had 
made a reconnoissance on the Nashville and Chattanooga and 
Nashville and Decatur railroads, which doubtless had some 
relation to projected movements or raids. It suggested greater 
vigilance along these important roads. 

December 27th, General Wheeler, with fifteen hundred 
men, appeared at Calhoun, Tennessee, with evident expecta- 
tion of capturing a train under escort of Laiboldt's brigade. 
Colonel Laiboldt charged this force, and routed it speedily, 
and Colonel Long, with one hundred and fifty men, having 
come from the opposite side of the river, in support, moved 
in pursuit, believing that a small force had been cut off from 
the main body. By a saber charge, this force was scattered in 
all directions. One hundred and thirty-one prisoners were 
taken, including five officers, one a division inspector and one 
a surgeon. The number of killed and wounded was not as- 
certained. Colonel Long lost two killed, twelve wounded, 
and one missing. Wheeler commanded in person, and an- 
ticipated rich booty with slight trouble, but failed in his object, 
with heavy loss. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE CONFLICT AT THE CLOSE 

OF 1863. 

The year 18G3 was crowded with disaster to the insurgents. 
They were victorious in some of the great battles in Virginia, 
but lost fearfully in the battle of Gettysburg. So that, at the 
. where < >nly they had been at all successful, their strength 
was relatively Less than at the beginning of the year. In the 
West, their losses in men, material of war, and territory were 
immense. In their effort to maintain their hold upon the Mis- 
pi river, they lost two armies, and when subsequently 
the •• Father of "Waters" flowed "unvexed to the sea," and the 
s-ui'remacy of the national navy upon this great river and its 
tributaries was unquestioned, all contiguous portions of the 
insurgent states were at the mercy of the national armies. 
At the close of the year the central offensive line was resting 
upon the northern limits of Alabama, Georgia, and North Car- 
olina. The loss of so much territory, the complete division 
of what remained by the navy moving at pleasure upon the 
Mississippi river, and the immense diminution of men and 
means, gave new conditions to the campaigns of the next 
year. 

les the effect of numerous defeats during the year, two 
proclamations of the President of the United States greatly 
alarmed the insurgents. On the 1st day of January, 1863, he 
pr< claimed freedom to all the slaves in the revolted states, and 
in the last month he promised pardon to all below a given 
grade, in the insurgent armies. 

AlS a sequence of the freedom of the slaves, and as a war 
measure of great moment, arms were soon put in their hands. 

(8) 



GENERAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863. 9 

At first, however, the enrollment of the frcedmen as soldiers 
was only occasionally undertaken by individual department 
commanders in absence of any general plan or explicit author- 
ity from Washington. Though slavery directly and indirectly 
was the dominant cause of the war, there was manifest reluc- 
tance for nearly three years to lay hands upon it, and after its 
abolition was decreed, the national authorities hesitated to 
make soldiers of those whose bondage they had broken. The 
slaves had aided the enemy not only by their productive labor, 
but also by the construction of defenses, and contributed to 
the strength of the rebellion in greater measure, than they had 
previously given political weight to the Southern States, in 
Congress. The more moderate and far-seeing men of the 
South anticipated, from the first, that sooner or later the 
African race would be involved in the war. And later than 
many of this class anticipated, and a growing party in the 
North demanded, the President pronounced the freedom of the 
negroes in the seceded states. Their enlistment as soldiers 
was so plainly a legitimate consequent that it was not long 
delayed. Both measures were repugnant to the traditional 
and inveterate prejudices of the Southern people, and of many 
in the North as well. In the official utterances of the Confed- 
erate President, the reprehension of the civilized world was 
invoked upon those who proposed these measures, and the 
total destruction of the Africans in America was predicted. 
But the argument in their support was so simple and forcible 
that serious opposition to either soon ceased in the North. As 
the slaves were a source of strength to the rebellion, the logic 
of war first declared them contraband, and then demanded 
their employment as soldiers. The fact that their freedom 
was contingent upon the overthrow of the Southern Confed- 
eracy, not only justified their grasp of the musket, but enforced 
its obligation. And the results vindicated the policy, as colored 
regiments greatly augmented the national armies for the cam- 
paigns of 1864. 

The President's offer of pardon to the masses in the Con- 
federate armies, had marked effect. It gave assurance that 
peace could ensue without the entailment of penal criminality 
upon those in arms against the government below the rank of 



10 GENERAL Vir.W \T THE CLOSE OF 1863. 

brigadier-general, and hence removed the necessity that mere 
ration Bhould keep them under the standards of treason. 
And as this promise of amnesty involved no hard conditions, 
and was made al a time of general despondency in the South, 
and when Buch was the depreciation of Confederate money, 

that no i r man could give even partial support to a 

family from his pay as a soldier, it prompted numerous de- 
sertions. Desertion being added to the drain of active cam- 
as, the diminution of the insurgent armies became alarming 
to the leaders. But they still claimed that the independence 
of the Southern States was assured, and on this ground, in part 
justified a conscription of widesl compass. The people did 
,,,,, bear this patiently. Murmurs of discontent became gen- 
eral. Occasionally there was open protest and severest criti- 
cism. Bu1 as nothing but counter-revolution could remedy 
the evil, and as this step plainly led through anarchy to sub- 
mission to the general government, the relentless conscription 
of jroung and old, and the sweeping appropriation of private 
property was endured. As a result, sullenness and discour- 
agement took the place of cheer and hope in their armies, and 
outward restraint rather than moral force kept multitudes in 
the ranks; while the certainty of pardon, in the event of the 
failure of the rebellion, induced those not ready to desert to 
weigh the cosl of protracting a contest when success was cx- 
tremely doubtful. But the leaders, after a year of gigantic 
reverses, -landing upon the threshhold of new campaigns 
with diminished armies, as boldly as ever declared that subju- 
gation was impossible. President Davis, in his annual mes- 
sage to his congress, announced that " grave reverses had be- 
fallen the Confederate armies," and that the hope of a speedy 
termination of the war, entertained at the beginning of the 
year, had qo1 been realized, and yet asserted that peace could 
only cine with the acknowledgment of the independence of 
the Confederate States. Even after General Lee's defeat at 
Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the 
retreal of General Bragg's army over Cumberland Mountains, 
M. T. Maury assured the world, in a paper published in the 
" London Times," that the prospect of success to the South 
was brighter than at any former period of the war. Whether 



GENEKAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863. 11 

this assurance was real or assumed, on the part of the leaders, 
and whether they had to any great extent the sympathy of 
the masses in their avowed hopes, such was the power of the 
Confederate government and the momentum of the rebellion, 
that armies of fair defensive proportions were maintained, and 
some of the Southern generals even entertained projects of 
aggression. 

The events of the year as affecting the national cause, viewed 
from a military or political stand-point, were cheering in the 
extreme. The victories of the national armies and the support 
of war measures as evinced by the elections, equally indicated 
that the crisis of the nation's destiny had been safely passed. 
The strength of the rebellion had culminated, and the general 
situation gave encouragement to the government and those who 
supported it, to strike blow after blow until the final one should 
be given. The elections declared the nation's approval of the 
President's proclamation of freedom to the slaves, and the pol- 
icy of making them soldiers, and universal freedom was now 
as firmly established as a condition of peace as the surrender 
of the Confederate armies. 

The maintenance of the full strength of the national armies 
was now the grand problem. The term of enlistment of 
very many regiments would expire early in 18G4. Their re- 
tirement during active operations would endanger the success 
of all plans of aggression which might be formed. In fact, 
the speedy suppression of the rebellion turned upon their re- 
tention in the service, and yet there was no law to hold them. 
Fortunately for the country her citizen soldiers were equal to 
the emergency, and their voluntary re-enlistment, more strin- 
gent drafting, and the enrollment of the freedmen, gave prom- 
ise of adequate armies. 

It was evident at the close of the year that the Army of the 
Cumberland was again to confront its old enemy, the Army of 
tka Tennessee. After its defeat at Chattanooga, this army took 
position at Dalton, with a heavy detachment at Buzzard's Roost, 
and forces also at the strong positions between Dalton and At- 
lanta. The Western and Atlantic railroad courses through the 
hills and mountains of Northern Georgia, which give marked 
advantage to an army acting on the defensive, against another 



12 GENERAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863. 

depended upon the railroad for supplies. And before the ex- 
of the nexl central campaign could be determined, 
the Confederate generala exerted themselves to give additional 
gth to tl w 1 1 i cl l nature had provided. Whether 

they should be able to take the offensive or not, their past ex- 
perience suggested the propriety of making provision for de- 
far to the rear as practicable, while maintaining a strong 
defensive front. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT DURING JANUARY, FEBRUARY, 
AND MARCH, 1864, AND PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSION. 

At the beginning of the year 1864, and during the first 
months of the year, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland 
were disposed from Knoxville to Bridgeport, and on the rail- 
road from the latter place to Louisville, Kentucky. The atti- 
tude of the army was mainly defensive. In fact, it was in no 
condition for aggression. At least ten thousand animals had 
died during the siege of Chattanooga, and those which survived 
were so reduced in strength as to be unfit for service. The 
army, too, was temporarily weakened by the absence of numer- 
ous regiments that had been granted furloughs upon re-enlist- 
ment ; and previous to the completion of the railroad between 
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, it was hardly possible to supply 
the troops at rest on the defensive line, including the Army of 
the Ohio in East Tennessee. Thus restrained from active op- 
erations, its chief duty was preparation for future aggression. 

As the primary step, it was imperative to make Chattanooga 
a reliable proximate base of supplies for an army advancing 
toward Atlanta. The Confederate army being in winter-quar- 
ters in Northern Georgia, could destroy all the productions of 
that region which it did not consume or transport. So that 
the accumulation of supplies at Chattanooga, and the continued 
maintenance of railroad communications with Nashville and 
Louisville, were conditions of a southward advance ; and the 
practicability of making Chattanooga a base for offensive op- 
erations, hinged upon the capacity of a single railroad. 

Two railroads from Nashville meet at Stevenson, Alabama, 
but from their junction to Bridgeport, and thence to Chat- 

(13) 



J I OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

tanooga, there is only a Biugle track. As the bridges at Bridge- 
portand Falling Waters were not completed until the 14th of 
January, half the winter was gone before there was the slightest 
accumulation of supplies; and though subsequently this single 
railroad was pressed to its utmost capacity, such were the im- 
mediate wants of the armies, and so numerous were the vet- 
passing over the road, that the large store- 
.hirli had been built at Chattanooga were very slowly 

I ' iring the first half of January, the enemy was not active. 

era! Thomas Ben1 scouting parties in all directions, but no 
indications of aggression were discerned. Apart from the ex- 
haustion which the preceding campaigns had produced, a 
change of commanders was doubtless one cause of inaction. 
Soon after his defeat before Chattanooga, General Bragg had 

. removed from command in Georgia, and General Joseph 
E. Johnston, while charged with the administration of a mili- 
tary division corresponding in extent to the one which had 
been created for General Grant, assumed personal command of 
the forces immediately south of Chattanooga. His presence 

1 ]t.n indicated his appreciation of the importance of the 
center of his line, either to regain what had been so recently 
lost, or to neutralize Chattanooga, as far as possible, as a base 
for aggressive operations. 

By this time, the foreshadows of the campaign which Gen- 
eral Grant had projected began to appear. Mobile was his 
next objective, with Atlanta and Mongomery as important 
intermediate points/:- Not being ready to advance upon the 
direct line to his objective, he proposed a movement from 
his right fiank by General Sherman, while General Thomas 
should make effort to hold Johnston's forces at Dalton, and 
General Foster, commanding in East Tennessee in room of 
< reneral Burnside, should neutralize Longstreet's army. The 
objects proposed for General Sherman were the destruction of 
the railroads from Vlcksburg to Meridian, and the capture of 
Mobile, should its practicability be developed as he advanced. 
But before he was ready to move, rumors were current that 



Statement of plan by General Badeau, in "Life of General Grant. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 15 

IiOBgstreet was receiving reinforcements from Virginia. This 
deranged the plans with regard to the center and left. Gen- 
eral Thomas was desirous of recalling his troops from East 
Tennessee, to be able to demonstrate strongly against Dalton ; 
but it now became necessary that he should have regard to the 
contingency of sending additional troops to General Foster. 

General Longstreet's attitude had been ambiguous since his 
abandonment of the siege of Knoxville, upon the approach of 
General Sherman, in December. His presence was a menace, 
even in absence of operations of direct offense ; and as it was 
possible for reinforcements to reach him from Dalton and 
from Virginia, an effort to regain the mountain fortresses of 
East Tennessee was probable, especially if General Johnston 
could entertain the hope of keeping the war out of Georgia by 
carrying it to the [North. Any plan of aggression on his part 
would involve the possession of a route to the northeast of 
Chattanooga, and for a time such a course was plainly indi- 
cated or feigned. 

When, on the 15th of January, General Wood advanced to 
Dandridge and drove the rebel cavalry from the town, an 
offensive return was provoked, which for a time threatened to 
change General Grant's plans very materially. Though Gen- 
eral Wood was joined by General Sheridan's division and 
McCook's cavalry at Dandridge, it was not deemed safe to 
hazard a general engagement. For two days there was skir- 
mishing, and late in the afternoon of the 18th, there was a 
brisk conflict mainly between McCook's cavalry and Long- 
street's advance. Three Ohio regiments — the First, Mnety- 
third, and One Hundred and Twenty-fifth — were holding the 
front as pickets, and were severely pressed by a tentative ad- 
vance of the enemy, but they fought bravely to cover the prep- 
arations for a retreat. McCook, by a saber charge, cleared 
the field and captured two steel rifle-guns, and over one hun- 
dred prisoners. This action and the darkness permitted the 
safe retreat of the national troops. They fell back, first to 
Strawberry Plains, and subsequently to Marysville, followed 
by Longstreet. 

Simultaneously with this movement, General Roddy crossed 
the Tennessee river near Florence, Alabama, with two brigades 



1 1 ; OPERATIONS FEOM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

avalry. General Dodge, commanding troops of General 
Sherman's army at Pulaski, Tennessee, received information 
oo the 20th, that he was preparing boats and concealing them 
with the evident purpose of crossing his command for a raid 
upon the railroads. General Grant at once advised General 
Tin. mas of the fact, and directed him to organize an expedi- 
tion to drive Roddy back, and destroy his boats and all ma- 
terial which could be used in effecting the passage of the river. 

he was across two days before these instructions were 

municated, and ( teneral Thomas could only make arrange- 
ments i" defeat bis purpose. He directed the detachments 
guarding the roads to watch against attacks, and ordered Gen- 
eral Crook commanding cavalry at Huntsville, Alabama, to 
advance against Roddy and drive him across the river. 

ilonel II. O. Miller, Ninety-second Indiana, commanding 
one expedition, defeated Johnson's brigade near Florence on 
the 26th, killing fifteen, and wounding and capturing a large 
number. Among the prisoners were three officers. His own 

was ten wounded. General Gillem also sent parties from 
the line of the Northwestern railroad against Roddy, as soon 
as he beard that he had crossed the river. These parties 
returned on the 30th with Lieutenant-Colonel Brewer, two 
tains, three lieutenants, and twenty men as prisoners. Hav- 
ing thus met forces between him and the railroad in all di- 
Roddy recrossed the river, having effected no damage 
that compensated for his losses. 

January 27th, the cavalry under General Elliott, in a brilliant 
action at Mossy Creek, East Tennessee, defeated General Mar- 
tin, commanding two divisions of cavalry, Morgan's and Arm- 
strong's, and followed his routed forces until darkness ter- 
minated the pursuit. Campbell's and La Grange's brigades 
were engaged, and they put the enemy to rout by a saber 
charge, capturing one hundred and twelve prisoners, including 
two regimental commanders and seven other officers, two rifled 
guns, eight hundred small arms, Morgan's battle-flag, and two 

nental flags, which the enemy had previously captured 
from the national troops, andkillcdand wounded over two hun- 
dred men. exclusive of prisoners. Morgan's division was 
t bor, Highly broken, and Armstrong's was thrown into rapid re- 



OPERATIONS FROM JANNARY TO MARCH, 1864. 17 

trea*t. Guerrillas were also active. January 20th, one hun- 
dred and fifty guerrillas attacked Tracy City, and having three 
times summoned the garrison to surrender, were handsomely 
repulsed. 

The next day, Colonel T. J. Harrison, Thirty-ninth Indiana 
Mounted Infantry, sent two hundred men on an expedition to 
Sparta, Tennessee, to look after the guerrillas infesting that 
region. This party in five subdivisions scoured the country 
occupied by the bands of Curtis, Ferguson, Bledsoe, and Mur- 
ray. Remaining out several days, they killed four men, 
wounded five or six, and captured fifteen, including a captain 
and lieutenant. They also captured thirty horses and twenty 
stand of arms. . 

On the 24th, Colonel Boone, commanding the Twenty- 
eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry , with four hundred and 
forty-six men, moved through McLemore's Cove, crossed to 
Broomtown valley, and proceeded through Summerville, across 
Taylor's ridge, to Dirt Town. Beyond the latter place he de- 
stroyed a camp of the Georgia militia, captured fifteen men, 
including Captain Hubbard, and returned without loss. 

Upon the completion of the railroad from Bridgeport to 
Chattanooga, General Thomas transferred the working parties 
to the road leading to Knoxville, and on the 24th directed 
General Stanley, commanding the First division of the 
Fourth Corps, to dispose his command from Chickamauga 
Station to the Hiawassee river, to protect the workmen on the 
road. As it had been suggested that troops might be sent to 
East Tennessee to support Foster against Longstreet, these 
troops were thus in readiness to meet this contingency while 
guarding the railroad, and watching against the direct move- 
ment of troops from Dalton to Longstreet. 

As deserters concurred in asserting that General Johnston 
was sending troops south from Dalton, General Thomas di- 
rected General Palmer to make a reconnoissance with a por- 
tion of his command to ascertain, if possible, whether these 
representations were true. The latter having accomplished 
his office by developing a strong force at Tunnel Hill, returned 
to Chattanooga. 
vol. n — 2 



IS OPERATIONS FEOM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

y, bruary LOth, General Grant directed General Thomas to 
prepare for an advance to Knoxville, with such forces as could 
be spared from the protection of Chattanooga and its commu- 
nications, to assist General Foster to drive Longstreet from 
Such a movement was no part of the orig- 
inal plan, hut concurrent reports had convinced General Grant 
,l iat there bad been a heavy concentration of troops under 
Longstreet to secure East Tennessee, and he determined to 
prevent it, and relievo that flank from pressure. General 

er hud prepared to assume the offensive if he could get at 
least ten thousand men from General Thomas. It was deemed 

to diminish the forces at Chattanooga, as there was. reason 
to believe that Johnston had detached heavily from Dalton to 
reinforce Polk against Sherman in Alabama, as well as to 
strengthen Longstreet for offense against Foster in East Ten^ 

The Army of the Cumberland was not in condition to enter 
upon a winter campaign, and General Thomas found it dim- 
cult to make such preparations as he deemed essential. His 
army was greatly diminished by the absence of regiments 
having re-enlisted as veterans. Artillery horses and train 
animals had not been supplied in room of the thousands that 
had died from starvation during the siege, and he advised a 
postponement of the movement until the railroad would be 
in running order to Loudon. On the 12th, however, the day 
previous to the one designated for starting, he was informed 
by General Grant that a conversation with General Foster, 
who, on a. wo unt of ill-health, had been superseded by General 
Schofield, and dispatches from the latter, induced him to doubt 
the propriety of moving against Longstreet, and suggested 
thai should he not he required to go into East Tennessee, he 
should make a formidable reconnoissance toward Dalton, and 
if possible occupy that place, and repair the railroads to it. 
This order was .riven on the 17th, and at the time there was 
some probability that it might be successful, as it was sup- 

1' ' 'hat Johnston had weakened his center, especially to 

strengthen Polk against Sherman. Two days later, however, 
General Thomas received information that Johnston had in 
hand six divisions, comprising from thirty to forty thousand 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 19 

men, and that no. troops had been sent away, except one bri- 
gade of infantry. This intelligence did not, however, induce 
General Grant to recall the movement, though it rendered 
General Thomas hopeless of success. 

The troops were put in motion toward Dalton, February 
22d. General Thomas threw General Stanley's division, Gen- 
eral Cruft commanding, with such cavalry as he could safely 
withdraw from Calhoun, Tennessee, forward on the Spring 
Place road, and Johnston's and Baird's divisions, with cavalry 
in advance and on the right flank, directly to Ringgold. At 
night, Craft's division was at Red Clay, with Long's cavalry 
in advance, having been instructed to observe the enemy well 
toward Dalton, and give timely warning of any effort to turn 
Craft's left flank, or to notify him to advance should Johnston 
retire. The other divisions were at Ringgold, in position on 
the ridge west of East Chickamauga, with a regiment of 
mounted infantry on each flank, and Carlin's brigade thrown 
toward Taylor's ridge. 

During the evening, General Palmer advised General 
Thomas that he had received intelligence that Johnston had 
dispatched Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions to reinforce 
General Polk, who was falling back before General Sherman, 
in Alabama. All available troops were now moved up to dis- 
lodge General Johnston, should this report prove to be true. 
Davis' division advanced to Ringgold on the 23d, and General 
Matthias was directed to send six regiments from Cleveland to 
support General Cruft, at Red Clay. Colonel Long advanced 
toward Dalton, on the Spring Place road ; first drove in the 
enemy's videttes, and when within four miles of Dalton, at- 
tacked and routed from camp a regiment of infantry. The 
enemy then forming in force, he withdrew to Russell's Mills. 
Craft's division advanced to Lee's house, on the road from 
Red Clay to Tunnel Hill. The four divisions were now well 
concentrated in the vicinity of Ringgold, and after a thorough 
reconnoissance on each flank, General Palmer advanced, on 
the 24th, to develop the enemy's strength at Tunnel Hill. 
After skirmishing three or four miles with Wheeler's cavalry, 
he gained possession of the town, when the enemy formed a 
new line, and opened with his batteries from a hill, one mile 



20 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

beyond General Palmer then withdrew, and encamped three 
milea to the aorthwest. The following morning he decided 
,,, feel the enemy's position more fully. Baird's division was 
south of Taylor's Ridge near Ringgold, and Craft's was well 
its left. 1 >;»n i-" :: and Johnson's divisions were in 

advance toward Tunnel Hill, with Harrison's mounted 
infantry in front, and Boone's on the left flank, and Long's 
brigade, supported by Grose's brigade of Cruft's division, was 
at Varaell's Btation, on the Dalton and Cleveland railroad. 
These pairs of divisions were ordered to advance on different 
lines, the former upon Tunnel Hill, and, if practicable, directly 
upon Dalt-.n: the latter, with Long's cavalry, to move down 
the valley, along the eastern base of Rocky FaceEidge, to 
threaten the right and rear of the enemy. 

In compliance, the troops on the right advanced in three 
columns. A tier the right and left had moved some distance, 
the center advanced, hut was soon checked by a battery of 
Parrotl guns planted on the summit beyond the' town of 
Tunnel Hill, and skillfully handled. The right and left col- 
umns Morgan's and Hambright's brigades, again advanced, 
and flanking this battery, forced its retirement. Davis' di- 
vision, with Johnson's in support, pursued and found the 
enemy at Buzzard's Roost, a gap in Rocky Face Ridge, whose 
precipitous acclivities and salient summits forbade assault. 
Baird and Craft also encountered the enemy as they moved 
down Rocky Face valley. Giving ground at first, he soon 
offered resistance upon a central hill. An attackw T as here nec- 

ry to develop his strength; and General Turchin, with 
four regiments, the Eleventh, Eighty-ninth, and Ninety-second 
Ohio, and the Eighty-second Indiana, was directed to advance. 
Advancing boldly, these troops pressed back the enemy and 
reached the summit, but were unable to hold it, as the routed 
troops met reinforcements, and returned in overwhelming 
force. The conflict was sharp, but it was too unequal to be 
maintained, and Turchin yielded the hill. Spirited skir- 
mishing and cannonading were continued until nightfall, when 
the national troops were withdrawn. Colonel Harrison spent 

* General Davis' division had previously closed up from the rear. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864 21 

the night at a gap six miles south of Buzzard's Roost, nearly 
opposite Dalton, whence he was driven the following morning 
by Cleburne's division, one of the two that had been dis- 
patched to Alabama. 

As it had been ascertained that General Johnston was 
holding his strong positions with forces superior to his own, 
General Thomas deemed it futile to attempt to dislodge him, 
and that it was even impracticable to maintain his threatening 
attitude. The country was stripped of provisions, and his 
transportation was not sufficient to supply his command. He 
therefore advised General Grant of his embarrassment, and 
suggested the abandonment of the enterprise. In reply, Gen- 
eral Grant urged him to maintain his position, and make the 
impression upon Johnston that an advance into the heart ot 
the South was intended, until the fate of General Sherman 
should be known. Compliance, however, was not considered 
practicable, and as it was known that Johnston had recalled 
his divisions from Polk's support, orders were issued for the 
withdrawal of the troops. Baird's division was posted on a 
line of hills north of the town of Tunnel Hill, to cover the re- 
tirement of Johnson and Davis, and then took permanent post 
at Ringgold. Davis' division returned to his former position 
near Rossville. ' Two brigades of Johnson's division were 
posted at Tyner's Station, and the third at Graysville, with a 
strong guard at Parker's Gap, to protect Baird's left flank. 
Cruft's division returned to Ooltawah and Blue Springs, the 
commander sending a detachment to Cleveland to guard his 
supplies, where Colonel Long also took post to patrol the left 
flank of the army. Colonels Harrison and Boone were 
stationed at Leet's tanyard, to observe the enemy toward 
Lafayette. 

This movement to Dalton involved a loss of more than three 
hundred men killed and wounded. Among the wounded 
was Colonel Mihalotzy, of the Twenty-fourth Illinois, who 
died a few days later at Chattanooga. The enemy's loss was 
probably two hundred. As a reconnoissance it was successful, 
though there were no such results as General Grant mentioned 
as probable. It seemingly recalled the two divisions that 
General Johnston had sent against General Sherman, but as 



22 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864 

the latter had retreated from Meridian on the 20th, six days 
previous to their return, the demonstration had no effect upon 
their movements. The chief advantages were the develop- 
ment of the strength of General Johnston's position before 
Dalton, and the suggestion to General Thomas of a plan to 
turn it by a movement through Snake Creek Gap. He was 
bo impressed with the feasibility of this plan, that upon his 
return to Chattanooga, he requested permission from General 
Grant to make preparation to accomplish it. 

Ea\ ing disposed his troops for defense, General Thomas ad- 
dressed himself to preparation for the spring campaign. He 
ordered General Butterfield to make a careful examination of 
the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and Captain Merrill, 
thirl' engineer of the department, to examine other roads, to 
ascertain the minimum force necessary to hold them securely. 
He al60 ordered a thorough examination of the railroad to 
Tunnel Hill, with a view to its repair, as an important step in 
provision for an advance. 

These examinations resulted in a more economical pro- 
tection of railroad communications, by means of a system of 
block-houses at the bridges and other important points, which 
hi. an element of power to the close of the war. And 
the conclusion having been reached that six thousand infantry 
and two thousand cavalry could hold securely the railroads to 
iiville, General Thomas recommended that the railroad 
guards, as far as practicable, should be drawn from the local 
T< in lessee militia. 

The month of February closed with the military situation 
by no means developed. General Sherman destroyed rail- 
roads extensively in Mississippi, but otherwise his expedition 
was not compensative. It was not known what Longstreet 
would do, whether give further trouble in East Tennessee, re- 
turn to Virginia, or join Johnston. Neither were General 
Johnston's plans at all indicated. One day would bring ru- 
mors from deserters, and from sources more reliable, that he 
was nnder orders to withdraw his army from Dalton, followed 
on the next by contradictions from sources equally entitled to 
credence. But ignorance of the purposes of the enemy did 
not prevent preparation for aggression. Reconstruction of 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 23 

railroads was pressed westward and southward, and material 
and supplies were accumulated as rapidly as possible. Steam- 
boats and large storehouses were built. Horses were provided 
for the artillery, and efforts were made to recuperate those of 
the cavalry worn down by hard winter service. Eight com- 
panies of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, and 
two regiments of colored troops, were ordered to commence 
the construction of block-houses and other defenses along the 
line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and the first 
Missouri Engineers and Mechanics were detailed for similar 
duty on the Nashville and Decatur railroad. In anticipation 
of a campaign designed to bisect the Gulf States east of the 
Mississippi river, the secure defense of railroad communi- 
cations from Chattanooga to the North with the least pos- 
sible draft upon the strength of the aggressive columns, was 
a matter of great moment. With strong block-houses at all 
the bridges, and with earthworks, in addition, at all of the 
more important points, a comparatively small force could hold 
the roads securely — at least, could prevent all damage that 
could not be quickly repaired. One of the greatest embarrass- 
ments to Generals Buell and Rosecrans, had been the neces- 
sity of scattering their troops in heavy detachments on their 
lines of supply. The plan now adopted promised better se- 
curity, both to the railroads and to the troops guarding them, 
while employing a small portion of the force formerly assigned 
to this service. Besides, it transferred the cavalry almost en- 
tirely from the rear to the front, and relieved the veteran 
infantry from guard duty, as new regiments and local militia 
could be trusted to hold the block-houses and earthworks. 

At the beginning of March there were indications that General 
Johnston was receiving reinforcements at Dalton, and General 
Grant was not free from apprehension that Longstreet's army 
might join him, in addition to other forces, for an attack upon 
Chattanooga. To provide against such a contingency, the 
two divisions of the Fourth Corps in East Tennessee were 
ordered to be constantly ready for quick movement to support 
General Thomas. On the 3d, Wagner's brigade of Sheridan's 
division was moved to Calhoun, Tennessee, to relieve the first 
brigade of the first division of cavalry, Colonel Campbell 



24 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

commanding, that it mighl take post at Cleveland. Five days 
l ater Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding second brigade 
of Davis' division, was ordered to Lee and Gordon's Mills, to 
Qgt h to the front, and observe the enemy upon a line 
;,,- former approach. The Bame day, Colonel Harrison was 
driven fromLeet's tanyard bya strong force of cavalry. Tins 
advance, coupled with rumors that Johnston had been joined 
by ten thousand men from South Carolina and by Eoddy's 
cavalry, thai Longstreet's cavalry was in motion toward him, 

and thai his ti ps were under orders to carry three days' 

rations on their persons, intensified somewhat the apprehen- 

that an offensive movement was meditated. There were 

hanges of troops, however, except that McCook's division 

avalry was ordered to Cleveland, since it was not yet 

deemed safe to withdraw the Fourth Corps from East Ten- 

e, as Longstreet's action was still uncertain. 

On the 17th of March, General Grant, having been appointed 

lieutenant-general, in command of the entire army, advised 

r.i I Tli* »mas that Major-General W. T. Sherman had been 

jned to the command of the Military Division of the Mis- 

ppi. The assumption of general command by General 

• gave the contemplated campaign into Georgia a closer 

relation to operations against General Lee's army in Virginia 

than had previously existed between movements east and 

Soon after his assignment to the command of the military 
division, General Sherman went to Chattanooga to confer with 
General Thomas with regard to future movements. At this 
conference, General Thomas suggested that the armies of the 
Tennessee and Ohio, under the respective commands of Major- 
Generals McPherson and Schofield, should demonstrate against 
Johnston's position before Dalton, by the direct roads to Buz- 
zard's Roost, and from Cleveland, while he should throw the 
entire Army of the Cumberland through Snake Creek Gap, 
which he knew to be unguarded, and fall upon Johnston's 
communications between Dalton and Resaca, and thereby 
t urn his position completely, and either force him to retreat to- 
ward the cast, through a diihcult country poorly supplied with 
provisions and forage, with a strong probability of the total 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 25 

disorganization of liis army, or attack him, in which event he 
felt confident of being able to beat him, especially as he hoped 
to gain position in his rear before he should be aware of his 
movement. General Sherman objected to this suggestion, for 
the reason that he desired the Army of the Cumberland to 
form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rally- 
ing point from which the two wings, the armies of the Ten- 
nessee and Ohio, could operate. 

The union of the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, 
and Ohio in a campaign from Chattanooga as a base, having 
been determined upon, preparations of the grandest dimen- 
sions possible were at once inaugurated with vigor. The most 
difficult problem was that of supplies. Its solution turned 
upon the capacity of a single railroad track from Stevenson to 
Chattanooga, and thence toward Atlanta. There was steam- 
boat transportation from Bridgeport to Chattanooga; but 
there was dependence alone upon the track from the former 
place to Stevenson. As the accumulation of supplies at Chat- 
tanooga had hitherto been slight, General Sherman restricted 
railroad transportation to dead freight, and forbade passage to 
citizens or private property. He also forbade the further issue 
of rations to the destitute citizens of the country. The peo- 
ple complained of these measures ; but such was the necessity 
for the accumulation of supplies, that he persisted in their 
maintenance, against the protests of the citizens, remon- 
strances from Washington, and what under other circum- 
stances would have been the demands of humanity. 

During the month of April, again, as before the battles in 
^November, Chattanooga was the scene of the greatest activity. 
Troops were constantly coming up from the rear and moving 
to position in the front. The quartermaster and commissary 
departments were pressed to extreme exertion building steam- 
boats, erecting and filling vast storehouses, bringing forward 
artillery and cavalry horses, mules, and cattle ; while the rail- 
way was almost constantly trembling under the long trains 
heavily loaded with supplies and munitions. 

General Johnston, in the meantime, was not idle, though he 
was restrained in his preparation for an offensive movement, 
which it was expected in the South he would be able to make 



26 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

in Buch force as to change the theater of war again to the 
N,.rth. Be waited for preparation for well-sustained aggres- 
Bion, and thus lost an opportunity for partial success. Cleve- 
land was the w.ak point in he national line. General Thomas 
1 not hold this vital point strongly while the Fourth Corps 
remained with General Schofield, and this corps could not be 
sat'clv withdrawn until it was known that Longstreet had 
abandoned East Tennessee. But before Johnston was well 
prepared even for defense, the opportunity was lost for forcing 
any concentration of troops which was not required by Gen- 
eral Sherman's plan of operations. General Johnston was 
fully alive to the importance of successful aggression to change 
the tone of feeling in the South, and sought such reinforce- 
ments as he thought were necessary. A little later he learned 
that he needed more troops than were available in all the 
South, upon the plan of defense which was adopted. In the 
light of subsequent events, it is plain that in failing to give 
adequate reinforcements to Johnston, while General Grant's 
armies were widely separated and weakened by the temporary 
absence of veteran regiments, the Confederate authorities at 
Richmond rendered impossible the aggression for which they 
subsequently clamored. In December previous, General Beau- 
regard suggested, as the only hope of success, that Richmond 
and other important places should be fortified and garrisoned 
for defense, and that an immense army should be concentrated 
against Grant, at Chattanooga, or thrown in bold offense from 
Knoxville. Later, General Johnston's suggestions were some- 
what similar, but were unheeded by Mr. Davis and his advis- 
ers. The Western army remained in diffusion, until concen- 
t rat ion, as a necessity of defense rather than a condition of 
ion, was hurriedly effected. Longstreet's army was 
sent to General Lee, and from all of the troops that so long 
menaced Knoxville, only Martin's division of cavalry joined 
General Johnston ; while almost all the national troops that 
wintered in East Tennessee were free to join the combination 
again-! him. The impracticable President had entertained 
visions of successful aggression from Dalton, but had been, 
from choice or necessity, so sparing in provision for such enter- 
prise, that the thought of it, except in wildest vagary, could 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 27 

not be entertained. To require Johnston to advance with less 
than fifty thousand men against a combination of armies, 
which in defense would greatly exceed one hundred thousand, 
was to exact defeat. The fact that the Confederate President 
did not discern this, revealed his incapacity as a revolutionary 
leader, and his subsequent criticisms of his ablest general, for 
the non-accomplishment of a palpable impossibility, manifested 
the inveteracy of his self-conceit and his utter misapprehen- 
sion of the situation in Georgia. His general had no choice 
of methods, but was confined to the defense of his positions 
between his enemy and the campaign region south of Resaca. 
Had he been able to assume the offensive, he could not have 
reached any vital point in the rear of Chattanooga, without a 
long detour, in dependence for supplies upon a devastated 
country, or on wagon transportation from a remote base. In 
his weakness and his restriction from movement by mountain 
barriers right and left, he could make no flank movements or 
threatening dashes, with infantry or cavalry ; and any expec- 
tation of a general advance from Dalton, except with an im- 
mense army, through East Tennessee or Northern Alabama, 
Bridgeport or Decatur — was groundless. 

Having now, from necessity, accepted the defensive, General 
Johnston could only make effort to embarrass Sherman's com- 
munications with his cavalry, and await the approach of the 
armies combining against him. He threw his cavalry into 
Northern Alabama, in constant menace, but accomplished no 
interruption to communications. General Thomas sent Gen- 
eral Geary, with two regiments and one piece of artillery, on 
a steamboat, to destroy the boats used by the cavalry in cross- 
ing and recrossing the river, as far to the west as possible. 
General Geary was only partially successful ; he destroyed a 
great many boats in going and coming, but was prevented by 
forces on each side of the river from going a great distance. 

On the 29th of April, a tentative advance was made by Gen- 
eral Baird, having reference to the general movement of the 
united armies. He sent three hundred cavalry, under General 
Kilpatrick, supported by Vanderveer's brigade, to feel the ene- 
my's position at Tunnel Hill. These troops encountered the 
enemy and drove him some distance, when developing a greatly 



28 OPERATIONS FHOM .JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

guperior fur-,, they were compelled to withdraw. At Davis' 
house the enemy pressed them, when they turned and repulsed 

him handsomely. The clay following, General Johnston gave 
indications of greater strength in front of Ringgold, and Gen- 
eral Thomas instructed General Baird to call upon General 
Johnson for help in the event of an advance against Ins posi- 

During the month, important changes were made in the 
Army of the Cumberland. The reorganization of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Corps having been of recent date, they remained 
intact, excepl Borne changes in general officers. On the 11th, 
the cavalry, under the general command of Brigadier-General 
\V. L. Elliott, was organized into four divisions; Colonel Ed- 
ward McCook,and Brigadier-Generals Kennard Garrard, Jud- 
bod Kilpatrick, and A. C. Gillem, commanding respectively, ac- 
C( irding to numerical designation. There were three brigades 

each division, and an average of three regiments in each 
bri gade. On the 15th, orders were received from Washington, 
requiring the consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps 
as the Twentieth, under the command of Major-General 
Hooker. Major-General Gordon Granger was relieved from 
the command of the Fourth Corps, and Major-General 0. 0. 
Howard assigned, and Major-General P. H. Sheridan having 
transferred to the Army of the Potomac, Major-General 
John Newton was assigned to the position made vacant by his 
vacation of the command of the Second division, Fourth Corps. 

There were now in the Army of the Cumberland a large num- 
ber of re-enlisted troops. During the winter and spring there 
re-enlisted eighty-eight regiments of infantry, three of mounted 
infantry, sixteen of cavalry, eighteen batteries of artillery, and 
twenty-six detachments of all arms, and eight thousand one 
hundred and thirty-six recruits in the aggregate were added to 
these organizations while on furlough. The importance of the 
n -enlistment of these troops can not be overestimated. With- 
out them and the " veterans " of the other tw T o co-operative 
armies, the Atlanta campaign could not have been safely un- 
dertaken ; the war v T ould have been greatly postponed, and its 
issue might have been different. The slow movement of the 
draft, and the provisional measure of short enlistments could 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 29 

not have furnished such troops as were demanded in the spring 
of 18C4. Without the veterans, aggression could not have 
been entertained, and the feeble armies, during the summer, 
might have been compelled to relax their grasp upon the heart 
of the rebellious states. It is then the plainest duty of the his- 
torian to mention the regiments and other organizations, whose 
members, in whole or in part, re-enlisted as " veteran volun- 
teers," and ever after bore the grandest name which the war 
originated. Of the regiments and batteries whose organization 
was maintained under re-enlistment, were the Thirteenth, Fif- 
teenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-sixth, 
Thirty-first, Thirty-third, Thirty-sixth, Fortieth, Forty-first, 
Forty-ninth, Fifth-first, Fifty-fifth, Sixty-first, Sixty-fifth, 
Sixty-ninth, Seventy-first, Seventy-fourth, and Eighty-second 
Ohio Infantry ; the First, Third, and Fourth Ohio Cavalry, and 
batteries " B," " C," " F," and " G," First Ohio Artillery; the 
Twenty-second, Thirtieth, Thirty -first, Thirty -fifth, Fortieth, 
Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Fifty-first, Fifty-seventh and 
Fifty-eighth Indiana Infantry ; Seventy-ninth Mounted Infan- 
try, and Thirteenth Indiana battery; the Tenth, Twenty-first, 
Thirty-sixth, Thirty-eighth, Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Fifty- 
first, Fifty-ninth, and Sixtieth Illinois Infantry, and batteries 
» H "and " I," Second Illinois Artillery ; the Fourth, Eighteenth, 
Twenty -first, and Twenty -third Kentucky Infantry ; the Sec- 
ond, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, and the 
Twenty-eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry ; the Forty-sixth, 
Seventy-third, Seventy-ninth, and One Hundred and Ninth 
Pennsylvania Infantry, and the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry ; 
the Forty -fifth, Fifty-eighth, and Sixtieth New York Infantry, 
and the New York Independent Battery; the Tenth and Thir- 
teenth Michigan Infanty ; the Fourteenth Michigan Mounted 
Infantry, and the First Michigan battery ; the Thirteenth Wis- 
consin Infantry, and the Fifth Wisconsin battery ; the Fif- 
teenth Missouri Infantry, and battery "G," First Missouri 
Artillery ; the Second Minnesota Infantry ; the Fifth Iowa 
Cavalry ; the Eighth Kansas Infantry, and Third Maryland In- 
fantry. Of the detachments, there were representatives in greater 
or less numbers from the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, Eighteenth, 
and Twenty-fourth Ohio Infantry, and the Tenth Independent 



30 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864 



battery; the Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty- 
nth Indiana Infantry; the Twenty-first, Twenty-second, 
and Twenty-seventh Illinois Infantry, and battery " C," First 
Illinois Artillery ; the Eighth Kentucky Infantry ; the Seventy- 
Q i n th Pennsylvania Infantry; batteries « F " and "M/'New 
Fork Artillery; the Firsl Michigan Engineers, and battery 
■ • i;.' Firsl Michigan Artillery; the Third Wisconsin battery ; 
the Firsl Missouri Engineers; the Tenth Maine Infantry, and 
battery "3," Maine Artillery; battery " F," Fourth United 
I rtillery, and battery «K," Fifth United States Artil- 
lery. 

On the Ls1 of May, the Army of the Cumberland was well 
in hand, awaiting orders to advance. The Fourth Corps, 
Major-General 0. 0. Howard commanding, was at Cleveland. 
The Fourteenth, Major-General J. M. Palmer commanding, 
was before Chattanooga, and the Twentieth Corps, Major- 
Gteneral Joseph Hooker commanding, was mainly in Lookout 
valley. The divisions of the Fourth Corps, in numerical 
order, were commanded by Major-Generals D. S. Stanley and 
.! i >hn Newton and Brigadier-General T. J. Wood ; those of the 
Fourteenth, Brigadier-Generals R. W. Johnson, J. C. Davis, 
and A. Baird, and those of the Twentieth, Brigadier-General 
A. S. Williams and J. "W*. Geary and Major-Generals D. But- 
terfield and Lovell H. Rousseau. The division of the latter, 
and other troops of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, assigned 
as garrisons, comprising thirty-two regiments of infantry, nine 
of cavalry, and thirty-nine batteries, were disposed at all im- 
portant points from Chattanooga to Nashville, on the direct 
road, and at Clarksville and Fort Donelson. The cavalry 
comprised four divisions, under Brigadier- General W. L. Elli- 
ott — the first, Colonel MeCook commanding, was with the 
Fourth Corps, at Cleveland; the second under Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Garrard, was ordered to report to General McPherson, 
commanding the Army of the Tennessee ; the third under Brig- 
adier-General Kilpatrick, was at Ringgold, and the Fourth, 
onder Brigadier-General Gillem, was at Nashville. The army 
for the field comprised 54,568 infantry, 3,238 cavalry, and 2,377 
artillery, with L30 guns; total, 60,773 effective men. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 31 



Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, Major- General George 
H. Thomas commandinq, April, 18(14. / f> 

Fourth Army Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL O. 0. HOWARD commanding. 

First Division. 
Major-General D. S. Stanley commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 
Gen. Charles Cruet commanding. Gen. W. C. Whittaker commanding. 

1st Kentucky Infantry. 21st Kentucky Infantry. 

2d " " 35th Indiana " 

21st Illinois Infantry. 84th " « 

38th " " 40th Ohio " 

31st Indiana " 51st " « 

81st " " 99th " « 

90th Ohio " 96th Illinois " 

101st " " 115th " « 

Third Brigade. 
Colonel Wm. Grose commanding. 
9th Indiana Infantry. 
30th " " 

36th " " 

59th Illinois " 
75th " « 

80th " " 

84th " " 

77th Pennsylvania Infantry. 

Artillery. 
6th Indiana Battery. Battery " B," Independent Penn. 

Second Division. 
Major-General John Newton commanding. 



First Brigade. 
Col. P. T. Sherman commanding. 
2d Missouri Infantry. 
15th " " 

24th "Wisconsin " 
28th Kentucky " 
36th Illinois " 
44th « " 

73d " « 

74th " « 

88th " * 



Second Brigade. 
Gen. G. D. Wagner commanding. 
40th Indiana Infantry. 
57th " " 

26th Ohio " 

97th " « 

100th Illinois " 






32 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

Third Brigade. 
Colonel C. G. Ra*XX& commanding. 

3d Kentucky Infantry. 
64th Ohio " 

65th " " 

125th " " 

22(1 Illinois " 

27th " " 

4-Jd " 

51st " " 

79th " " 

Artillery. 
Battery " G," 1st Missouri. Battery " M," 1st Illinois. 

Third Division. 
Brigadier-General T. J. "Wood commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

General A. Willich commanding. General W. B. Hazen commanding. 

8th Kansas Infantry. 1st Ohio Infantry. 

15th "Wisconsin Infantry. 6th " " 

15th Ohio " 41st " 

49th " " 93d « 

32d Indiana " 124th Ohio " 

25th Illinois " 5th Kentucky Infantry. 

35th " " 6th " " 

89th " " 23d " " 

Cth Indiana " 

Third Brigade. 
General Samuel Beatty commanding. 
9th Kentucky Infantry. 
17th " " 

13th Ohio " 

19th " " 

59th " " 

79th Indiana " 
86th " " 

Artillery. 
Gth Ohio Battery. Bridge's Illinois Light Battery. 

Fourteenth Army Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. PALMER commanding. 

I-irst Division. 
Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanding. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 33 



First Brigade. 
General W. P. Carlin commanding. 
2d Ohio Infantry. 
33d " 

94th " " 

10th Wisconsin Infantry. 
15th Kentucky " 

38th Indiana " 

42d " " 

88th " " 

104th Illinois " 



Second Brigade. 
General J. H. King commanding. 
15th U. S. Infantry, 1st Battalion. 
15th " 



16th 
18th 
18th 
19th 



2d 
1st 
1st 
2d 
1st 



11th Michigan Infantry. 
19th Illinois " 

69th Ohio Infantry. 



Third Brigade. 
Colonel Jas. M. Neibling commanding. 
1st "Wisconsin Infantry. 
21st " 
21st Ohio 
74th " 
24th Illinois 
37th Indiana 
78th Pennsylvania Infantry. 
79th " " 

Artillery. 
Battery "A," 1st Michigan. Battery " C," 1st Illinois. 

Second Division. 
Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis commanding. 



First Brigade. 
Gen. J. D. Morgan commanding. 
10th Illinois Infantry. 
16th " " 

60th " " 

10th Michigan " 
14th " " 



Second Brigade. 
Col. John G. Mitchell commanding 
98th Ohio Infantry. 
108th " " 

113th " " 

121st " " 

34th Illinois « 
78th " « 



Third Brigade. 
Colonel Dan. McCook commanding. 
52d Ohio Infantry. 
85th Illinois Infantry. 
86th " " 

110th " " 

125th " " 

22d Indiana " 
VOL. II— 3 



34 OPERATIONS FROM J LNTTARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

'tery. 
2d Minnesota Battery. Battery " I," 2d Illinois. 

5th Wisconsin Battery. 

Third Division. 
Brigadier-General A. Baird commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

Gen. J. B. TriuHix commanding. Col. P. Vandeeveer commanding. 

11th Ohio Infantry. 2d Minnesota Infantry. 

17th a (i 9th Ohio Infantry. 

31st « " 35th » 

3 6t h » " 105th Ohio " 

ggjk a « 75th Indiana Infantry. 

92d " " 87th " " 

82d Indiana Infantry. 101st " " 

Third Brigade. 

Colonel Geo. P. Este commanding. 

4th Kentucky Infantry. 



10th « 




ii 


18th " 




ii 


10th Indiana 




ii 


74th 




ii 


14th Ohio 




a 


38th " 




it 


92d Illinois 




a 


Artillery. 




r y- 


19th Indiana Battery. 



7th Indiana Battery 

Twentieth Army Corps. 
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER commanding. 

Company " K," 15th Illinois Cavalry. 
Independent Company, 8th 1ST. Y. Infantry. 

First Division. 
Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

Gen. Joseph Knipe commanding. Gen. Thos. H. Ruger commanding 

3d Maryland Infantry. 2d Massachusetts Infantry. 

20th Connecticut Infantry (5). 3d Wisconsin " 

4Cth Pennsylvania " 13th New Jersey " 

123d New York " 27th Indiana " 

141st " " " 107th New York « 

150th " " " 

* Absent on veteran furlough. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 35 

Third Brigade. 
Generae H. Tyndale commanding. 
61st Ohio Infantry. 
82d " " 

45th New York Infantry. 
143d " " " 

82d Illinois Infantry. 
101st " " 

Artillery. 
Battery " M," 1st New York. Battery " I," 1st New York. 

Second Division. 
Brigadier-General John W. Geary commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

Col. Charles Candy commanding. Col. A. Buschbeck commanding. 

5th Ohio Infantry. 27th Pennsylvania Infantry. 

7th " " 73d " " 

29th " " 109th " " 

66th " " 33d New Jersey " 

28th Pennsylvania Infantry. 119th New York u 

147th " " 134th " " " 

154th " " " 

Third Brigade. 
Colonel D. Ireland commanding. 
29th Pennsylvania Infantry. 
111th " " 

60th New York " 

78th " " " 

102d " " " 

137th " • " " 

149th " " " 

Artillery. 
Battery "E," Independent Pennsylvania. 13th New York Battery. 

Third Division. 
Major-General D. Butterfield commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

General W. T. Ward commanding. Colonel John Coburn commanding. 

70th Indiana Infantry. 5th Connecticut Infantry. 

79th Ohio " 20th " " 

102d Illinois " 19th Michigan " 

105th " " 22d Wisconsin " 

129th « " 33d Indiana " 

85th " « 



36 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

Third Brigade. 
Colonel J. Wood, Jr., commanding. 
26th "Wisconsin Infantry. 
33d Massachusetts " 
55th Ohio " 

73d " " 

136th New York " 

Artillery. 
Battery " C," 1st Ohio Artillery. Battery " I," 1st Michigan Artillery. 

Fourth Division. 
Major-General L. II. Rousseau commanding. 

First Brigade. 
General R. S. Granger commanding. 
10th Tennessee Infantry 
13th Wisconsin " 
18th Michigan " 

73d Indiana " 

102d Ohio " 

Not Brigaded. 
68th New York Infantry. 83d Illinois Infantry. 

68th " " 71st Ohio « 

75th Pennsylvania " 106th " " 

23d Missouri " 115th " " 

31st Wisconsin " 

Artillery. 

9th Ohio Battery. 20th Indiana Battery. 

Cavalry. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. L. ELLIOTT commanding. 
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, attached to Department Headquarters. 
First Division. 
Colonel E. M. McCook commanding. 
First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

Col. A P. Campbell commanding. Col. 0. H. La Grange commanding, 

1st Tennessee Cavalry. 1st Wisconsin Cavalry. 

2d Michigan " 2d Indiana « 

8th Iowa " 4th " " 

Tfdrd Brigade. 

Colonel L. D. Watkins commanding. 

4th Kentucky Cavalry. 

6th " « 

7th " " 

18th Indiana Battery. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 37 

Second Division. 
Brigadier-General K. Garrard commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

Col. Wm. B. Sipes commanding. Colonel R. H. G. Minty commanding. 

4th U. S. Cavalry. 1st Ohio Cavalry. 

7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 3d " 

4th Michigan Cavalry. 4th " 

Third Brigade. 
Colonel A. O. Miller commanding. 
17th Indiana Mounted Infantry. 
72d 

98th Illinois " " 

123d " " " 

Chicago Board of Trade Battery. 

Third Division. 
Colonel "W. W. Lowe commanding. 
First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

5th Iowa Cavalry. 8th Indiana Cavalry. 

9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 2d Kentucky " 

3d Indiana Cavalry (1 battal.) 10th Ohio 

Third Brigade. 

3d Kentucky Cavalry. 

5th " " 

Fourth Division. 

Brigadier-General A. C. Gillem commanding. 

First Brigade. Second Brigade. 

2d Tennessee Cavalry. 5th Tennessee Cavalry. 

3d u ii *10th " " 

4th " " * 12th " " 

Third Brigade. 
«8th Tennessee Cavalry. 
*9th " " 

*13th " " 

Unassigned Troops. 
10th Ohio Infantry, Department Headquarters, 
1st " Sharpshooters, " 

9th Michigan Infantry. 
1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics; headquarters at Bridgeport, Ala. 



* Not mustered. 



38 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

i . 
Garrison of Chattanooga. 
General Jas. B. Steedman commanding. 

First Separate Brigade. 
8th Kentucky Infantry. 3d Ohio Infantry. 

16th Indiana " 24th" " 

29th " " 44th Indiana Infantry. 

51st " " 68th " " 

■ ncer Brigade. Pioneer Brigade. 

18th Ohio Infantry, Chattanooga. Tenn. 1st Battalion, Chattanooga, Tenn. 

18th Michigan " " " 2d " " " 

21st " " " " Pontoon " " " 

22d " " " " 58th Indiana Infantry. 

Artillery, 

Reserve Artillery. 
First Division. Second Division. 

Battery "F," 4th U. S. Art. Battery " A," 1st Ohio Art. 

a ttQ >> it (i ii (i ].' ii u a 

II II JJ " 11 11 11 11 Q. II II II 

ii ii 3J" ii ii ii ii jyj ii ii ii 

" "H," 5th U.S. " 18th Ohio Battery. 

" "K," " " 1st Kentucky Battery. 

Garrison Artillery. 

Chattanooga, Tenn 
4th Indiana Battery. 3d Wisconsin Battery. 

8th " " 20th Ohio " 

10th " " Battery "I," 1st Ohio Artillery. 

Hth " " « "C," 1st Wisconsin Heavy Art. 

Battery " K," 1st Michigan Artillery. 

Bridgeport, Ala. 
Battery " E, 1st Ohio Artillery. Battery " B," 1st Ohio Artillery. 

Stevenson, Ala. 
Battery " K," 1st Ohio Artillery. 

Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
Battery " D," 1st Michigan Artillery. 12th Ohio Battery. 

8th Wisconsin Battery. 

Naahville, Tenn. 
12th Indiana Battery. Battery «C," 1st Tennessee Artillery. 

Battery " E," 1st Michigan Artillery. « » D » « u 

" " I," 4th U. S. Artillery. " « iy> " «( 

Fort Donelson, Tenn. 
Battery " C," 2d Illinois Artillery. 

Clarksville, Tenn. 
Battery "H," 2d Illinois Artillery. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 39 

Detached Artillery. 
10th Wisconsin Battery, Calhoun, Tenn. 
13th Indiana Battery, Gallatin, Tenn. 
21st Indiana Battery, Columbia, Tenn. 

1st Kansas Battery, Waverly, Tennessee (N. & N. W. R. R.) 
2d Kentucky Battery, Tullahoma, Tenn. 
Battery "A," 1st Tennessee Artillery, La Vergne, Tenn. 

Colored Troops. 
12th IT. S. Colored Troops, "Waverly, Tenn. (N. & N. W. R. R.) 
13th U. S. Colored Troops, Waverly, Tenn. (N. & N. W. R. R.) 
14th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn. 
15th U. S. Colored Troops, Nashville, Tenn. 
16th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tennesee (era route). 
17th U. S. Colored Troops, Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
42d U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn. 
44th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Battery "A," 1st U. S. Colored Light Artillery. 



Knoxville, January 31, 1864 — 2 p. M. 
■General Geo. H. Thomas, Chattanooga : 

I am preparing to take the offensive. To do do this with effect, in the 
face of Longstreet's reinforcements, will require at least ten thousand 
infantry from you. In addition, that you place working gangs on the 
road to the Hiawassee bridge, so as to increase our supplies, which may 
be boated over the Tennessee, at Loudon, and afterward sent by rail to 
this place. I also require a pontoon train of twelve hundred feet 
length. Colonel Babcock will come down in the first boat, to attend to 
this. The cavalry from Atlanta is reported to be moving into East 
Tennessee, through North Carolina. Seven regiments started on the 
13th instant. Please telepraph what is the extent of the assistance you 

can give me 

J. G. FOSTER, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Nashville, Tenn., February 6, 1864 — 2.30 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed 
most of his force from your front, two divisions going to Longstreet. 
Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the East. This makes it 
evident that they intend to secure East Tennessee, if they can, and I 
intend to drive them out, or get whipped this month. For this purpose, 
you will have to detach at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's 
division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chat- 
tanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary to 



40 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery- 
horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each one 
hundred men should also be taj -m, if you have them to spare. Let me 

know how soon you can start. 

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT. 

Nashville, February 10, 1864. 

-General Thomas: 

Prepare to start for Knoxville on Saturday. I will order Logan to 

send to ''hattanooga all the troops he can, and still hold his line of the 

road. The number will probably be about five thousand men. One 

division of your command will have to move out to hold the road to the 

lliawassee. 

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT. 



Nashville, February 17, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas: 

Longstreet can not afford to place his force between Knoxville and the 
Tennessee. If he does, it will then be time to move against him. The 
work of a raid on the road can soon be repaired, if it can not be pre- 
vented. Make your contemplated move as soon as possible. 

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT. 



Chattanooga, Tenn., February 19, 1864. 
Major-General Grant, Nashville, Tenn. : 

Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, Sixth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, 
arrived here yesterday, from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon, 
Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition toward Rome. 
J I e reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill, Stewart's division between 
Tunnel Hill and Dalton; Walker, two miles out from Dalton, toward 
Spring Place; Cheatham at Dalton; and Stevenson's and Bate's divisions 
to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of the camps, and estimates 
their force between thirty and forty thousand. He moreover states that 
no troops have beon sent away, except one brigade of infantry, which 
wont to Rome, about the 1st of this month. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. 

Tunnell Hill, February 26, 1864 — 7 J p. m. 
Major-General U. S. Grant, Nashville : 

I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnson occupy the pass at 

ard's Roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who 

.mber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place 

jsault Genoral Palmer made the attempt to turn vesterday with 

Band's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, exclusive of 

their cavalry, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's Roost. 

After expending nearly all of his ammunition, he retired durin- the 

night, to Catoosa Platform. Our transportation is poor and limited ; we 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 41 

are not able to carry more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery horses 

so poor, that Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is 

stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is 

much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion 

of Cleburne's division has returned. I will wait the development of this 

dav, and advise you further. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. 



Nashville, February 27, 1864. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas : 

It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full 
belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended, until the 
fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies 
can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga 
and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours and 
General Howard's wagons; these can be replaced temporarily, by yours 
returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw 
reinforcements constantly to your front. Can General Schofield not also 
take a division from Howard's corps? It is intended to send Granger to 
you the moment Schofield is thought to be safe without him. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Major- General. 



Nashville, February 27 — 6 p. m. 
Brigadier-General Wliipple, Chief of Staff: 

Information has reached Washington, that orders have been given for 
Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any such 
movement and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams from Bridge- 
port and Stevenson, to send supplies to the front? They have teams in 
great numbers at those places. Every energy should be exerted to get 
supplies and reinforcements forward. Troops will leave here at the 
rate of two or three thousand a day, for the front. Many of them go to 

Chattanooga. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Major- General. 



Chattanooga, March 5, 1864 — 11 p. m. 
Major- General Schofield, Knoxville : 

I have just received reliable information that Johnston has been rein- 
forced by ten thousand men from South Carolina, and by Roddy, and 
that he contemplates making an offensive movement in this direction. 
Can you spare Granger's corps ? If so, please direct them to concentrate 
at Cleveland, leaving a brigade of infantry and battery at Calhoun, to 
guard the railroad at that place. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. 



42 OPEBATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 

Chattanooga, March 5, 18G4. 

ted to Major-General Thomas to-day, and also two days 
since that the enemy were heavily reinforcing at Dalton. General Grant 
thinks it is not improbable that he may advance against us here In 
that case we shall need the Fourth Corps, and wish you to hold it m 
read , , ,„i. if h be needed. Can not send you any assistance 

whUe *» " ti ^'"' y U hUnging ^ US> WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE, 

Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff. 

EXTB \< TS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOS. E. 

JOHNSTON. 
On the 17th of February, the President ordered me, by telegraph, to 
detach l.i.Mt,nan1>General Hardee with the infantry of his corps, except 
Qson'a division, to aid Lieutenant-General Polk, against Sherman 
in Mississippi. This order was obeyed as promptly as our means of trans- 
portation permitted. 

******* 
* m the 27th of February, I suggested to the executive by letter, through 
I that all preparations for a forward movement should be 
made without delay. In a letter, dated 4th of March, General Bragg 
desired me " to have all things ready at the earliest practicable moment, 
for the movement indicated." In replying, on the 12th, I reminded 
him that the regulations of the war department do not leave such prep- 
arations to commanders of troops, but to officers who receive their orders 
from Richmond. 

(in tli.- 18th, a letter was received from General Bragg, sketching 
a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used 
in them under me. I was invited to express my views on the subject. 
In doing so, both by telegraph and mail, I suggested modifications, and 
urged that the additional troops named should be sent immediately, to 
enable us, should the enemy advance, to beat him, and then move for- 
ward; or, should he not advance, do so ourselves. General Bragg replied, 
bj telegraph, on the 21st: "Your dispatch of 19th does not indicate 
ptance of plan proposed. Troops can only be drawn from other 
] points for advance. Upon your decision of that point, further action 
must depend. 

1 replied, by telegraph, on the 22d: "In my dispatch of the 19th, 
I expressly accepl taking offensive, only differ with you as to details. I 
me that the enemy will be prepared for an advance before we 
are, and will make it to our advantage. Therefore I propose, both 
for offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately." 
This was not noticed. Therefore, on the 25th, I again urged tho 
of reinforcing the Army of the Tennessee, because the enemy 
was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours 
was less than it had been then. 



OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 18G4. 43 

On the 8th of April, Colonel B. S. Ewell, A. A. G., was sent to Richmond, 
to represent to the President my wish to take the offensive, with proper 
means, and to learn his views. A few days after, Brigadier-General Pen- 
dleton arrived from Richmond, to explain to me the President's wishes 
on the subject. 1 explained to him the modification of the plan com- 
municated by General Bragg, which seemed to me essential, which re- 
quired that intended reinforcements should be sent to Dalton. I urged 
that this should be done without delay, because our present force was 
not sufficient even for defense, and to enable us to take the offensive, if 
the enemy did not. 

By Telegraph from Chattanooga, February 28, 1864. 
Major-General Grant, Nashville: 

General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line 
between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men 
will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should 
be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and De- 
catur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to 
protect that line. One thousand infantry will be sufficient to protect the 
line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication 
can be guarded by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a 
great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Ten- 
nessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the 
state. I believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and 
Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move 
along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far at least 
as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As 
soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad 
lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required 

to guard the bridges along the road. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. iS. V. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE COM- 
MITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval, 
and if obtained it was my intention (having acquired by the reconnoissance 
of February 23d, 24th, and 25th, a thorough knowledge of the approaches 
direct upon Dalton from Ringgold and Cleveland) to have made a strong 
demonstration against Buzzard's Roost, attracting Johnston's whole atten- 
tion to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and 
cavalry through Snake Creek Gap, upon his communications, which I had 
ascertained from scouts he had up to that time neglected to observe or 
guard. With this view, I had previously asked for the return to me of 
Granger's corps and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already 
initiated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon 
as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

The firsl of May, 1864, was a crisis of the war. Two of the 
largest armies hitherto assembled East or West were in read- 
ings to move against the enemy at the bidding of the Lieu- 
tenant-General. The local objectives of these armies were 
distinct, but the common general object was the immediate 
suppression of the rebellion. It was proposed to accomplish 
this grand aim, by crushing General Lee's army covering 
Richmond and General Johnston's standing before Dalton. 
These two armies embodied the life of the rebellion. 

Generals Grant and Sherman were to move on lines too re- 
mote tn admit direct co-operation, but they proposed to be 
unit nally helpful by simultaneous aggression. General Grant 
was to turbid the transfer of troops from Virginia to Georgia, 
by vigor of attack, and General Sherman was to engage John- 
ston in such a manner that he could not send supporting col- 
umns from Georgia to Virginia. Volunteers were invited for 
hundred days, to hold the important points in the rear of 
the two great armies, that all the available veteran troops 
East might be massed against General Lee, and all in the "West 
concentrated at Chattanooga, that General Sherman, with three 
armies in one, should dash upon General Johnston at Dalton. 
Campaigns, East or West, had never been undertaken under 
conditions of similar promise, and the loyal people were hope- 
ful of caily and complete success. 

The conditions of the Georgia campaign were exceedingly 

rable to General Sherman, as compared with the ruling 

features of all preceding campaigns in the central theater of 

war. The superiority of the national army at Chattanooga 

(44) 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 45 

had been far greater than in any previous battle in this region, 
and in some of the anterior engagements, as at CMckamauga, 
the enemy had been superior. But General Sherman's pre- 
ponderance of strength was greater than General Grant's when 
General Bragg was hurled from Lookout Mountain and Mis- 
sionary Ridge. Then the strength of the opposing armies was 
perhaps as three to two ; it was now to be as two to one. Be- 
sides, General Johnston could not now have, as his predecessor 
had always had, when on the defensive, the advantage of inte- 
rior lines. The possession of Chattanooga and Cleveland, 
with roads converging at Dalton, gave direct lines for General 
Sherman's first advance, and with the railroad and river from 
Knoxville to Decatur well guarded, and a fortified line of sup- 
ply from the north, he could move southward without endan- 
gering flank or rear, so long as he could so engage the enemy 
as to keep him before him. In the projected campaign, neither 
General Sherman nor General Johnston could have the ad- 
vantage of interior lines, only so far as the defensive could 
give to either, shorter lines for maneuver and array, within a 
limited range only. The general line of maneuver being 
north and south, forbade great advantage of lines to either. 

But General Johnston had other advantages. He had 
choice of positions and could always resist behind battlements 
with good management, and in giving ground would be con- 
stantly gathering to him his reserves ; while General Sherman, 
in advancing, would be compelled to detach more and more 
from his offensive forces to guard his constantly lengthening 
line of supply. So, therefore, the relative conditions of the 
campaign were by no means expressed by the comparative pro- 
portions of the opposing armies. 

The 2d clay of May was first named by General Grant for 
the advance of the great armies, but finally the 5th was 
announced in orders. General Thomas, however, commenced 
his dispositions and movements on the 2d. On this day, Gen- 
eral Davis' division joined General Baird's at Ringgold, and 
General Butterfielcl's advanced from Lookout valley to Lee 
and Gordon's Mills. During the day, General Baird sent 
infantry and cavalry detachments to reconnoiter toward Tun- 
nel Hill, and developed the enemy in force at that point. 



.{,; THE TUENING OF DALTOX. 

May 3d General Johnson's division closed upon the other two 
;,,•„„. Fourteenth Corps a1 Ringgold. On the day following, 
the Fourth Corps, with McCook's division of cavalry on its 
lefl „,, lk advanced to Catoosa Springs, and Butterfield's 
division advanced to Pleasant Grove, and General Williams' 
divi8 ion to Lee and Gordon's Mills. The next day, General 
Geary's division, having marched across the mountain from 
Bridgeport, closed up od the other divisions of the Twentieth 
Corps :l t Leet's tanyard, completing the concentration of the 
\ru.v of the Cumberland. 

Q eral Sherman originally designed that the Army of the 
Tennessee, Major-< General McPherson commanding, should ad- 
vance from Decatur by Gunter's Landing and Lebanon, Ala- 
bama, to Lafayette, Georgia ; but subsequently, he ordered it to 
move upon ( Jhattanooga. This army was not as strong as had 
been anticipated, as two of its veteran divisions under General 
A. .I. Smith were detained bythe protraction of General Banks' 
expedition west of the Mississippi river. With two corps, 
General McPherson attained position at Lee and Gordon's 
Mills on the 6th, and the same day the Army of the Ohio, Ma- 
j 1 1 p-General Schofield commanding, reached Red Clay. At the 
close of this day the armies representing the controlling 
b1 rength of the contending powers in the West, lay confronting 
each other on the eve of one of the greatest campaigns of a 
war, made memorable in the annals of the world by the 
magnitude of armies, the frequency of great battles, and im- 
mense compass of military operations. 

General Sherman's three armies for offense now numbered 
nearly one hundred thousand men. There were sixty thou- 
sand seven hundred and seventy-three men in the Army of 
the Cumberland; twenty-four thousand and sixty-five in the 
Army of the Tennessee ; and thirteen thousand five hundred 
and fifty-nine in the Army of the Ohio. The Army of the 
Cumberland comprised fifty -four thousand five hundred and 
sixty-eighl infantry, two thousand three hundred and seventy- 
Beven artillery, three thousand two hundred and twenty-eight 
cavalry, and one hundred and thirty guns; the Army of the 
Tennessee, twenty-two thousand infantry, one thousand four 
hundred and four artillery, six hundred and twenty-four cav- 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 47 

airy, and ninety-six guns ; and the Army of the Ohio, eleven 
thousand one hundred and eighty-three infantry, six hundred 
and seventy-nine artillery, one thousand six hundred and 
ninety-seven cavalry, and eighty -two guns. The grand aggre- 
gates were eighty-eight thousand one hundred and eighty- 
eight infantry, four thousand four hundred and sixty artillery, 
five thousand five hundred and forty-nine cavalry, and two 
hundred and fifty-four guns. General Johnston's army em- 
braced forty-four thousand nine hundred infantry, artillery, 
and cavalry ; two corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals 
Hardee and Hood, and four thousand cavalry, by Major-Gen- 
eral "Wheeler. 

General Sherman proposed first to carry Tunnel Hill, and 
then threaten a direct attack upon Johnston's main position 
before Dalton, while McPherson's army should move through 
Snake Creek Gap to operate against Resaca. He accordingly 
gave orders, May 6th, requiring General Thomas, on the day 
following, to move his center, the Fourteenth Corps, directly 
upon Tunnel Hill ; his right, the Twentieth Corps, to Trickum, 
and his left, the Fourth Corps, to Lee's house, in support of the 
Fourteenth : General McPherson to advance with his army 
first upon Ship's Gap and Villanow, and thence to Snake Creek 
Gap, and through it as soon as practicable ; and General Scho- 
field to move forward to Catoosa Springs, feeling toward Gen- 
eral Thomas' left flank. 

The Army of the Cumberland moved on the 7th, in com- 
pliance with orders. The enemy made a show of resistance to 
General Palmer, with infantry and artillery, at Tunnel Hill, 
but on the appearance of General Howard's corps upon his 
left, his troops fled to Buzzard's Roost. General Hooker, upon 
reaching Trickum, threw out detachments toward Buzzard's 
Roost on the left, and Villanow on the right, to observe the 
enemy. General Kilpatrick's cavalry remained at Gordon's 
Springs, in readiness to establish communications with the 
Army of the Tennessee, expected at Villanow on the morning 
of the 8th. 

The next day, Harker's brigade of Kewton's division of 
the Fourth Corps advanced along Rocky Face ridge to a 
point within a mile and a half of the enemy's signal station. 



48 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

Meeting h< to with obstructions forbidding farther advance, 
Barkermade preparations to bold the position. Skirmish 
lines were then thrown forward from Wood's, Davis', and 
Butterfield'e divisions, and the enemy was pressed into his in- 
trenchments at Buzzard's Roost, or " Mill Creek Gap,"* and 
the three divisions advanced to the entrance. 

A.e < General McPherson was now 7 moving upon Snake Creek 
< i;i].. it was imperative that a strong feint should be made, to 
create the impression that it w T as the intention to carry the 
p< .sition 1 >y assault. Accordingly, General Geary was directed 
to scale Chattooga Mountain with his division, if practi- 
cable, at the point known as Dug Gap, where the road from 
Lafayette to Dalton ascends from Mill Creek valley. Chat- 
tooga Mountain is separated from Rocky Face ridge by Mill 
Creek at Buzzard's Roost, and from that point trends south- 
ward. 

At the point selected for Geary's ascent, the mountain side 
is steep and rough, and the summit is crowned with a palisade 
of rocks, with occasional openings that admit passage to the 
top. With the One Hundred and Nineteenth New York de- 
]. loved as skirmishers, and Buschbeck's and Candy's brigades 
formed on right and left, in two lines of battle, Geary moved 
up the mountain. Midway, his skirmishers became hotly en- 
gaged,but the enemy w T as pressed upward until the main lines 
reached the base of the palisades. After resting for a few 
minutes, to recover from the exhaustion produced by excessive 
heat and protracted exertion, an effort was made to reach the 
summit. A few men only succeeded, and they were either 
killed or forced back. The position was such that defense 
was easy, even by rolling stones from the summit. A second 
attempt, however, was made, soon after the first failed, but 
with similar issue. General Geary, then brought McGilPs 
rifled battery to bear upon the enemy in his front, to cover an 
effort of the Thirty-third New Jersey to reach the summit a 
half mile to the right, where the enemy made less show of 
strength. As in the other cases, a few men gained the crest, 
and their shouts invited the advance of the whole line, but 

* So designated by General Johnston. 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 49 

again there was emphatic failure. By this time, General 
Hardee was present with reinforcements, and further effort 
would have been madness. Geary "ost heavily, hut his action 
being regarded by the enemy as the initiative to carry the po- 
sition by assault, it was in some degree compensative, as such 
impression was the object of the movement. Night and the 
third repulse coming together, the division was withdrawn to 
the valley, out of reach of the enemy's guns. 

During the afternoon, Johnson's and Baird's divisions were 
advanced to Davis' support, and Butterfield's was ordered to 
join General Hooker. General Kilpatrick communicated with 
General McPherson, and then moved to Trickum. McCook's 
division was thrown on Schofield's left flank, to cover the ex- 
tremity of the general line, until General Stoneman should 
come up. The position for General Garrard's cavalry division 
was to be with General McPherson, but it was yet in the rear, 
en route from Pulaski, Tennessee. 

The next day, the Army of the Cumberland was somewhat 
heavily engaged on the east, north, and west of Buzzard's 
Boost. The action was intended as a feint, unless it should 
be ascertained that General Johnston was withdrawing his 
army. Such, however, was the position, by nature and art, 
that emphatic feints subjected the national forces to great ex- 
posure, and there was considerable loss throughout the line. 
The character of the feints may be inferred from the fact that 
General Johnston reported that five assaults upon "Bocky 
Face Mountain " were repulsed on the 9th of May. His 
troops holding Buzzard Boost were Stewart's and Bate's di- 
visions, supported by Stevenson's and Anderson's. The 
defenses for infantry were at right angles to the roads, and 
batteries, covered with abatis, were placed on the adjacent 
summits to throw a converging fire upon the valley, which 
was flooded by means of well-concealed dams. Carlin's bri- 
gade, supported by the remainder of Johnson's division, felt 
the enemy's lines on the west; Morgan's brigade of Davis' 
division, on the north, and Grose's brigade of Stanley's divis- 
ion, on the east. The loss in killed was slight, but a great 
many were wounded. The heaviest loss, in comparison with 
vol. n — 4 



50 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

the number of troops engaged, was in McCook's division on 
, xtreme Left. Under instructions from General Schofield, 
Colonel McCook made demonstrations on all the roads lead- 
in- t.. l):ilt..n «.ii tho east. Colonel La Grange, commanding 
hia second brigade, encountered Wheeler, with twenty-two 
hundred men,on the road from Varnell's Station. He was at 

first su< fill, and pressed Wheeler back to intrenclimcnts 

near Poplar Place, but was there repulsed with heavy loss. He 
and fourteen officers were captured, and one hundred and 
thirty-six of his men were cither killed, wounded, or captured. 
Wheeler's Loss was supposed to be greater. During the day, 
Hooker's corps was at Trickumto support McPherson in pass- 
ing through Snake Creek Gap. 

The action the next day was less severe, though the feint 
was vigorously maintained with a view to prevent any con- 
vent ration against General McPherson. To give him support, 
Kilpatrick's cavalry was ordered to join him, and Williams' 
division of the Twentieth Corps was sent to his rear. In the 
evening, General Hooker was directed to send a division on 
the following day to widen the road through the gap, to facili- 
tate the pa—age of troops and trains. 

General McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap, and 
reached the vicinity of Eesaca at 2 p. m. on the 9th. Finding 
the place " fortified and manned," and no roads through the 
forest to the railroad, while his flank was exposed to attack 
from the direction of Dalton, he withdrew to the debouche of 
the gap through which he had passed. During the afternoon 
of the 9th, General Johnston learned that two corps of the 
national army were in the gap, and sent General Hood to 
Besaca with three divisions. 

When General Sherman learned that McPherson had not 
touched Johnston's communications and had withdrawn to 
the gap, he made a change of plan. He desired, from the first, 
to hold Johnston at Dalton, and entertained the hope that 
McPherson's movement would so interrupt his communica- 
tions that he would be forced to give battle at Dalton— an 
issue that was preferred to operations " far down into Georgia." 
His instructions to General McPherson were to secure Snake 
Creek (Jap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 51 

flank or his railroad at any point between Tilton and Dalton. 
He said: "I hope the enemy will fight at Dalton ; in which 
•case he can have no force there that can interfere with you ; 
but should his policy be to fall back along the railroad, you 
will hit him in flank. Do not fail in that event to make the 
most of the opportunity, by the most vigorous attack possi- 
ble, as it may save us what we have most reason to appre- 
hend — a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it. 
In either event, you may be sure the forces north of you will 
prevent his turning on you alone. In the event of hearing 
the sounds of heavy battle about Dalton, the greater necessity 
for your rapid movement on the railroad. If broken to an 
extent that would take some days to repair, you can with- 
draw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await the devel- 
opment, according to your judgment or the information yon 
may receive." As soon as he learned that General McPherson 
had failed to accomplish any of these objects, except to attain 
position at the debouche of the gap, he determined to attack 
with his armies through the gap, and issued orders for the 
movement. 

It was plain to General Sherman, as it had been to General 
Thomas, in February, that no effort should be made to dis- 
lodge the enemy from Buzzard Roost, by direct attack ; but 
he continued the feint, in order to still hold Johnston at Dal- 
ton, that he might throw his armies upon his rear. Snake 
Creek Gap made it easy to turn Dalton, by an army strong 
enough to uncover its communications, or to detach sufficient 
forces to risk an engagement with the enemy's whole army. 
Through this gap all the fortresses north of Dalton could be 
evaded, and the army in passage be under the cover of the 
mountains. Had Johnston's army been strong enough for 
division to hold the positions north of Dalton, and the lower 
mouth of the gap, he could have defied a hundred thousand 
men. But as his safety demanded the concentration of his 
army on his lines of retreat and supply, he was compelled to 
leave the passage undefended, and make roads for the quick 
transfer of his army from Dalton to Reseca, should his antag- 
onist use the gap for a flank movement. General Sherman's 



52 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

orders to effect this measure required the concentration of his 
armies in Bnake Creek Gap, on the 12th. 

When Genera] Johnston first learned that General McPher- 
son had retired from Resaca, he recalled Hood's three divis- 
ions,and on the 11th his army was again concentrated at 
Dalton. On the morning of the 12th, he was confronted by 
II, .ward's corps and Stoneman's cavalry, the remainder of the 
national forces being in motion to concentrate in Snake Creek 
Gap. Stanley's division was before Buzzard's Roost Gap; 
Newton's was holding the north end of Pocky Face ridge, 
;U1 .1 the roads around it; Wood's was in reserve on Tunnel 
Hill, and Stoneman's troopers were on Newton's left flank. 
From the signal station on the ridge, the movements of the 
enemy were plainly visible. About 10 a. m. a heavy column 
was seen to advance toward Newton's left, as if to turn it. 
The menace was of such positive expression that Wood's di- 
vision moved to Newton's support. But the enemy, after 
driving back Newton's skirmishers, withdrew. General John- 
ston's object, doubtless, was to ascertain whether the national 
forces had withdrawn from his front, as he had heard the day 
previous that Pesaca was again threatened. The evening 
before, he had ordered General Polk, who had just arrived 
with Boring's division, to defend the place with that division, 
and Canty's brigade. But as his safety depended upon bis 
knowledge of General Sherman's movements, his reconnois- 
Bance was directed to this end. During the day, be was so 
fully assured of the flank movement, that, by a night march, 
he transferred his infantry and artillery to Pesaca, leaving his 
cavalry to cover his rear. 

This result was not in harmony with the plans and expecta- 
tions of General Sherman, his object being to bold John- 
ston's army at Dalton, until his own armies could pass through 
Snake Creek Gap; but the opportunity to accomplish it was 
Losl 1 "'tween the 9th and the morning of the 13th. On the 
9th, Resaca was held by Canty's brigade. The day following, 
Genera] Hood was therewith three divisions. On the 11th, 
Canty's brigade again held the place, and from the evening 
of the 11th until the morning of the 13th, General Polk was 
there with Loring's division in addition to Canty's brigade. 



THE TURNIXG OF DALTON. 53 

General McPhcrson passed through Snake Creek Gap on the 
9th, and was on that day with his army within a mile of Res- 
aca, and from the 9th to the 18th, he was south of the gap. On 
the 11th, Hooker's corps was in supporting distance, and on 
the 12th, Palmer's corps and Schofield's two divisions were 
close in the rear of Hooker. 

Johnston remained in ignorance of Sherman's grand flank 
movement until the evening of the 12th, and then he was at 
Dalton with his army. After the national armies had gained 
Snake Creek Gap, he was unable to ascertain how many troops 
passed through it. An army, there, could pass as secretly as a 
brigade. He said in his official report, that "Rocky Face 
Mountain, and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, completely 
covered for the enemy the turning of Dalton." His ignorance, 
then, of the movement until the evening of the 12th, was a 
condition of its success. Had McPherson's army and the 
forces in his rear, on that day, moved rapidly into position 
between Resaca and Tilton, Johnston would have been thrown 
from his communications, or been compelled to give battle 
upon conditions of great disadvantage. 

It was unfortunate that Resaca was not gained at the same 
time that Dalton was turned, as the campaign did not furnish 
a similar opportunity to defeat Johnston, or press him from 
Ms communications. The grandest possibility between Tun- 
nel Hill and Lovejoy's Station invited a prompt advance in 
force from the debouche of Snake Creek Gap. General 
Thomas' plan differed from the one adopted by General Sher- 
man. He proposed that the Armies of the Tennesse and the 
Ohio should hold General Johnston at Dalton, by a feint upon 
his position at Buzzard's Roost, while the Army of the Cum- 
berland, sixty thousand strong, should pass rapidly through 
Snake Creek Gap, and fall upon Johnston's communications 
between Dalton and Resaca, and thus cut him off from his 
communications, and either drive him eastward into a moun- 
tain region, or force him to give battle on unequal conditions. 
General Sherman's first plan proposed to demonstrate against 
Resaca, so as to hold him at Dalton to give battle, or induce 
General Johnston to abandon Dalton, and then strike his 
army in flank, while in motion between that place and Resaca. 



54 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

This first Beriea of operations in offense and defense gave 
the types of the campaign. The offensive compelled a choice 
between the direct attack of fortified positions and the flank 
movement. The adopted methods of defense were the main- 
tenance of fortified positions as long as practicable, a constant 
outlook for opportunities to strike insulated columns, and re- 
treal when necessary to save communications. General John- 
's leading idea was to fight under cover, and thus reduce 
ih,' uational army until he could meet it on equal conditions 
of battle, and nt Dalton, and almost daily while he held com- 
mand, he gave it revelation. General Sherman's leading ob- 
jecl was to entrap or force his enemy into battle under cir- 
cumstances which would not neutralize his superior strength, 
and of this, his zigzag lines of aggression were the expression. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF 
OPERATIONS FROM MARCH, 1864, TO JULY, 18G5. 
The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Missis- 
sippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. John- 
Bton, hisablestand best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied 
the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine run westward, 
Btrongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, 
against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied 
a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defend- 
ing Atlanta. Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad center, 

against the armies under Major-General Sherman. 

******** 

These two armies and the cities covered by them and defended by them r 

were the main objective points of the campaign. 

********* 

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army to- 
break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as 
he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If 
tin' enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to 
the full eztenl of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of 
Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to- 
do so. 



Culpepper, April 25 — 10.30 a. m. 
Major-Gt ncral Sherman : 

Will your veterans be back to enable you to start on the 2d of May ? 

I do not want to delay later. U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General, 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 55 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
Nashville, April 27, 1864. 
Lieutenant- General Grant, Culpepper : 

In view of the fact that I will have to take the initiative with twenty 
thousand less men in McPherson's army than I estimated, I intend to 
order all McPherson's disposable force, twenty thousand (20,000), and 
Garrard's cavalry, five thousand (5,000), to Chattanooga, to start from a 
common center. I go forward to-morrow. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Culpepper, Va., April 28, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Get your forces up so as to move by the fifth (5th) of May. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 8, 1864. 
Major-General, Hallecl; Washington, D. C. : 

I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through whose 
gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night, McPherson will 
be in Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca, and to-morrow will move to 
the attack. Army in good condition. I hope Johnston will fight here, 
instead of drawing me far down into Georgia. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 9, 1864 — 8 p. m. 
General Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, Z>. C. : 

We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to 
keep Johnston's army busy, whilst McPherson could march to Resaca to 
destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to two (2) 
p. m., w T hen he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. After break- 
ing the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake Creek 
Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats south. 
I will pitch in again early in the morning. Fighting has been mostly 
skirmishing, and casualties small. McPherson has the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, twenty-three thousand (23,000), and only encountered cavalry, 
so that Johnson did not measure his strength at all. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

1 I KADQCARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, 

In the Field, Totwel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864—7 a. m. 
.' Ball ■'■-. Washington, D. C. : 
I am Btarting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and make 
this dispatch thai you may understand Johnston acts purely on the de- 
fensive. I am attacking him on his strongest fronts— viz., west and north 
—till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round 
through Snake Creek Gap, and interpose between him and Georgia. I 
am not driving tiling too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry 
that are rapidly coming up to me from the rear— Stoneman on my left 
and ' tarrard on my right— both due to-day. Yesterday I pressed hard to 
prevent .lohnston detaching against McPherson, but to-clay I will be more 
as I believe McPherson has destroyed Eesaca, when he is ordered 
to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against Johnston's 
flank when he does start. All are in good condition. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864. 

General: — I propose to leave hereabouts one (1) of your corps — say 
Howard's — the cavalry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General 
Stoneman, to keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton through Buz- 
zard Roost, as long as possible, and with all the remainder of the three 
armies to march to and through Snake Creek Gap, and attack the enemy 
in force from that quarter. 

You may at once commence your preparations, and give orders that 
tin' force left here is to be under the command of the senior officer, who 
will strip his command light, sending all spare wagons to Ringgold; that 
the cars run daily to this point with daily supplies, but the main stores 
t'i be at Ringgold; that the cavalry watch well the passes north of Tunnel 
Hill, and at Pay's Gap; and that in case the enemy detect the diminu- 
tion of force, and attack, gradually withdraw in the direction of Ring- 
gold, but defend that point at all costs; that a locomotive and construc- 
tion train Vic kept here with orders, and prepared, if this retrograde 
movement be made necessary ; that the party shall take up, at intervals, 
rails, so as to make a repair train necessary to replace them — this, that 
the enemy may not have the track to facilitate his movement in pursuit. 
A few rails should at once be removed at some point east of the tunnel, 
that can again be put down when we want it done. 

The pass at Snake creek is represented as very narrow. Please instruct 
a division to be there to-morrow, provided with axes and spades, so as to 
widen the road as to enable the passage of wagons; also to facilitate the 
march of troops by roads and paths outside the wagon track. 

General Stoneman will be at Varnell's to-night, and by to-morrow night 
all his command will be in, so that we will calculate all to go to Snake 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 57 

creek, and close up on General McPherson during the day after to-morrow. 
As soon as General Stoneman comes, I will cause him to relieve Colonel 
McCook on that flank, so that you may send him to replace General 
Geary at Ray's road. Let the troops move as much under cover as possi- 
ble ; wagons going round by Villanow, and troops by Mill Creek road. 
General Schofield will either go round by Villanow or follow General 

Newton. 

I am, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864. 
General: — I think you are satisfied that your troops can not take 
Rocky Face ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws 
of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us. 
Two plans suggest themselves : 

1. By night, to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's 
cavalry, which should be near at hand, and to move rapidly your entire 
army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill Creek road 
to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson while the wagons are moved 
to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson, to move from Sugar 
valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton. 
Could your army and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston? 

2. I cast loose from the railroad altogether, and move the whole army 
on the same objective point, leaving Johnston to choose his course. 

Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days' provisions, 
and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from McPherson 
and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near approach of Stone- 
man. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is apprized of the necessity 
for haste. Do you think any danger to McPherson should make us de- 
lay one day? 

Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points. 

Yours, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Thomas, present. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

General McPherson reached Resaca, but found the place strongly forti- 
fied and guarded, and did not break the road. According to his instruc- 
tions, he drew back to the debouche of the gorge, where he has a strong 
defensive position, and guards the only pass into the valley of the Oosta- 



58 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

nanla available to us. Buzzard Roost Gap, through which the railroad 
naturally and artificially too strong to be attempted. I must 
feign on Buzzard Roost, but pass through Snake Creek Gap, and place 
D Johnston and Resaca, where we will have to fight it out. 
I .' im making the preliminary move. Certain that Johnston can make 
„,, detachments, I will be in no hurry. My cavalry is just approaching 
from Kentucky and Tennessee, detained by difficulty of getting horses, 
and even dow it is less than my minimum. ^ ^ SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,. 
In the Field, Tunnell Hill, Ga., May 11, 1864. 
, kal:— I received by courier in the night yours of 5 and 6.30 p. m. 
of yesterday. You will also, during the night, come to the same con- 
clusion. 

You have now your twenty-three thousand, and General Hooker is close 
in support, so that you can hold all Joe Johnston's army in check should 
he abandon Dalton. He can 't abandon Dalton, for he has fixed it up so 
well for us, and he observes we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit. 
Hecan'i afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army will 
not admit of it. 

Strengthen your position, fight anything that comes, and threaten the 
safety of the railroad all the time. But to tell the truth, I would rather 
he would stay in Dalton two more days, when he will find a larger party 
than he expects, in an open field. At all events we can then choose our 
ground, and he will be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend 
to put a column into Buzzard Roost Gap at present. 

See that you are in easy communication with me and all headquarters. 
After to-day supplies will be at Ringgold. 

Yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-Gcneral Commanding. 
Mitjor-General McPherson, Commanding Army of the Tennessee, Sugar Valley, 
Georgia. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Tunnell Hill, Ga., May 11, 1864. 
General : — The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton. 
In that event, Howard's and the cavalry will pursue, and all the rest will 
f.>ll,,w your route. I will be down early in the morning. 
Try to Btrike him, if possible, about the forks of the roads. 
Hooker must lie with you now, and you might send General Garrard by 
Somerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all the lines to 
be felt at once. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-G encral Commanding r 
General McPherson, Sugar Valley. 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 50 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO 3.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Snake Creek Gap, Ga., May\2, 1864. 
The object of the movement for to-morrow is to interpose between the 
enemy and Resaca, and to break his communications. 

I. Major-General McPherson will move his column directly on Resaca, 
occupying in force the hills on this side of Camp creek, and his left ex- 
tending along up Camp creek. He will prepare to advance a part of his 
force from his left to the railroad, and break it, and then fall back to his 
line. 

II. Major-General Thomas will follow close to General McPherson, and 
when he reaches a main road crossing to the Eesaca road, about two 
miles this side of town, viz., the Dalton and Calhoun road, he will turn 
to the left toward Dalton, prepared to deploy forward and connect on his 
right with General McPherson's left, choosing strong positions to cover 
the movement on the railroad. 

III. Major-General Schofield will follow General Thomas, and at the 
first Dalton road, known as the Dalton and Rome road, will turn to the 
left and advance to abreast of General Thomas, and connect with him. 
General Schofield will leave one brigade in Snake Creek Gap, about five 
miles east of Villanow, and the balance of the one division in General 
McPherson's intrenched camp at this point. 

IV. The cavalry of General Garrard will picket all roads to our rear 
and in case of being threatened from the north, will come into Snake 
Creek Gap, and cover the rear of the army and the wagon train. The 
cavalry of General Kilpatrick will move south of the main road to 
Resaca, and be held in reserve near the forks of the road, and be sub- 
ject to the orders of the commander-in-chief. 

V. All trains will be brought in Snake Creek Gap, and be placed in 
convenient order off the road. Great care must be observed in keeping 
the road clear, and ambulances and wagons when not traveling the road, 
must invariably turn out and leave all the road clear. Each army com- 
mander will leave his own wagon guards, and the men should leave their 
knapsacks in camp. 

VI. The movement will begin at six (6) o'clock a. m. to-morrow. 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Resaca, May 13, 1864 — 2.15 p. m. 
General Thomas, Commanding Army of (he Cumberland : 

Until I hear that Joe Johnston is south of the Oostanaula, I would not 
cross at Lay's. We must first interpose between Dalton and Resaca, 
threatening the latter all the time. I want Hooker's right and McPher- 
son's left strong, until we encounter Johnston, who has not yet got below 
Resaca, I think. If he retreat east, we have the advantage. I want the 



GO THE TURNING OF DALTOX. 

pontoons up, and to secure the railroad on Hooker's right. Palmer 
should join on to Hooker, and Hooker should be strong. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Snake Creek Gap, May 13, 1864. 
G cneral Sloncman, Commanding Cavalry: 

Your note of to-day was received. Very good, indeed. Press down the 
valley strong, and communicate with me. Your messenger will find me 
where there is most noise of artillery, or near Resaca. You can safely 
move on parallel roads, by brigades. Let your packs follow on the heels 
of the column. Pick up whatever of provisions and plunder you can. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT. 

Speaking of the demonstration against Rocky Face ridge, he says: 
" This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, 
for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of 
Resaca unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, 
and although there were many good roads from north to south, endanger- 
in i: his left Hank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by 
which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell 
back and took strong position near the west end of Snake Creek Gap. I 
somewhat disappointed at the result; still, appreciated the advantage 
gained, and on the 10th ordered General Thomas to send General Hook- 
corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to 
follow with another corps, the Fourteenth, General Palmer's, leaving Gen- 
eral Howard, with the Fourth Corps, to continue to threaten Dalton in 
front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek 
Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the 
same route, and on the 11th the whole army, excepting General Howard's 
corps and some cavalay left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west 
side of Rocky Face ridge, for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next 
day we moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, 
preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry ; General Thomas to come up 
on his left, and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and 
drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca, 
but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his 
brigade to Colonel Murray, who according to his orders wheeled out of the 
road leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck 
the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their 
fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the 
Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left 
abreast the town. General Thomas came, up on his left, facing Camp 
creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to 
General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard 
entered it, and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at 



THE TURNING OF DALTON. 61 

Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the pas- 
sage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his 
army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads 
constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the 
country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events 
on the 14th of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind 
Camp creek, occupying the forts of Resaca, and his right on some high 
chestnut hills to the north of the town." 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE " COMMIT- 
TEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR." 

Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military Division 
of the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga, to 
consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a spring cam- 
paign. At that interview, I proposed to General Sherman that if he 
would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the 
enemy's position at Dalton, by the direct roads through Buzzard Roost 
Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole force 
through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the 
enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning 
his position completely, and force him either to retreat toward the east, 
through a difficult country, poorly supplied with provisions and forage, 
with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack 
me, in which latter event, I felt confident that my army was sufficiently 
strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain position on his commu- 
nications before he could be made aware of my movement. General 
Sherman objected to this plan, for the reason that he desired my army to 
form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for 
the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to 
operate from. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' OFFICIAL REPORT. 

General Hooker was directed to send another division of his command 
to Snake Creek Gap, with instructions to repair the road through the 
gap, so as to facilitate the passage of infantry and wagons. On the 11th, 
it was decided to leave one corps, Howard's, supported by Stoneman's 
and McCook's divisions of cavalry, and move to Snake Creek Gap with 
the balance of the army, attacking the enemy in front from that quarter, 
whilst Howard was keeping up the impression of a direct attack at 
Buzzard's Roost. This movement was to commence on the 12th. In- 
structions were given to corps commanders to provide their commands 
with ten days' rations and a good supply of ammunition, sending all 
surplus wagons back to Ringgold. At 9 a. m. on the 13th, General How- 
ard's command occupied Dalton, it having been evacuated by the enemy 
on the evening of the 12th. Concentrating his troops in Dalton, General 
Howard pursued the enemy along the railroad, in the direction of Resaca. 



62 THE TURNING OF DALTON. 

capturing a considerable number of prisoners. The concentration of the 

balai of the army in Snake Creek Gap having been completed by the 

n j g hi of the 12th, al 8 a. m. on the 13th, Hooker's corps, preceded by 
Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved out on the Eesaca road in support of Mc- 
Pherson's troops threatening Resaca. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWARD'S REPORT. 
May llth, the troops of the corps were disposed as follows: General 
Stanlej to hold the gap; General Newton to hold Rocky Face, and the 
roads leading around the north end of it, with General Stoneman's 
cavalry covering his left Hank; and General Wood in reserve on Tunnel 
Hill. During the evening of this day, and on the morning of the 12th, 
the general movement was progressing, and the Fourth Corps found itself 
alone confronted by the whole rebel army. 



EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL JOS. E. JOHNSTON'S REPORT. 

At Dalton, the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the 
chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten, they had a safe 
refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold, and in the fortress of Chat- 
tanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Altanta, one hundred miles 
oil', with three intervening rivers. Therefore, victory for us could not 
have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. 

On the 5th of May, this army was in line between Ringgold and Tun- 
ixl Hill, and after skirmishing on that day and the following day, on the 
7th, pressed back our advanced forces to Mill Creek Gap. On the same 
day. Canty reached Resaca with his brigade, and was halted there. On 
tli.- 8th, at 4 r. m., a division of Hooker's corps attacked Dug Gap, which 
was bravely held by two regiments of Reynolds' Arkansas brigade and 
( hngsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry, fighting on foot, until the arrival 
of Lieutenant-General Hardee, with Granbury's brigade, when the enemy 
was put to flight. On the 9th, five assaults were made on Lieutenant- 
• reneral Hood's troops on Rocky Face Mountain. All were repulsed. In 
tin- afternoon, a report was received that Logan's and Dodge's corps were 
in Snake Creek Gap. Three divisions, under Lieutenant-General Hood, 
were therefore sent to Resaca. On the 10th, Lieutenant-General Hood 
reported the enemy retiring. Skirmishing to our advantage continued 
all day, near Dalton. Major-General Bate repulsed a vigorous attack 
at night. On the llth, Brigadier-General Canty reported that the enemy 
was again approaching Resaca. Lieutenant-General Polk arrived in the 
evening with Loring's division, and was instructed to defend the place 
witli those troops and Canty's. The usual skirmishing continued near 
Dalton. 

Rocky Face Mountain and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, com- 
pletely covered for the enemy the operation of turning Dalton. On the 



THE TURNING OF J)ALTON. 63 

12th, the Federal army, covered by the mountain, moved by Snake Creek 
Gap toward Resaca. Major-General Wheeler, with 2,200 of ours, attacked 
and defeated more than double that number of Federal cavalry, near 
Varnell's Station. At night, our artillery and infantry marched for Re- 
saca. The cavalry followed on the 13th. On that day, the enemy ap- 
proaching on the Snake Creek Gap road was checked by Loring's troops, 
which gave time for the formation of Ilardee's and Hood's corps, just 
arriving. As the army was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the 
Oostanaula, and the right of Hood's on Connasauga. There was brisk 
skirmishing during the afternoon on Polk's front and Hardee's left. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

BATTLE OF RESACA. 

Early on the morning of the 13th, General Howard dis- 
covered that General Johnston had withdrawn from Dalton, 
and he at once occupied the town, having driven his cavalry 
from it. He then moved in pursuit, and skirmishing as he 
advanced, encamped eight miles toward Resaca. In the 
morning, General Johnston reached Resaca, Loring's division 
having moved out to check General McPherson and give time 
for the formation of Hood's and Hardee's corps upon their 
arrival from Dalton. He formed his army, now stronger by 
several thousand men than at Dalton, with Polk's corps on 
the left, resting on the Oostanaula river below the town, Har- 
dee's in the center, and Hood's on the right, his right flank 
resting on the Connasauga river. 

At 8 a. m., Hooker's corps, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, 
moved out upon the Eesaca road, in support of McPherson, 
who was advancing against the town. Kilpatrick encountered 
Wheeler and drove him nearly to the town, when, being 
wounded, he turned over the command to Colonel Murray. 
Palmer's corps moved from Snake Creek Gap, two miles 
northeast of Hooker, and then moved parallel with the Resaca 
road, under orders to proceed as far as the railroad. On reach- 
ing the vicinity of the railroad, his skirmishers encountered 
those of the enemy, strongly posted on the hills, immediately 
west of the railroad, and warmly engaged them until night- 
fall. Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps moved forward 
to support Palmer's right. Schofield's two divisions advanced 
upon Palmer's left. Howard advanced to the vicinity of Re- 
saca, and when communications were established throughout 
(64) & 



BATTLE OF RESACA. 65 

the line, it was found that his right was but a mile from Scho- 
field'e left. 

General Johnston's position was a strong one, with Camp 
creek in front, and heavy intrenchments in the immediate 
vicinity of the town — the strongest to defend the bridges across 
the Oostanaula, and cover the retreat of his army. His outer 
defenses consisted of detached redoubts, and extensive rifle- 
trenches, and the ground beyond was favorable for defense. 
His army was disposed partly in the inner defenses, but mainly 
on the high hills north and west of the town, which were for- 
tified. 

Before delivering battle, General Sherman ordered a pon- 
toon bridge to be thrown across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry, 
in the direction of Calhoun, Sweeny's division of the Fif- 
teenth Corps to cross and threaten that place, and Garrard's 
division of cavalry to move from Villanow toward Rome, to 
cross the Oostanaula, and if possible break the railroad below 
Calhoun and above Kingston. On the 14th, General Mc- 
Pherson crossed Camp creek, near its mouth, and forced 
Polk's corps from the hills commanding the railroad bridges 
from the west, and secured a lodgment close to his works. 
This done, it became necessary to swing round the whole line 
formed the previous evening, from Hooker's left to the extreme 
left. This movement was made with the right of Johnson's 
division, which was the right of the Fourteenth Corps, as a 
pivot, and each division advanced until it encountered the 
enemy. 

As Johnson's right was in proximity to the enemy, the di- 
visions to the left met the enemy in succession. Baird's 
division was in line on Johnson's left, and Davis in reserve. 
General Howard, in compliance with orders from General 
Thomas, moved in the morning, to form his corps on the left 
of Schofield, and advance upon the main roads to Resaca. 
Newton's division, followed by Wood's, moved toward Scho- 
field's left, and Stanley's toward the enemy's extreme right, 
on the Fulton and Resaca road. When Newton gained Scho- 
field's left, Wood changed direction to the left, upon a road 
.between Newton and Stanley. 
vol. n — 5 



<jtj BATTLE OF RESACA, 

Carlin'a brigade of Johnson's division was the first to en- 
counter the foe. General Carlin crossed Camp creek and 
advanced Borne distance over the open ground in front of the 
enemy's position, under a severe fire of artil 1 ery an d musketry. 
The passage of the creek disordered his lines somewhat, and 
being hopeless of holding the enemy's works should he suc- 
ceed in an assault, he withdrew, and found shelter and a par- 
apet at the bank of the stream. Here he maintained position 
all day, and delivered a desultory but destructive fire. Gen- 
eral King, perceiving Carlin's repulse, halted his brigade to 
the hit and rear. The ground over which the left of Baird's 
division and the right of Schofield's line advanced, was thickly 
wooded, rendering it difficult to maintain lines, and the troops 
farther to the left having gained ground, those having been 
delayed moved forward rapidly as they emerged from the 
woods upon the open space before the enemy's intrenchments ; 
but such was the severity of the musketry and artillery fire 
to which they were exposed, that they were soon compelled 
to retreat. Some isolated squads had passed Camp creek, and 
were driven back; others were so delayed by the miry banks 
that they could not withdraw with the main line, and were 
compelled to seek cover at the stream. To cover the retreat 
and re-formation of Turchin's brigade, and Schofield's right, 
Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division, in reserve, moved 
quickly to the left, and was severely engaged, while the 
broken lines were reformed upon the high ground west of the 
creek. As the lines of advance of Howard's corps were con- 
verging, the three divisions made close connection before 
reaching the enemy's position, and as the convergence of the 
roads shortened the battle front continually, the greater por- 
tion of Newton's division fell in rear of Schofield's right, in 
reserve, and when his left carried the position in its front, 
Newton moved to the relief of his left center, and grasped 
firmly all the ground that had been gained. In the meantime, 
Wood eame abreast of Newton, and drove the enemy from 
his rifle-pits, and Stanley formed his division on Wood's left, 
wiili one brigade across the Fulton road, to protect his flank. 
These movements were all slowly made, in consequence of 
dense woods and rough ground, and the resistance of the 



BATTLE OF RESACA. 67 

enemy. But an advanced line was gained, and from it artil- 
lerists poured a fire so destructive as in some cases to drive 
the enemy temporarily from his works. 

General Johnston, fearing that the lines of investment were 
closing around him, determined to assume the offensive, and 
if possible turn General Sherman's left flank. General Stan- 
ley soon observed indications of the movement. As General 
Howard had no reserves to direct to the endangered flank, ho 
communicated in person with General Thomas and secured 
immediate assistance from the Twentieth Corps. In compli- 
ance with orders, General Hooker promptly dispatched Wil- 
liams' division, under the guidance of Colonel Morgan,* of the 
Fourteenth Colored regiment, and preceeded it to the point of 
danger. Williams moved rapidly on the most direct route, 
and arrived on the extreme left just as that flank had been 
turned and pressed back. Stanley had exhausted all his re- 
serves in extending his line against the overlapping of the 
enemy. Simonson's battery, by effective execution, was re- 
tarding the advance of the enemy to double up the line, when 
Williams deployed his division and advanced to the support 
of the battery. His terrific fire first checked and then routed 
the enemy, and completely defeated this attempt at flanking. 
The other divisions of the Twentieth Corps, Geary's and But- 
terfield's, followed Williams, later in the evening, and Mc- 
Cook's cavalry passed to Hooker's left. 

The enemy's troops engaged against the left flank were 
Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions and two brigades of Walk- 
er's — a strong column in view of the length of Johnston's lines 
and the relative inferiority of his army. Another fact evinced 
his estimate of the importance of the movement. After its 
failure he gave orders for its repetition the next morning, but 
was subsequently led to revoke them, when he learned that 
the national infantry w^ere crossing the Oostanaula river, near 
Calhoun, on a pontoon bridge. To provide against this men- 
ace to his rear, he dispatched General Walker to Calhoun. 

Such advantages had been gained during the day as prom- 
ised success in forcing Johnston to abandon his position, and 

* Colonel T. J. Morgan was volunteer aid to General Howard. 



63 BATTLE OF RESACA. 

orders were issued for a general advance the next morning. 
rithstanding this aggressive purpose, the troops covered 
themselves with the usual defenses. There was no change in 
the Line, excepl that Schofield was directed to withdraw from 
the center and pass to Hooker's left. 

There was delay in making the attack in the morning, 
to awail the result of a reconnoissance hy General Geary, from 
the Left flank. Full preparations were not completed until 
noon. At this hour the Twentieth Corps advanced— Geary on 
the right, Butterfield on the left, and Williams in reserve. 
Before the enemy's works were reached, General Hooker di- 
rected General Williams to deflect to the left to cover and 
protect that flank, again threatened by the enemy, as Gen- 
eral Johnston, having learned that there was no immediate 
danger from infantry at Calhoun, had repeated his order to 
General Hood to advance against the national left. Facing 
to the east, Williams' division moved to the point menaced — 
Knipe's brigade on the right, Ruger's in the center, and Rob- 
inson's on the left. The ground traversed by the advancing 
columns was hilly, with woods and open spaces alternating. 
Williams' brigades formed lines on a series of hills west of the 
railroad and running parallel to it; batteries were planted 
with supports to command the ground in front of the line. 

The enemy before Hooker, occupied intrenched hills, having 
spurs extending in all directions, and batteries were so placed 
on the higher points as to enfilade assaulting lines. Geary's 
and Bntterfield's divisions advanced with spirit, and though 
receiving a heavy fire from artillery and musketry, carried the 
nearest hills. Then Butterfield's division — Ward's, Coburn's, 
and Wood's brigades — supported by Ireland's brigade on 
Geary's left, drove the enemy from a battery, which from a 
ruling position was pouring an exceedingly destructive fire; 
but another line of intrenehments was so near that the cap- 
tors could neither remove the guns nor remain with them. 
But, withdrawing to tenable ground, they covered the guns 
so fully with their fire that the enemy could not approach 
them, and during the remainder of the day the guns remained 
between the lines. They were taken during the night by a 
detachment of the Fifth Ohio under Colonel Kilpatrick. 

In the meantime, the entire line became engaged, from How- 



BATTLE OF RESACA. 69 

ard's right to Hooker's left; while throughout the whole front 
of the "Army of the Cumberland," heavy skirmishing and 
artillery action was maintained. General Howard, being 
nearest the assaulting corps, kept up a constant fire of artil- 
lery and musketry, and in one instance made a positive attack, 
and although he did not succeed in holding any point of* the 
enemy's line, he prevented the diversion of troops from his 
front, to sustain their comrades before General Hooker, against 
whose left they were maintaining the offensive with great de- 
termination. Near the railroad, in front of Williams, he 
massed his forces and advancing as much as possible under 
cover, made repeated assaults, but was unable to disturb the 
line. Williams' artillery was used with most destructive effect 
in the repulsion of these assaults. In front of Williams' right 
and Geary's left, there was a long cleared field, compassing 
two hills and a ravine, and extending to a wooded hill, upon 
which rested the enemy's main line. This field was flanked 
on the right by wooded hills, which extended to the captured 
battery. About 5 p. m. Stevenson's division left the main line 
and charged in column to gain possession of these lateral hills. 

This movement, if successful, would have insulated one- 
half of Geary's division, which had been concentrated under 
Colonel Cobham, in the rear of the guns wrested from the 
enemy. But Stevenson was repulsed mainly through the con- 
centration of fire from Williams' right and Geary's left. His 
leading; regiments were almost annihilated. On both sides, 
artillery charged with canister and schrapnel was freely used. 
Stevenson's repulse closed the general contest. This attack 
of Stewart's and Stevenson's divisions was made after General 
Johnston had decided to evacuate Eesaca, but his order for- 
bidding the assault was not received in time to prevent it. 

During the night of the 15th, General Johnston abandoned 
Eesaca. It was observed by those on the outlook the preced-, 
ing day, that he was sending his material to the rear. He 
had lost positions on his right and left, and had been pressed 
throughout his lines by two days of fighting, and the exposure 
of his communications in the event of a flank movement, 
which had been foreshadowed, made his retreat necessary. He 
had attacked the brigade across the river below Eesaca on the 



7(1 BATTLE OF RESACA. 

15th, and had beeD repulsed, and as General Sherman's front 
now presented defenses as well as his own, the transfer of 
heavy forces across the river was plainly practicable. He 
therefore retreated before embarrassments crowded upon him. 

The action at Resaca, though presenting different features 
from the one before Dalton, was not essentially different in 
type or result. In the latter one, the two armies more fully 
confronted each other, and there was more fighting and 
heavier losses. The champaign region of Georgia was now be- 
fore General Sherman, offering freedom for maneuver and 
strategy, which the mountain region had denied. 

As the aggregate monthly losses of the Army of the Cum- 
berland were reported by General Thomas, it is impossible to 
ascertaiD definitely the casualties at Resaca. The Twentieth 
Corps lost seventeen hundred and forty-six men, and the other 
two corps lost nearly as many in the aggregate. General 
Johnston's losses were also heavy, especially when he assumed. 
the offensive. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH RIVER, THE TURNING OF ALLATOONA, 
BATTLES NEAR NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

Resaca was occupied by the Army of the Cumberland on 
the morning of May 16th, and General Sherman gave orders 
for rapid pursuit. There was delay, however, in passing the 
river, as it was necessary to throw a pontoon bridge at Resaca 
and at points above. During the day, the Army of the Ten- 
nessee crossed at Lay's ferry, and Howard's corps at Resaca. 
As in the pursuit the Army of the Cumberland was to follow 
the enemy's line of retreat, General Howard moved forward 
toward Calhoun. His progress was slow, as stubborn resist- 
ance was offered by the rear-guard of Johnston's army. 

The next day, the three armies advanced. Palmer's corps 
followed Howard's; Hooker's having crossed above, moved on 
the left. On his left, was the Army of the Ohio, and the 
Army of the Tennessee advanced on lines on the right of the 
central army. Stoneman's cavalry was on the extreme left, 
and Garrard's on the extreme right, under instructions to 
reach the enemy's rear if practicable. 

Early in the day, General Howard found the rear-guard 
of the enemy, formed of cavalry and artillery, and at times 
supported by infantry. Three lines were presented at short 
intervening distances, and generally behind barricades m 
woods, with open ground in front, When the first line was 
pressed from position, the troops forming it passed to the rear 
of the third and reformed. Thus, not only was the rear of 
the army covered, but two of the three lines of the rear-guard 
itself. The Fourth Corps advanced in two columns abreast, 
and pressed the enemy so strongly in the evening that a bat- 

(71) 



72 ETOWAH— ALLATOOXA— NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

tie Beemed imminent. The skirmish lines were reinforced 
until they had the weight of linos of battle, and artillery was 
freely used. The action terminated as darkness approached, 
and during the night, General Johnston abandoned a position 
which he had intrenched. His reasons were, that a portion 
oik's corps was yet in the rear; that, as he thought, the 
expiration of service of the regiments in the national armies 
confronting him that had not re-enlisted, would soon reduce 
their strength, and he hoped that some blunder would give 
him an opportunity to strike a blow without risking a general 
battle, or to enter such a contest with advantages to counter- 
balance the inferiority of his army. 

General Sherman's object now was to compel Johnston to 
fight north of the Etowah river, divide his army, or give up 
Ri . i ne or Allatoona. In the event of his attempt to hold both 
these places, he proposed to break his line at Kingston ; or 
should he concentrate at Kingston, to break his railroads right 
and hit, ami " light him scpiare in front." To give support to 
the cavalry on the right, he directed General Thomas to send 
a division from Resaca toward Rome, and Davis' had been put 
in motion. 

On the 18th, the armies moved forward without change of 
order, and at night the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps encamped 
near Kingston. At 8 A. M. the next day, the central column, 
iley's division leading, advanced toward Cassville. Midway 
to that place the enemy opened upon Stanley with a six-gun 
battery, from an eminence, but yielded, under the pressure of 
an attack with infantry and artillery. Moving in pursuit nearly 
four miles, Stanley was again arrested. This time there was a 
formidable combination before him, and the enemy was ob- 
served to be advancing in two lines of battle. General Howard 
promptly deployed his corps — Stanley's and Wood's divisions 
in front, and Newton's in support of the left. As soon as the 
enemy observed these dispositions, his lines were halted and 
their front covered with barricades. When Howard's artillery 
opened, the first line retreated in some confusion, and the 
Fourth Corps advanced and occupied the position. Here a 
junction with Hooker's corps was made, which had engaged 
the enemy during the day on the direct road from Adairsville 



ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 73 

to Cassville. Skirmishing was maintained until dark, when 
the three corps bivouacked in close proximity. During the day, 
General Schofield approached Cassville, and General McPher- 
son moved from Woodland to Kingston. 

As reports had reached General Sherman that General John- 
ston had been reinforced, he thought it probable that lie would 
now give battle in the vicinity of Cassville, and in such expec- 
tation he threw his armies from their parallel lines of march, 
toward the head of the central column. His cavalry was on 
right and left, in effort to break the railroad in Johnston's rear 
to force him to battle, or to subject a portion of his army and 
trains to capture, before he could cross the Etowah river. Gen- 
eral Schofield was under instructions to support the cavalry on 
the left, in the accomplishment of this object, and during the 
day, McCook's division of cavalry had a brilliant passage of 
arms with Stevenson's division of infantry. 

It was General Johnston's purpose to give battle at Cassville. 
He had been joined by French's division of Polk's corps, and 
.the lines which Howard first encountered were Hood's, who 
had orders to attack. His lieutenant, however, under the im- 
pression that the columns on the east had turned his position, 
refrained until it was too late to overpower the head of column. 
Even after this failure, General Johnston meditated delivering 
battle, but was dissuaded by his lieutenants, Polk and Hood, 
though General Hardee gave counter advice. During the night 
he crossed the Etowah with all his trains, and moved to his 
strong position at Allatoona Pass. This step was a matter of 
subsequent regret to him, though it is probable that his sorrow 
would have been more profound, had he engaged Sherman's 
three armies at Cassville. 

Pending these greater movements, General Davis with his 
division captured. Rome. His orders did not require him to go 
so far from the line of march, but as circumstances, in his judg- 
ment, justified the step, and having advised General Thomas 
of his purpose, he passed beyoud all co-operation with the cav- 
alry, and hurried Mitchell's brigade in advance, on the 17th, 
drove back the rebel cavalry, and deployed within range of the 
artillery, on De Soto hill, on the west side of the Oostanaula. 
McCook's brigade and Morgan's moved forward, and the enemy, 



;j etoWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

at firsi assuming the aggressive, was driven within his fortifi- 
cations. The aexi morning the city was abandoned in too 
much hurry to destroy machine-shops and iron-works of great 
value, and vasl quantities of stores and cotton, and six pieces 
f artillery. General Davis lost in killed and wounded one 
hundred and fifty men. 

BEYOND THE ETOWAH. 

General Sherman did not pursue beyond the Etowah. The 
rough hills and gorges around Allatoona presented such ob- 
Btacles to maneuver and attack as to deter him from a direct 
advance. He chose rather to make a detour to the right, to 
turn Allatoona, or throw his armies upon Johnston's com- 
munications at Marietta or the Chattahoochee river. He ac- 
cordingly gave orders for a few days of rest, and time to repair 
the railroad to Cassville, and accumulate supplies at Resaca. 

At this period, General Johnston was calling to him in- 
fantry from the Southwest and cavalry from Mississippi, and 
General Sherman was making effort to maintain his relative 
superiority. His losses and constantly lengthening line of 
supply were reducing his offensive strength, and he called all 
available troops from the rear. May 23d, he ordered General 
Blair, with two divisions of infantry of the Seventeenth 
Corps, and Long's brigade of cavalry of Garrard's division, to 
move on Koine and Kingston, from Huntsville, Alabama. 

On this day, he put his armies in motion south of the 
Etowah. The Army of the Tennessee crossed the river at the 
mouth of Conascne creek, on a bridge which had been saved 
from (list ruction, and advanced toward Dallas by Van Wert. 
General Thomas crossed four miles south of Kingston, and 
moved through Euharley and Stilesboro. General Schofield 
crossed near Etowah cliffs, and kept on the left of General 
Thomas. Each army had supplies for twenty days in wagons. 
M« 'Cook's division of cavalry preceded the central columns, 
and reached Stilesboro in the afternoon, and finding the enemy 
there in force, with cavalry and infantry, skirmished until 
dark. Hooker, Howard, and Palmer encamped south of 
Euharley creek. Kilpatrick's division, Colonel W. "W. Lowe 
commanding, was left to guard the line of the Etowah — an im- 



ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 75 

portant duty, as Wheeler's cavalry had been sent to interrupt 
communications north of that river. Garrard's division was 
covering General McPherson's right flank. 

At daylight on the 24th, by direction of General Thomas, 
General Hooker sent Geary's division to Euharley creek, to 
hold the Alabama road toward Allatoona, and cover the left 
flank of the corps, until relieved by General Schoh'eld. The 
remainder of the Twentieth Corps was directed to advance to 
Burnt Hickory, preceded by McCook's cavalry. The cavalry 
commander, upon arrival, was instructed to picket strongly 
the roads leading toward Alatoona, and cover the movements 
of the army. McCook reached Burnt Hickory at 2 p. m., 
having skirmished with the enemy for several miles. In this 
skirmish he captured a rebel courier, bearing dispatches from 
General Johnston to a division commander of cavalry, re- 
quiring him to observe the movements of the national forces 
toward Burnt Hickory, and advising him that his army was 
moving toward Dallas and Powder Springs. Later in the 
day, General Garrard informed General Thomas that in 
moving upon Dallas, he had been attacked by Bate's division, 
the advance of Hardee's corps. Thus, from two sources, the 
fact was ascertained that General Johnston had divined Gen- 
eral Sherman's purpose in time to throw his army before him 
near Dallas. At night, the Fourth and Twentieth Corps en- 
camped at Burnt Hickory ; the Fourteenth, impeded by trains, 
halted some distance in the rear. 

The next morning, the march was resumed. McCook's 
cavalry moved on the road to Golgotha, followed by Butter- 
field's division. Hooker's other two divisions, and Howard's 
corps, advanced on roads running south of Butterfield's line 
of march. General Howard sought roads to the right, to 
avoid the main roads, upon which the trains of Johnson's di- 
vision and the Twentieth Corps were advancing. Baird's 
division was left at Burnt Hickory, to protect trains and the 
rear of the army. The divisions of the Army of the Cumber- 
land, marching upon four roads, were under orders to con- 
verge upon Dallas, as it was not expected that Johnston's army 
would be met nearer than that place. But at 11 a. m. Geary's 
division, the central one of the Twentieth Corps, came upon 



76 ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHUECH. 

the enemy in considerable force. A cavalry outpost had been 
previously found near Owen's Mill, where a burning bridge 
had caused some delay. After crossing this bridge, General 
ryhad deployed the Fifth Ohio as skirmishers in ad- 
vance of Candy's brigade, and when within four and a half 
miles of Dallas, this regiment became heavily engaged, and 
bood after, a charge.was made by the enemy. Candy's brigade 
was then rapidly deployed, and after a sharp conflict repulsed 
the foe. General Geary immediately extended his skirmish 
line, formed Candy's brigade in line of battle, and brought up 
Ireland's and Buschbeck's in support. Advancing again, the 
division drove the enemy a half mile. From prisoners, it was 
now ascertained that Hood's corps was in front, and that 
Hardee's was not far distant, in the direction of Dallas. The 
situation was now critical, as no supporting forces were near. 
General Hooker, who was with his central division, now di- 
rected that it should be formed upon a hill affording advan- 
for defense, that the skirmish line should be extended, 
and make a show of strength by maintaining an aggressive 
fire, and that barricades should be constructed. He sent 
orders immediately to "Williams and Butterfield to hasten to 
Geary's support, and informed General Thomas of the posture 
of affairs. 

As Williams and Butterfield were several miles distant, they 
did not reach Geary's position until late in the afternoon. 
Upon arrival, their divisions advanced against the enemy with 
Geary's in reserve, under instructions from General Sherman 
to drive him beyond New Hope Church, a point where roads 
from Marietta, Dallas, and Ackworth meet. 

Though the country was hilly and covered with trees and 
undergrowth, "Williams' and Butterfield's division, dashed at 
the enemy at double-quick, and drove him back a mile and a 
halt; to New Hope Church ; but here they received his artillery 
fire at short range, and were arrested. Geary moved to the 
front again, and though the attack was vigorously made, the 
enemy was not dislodged. General Johnston had thrown his 
army directly across General Sherman's line of advance, and 
was ready for defensive battle. His position was a strong one, 



ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 77 

ami his troops were under cover. The engagement which 
defined his position resulted in heavy losses to hoth armies. 

When General Sherman first learned that the enemy was 
before him in force, he divined that he was on Johnston's right 
flank, and proposed to turn it. With this object in view, he 
directed General McPherson to move to the left, if he could 
not dislodge the eneny in his front. But General McPherson 
did not move to the left as projected, and the opportunity to 
pass round General Johnston's right to Ackworth and Mari- 
etta was lost. 

General Hooker at night intrenched a line in close prox- 
imity to the enemy. The Fourth Corps, ordered by General 
Thomas to his support during the day, came up by divisions 
in the evening and after night, and formed on his left. Davis' 
division of the Fourteenth Corps, having left Rome on the 
24th, was now in supporting distance ; but Johnson's and 
Baird's divisions, having been delayed by the trains on the 
roads in advance of them, were still in the rear. 

The following day was spent in the concentration of the 
armies. General McPherson's army advanced to Dallas, and 
General Schofield's was directed to the left of General 
Thomas, to turn Johnston's right flank. Garrard's cavalry 
formed the extreme right, Stoneman's the left, and McCook'a 
covered the rear. 

The Twentieth Corps maintained the position assumed the 
previous evening. The Fourth was slightly changed by swing- 
ing round to occupy a line of hills, trending at right angles to 
Hooker's line. This change of front threatened the enemy's 
right flank more directly. General Schofield, on Howard's 
left, covered the road leading from Allatoona to Dallas, by 
New Hope Church. Both Howard and Schofield skirmished 
into position ; and so close were they to the enemy that not 
only their skirmishers,* but their main lines maintained a con- 
tinuous fire. 

In the forenoon, General Davis, by direction of General 
Thomas, made a reconnoissance to Dallas, to determine the 
position of Johnston's left flank and open communications 
with General McPherson. He advanced on the Burnt Hickory 
road with Morgan's brigade in front, drove the enemy's pick- 



yg ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

eta through the town, and deployed his division on the east of 
the Marietta road. Soon after, the Army of the Tennessee 
came ahreast, and was formed in lines extending across the 

Villa Rica road. 

During the day, McCook, on the left, struck a column of 
cavalry in Hank, broke it in two, and captured fifty-two pris- 
oners. From his prisoners he learned that Wheeler's cavalry 
corps was on Johnston's right Hank. In the afternoon, John- 
Bon's division of the Fourteenth Corps came up in the rear of 
the Fourth Corps. 

The opposing armies were now in closest proximity. Har- 
rps was on Johnston's left, Hood's on his right, and 
Polk's in the center. The batteries of the two armies were 
placed on the commanding positions in the opposing lines, 
and Qothing was needed to precipitate the work of death but 
a word from either of the commanding generals. 

As < General Johnston had twice withdrawn his army under 
circumstances not radically different, General Sherman did 
not feel confident that he would maintain his position even 
for a day, and gave such orders as would compass the issues 
of battle or the retreat of the enemy. He directed General 
McPherson to connect his left with Hooker's right, so that he 
could then move his whole line by the left flank beyond John- 
ston's right, and interpose between him and the railroad. In 
addition to McPherson's movement, a strong demonstration 
by 1 1 01 ker and Howard, and a positive attack upon Johnston's 
righl Hank, were ordered. 

The effort to turn this flank commanded the personal atten- 
tion of Generals Sherman and Thomas, in addition to General 
Howard, who was ordered to furnish the assaulting column. 
In the beginning, General Sherman designated the point in 
enemy's line upon which the assault should be made, but 
Generals Thomas and Howard, upon special examination, 
perceived that there the enemy could bring a cross-fire of ar- 
tillery and musketry to bear upon the approaches, and General 
Howard was directed to move his column to the left, beyond 
all the troops in line, and endeavor to strike the enemy's 
flank. 

General T. J. Wood's division of the Fourth Corps was 



ETOWAH ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 79 

selected to make the assault, to be supported on the left by 
General R. W. Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps, 
and by General McLean's brigade of General Schoficld's 
Twenty-third Corps, on the right. The column was formed 
in the rear of the extreme left of the Twenty-third Corps — 
Wood's division in column of six lines deep, Johnson's on 
the left, with a brigade front. After moving a mile to the 
east, General Howard supposed that he had reached the ene- 
my's flank, and directed General Wood to wheel his command 
so as to face the south, and advance. The enemy's works were 
soon discovered, and upon examination of their strength, the 
column was moved another mile to the east. Here, Generals 
Howard and Wood reconnoitered the ground, and ascertained 
that the line of works did not cover the whole division front, 
and preparation was made for attack. Johnson's division was 
slightly refused on Wood's left, with Scribner's brigade in 
front, and McLean's brigade was sent to a point in full view 
from the enemy's works, a little to the right of the place of 
attack, to attract his attention and draw his fire. 

At 5 p. m. the entire column marched briskly forward, Ha- 
zen's brigade of Wood's division leading, and having driven 
back the enemy's skirmishers, assaulted his main line with 
great vigor. Hazen at first was without support from John- 
son's division on his left, and was so heavily engaged that 
General Wood was compelled to move up his supporting lines. 
Scribner's brigade was also hurried forward on Hazen's left, 
but, before getting abreast of Hazen, was struck in flank from 
the opposite side of a creek on the left. Colonel Scribner 
halted, to throw out troops to cover his flank, at the crisis of 
the assault, and it was soon evident that it had failed. The 
Confederate general, Cleburne, threw his reserves and an en- 
filading fire upon Wood's left flank, and forced it back, and 
his right at the same time was subjected to a cross-fire of ar- 
tillery and musketry, and was also without support, as McLean 
had not shown himself to the enemy nor opened fire. As 
both of Wood's flanks were melting away under a most de- 
structive fire, General Howard ordered the withdrawal of the 
column. The retirement was made with such deliberation as 
permitted the removal of the wounded. General Johnson 



80 ETOWAH — ALLATOOXA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

withdrew to the left and rear of the main line, and General 
Wood to a ridge farther to the front and right. General 
McLean withdrew entirely, and left the two divisions in com- 
plete isolation. 

neral Wood lost over ' fourteen hundred men killed, 
wounded, and missing. General Johnson's loss was slight in 
comparison, but was himself severely wounded. The reported 
loss of the enemy was four hundred and fifty. 

Two advantages resulted from this unsuccessful assault, 
though dearly purchased. A position was secured far on the 
enemy's right, which was of importance to subsequent move- 
ments, and it was clearly developed that Johnston's right 
would be found in strength wherever a column might go to 
turn it. At night, Wood and Johnson intrenched their re- 
spective positions. 

During the day, the enemy came out of his works in front 
of Newton's division, but was handsomely repulsed by Wag- 
ner's and Kimball's brigades. Colonel Daniel McCook's bri- 
gade of General Davis' division seized a mountain pass in 
the rebel center, and held it against a night attack by troops 
from Folk's corps. 

General McPherson found it impracticable to move to the 
left, in compliance with General Sherman's orders. General 
Johnston was meditating offensive action, and pressed the na- 
tional lines throughout their length in search for an opportu- 
nity to strike an effective blow. Each commander was watch- 
ing for an advantage, and yet each was " duly cautious in the 
obscurity of the ambushed ground." During the 28th, there 
was brisk skirmishing from flank to flank. General Sherman 
was waiting for McPherson's movement to the left, to make 
effort to turn General Johnston's position, and the latter was 
planning a battle for the next day. At night, General Hood 
was instructed to attack the national left the next morning at 
dawn, and the remainder of the army was ordered to join in 
the action, successively from right to left. 

General Hood advanced, but finding an intrenched flank, 
refrained from attack and asked for instructions. As this 
delay (Ideated the surprise, that was intended, in the initia- 
tive, Hood was recalled. But in the evening General John- 



ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 81 

ston attacked McPhorson, as lie was in effort to leave position 
to close up on the center of the national line. Fortunately 
the Army of the Tennessee had not moved far from the de- 
fenses, and repulsed Hardee's corps with great loss. As a 
feint, to cover the assault upon McPherson, the enemy demon- 
strated in front of Stanley and Newton, and at intervals during 
the day there was artillery action and skirmishing throughout 
the battle front. 

As General McPherson did not change position, there were 
only slight changes at other points in the line. A brigade of 
Stanley's division was thrown between Schofield and Wood, 
and Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division was 
placed in position about half-way toward General Hooker. 
The chasm here was three miles wide. Colonel Mitchell in- 
■frenched thoroughly, and cut roads to his rear to facilitate the 
closing up of the right wing upon the center at New Hope 
Church. 

The purpose to move the whole line to the left was not 
abandoned by General Sherman, though the repeated attempts 
of General McPherson to leave position, during the last days 
of the month, invited the enemy's attacks. 

During the month of May, the Army of the Cumberland 
lost about nine thousand men. Sixty-six officers and ten hun- 
dred and ninety enlisted men Were killed ; three hundred and 
one officers, and six thousand four hundred and fifty-one en- 
listed men were wounded, and eight officers and eight hundred 
and fifty-eight men were missing from the three corps of in- 
fantry. Colonels A. S. McDougall, One Hundred and Twenty- 
third New York, and John H. Patrick, Fifth Ohio, fell at New 
Hope Church, and Colonel Gilbert, Nineteenth Michigan, was 
mortally wounded ; Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Lloyd, One Hun- 
dred and Nineteenth New York, was killed at Resaca. The 
army captured one thousand four hundred and seventy-seven 
prisoners, and received five hundred and fifty deserters. 

As General Sherman had held his armies before General 

Johnston, near Dallas, he had not made effort to ascertain 

with what force Allatoona was held, to turn which stronghold 

was his primary object in moving his armies to the right. He 

VOL. II — 6 



82 ETOWAH— -ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

had ordered General Blair to move to that point, but on the 
first of June be was still ['-av in the rear. But as at this time 
General McPherson effected his own disloclgment from the 
position thai had been so closely watched by the enemy, and 
the united armies could move by the left flank, General Sher- 
man ordered General Garrard to move to the east end of 
A Hat oona Pass, and General Stoneman to the west with, in- 
structions to fight cavalry with cavalry, and infantry with 
dismounted cavalry. 

As General McPherson's army, by divisions, approached 
New I [ope Church, the divisions of the Twentieth Corps 
moved to the left of Johnson's division, which had held the 
extreme left since the 27th of May. Davis' division relieved 
Hovey's of the Twenty-third Corps, and Baird's advanced 
from Burnt Hickory to Johnson's rear. Schofield's troops 
passed to Hooker's left. At night, Garrard and Stoneman 
were at Allatoona. 

On the 2d, Hooker moved to the left of Schofield, and Baird 
moved to Johnson's left, when Hooker, Schofield, and Baird 
moved on a right wheel, drove back the enemy's skirmishers, 
and threw General Johnston farther from the roads leading to 
Ackworth and Allatoona ; and yet, in front of the new posi- 
tions on the left, finished defenses were found. The move- 
ments of the day were embarrassed by a rain-storm, which 
flushed the creeks and softened the ground. 

During the 4th and 5th, the national line was gradually ex- 
tended to the left, and by successive steps was advanced to 
Johnston's immediate front. From first to last, each army 
fortified as it advanced, and the field-works from Dallas far 
toward Ackworth revealed to the future the proximity and 
nature of the belligerence of the two armies. When at last 
General Johnston perceived that General Sherman's move- 
ment to the left had given him an open way to Ackworth, he 
abandoned the position and threw his army upon the moun- 
tains and hills north and west of Marietta. 

The Army of the Cumberland rested on the 5th, and on the 
next day moved leisurely into position southwest of Ackworth : 
Hooker's corps, near the junction of the Sandtown road with 
the one leading from Burnt Hickory to Marietta ; Palmer's on 



ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 83 

his left, and Howard's at Durham's house, three miles from 
Ackworth. McPherson was now on the left and Schofield on 
the right. As all the troops had been under fire for several 
consecutive days, though there had been no general battle, a 
rest until the 10th was declared. During this period, the re- 
pair of the railroad was hastened, and Allatoona was fortified 
as a secondary base of supplies. 

June 8th, General Blair reached Ackworth with nine thou- 
sand men, having left fifteen hundred as a garrison at Alla- 
toona. This reinforcement restored the grand aggregate of 
the armies again. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

We have secured two good bridges and an excellent ford across the 
Etowah. Our cars are now arriving with stores. I give two days' rest, to 
replenish and fit up. On the 23d, I will cross the Etowah and move on Dal- 
las. This will turn the Allatoona Pass. If Johnston remain at Allatoona, 
I shall move on Marietta; but if he fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will 
make for Sandtown and Campbellton, but feign at the railroad crossing. 

General Davis' division occupies Rome, and finds a good deal of provis- 
ions and plunder — fine iron-works and machinery. I have ordered the 
Seventeenth Corps, General Blair's, to march from Decatur to Rome. My 
share of militia should be sent at once, to cover our lines of communica- 
tion. Notify General Grant that I will hold all of Johnston's army too 
busy to send anything against him. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 10.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 22, 1864. 

II. The several armies will move punctually to-morrow morning, pro- 
vided as heretofore ordered, by separate roads, aiming to reach the posi- 
tions hereinafter assigned them in the course of the third day, and in 
the meantime each wing communicating freely with the center by cross- 
roads. 

The Army of the Cumberland will move on Dallas by Euharley and 
Stilesboro ; the division of General Jeff. C. Davis, now at Rome, marching 
direct for Dallas by Van Wert. The Army of the Ohio will move for posi- 
tion on the left, via Richland creek and Burnt Hickory or Huntsville. 



84 ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH. 

The Army of the Tennessee will move, via Van Wert, to a position on the 
head of Pumpkin Vine creek, south of Dallas. 
'ill Marietta is the objective point, and the enemy is supposed to be 
in force at AUatoona, but with cavalry all along the line of the Etowah. 
Henceforth great caution must be exercised to cover and protect trains. 
********* 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. ^ ^ DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 23, 1864. 

' Blair, Huntsville, Ala. : 

We are now all in motion for the Chattahoochee. Colonel Long tele- 

graphs from Pulaski, and should overtake you at Decatur, or soon after 

ng. Although you must move on Rome and Kingston by the direct 

still you can make believe you have designs on Gadsden and Talla- 

Keep silent, and the enemy will exaggerate your strength and 

oses. Johnston has called to him all the infantry of the Southwest, 

and also the cavalry of Mississippi, so you must look out for them. If 

they hang around you, keep Long close in, and watch the opportunity for 

him to charge with sabers. 

h W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
General : — If you can 't drive the enemy from his position, work to the 
left, so as to connect with Hooker. 

We are working on the left of the line in front of us, and as soon as you 
are in connection with General Hooker, I will strengthen the left, and 
work round in that direction, so we may, if we choose, march round their 
extreme right, and reach Marietta or Ackworth. 

Yours, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major- General Commanding. 
General McPherson, Dallas, Ga. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

Near Dallas, May 28, 1864. 

il Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

The enemy discovered my move to turn AUatoona, and moved to meet 

us lure. Our columns met about one mile east of Pumpkin Vine creek, 

and we pushed them back about three miles, to the point where the road 

forks to AUatoona and Marietta. Here Johnston has chosen a strong line, 

and made hasty but strong parapets of timber and earth, and has thus 

far stopped us. My right is at Dallas, center about three miles north, and 



ETOWAH ALLATOONA NEW HOPE CHURCH. 85 

I am gradually working around by the left, to approach the railroad 
anywhere in front of Ackworth. 

Country very densely wooded and broken ; no roads of any conse- 
quence. We have had many sharp encounters, but nothing decisive. 
Both sides duly cautious in the obscurity of the ambushed ground. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Dallas, May 30, 1864. 
General HaUeck, Washington, D. C. : 

To move General McPherson up to the center, he has had to make a 
retrogade of a mile or so, owing to difficult ground. Every time he at- 
tempted to withdraw division by division, the enemy attacked his whole 
line; it may be on the theory that we wanted to draw off altogether. 
These assaults were made in the night, and were all repulsed with 
comparatively small loss to us, but seemingly heavy to the enemy. If 
we can induce the enemy to attack us, it is to our advantage. 

Do n't expect us to make much progress toward the Chattahoochee till 
Blair comes up, and moves into Allatoona Pass. 

********* 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Ackworth, June 8, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, I). C. : 

General Blair arrived to-day, with two divisions of the Seventeenth 
Army Corps, about nine thousand (9,000) strong, having left about fifteen 
hundred (1,500) in the Allatoona Pass, to fortify and hold it. Colonel 
Wright, railroad superintendent, reports he will have the Etowah bridge 
done by the 12th instant. 

To-morrow I will feel forward with cavalry, and follow with infantry 
the moment the enemy develops his designs. 

If he fights at Kenesaw Mountain, I will turn it; but if he selects the 
line of the Chattahoochee, then I must study the case a little before I 
commit myself. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding, 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN, INCLUDING THE BATTLE 
AT KULP'S HOUSE, ASSAULT OF THE MOUNTAIN, AND THE FLANK 
MOVEMENT. 

June 9th, General E. M. McCook, commanding the First 
division of cavalry, made a reconnoissance in front, and having 
driven back the enemy's pickets, formed a heavy line three 
miles in front of General Hooker, and observed the enemy in 
force on Pine Mountain. General Johnston's army now 
rested with its left on Lost Mountain, its center at Gilgath 
Church, and its right extended across the railroad. On the 
10th, Palmer's corps advanced southeasterly and confronted 
Pine Mountain, and skirmishing, gained an eminence within 
artillery range. Howard's corps, with Hooker's in rear, came 
abreast. The next day, Palmer and Howard advanced slightly, 
and moved by the left flank until Palmer's left touched Mc- 
Pherson's right at the railroad. General Johnston's position 
was now fully discovered. His lines extended over a series of 
hills from Kenesaw Mountain to Lost Mountain, with Pine 
Mountain fortified in front. Before him, the ground was so 
broken by ravines and so densely wooded as greatly to em- 
barrass the advance of the national armies. 

Two days of constant rain prevented all motion; but on 
the 14th, active overations were resumed. The Fourteenth 
Corps, carrying with it the left of the Fourth, advanced a 
mile. The right of the Fourth still rested in proximity to 
Pine Mountain, with the Twentieth Corps closed compactly 
upon it. During the day, Lieutenant-General Polk was 
killed upon the mountain by a cannon shot from one of the 
guns of Simonson's Indiana battery. The advanced position 
(86) 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAAV MOUNTAIN. 87 

being now well turned by the forward movement of the left 
of the national line, was abandoned the following night, and 
the troops withdrawn to the main line of intrenchments be- 
tween Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. 

It was not known that General Johnston had a second in- 
trenched line, and that he might not have time to construct 
one, General Sherman ordered an advance of his armies the 
next day. General Schofield was directed to threaten Lost 
Mountain ; General McPherson to turn Kenesaw Mountain on 
the left, and General Thomas to press the center with a view 
to its rupture. General Schofield carried a line of works in 
his immediate front, which had been left exposed by the aban- 
donment of Pine Mountain. General McPherson gained a 
hill on his left front, and General Thomas advanced a mile 
and a half in the center ; but as in all other cases, General 
Johnston had his key-points well fortified and strongly de- 
fended. Newton's and Geary's divisions, supported by the 
remaining divisions of the Fourth and Twentieth Corps, car- 
ried an intrenched skirmish line and advanced nearly to the 
main line. General Howard, deeming it unsafe to assault with- 
out a reconnoissance, restrained Newton ; but Geary pene- 
trated the abatis and maintained a conflict under the enemy's 
guns until dark, losing five hundred and thirty-four men. 
During the night, the two corps intrenched a line a short dis- 
tance from the enemy, and in the morning cannon responded 
to cannon, while the usual skirmishing prevailed between the 
armies. It being now evident to General Johnston that an 
assault could be made with fair prospect of success, he aban- 
doned six miles of good field-works and fell back to an in- 
trenched line on the Marietta side of Mud creek. 

Early on the morning of the 17th, General Thomas ordered 
an advance of his army. The Fourth and Twentieth Corps 
and the right of the Fourteenth moved over the abandoned 
fortifications in a southeasterly direction, and encountered a 
skirmish line in front of a series of hills extending southwest 
from Kenesaw Mountain. The ground was so favorable to 
the enemy that it was not until night that his skirmishers 
were driven across Mud creek, and during the night he made 
two attempts to dislodge the skirmishers of the Fourth Corps 



88 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

intrenched on the wesl Bide of the stream. The next morn- 
ing Generals Wood and Newton threw forward a strong 
line of skirmishers, and partially surprising the enemy, secured 
a portion of his main line. General Harker, of Newton's 
division, without waiting for orders, deployed two regiments 
to hold the position. Perceiving the advantage, General How- 
ard ordered General Newton to move up his entire division in 
support. ( reneral Wood gained the ridge across the creek on 
the right and intrenched, and General Baird moved his division 
promptly on General Newton's left. As soon as it was dark, 
Newton's division intrenched within less than one hundred 
yards of the enemy's works. The advantage gained was de- 
cisive. < reneral Johnston's new line was nearly perpendicular 
in direction to his old one, and that portion of the latter which 
he had lost was so related to the former that a successful as- 
sault was practicable. This General Thomas ordered for the 
next day, but the enemy withdrew before morning. 

Early the following morning, General Thomas ordered an 
advance to ascertain how far General Johnston had receded. 
The Fourth Corps, Stanley's division leading, moved forward, 
and driving the enemy across Nose's creek, halted on- the Avest 
bank ; the Twentieth Corps crossed the creek late in the day, 
and formed with its left in proximity to the right of the 
Fourth ; and the Fourteenth advanced toward Kenesaw 
Mountain and rested in line in proximity to its base, touching 
with its right the left of the Fourth. General Johnston's po- 
sition was now well defined. Hood's corps was covering 
Marietta on the northeast; Loring's was holding Kenesaw 
Mountain, and Hardee's extended from the mountain to the 
road from Lost Mountain to Marietta. His lines were in view 
running along the base of the large mountain over the small 
one, and thence on the hills to the southwest. The large 
mountain was his salient, and from it right and left he drew 
back his flanks to cover Marietta and his communications. 
The position was one of great strength, thoroughly intrenched, 
and covered against approach by entanglements of every type. 

Through three weeks of rain, General Sherman had been 
pressing the enemy from position to position, but it was now 
apparent that General Johnston must maintain his ground or 



OrERATIOXS XEAR KENESAW MOUXTAIN. 89 

defend Atlanta much nearer its gates. That he might reach 
round his army toward his communications, General Sherman 
determined to move his armies by the right flank, hut not at 
first to uncover his depot of supplies at Big Shanty, and while 
he put the Army of the Cumberland in motion to the right, 
he held the Army of the Tennessee east of the railroad, in 
readiness, at call, or when the noise of battle should reveal 
the necessity to move also to the right. 

On the morning of the 20th, General Wood's division and 
one brigade of General Stanley's moved to the right to relieve 
General Williams' division, that the latter might co-operate 
with General Schofield whose advance was resisted on the Sand- 
town road. During the forenoon, General Stanley, with Whit- 
taker's and Kirby's brigades, crossed Nose's creek and in- 
trenched a line, and in the afternoon Whittaker carried a 
wooded hill in his front and Kirby a bald one before him. 
The former barricaded at once, and held his position against 
repeated and furious assaults of the enemy, but the latter hav- 
ing been less prompt in constructing defenses, was driven 
back. ■ At dark, the extended right of the Fourteenth Corps 
touched the left of the Fourth, and Williams' division was in 
connection with General Schofield's left. 

The next morning, General Newton's division was relieved 
by a division from General Palmer's corps, when it moved to 
the right of General Wood. This accomplished, General 
Howard ordered Kirby's brigade and Nodine's, the left bri- 
gade of General Wood's division, to regain the hill which 
Kirby had lost the evening previous. It had been intrenched 
by the enemy during the night, and his artillery bore upon it, 
but these brigades carried it handsomely and intrenched its 
crest, under the fire of two of the enemy's batteries. General 
Wood then pushed two regiments to the front and right, and 
gained an eminence which commanded a long intrenched 
skirmish line, and permitted the advance of the right of the 
Fourth Corps a distance of five hundred yards. General 
Hooker advanced with his left abreast of General Howard's 
right, against all the resistance the enemy could offer. This 
movement was so threatening, that General Johnston trans- 
ferred Hood's corps from his right to his left, leaving on\y 



90 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

Wheeler's cavalry in front of the Army of the Tennessee, and 
made three unsuccessful assaults during the night to dislodge 

General Wood. .,,-«, > r *. 

The removal of this corps from General McPherson s front 
waB go thoroughly covered by the activity of Wheeler's troop- 
ers t liit he was led to believe that there was a concentration 
rather than a vacuum behind their bold front. But though 
General Johnston succeeded in hiding the uncovering of his 
,.,,,],,, :m ,i the heavy concentration on his left, his subsequent 
aggression resulted in signal defeat. He gained, however, in 
defensive strength at the very point it was most needed, and 
defeated the combination to turn his left, and in fact defeated 
for a time all efforts to dislodge him. General Sherman's plan 
proposed that General McPherson should, " at the first pos- 
sible chance, push forward on the line of the railroad and 
main Marietta road, break through the enemy and pursue 
him, or secure a position on the commanding ridge over which 
.' roads pass," while the movement of the Army of the 
Cumberland toward General Schofield, who was searching for 
the enemy's left flank, should cause him to lengthen his line 
- beyond his ability to defend," and give an opportunity to 
break it, by a quick and energetic blow. This maneuver en- 
tirely failed in its final development through the transfer of 
Hood's corps from the right to the left, so secretly that it was 
in battle against Hooker's corps, on the Powder Spring road, 
before it was ascertained that it was not still before McPher- 
son. 

The movements ordered by General Sherman for the 22d, 
had reference to preparation for attack upon Johnston's left 
flank. He directed General Schofield to cross Nose's creek, 
and turn the head of his column up toward Marietta until he 
reached Hooker, and deploy south of the Marietta and Pow- 
der Spring road; while General Hooker was ordered to get 
possession of the ground, if practicable, up to Mrs. Kulp's, 
and deploy with his right resting on the Powder Spring road. 
This accomplished, the remainder of General Thomas' line 
was to be advanced in conformity. General McPherson was 
instructed to press the enemy in his front, to cover Big 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 91 

Shanty, and hold his rear massed in readiness to support 
General Thomas, should he become heavily engaged. 

At 3 a. m. on the 22d, Cobham's detachment of Geary's di- 
vision drove the enemy from the hill a mile in front of the 
center of the Twentieth Corps. The whole division soon fol- 
lowed, and intrenched a commanding ridge, reversing the 
works of the enemy, and covering artillery as well as infantry 
lines. Subsequently, Williams' division advanced to Geary's 
right, and Butterfield's to his left, each skirmishing into posi- 
tion. The corps did" not form a continuous line, but each 
division occupied a hill with slopes to right and left, and 
between Williams' left and Geary's right there was a swampy 
ravine. Williams' right rested on the Powder Spring road, 
at Kulp's house, and his division was formed with Ruger's 
brigade on the right, Knipe's in the center, and Robinson's 
on the left. In front of Robinson, who held a lateral hill, 
slightly refused, there was an open space extending to Geary's 
front. The ground was open before Knipe, except in front 
of his left, and almost entirely wooded in Ruger's front. Gen- 
eral Williams' placed Winegar's and Woodbury's batteries 
before his center and left so as to command all the open 
ground. When the Twentieth Corps had attained this ad- 
vanced position, General Howard moved his line forward in 
correspondence. 

At 3 p. m., General Williams was informed that Hood's corps . 
was massed before him. Reporting the fact to General Hooker, 
he was directed to deploy his division and construct breast- 
works without delay. He had, however, no time to construct 
defenses, and barely enough for array, before the enemy was 
seen to emerge from the woods beyond the open space in his 
front and dash toward his lines. The formation in triple lines 
and the peculiar shout of the troops forming them, alike, pre- 
saged an assault. The movement was begun with the enemy'a 
usual spirit, but Woodbury's canister swept the open ground 
with such destructive effect that the enemy was soon thrown 
into confusion and retreat. A portion of the column was driven 
directly back, and the remainder was forced by volleys from 
Knipe's line and Ruger's left, to seek cover in a ravine and 
dense clump of trees and underbrush, on Knipe's left front. 



92 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

A 3e cond column moved directly against Robinson's position, 

being exposed in the open ground to a direct fire from 
Winegar's battery, and an enfilading one from Geary's guns 
on the left, was also thrown into confusion and rout. As afinal 
effort the rebel troops who bad taken shelter in the ravine and 

Is, having been reinforced from the rear, attempted to turn 
Knipe's lefl think by a stealthy advance under cover; but the 
movement having been perceived, Winegar's battery and 

y's artillery again opened. The Sixty -first Ohio of Robin- 
son's brigade advanced to support the endangered flank, and 
the concentric lire of artillery and musketry soon completed 
the repulse of the enemy. While Hood's attack was in pro- 

-. heavy cannonading was maintained throughout the front 
of the Army of the Cumberland. 

In the repulse of Hood's attack, General Hooker's artillery 
was so remarkably effective, that General Johnston admitted 
in his official report that bis troops, Stevenson's and Hindman's 
divisions', were compelled to withdraw by the fire of fortified 
artillery. His loss was exceedingly heavy; General Hooker's 
very light. General Williams, who alone was directly assailed, 
lost only one hundred and thirty men, including nineteen cap- 
bured on the picket line by the sudden advance of the enemy. 
Major D. C. Becket, of the Sixty-first Ohio, was killed. 

As soon as the character of the attack upon General Hooker 
was developed, General Thomas made provision for his support. 
The reserve regiments of the Fourth Corps were immediately 
.thrown to the right, and as soon as practicable, Butterfield's 
division was relieved by Stanley's, and moved to the rear of 
Williams' right . These dispositions were sufficient for defense, 
but the transfer of* Hood's corps to General Johnston's left 
flank, necessitated a new combination, either to turn his posi- 
tion or break through his lines. General Thomas suggested 
that General McPherson should attack Marietta from the east 
side of Kenesaw Mountain; but General Sherman decided to 
attack General Johnston's fortified lines near his center, and 
on the 24th, directed Generals McPherson and Thomas to make 
] .reparations to assault on the 27th — the former near Little 
Kenesaw, and the latter about a mile to the south, in front of 
the Fourth Corps. 



OPERATIONS NEAR KEXESAW MOUNTAIN. 93 

General Thomas designated Davis' and Newton's divisions 
to form the assaulting column, and during the night of the 
25th, Davis' and Baird's divisions having been relieved on the 
left of the Army of the Cumberland by General McPherson's 
troops, moved to the rear of the Fourth Corps. On the morn- 
ing of the 27th, Morgan's brigade of Davis' division occupied 
the intrenchments thrown up by "Whittaker's brigade of Stan- 
ley's division. Stanley moved to the left to support ISTewton, 
and Baird held his division in direct support on Davis' right. 
Hooker's whole corps was held in readiness to support Palmer's 
and Howard's. 

At 8 a. m. the preparations were complete. The brigades of 
Colonels Daniel McCook and J. G. Mitchell were massed in 
rear of the intrenchments held by Morgan's brigade, as there 
was no cover for formation in front. Their point of attack 
was a salient in the enemy's works, conforming to a projection 
in the ridge, around whose summit his fortifications were built, 
and was selected in consequence of the absence of obstructions 
in front. Newton's division was formed with Harker's and 
Wagner's brigades in line, slightly separated for better cover, 
and Kimball's in echelon with Wagner's. For fifteen minutes 
all the artillery available, poured a concentrated fire upon the 
points of attack, and then the columns moved forward. From 
the moment that McCook's and Mitchell's brigades bounded 
over their intrenchments, they were subjected to a galling fire 
of artillery and musketry. The distance to the enemy's works 
was about six hundred yards, and the ground was rough and 
partially covered with trees and undergrowth ; but disregard- 
ing the fire of the enemy and the difficulties of the way, these 
brigades advanced rapidly until they were under the guns of 
the enemy. They reached his works, but such was their 
strength, and the spirit of the heavy forces behind them, and 
such their own exhaustion, that they were compelled to 
halt. At this juncture, their situation was exceedingly 
critical. To carry the works was impracticable ; to retreat, 
threatened almost total destruction, and the maintenance of 
position likewise involved great hazard and loss. As, how- 
ever, it was soon ascertained that it was possible to so far 
restrain the fire of the enemy by a vigorous response that 
defenses could be constructed, General Thomas directed 



04 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

General Davis to hold the position and fortify it. Intrenching 
tool8 weTe a i once sent forward, and works were thrown up 
within afew yards of the enemy. The loss in the advance and 
during theday was very great. Colonel McCook fell early mor- 
tally wounded ; Colonel Harmon, the next in rank, was soon 
after killed, when the command fell to Colonel Dilworth. 
Lieutenant-Colonel James Shane and Major John Yager of 
Mitchell's brigade received fatal wounds, and from hoth bri- 
gades a very Large number of officers and men were killed and 

wounded. 

The conditions of Newton's assault were somewhat differ- 
ent, and so was the result. His troops were less exposed in 
the' advance, but the formidable obstructions and entangle- 
in, ins held them to a terrific fire under circumstances that for- 
bade its restraint. As a consequence, he was compelled to 
withdraw his division altogether as soon as it was evident 
thai the assault could not be successful. At the moment of 
making a second effort to advance, General Harker was 
mortally wounded, and in his brigade and in Wagner's the 
loss was very great. Some were killed on the enemy's para- 
pet. 

The aggregate loss to Davis and Newton, in nearly equal 
division, was fifteen hundred and eighty killed, wounded, and 
missing. The compensation was the lodgment of troops in 
proximity to works too strong to be assaulted, and the in- 
fliction of a loss to the enemy of two hundred and thirty-six 
men, including one hundred captured. The officers and men 
engaged in this assault " went to their work with the greatest 
coolness and gallantry," as General Thomas testified, but their 
valor and sacrifice brought no adequate reward. 

During the progress of the action* in the center, Generals 
McPherson and Schofield demonstrated strongly on the ene- 
my's Hanks. The former threw a portion of his army against 
a spur of Little Kenesaw, and though he attained position 
near the enemy, did not disturb his line. The latter gained 
some advantage at Olley's creek, as opening the way for an- 
other flank movement to the right. 

Thus far in the campaign, Generals Sherman and Johnston 
Lad each kept up the most persistent belligerence to keep the 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 95 

other from detaching troops to Virginia. But on the 28th, 
General Grant authorized General Sherman to make his move- 
ments without reference to the retention of General Johnston's 
forces where they were. This independence and the necessity 
of active offense induced immediate preparation for an effort 
to reach General Johnston's communications. As the ac- 
complishment of this project necessitated the temporary 
abandonment of the railroad, General Sherman proposed, 
should the development of his movement cause General John- 
ston to abandon Marietta, to swing in upon the road in his 
rear, but should he hold that position, to strike it between him 
.and the Chattahoochee bridge. 

The Army of the Cumberland lost during the month five 
thousand seven hundred and forty-seven men— sixty-seven offi- 
cers killed, two hundred and fifty-nine wounded, and eight 
missing, and eight hundred and seventy-three enlisted men 
killed, four thousand three hundred wounded, and forty miss- 
ing. The army captured seven hundred and forty-two 
prisoners, including thirty-seven officers, and received five 
hundred and two deserters at Nashville and Chattanooga. 

During the month, the enemy's cavalry in small parties, 
assisted by guerrillas and disloyal citizens, w&s exceedingly 
active along the railroad south of Dalton, but wrought no 
damage beyond slight interruptions and the destruction of a 
few cars. On the 10th, the "District of the Etowah" was 
oreated, with General Steedman in command, who was charged 
with the protection of the line of supply south from Chatta- 
nooga. Soon after, the district commander sent Colonel Wat- 
kins' brigade of cavalry to Lafayette, and a few days later it 
was attacked by General Pillow with about two thousand 
men. Colonel Watkins refused to surrender, and with four 
hundred men defended the town until reinforced by Colonel 
Oroxton, commanding the Fourth Kentucky Mounted In- 
fantry, whose vigorous attack routed the enemy. Pillow's 
loss was about three hundred men, including eighty captured. 
Watkins and Croxton lost sixty. On the 28th, Brigadier- 
General Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps arrived at 
Chattanooga, and was soon after disposed to protect the rail- 
road north from Allatoona. 



96 OPERATIONS XKAli KKXESAW MOUXTAIX. 

As these troops gave assurance of secure communications, 
and as supplies had been accumulated in such quantity as to 
warrant the temporary abandonment of the railroad, General 
Sherman gave orders," July 1st, lor the movement of his armies 
to the right, to turn the position ho had failed to carry by 
assault. I Ii^ orders required that General Thomas should 
hold bis intrenchments and observe the enemy until General 
McPherson should pass to the right in menace to Johnston's 
rear. General McPherson moved his army on the 2d, and the 
night following General Johnston withdrew his army, and 
when morning dawned, was far on his way to other intrench- 
ments. In the pursuit, the Army of the Cumberland first 
converged upon Marietta, and then moved on the direct roads 
t<> Atlanta. The enemy's rear-guard was overtaken four 
miles from Marietta, and driven forward to Ruff's station, 
where Ins forces were found in strong earthworks, constructed 
long before in provision for retreat. The lines of the Army 
of the Cumberland were speedily formed, and at midnight 
were again in closest proximity to the enemy. General Sher- 
man urged bis army commanders to extreme activity and vigor 
to press the enemy in confusion upon the bridges across the 
Chattahoochee* But General Johnston was secure against direct 
attack. His forecast of the possibilities of the unequal war- 
fare bad been so exhaustive that his steps from one intrenched 
position to another had all been anticipated. He held his 
works at Ruff's station and on his left flank against General 
McPherson, until Hood's and Loring's corps were across the 
( 'liattahoochce, and then placed Hardee's corps in his intrench- 
ments on the right bank of the river to cover the bridges. 

General Sherman's plans were soon formed, though their 
execution was deferred to give rest to his armies, perfect his 
communications, and accumulate supplies in proximate depots, 
thai he migbt be free from daily dependence upon the contin- 
uity of his communications in the next stage of his cam- 
paign. He proposed to make the next advance from his left, 
and the initial dispositions were such as at the same time to 
protect his communications against an anticipated cavalry 
raid north of Marietta. While holding the main portion of the 
Army of the Cumberland firmly against Hardee's corps in his 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 97 

defenses, and feigning with the Army of the Tennessee and 
Stoneman's cavalry far down to the right, lie threw Garrard's 
cavalry to Roswell, and disposed the Army of the Ohio, and 
portions of the Fourth Corps, to secure and fortify the cross- 
ings from Roswell to Paice's ferry. Between the 6th and 9th, 
two heads of column crossed the river, one at Roswell and 
the other at Phillips' ferry ; and to give security to the cross- 
ings, strong defenses were thrown up on the enemy's side of 
the river. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 20.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Acworth, Ga., June 9, 1864. 
The armies will move forward to-morrow morning. 

I. Major-General Thomas, the center, on the Burnt Hickory and the 
Marietta road, and such other roads as he may choose between it and the 
Acworth and Marietta road, aiming to strike the northern end of Kene- 
saw Mountain. 

II. Major-General McPherson will move by the Acworth and Marietta 
road, with a column following the railroad, and his cavalry well to the 
left after passing Big Shanty. 

III. Major-General Schofield will cover his wagons well about Mount 
Olive Church, and feel well with cavalry and skirmishers down the road 
past Hardshell Church, to ascertain the enemy's strength about Lost 
Mountain and the ridge connecting it with Kenesaw Mountain. He will 
not pass position about Hardshell Church in force until he is certain Major- 
General Thomas has reached some point on Kenesaw. 

IV. The object will be to develop the enemy's position and strength, 
and to draw artillery fire from his intrenched works. . . . 

V. Major-General Stoneman's cavalry will cover the right, and Brigadier- 
General Garrard's the left flanks. Brigadier-General McCook's cavalry 
should be kept to the rear, or to keep up communications. 

VI. The movement will begin at six (6) o'clock a. m., and continue until 
some one of the columns reaches Kenesaw Mountain, or until the center 
is checked. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

R. M. SAWYER 

Aid-de-Camp. 

vol. n — 7 



98 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Big Shanty, June 11, 1864. 

tl Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

Johnston is intrenched on the hills embracing Lost Mountain, Pine 

1 1 iil. ;unl Eenesaw. Our lines are down to him, but it has rained so hard, 

and the ground is so boggy, that we have not developed any weak point or 

Hank. 

I will proceed with due caution, and try and make no mistake. The 
Etowah bridge is done, and the construction train has been to our very 
camps. Supplies will now be accumulated at Allatoona Pass, or brought 
right up to our Lines. 

One of my chief objects being to give full employment to Joe John- 
ston, it makes no difference where he is, so he is not on his way to Vir- 
ginia. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 13, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

We have had hard and cold rains for about ten days. A gleam of sun- 
shine this evening gives hope of a change. The roads are insufficient 
here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As 
soon as possible I will study Johnston's position on Kenesaw and Lost 
Mountain, and adopt some plan to dislodge him or draw him out of his 
position. We can not risk the heavy losses of an assault at this distance 
from our base. Cars now run to our very front camps. All well. 

There are troops enough in Kentucky to manage Morgan, and in Ten- 
nessee to watch Forrest should he make his appearance, as Johnston 
doubtless calculates. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 16, 1864. 
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

General Thomas did not make the progress last night I expected. He 
found the enemy strongly intrenched on a line slightly advanced from 
a straight line connecting Lost and Kenesaw Mountain. I have been 
along it to-day, and am pressing up close. Shall study it, and am 
now inclined to feign on both flanks, and assault the center. It may 
cost us dear, but in result would surpass an attempt to pass round. The 
enemy has a strong position, and covers his road well, and the only 
weak point in the game is in having the Chattahoochee in his rear. If, 
by assaulting, I can break his line, I see no reason why it should not pro- 
duce a decisive effect. I know he shifts his troops about to meet our 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 99 

supposed attacks, and thereby fatigues his men, and the woods will 
enable me to ma6k our movements. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 21, 18G4. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather 
as far off as ever. The roads are impassable, and fields and woods be- 
come quagmires after a few wagons have crossed, yet we are at work all 
the time. The left flank is across Novaday, and the right across Nose's 
creek. The enemy holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta 
behind it, and has retired his flanks to cover that town and his rail- 
road. I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will 
permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding, 

Headqtarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, June 22, 1864. 
General: — I will start early to look at the position of McPherson as 
near the north base of Kenesaw as I can safely do, and then come to 
Wallace's, or the house in front, and then over to Hooker. I have ordered 
Schofield to cross his whole command over Nose's creek, and turn the 
head of his column up toward Marietta, until he reaches Hooker, to sup- 
port and co-operate on his right, but to keep his cavalry and a part of hi3 
rear infantry on the Sandtown road, prepared to regain it in case the enemy 
shows signs of let go. I fear we will get our commands too close, but I 
suppose Schofield can find room to deploy south of the Powder Springs 
and Marietta road. You may order Hooker to extend to that road and 
leave Schofield beyond. If he can get possession of the ground up to 
Mrs. Kulp's house, I wish him to do so, and the balance of your line to 
conform. I will explain McPherson's orders when I meet you. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
General : — "When on the hill in front of your center to-day, waiting for 
you, I signaled General Hooker : 

" How are you getting along ? Near what house are you ? 

" W. T. Sherman, 

"Major-General." 



100 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

At this hour (91) I have received this answer: 

" Kulp House — 5.30 p. m. 
" We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only ap- 
prehension being from our extreme right flank. Three (3) entire corps 

are in front of us. „,,,-, TT » 

' Major-General Hooker. 

I was at the Wallace house at 5.30 p. m., and the Kulp house was within 
two miles; and though I heard some cannonading, I had no idea of his 
being attacked, and General Hooker must be mistaken about three (3) 
corps being in his front. Johnston's army has only three corps, and I 
know there was a respectable force along McPherson's front ; so much so, 
that this general thought the enemy was massing against him. I know there 
was some force in front of Palmer and Howard, for I was there. Still, it is 
very natural the enemy should meet Hooker at that point in force, and I 
gave Schofield orders this morning to conduct his column from Nose's 
creek, on the Powder Spring road, toward Marietta, and support Hooker's 
right flank, sending his cavalry down the Powder Spring road toward Sweet- 
r, and leaving some infantry from his rear to guard the fords. Cap- 
t.iin Dayton says that General Schofield received my orders, which were 
in writing. If later information shows that Schofield is not up, send a 
staff officer and notify him of the necessity, and, if need be, call off all 
of Palmer's, and notify McPherson, who has orders for this very contin- 
gency. To-morrow, if need be, we must bring things to a crisis. 

Cars and telegraph now all right. Some of John E. Smith's men are 

at Chattanooga, so that I think our road will be better guarded. The 

cavalry of Lowe should be out on the Tennessee road, patrolling from 

Cartersville to Spring Place. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864. 
General: — General Hooker, this p. m., advanced to the Kulp house, 
two and half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports finding three (3) 
corps. He was attacked twice, and successfully repulsed the enemy. 
General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics, and that you 
ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but I judge the safer 
ami better plan to be the one I indicated, viz., for you to leave a light 
force and cover that flank, and throw the remainder rapidly, and as much 
out of view as possible, to our right. 

You may make the necessary orders, and be prepared for rapid action 
to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of Kenesaw will do you 
as little mischief as possible. Yours, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 
Major- General McPherson, Commanding the Army of the Tennessee. 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 101 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 28.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 24, 18(14. 

The army commanders will make full reconnoissances and preparation 

to attack the enemy in force on the 27th instant, at eight (8) o'clock a. m. 

precisely. The commanding general will be on "Signal Hill," and will 

have telegraphic communication with all the army commanders. 

I. Major-General Thomas will assault the enemy at any point near his 
•center, to be selected by himself, and will make any changes in his troops 
necessary, by night, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy. 

II. Major-General McPherson will feign by a movement of his cavalry 
and one (1) division of infantry on his extreme left, approaching Marietta 
from the north, and using artillery freely ; but will make his real attack 
at a point south and west of Kenesaw. 

III. Major-General Schofield will feel to his extreme right, and threaten 
that flank of the enemy with artillery, and display, but attack some one 
point of the enemy's line as near the Marietta and Powder Spring road as 
he can with prospect of success. 

IV. All commanders will maintain reserve and secrecy, even from their 
staff officers, but make all proper preparations and reconnoissances. 
When troops are to be shifted to accomplish this attack, the movements 
will be made at night. At the time of the general attack, the skirmishers 
at the base of Kenesaw will take advantage of it, to gain, if possible, the 
summit, and hold it. 

V. Each attacking column will endeavor to break a single point of the 
enemy's line, and make a secure lodgment beyond, and be prepared for 
following it up toward Marietta and the railroad, in case of success. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 24, 1864. 
General : — I am directed by the major-general commanding to acknowl- 
edge the receipt through you of Rousseau's communication in copy, the 
original of which also came to hand. The general commanding thinks 
quite favorably of the suggestion therein, and desires you to instruct Gen- 
eral Rousseau to gradually collect his available force of cavalry and infantry 
at Pulaski, Athens, and Decatur, upon the representation of protecting 
our roads against Forrest, but really to strike as proposed ; the cavalry to be 
well fed, and the infantry stripped for light, rapid movements, and to be 
ready to move at telegraphic notice from us. The time to do it will be 

when we have forced Johnston across the Chattahoochee 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Mqjor-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding, etc. 



102 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,. 
In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 25, 1864. 
d Ilalleck, Washington, D. C. : 
I have nothing new to report; constant skirmishing and cannonading. 
I am making some changes in the disposition of our men, with a view to. 
attack the enemy's left center. I shall aim to make him stretch his line 
until he weakens it, and then break through. 

*********** 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding* 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi 
In the Field, June 27, 1S64 — 11.45 a. m. 
General Schqfield : 

Neither McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking through, but 
each has made substantial progress, at some cost. Push your operations 

on the flank, and keep me advised. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding* 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi^ 
In the Field, June 27, 1864 — 11.45 a. m. 
General Thomas : 

McPherson's column marched near the top of the hill through very 
tangled brush, but was repulsed ; it is found almost impossible to deploy, 
but they still hold the ground. I wish you to study well the positions, 
and, if it be possible, break through the line to do it; it is easier now than 
it will be hereafter. I hear Leggett's guns well behind the mountain. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding,. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi. 
In the Field, June 27, 1864 — 1.30 p. m. 
General Thomas : 

McPherson and Schofield are at a dead lock. Do you think you can 
carry any part of the enemy's main line to-day ? McPherson's men are 
up to the abatis, and can't move without direct assault. I will order an 
assault, if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one 
division close up on the Powder Spring road, and the other across Olley's 
creek, about two miles to his right and rear. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,. 

In the Field, June 27 — 2.25 p. m. 
General Thomas : 

Secure what advantageous ground you have gained ; but is there any- 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 103 

thing in the enemy's present position, that, if we should approach by reg- 
ular saps, he could not make a dozen new parapets before our saps are 
completed ? Does the nature of the ground warrant the time necessary 

for regular approaches ? 

011 W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 

June 27—10.45 a. m. 

Major-General Sherman : 

Yours received. Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces 

of the enemy's breastworks, and was repulsed with canister at short 

range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner's brigade of 

Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so severely handled 

that it is compelled to reorganize. Colonel Mitchell's brigade of Davis' 

division captured one line of rebel breastworks, which they still hold. 

McCook's brigade was also severely handled, nearly every colonel" being 

killed or wounded. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The 

troops are all too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all that we 

have gained. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, June 27. 
General Sherman : 

Your dispatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all the ground we have 
gained, and the division commanders report their ability to hold. They 
also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong ; in fact, so strong that 
they can not be carried by assault, except by immense sacrifice, even if 
they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the best chance is to ap- 
proach them by regular saps, if we can find a favorable approach to bat- 
ter them down. We have already lost heavily to-day, without gaining 
any material advantage. One or two more such assaults would use up 

this army. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 1864. 
General Halleck : 

Pursuant to my orders on the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank 
of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a. m. General 
McPherson, at the southwest end of the Kenesaw, and General Thomas 
at a point about a mile further south ; at tho same time, skirmishers and 
artillery along the whole line kept up a sharp fire. Neither attack sue. 



104 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

oeeded though both columns reached the enemy's works, which are very 

Btrong General McPherson reports his loss about five hundred, and 

General Thomas about two thousand ; the loss particularly heavy in gen- 

and'field officers. General Harker is reported mortally wounded; 

Colonel Dan. McCook, commanding brigade; Colonel Rice, Fifty- 

:], Ohio, vcy seriously. Colonels Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, and 

Augustine,Fifty-fifth Illinois, are killed. 

The facilities with which defensive works of timber and earth are con- 
Btructed, gives the party on the defensive great advantage 

I can not well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my 
railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as 
the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies^ of 
any kind here. I can press Johnston, and keep him from reinforcing 
Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can 
6pare. 

McPherson took, to-day, one hundred prisoners, and Thomas about 

as many, but I do not suppose that we have inflicted heavy loss on the 

enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets. 

J ' l W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

June 27, 1864—9 p. m. 
General Thomas : 

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our 
railroad ? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured 

the way. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, June 27. 
General Sherman : 

"What force do you think of moving with ? If with the greater part of 
the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks 
twelve feet thick, and strongly abatised. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major- General U. S. V. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi 

Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 
General Thomas : 

Let your troops fortify as close up to the enemy as possible. Get good 

positions for artillery, and group as conveniently as you can by corps and 

divisions, keeping reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within 

eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and he could move by that flank. 

The question of supplies will be the only one. I regret beyond measure 

the loss of two such young and dashing officers as Harker and McCook. 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 105 

McPherson lost two or three of his young and dashing officers, which is 
apt to be the case in unsuccessful assaults. Had we broken the line to- 
day, it would have been most decisive; but as it is, our loss is small com- 
pared with some of those east. It should not in the least discourage us. 
At times, assaults are necessary and inevitable. At Arkansas Post we 
succeeded ; at Yicksburg we failed. I do not think our loss to-day greater 
than Johnston's, when he attacked Hooker and Schofield the first day 

we occupied our present ground. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- Genera I Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 18G4. 
General McPherson : 

Is General Blair back ? Report to me fully his operations for to-day. 
Schofield' s right division (Cox) has gained a good position on the other 
side of Olley's creek and at the head of Nickajack. If we had our sup- 
plies well up, I would move by the right flank ; but suppose we must 

cover our railroad for a few days. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-G 'eneral Commanding. 



Washington, June 28, 18G4 — 4 p. m. 
Major-General Sherman •" 

General Grant directs me to say that the movements of your army may 
be made entirely independent of any desire to retain Johnston's forces 
where they are. He does not think that Lee will bring any more addi- 
tional troops to Richmond, on account of the difficulty of feeding them. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864. 
General Schofield: 

General Thomas is here. He will study the ground well, and prepare 
to relieve Hascall's division to-night, in which event I want you with your 
whole force to occupy between Olley's creek and Nickajack, to drive the 
enemy from the forks of the road, and picket as far down as Nickajack 
creek, and as far down on the Sandtown road as possible. At the same 
time, General Stoneman's cavalry, supported by McCook, should move 
across Sweetwater by Powder Springs, and down the west side of Sweet- 
water creek to Sweetwater town, which crossing once secured, Stoneman 
to hold it, and McCook to return to Lost Mountain. 

General McPherson's command to remain where it is until our stores 
are complete, when his cavalry will guard the roads from Marietta to- 
ward Allatoona, while McPherson moves with his whole command down 
the Sandtown road to the Chattahoochee. If Johnston holds on to 



106 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

K mesa* then wo must strike some point on the railroad, between Ma- 
rietta and the bridge; but if he lets go of Marietta, then we will swing 
acrosa the railroad, to a position that gives us again the use ot the rail- 

road - W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO 31.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

Ik the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, July 1, 1864. 

The object of the 'contemplated movement is to deprive the enemy of 

the great advantage he has in Kenesaw, as a watch-tower from which to 

observe our every movement, to force him to come out of his intrench- 

ments, or move further south. To attain this end: 

I All army commanders will till up their wagons at Big Shanty depot, 
to their utmost, with provisions, ammunition, and forage. The chief 
quartermaster and commissary will give all necessary orders to clean out 
the depots in front of Allatoona, and so instruct that the locomotives and 
cars will come forward of Allatoona with great caution, and only when or- 
dered by chief commmissary. 

II. Major-General Thomas will hold the ground below Kenesaw, as far 
as Olley's creek, near Mount Zion ; Major-General Schofield that from 
Olley's creek to Nickajack, and General McPherson will move his train 
and troops rapidly in a single march, and as little observed from Kenesaw 
as possible, to the Sandtown road, and down it to the extreme right, with 
one corps near the Widow Mitchell's, another near Ruff's mill on the 
Nickajack, and tin; the third in reserve, near the forks of the road. 

III. General Garrard's cavalry will cover the roads out of Marietta. 
which pass north of Kenesaw, and General Stoneman's cavalry will oc- 
cupy Sweetwater (old town), coincident with the movement of McPherson. 
General McCook will receive orders from General Thomas. In case the 
enemy presses Garrard back by superior and overwhelming forces, he 
will send one of his brigades to the flank of General Thomas, and will, 
with the others, fall back gradually toward Allatoona, disputing every 
foot of ground. 

IV. .Major-General McPherson will threaten the Chattahoochee river 
and also the railroad, and General Thomas will press the enemy close, 
and. at the very earliest possible moment, break his lines, and reach the 
railroad below Marietta. All movements must be vigorous and rapid, as 
the time allowed is limited by the supplies in our wagons. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de- Camp* 



OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 107 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
Marietta, Ga., July 3, 1864 — 10 a. m. 
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. ; 

The movement on our right caused the enemy to evacuate. Wo occu- 
pied Kenesaw at daylight, and Marietta at 8.} a. m. Thomas is moving 
down the main road toward the Chattahoochee ; McPherson toward the 
mouth of Nickajack, on the Sandtown road. Our cavalry is on the ex- 
treme flank. Whether the enemy will halt this side of the Chattahoochee 
or not will soon be known. Marietta is almost entirely abandoned by its 
inhabitants, and more than a mile of the railroad iron is removed betwen 
the town and the foot of Kenesaw. I propose to press the enemy close 
till he is across the Chattahoochee river, when I must accumulate store3 

and better guard my rear. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding, 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864. 
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

I telegraphed to you, and Mr. Secretary Stanton answers. Drop me a 
word now and then of advice and encouragement. I think I have done 
well to maintain such an army in this country, fighting for sixty (60) days, 
and yet my losses are made up by the natural increase. The assault I 
made was no mistake. I had to do it. The enemy, and our own army 
and officers, had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines 
formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found be- 
hind anything like a parapet, why everybody would deploy, throw up 
counter-works, and take it easy, leaving it to to the " Old Man " to turn 
the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor 
(mathematically), I would have put the head of George Thomas' whole 
army right through Johnston's deployed line on the best ground for " go- 
ahead," while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to 
my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck 
down so early, the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle 
would have all been in our favor, on account of our superiority of num- 
bers and initiative. Even as it was, Johnston has been much more cau- 
tious since, and gave ground more freely. His next fighting line (Smyrna 
camp-ground) he only held one day. 

* -K * * *• * * * # 

Write me a note occasionally, and suggest anything that may occur to 
you, as I am really in the wilderness down here; but I will fight any and all 
the time on anything like fair terms, and that is the best strategy, but it 
would not be fair to run up against such parapets as I find here. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General, 



108 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
Is the Field, near Chattahoochee River, July 13, 1864. 
Dku . g eneral — 1 have written you but once since the opening of the 
campaign but I report by telegraph to General Halleck daily, and he 
furnishes you copy. My progress was slower than I calculated, from 
two chief , u uninterrupted rain from June 2d to the 22d, and 

the peculiar submountainous nature of the country from the Etowah to 
the Chattahoochee, But we have overcome all opposition, and whipped 
Johnston in every fight when we were on anything like fair terms, and I 
think the army feels that way, that we can whip the enemy in anything 
like a fair fight ; but he lias uniformly taken shelter behind parallels of 
strong profile, made in advance for him by negroes and militia. I regarded 
-ault on the 27th of June necessary for two good reasons: 1. Because 
.,,•!, iv, as well as my own army, had settled down into the belief that 
'• flanking" alone was my game ; and, 2. That on that day and ground, had 
the assault succeeded, 1 could have broken Johnston's center, and pushed 
his army back in confusion, and with great loss, to his bridges over the 
Chattahoochee. We lost nothing in morale in the assault, for I followed 
it upon the extreme right, and compelled him to quit the very strong lines 
of Kenesaw, Smyrna camp-ground, and the Chattahoochee, in quick suc- 
ci ssion. . . . 

I have now fulfilled the first part of the " grand plan." Our lines are 
up to the Chattahoochee, and the enemy is beyond. 

********* 

I feel certain we have killed and crippled for Joe Johnston as many as 

we have sent of our men to the rear ; have sent back about six or seven 

thousand prisoners ; have taken eleven (11) guns of Johnston, and about 

ten (10) in Rome; have destroyed immense iron, cotton, and wool mills; 

and have possession of all the entire country. My operations have been 

rather cautious than bold, but, on the whole, I trust are satisfactory to 

you. 

********* 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Lieutenant-General Grant near Petersburg, Va. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, AND BATTLE OF PEACHTREE CREEK. 

Acting upon the belief that two corps were across the river, 
and intrenched, General Johnston withdrew Hardee's corps 
the night of the 9th, and the smoke of the burning bridges 
was the first revelation of his action. He selected as his next 
line, Peachtree creek and the Chattahoochee below its mouth, 
and placed his army on the high ground south of the creek in 
waiting to attack the national armies whenever they should 
attempt to cross. Should he be unsuccessful in preventing 
their passage, he proposed to delay their approach to Atlanta 
until his defenses between the Marietta and Decatur roads 
could be intrusted to the state troops, and then sally out with 
his whole army, and strike the flank most exposed. He was 
under the impression that his method of defense, covering con- 
tinually, not only his main line, but his skirmishers, with in- 
trenchments, had enabled him to inflict losses fivefold greater 
than his own, and that such had been the reduction of Gen- 
eral Sherman's superiority that he could now safely deliver 
offensive battle, especially as he had the fortifications of At- 
lanta for refuge in the event of defeat, which, in his esti- 
mation, were " too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to 
be invested." But as his estimation of the reduction of Gen- 
eral Sherman's strength was radically erroneous, there was no 
ground for his faith in his ability to meet him in general 
battle. He confessed a loss of ten thousand killed and 
wounded of infantry and artillery, and though General Sher- 
man's loss in the same arms were probably one-half more, the 
relative strength of the armies had not materially changed 
since the battle of Resaca, and now, as then, he had fifty 

(109) 



110 ADVANCE UrOX ATLANTA, ETC. 

thousand againsl a hundred thousand men for an open battle. 
In the (Utilise of fortifications, he was relatively stronger, as 
he had gradually received accessions of militia, to be used only 
in constructing and holding intrenchments, so that his pur- 
!".-.■ i" act offensively before Atlanta was formed in ignorance 
of the fad thai General Sherman had maintained a hundred 
thousand nun on his offensive front, against all his losses and 
the demands of an ever-lengthening line of supply. 

To General Sherman, the outlook from the Chattahoochee 
was promising in the main, but there were contingencies pro- 
ductive of no slight anxiety. He had been able thus far to 
maintain his communications against all the forces that Gen- 
eral Johnston could detach against them ; but Forrest, the bold 
raider, had given remote menace from East Tennessee, and 
the possibility of a dash by him from Mississippi Was not yet 
entirely removed. And he looked anxiously, though hope- 
fully, to Major-General Canby, commanding the newly created 
military division of West Mississippi, to so engage the enemy's 
forces in the West and Southwest as to prevent their approach 
to his rear. Before him, the city of Atlanta, his next objective, 
was in view. Its importance as a railroad and manufacturing 
center, and the moral effect of its successful defense, might 
justly be regarded as overmastering incentives to the enemy 
to fortify, and to fight to hold it. To sever its railroad con- 
nection with the states west, and cut off supply and reinforce- 
ment from that quarter, General Rousseau, with a mounted 
force, was in motion from Decatur, Alabama, to Opelika, and 
Stoneman had been sent to strike the same road nearer At- 
lanta. But another general advance could not be delayed in 
waiting for the issues of remote operations, and with the com- 
pletion of preparations for it, there came, as an incentive to 
prompt motion, the announcement from General Grant that 
the transfer of Confederate troops from Virginia to Georgia 
was not improbable, and that provision for such a contingency 
should be made. 

On the 16th, the date of General Grant's dispatch, General 
Sherman gave orders for the advance toward Atlanta on the 
fi allowing day. McPherson's army had been previously trans- 
ferred from the extreme right to Roswell ; Schofield's was across 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. Ill 

in front of Phillip's ferry, and Howard's corps on the south 
side, before Power's ferry. The next morning, General 
McPherson crossed at Roswell, and moved toward the Augusta 
railroad, east of Decatur; General Schofield advanced toward 
Cross Keys, and Palmer's and Hooker's corps passed the river 
on pontoon bridges, at Paice's ferry, covered by Wood's di- 
vision, which marched down the left bank of the river from 
Power's ferry, and subsequently rejoined the Fourth Corps, 
and with it moved toward Buckhead. Garrard's cavalry acted 
with General McPherson, and Stoneman's and McCook's 
watched the river and roads below the railroad. 

The movement was a right wheel, with Palmer's corps of 
the Army of the Cumberland as a pivot. The night of the 
17th, the Army of the Cumberland rested on Nancy's creek, 
a tributary of Peachtree creek, having pressed back the 
enemy's skirmishers from the bank of the Chattahoochee. 
The next day it advanced until Palmer's right rested at the 
junction of Nancy's and Peachtree creeks, and Howard's 
corps at Buckhead. General Schofield approached Decatur, 
and General McPherson broke up a section of the Augusta 
railroad a few miles east of the town. The line was now a 
long one, but the movements prescribed for the 19th were de- 
signed to unite the armies before Atlanta, or in that city. 

Early in the morning, Woods' division leading, the Fourth 
Corps reached Peachtree creek on the Buckhead and At- 
lanta road, finding the bridge burned and a heavy fortification 
on the high ground beyond, manned with infantry and artil- 
lery. In the afternoon, General Wood constructed a bridge 
and forced the passage, and drove the enemy from his defenses. 
General Stanley crossed the north fork of the creek some dis- 
tance to the left, against strong opposition. To the right, 
Davis' and Geary's divisions fought their way over the stream. 
General Geary covered the construction of a foot-bridge with 
a heavy artillery fire, and gained a strong position beyond. 
General Davis first threw over Dilworth's brigade, which soon 
became warmly engaged, and after a sharp conflict repulsed 
the enemy. Mitchell's brigade moved promptly in support, 
and participated in the action near its close. All the troops 
on the south side intrenched during the night. 



112 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 

Early the- next morningthe remaining divisions of the Army 
of the Cumberland passed the stream. This army was now 
compactly formed, and was under orders to advance to de- 
velop the enemy's purpose with respect to Atlanta. Between 
( General Thomas' left and General Schofield's right there was, 
however, a wide interval, and General Sherman ordered two 
divisions of the Fourth Corps to move to the left to connect 
with Crucial Schofield. Their movement to the left did not 
till the interval nor greatly diminish its length, but changed 
its location in the general battle front, and gave the prepon- 
derance of strength to the left wing. When Stanley and 
Wood had moved to the left and faced toward Atlanta, in 
harmony with General Schofield's column, there was still an 
interval of nearly two miles* between the right of their line 
and General Thomas' left on the Buckhead road. 

When General Williams crossed the creek, he advanced be- 
yond General Geary to an eminence abreast of one Johnson 
had taken for his division on the left of the Fourteenth Corps,, 
and separated from it by a depression. Here he halted, by 
direction of General Hooker, as he was near an extensive in- 
trenched outpost of the enemy, and his front was covered by 
dense woods and thickets. At 10 a. m. General Geary moved 
forward to the hill on the left of General Williams, and formed 
his division several hundred yards in advance. Later, General 
Newton advanced and attained a good position in open ground 
on the Buckhead road, a division interval from Geary's left. 
General Hooker for a time held Ward's division opposite this 
interval, but concealed behind a hill. The resistance offered 
to the skirmishers that covered the advance of these divisions,, 
and other circumstances, indicated the presence of the enemy 
in strong force, and both Newton and Geary made dispositions 
for defense. The former placed two brigades in line — Wag- 
ner's, Colonel Blake commanding, on the left of the road, and 
Kimball's on the right— and held Bradley's in column for sup- 
port. Between the two deployed brigades, he placed a four- 
gun battery, and constructed slight rail barricades. General 
Geary formed his division with Candy's brigade on the left,. 

* Statement in General Howard's report. 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 113 

Jones' on the right, and Ireland's massed in rear of Jones'. 
As the ground in front of Jones was wooded, but open before 
Candy and on his left, General Geary planted his guns on 
Candy's line. Here also barricades of rails were constructed. 

A new army commander had been observing the movements 
of the national forces since the 17th, as on that day General 
Johnston, by order of the Confederate President, had given his 
army and his immediate projects to General Hood. General 
Johnston had proposed to himself attack General Sherman's 
armies as they should cross Peachtree creek, in hopes of press- 
ing them in confusion upon the creek and the river beyond, 
but he had not anticipated such favorable conditions as now 
existed. He had determined to assume the offensive against 
Sherman's combined armies, and to make flanks to turn, by 
breaking lines ; but his successor had been permitted to see the 
wide separation of the two smaller armies from the Army of 
the Cumberland, and then to see the latter cross Peachtree 
creek bereft of the two divisions which extended its flank be- 
tween the forks of the stream, and then advance with its short- 
ened left flank thrown forward almost to the hills upon which 
his forces were massed for sudden attack, while its right was 
wedged in between his works and the creek. And now to add 
surprise to exposure, that his success might be assured, he 
called in his skirmishers in semblance of entire withdrawal, 
and sent soldiers into the national lines, under the pretense of 
capture, who should say that there were no heavy bodies of 
their troops within two miles. So when, after formation, the 
most exposed divisions threw forward their skirmishers to de- 
velop the state of things in their front, there was no resist- 
ance, and no enemy in view until the moment that the massed 
forces were ready to spring from concealment, in boldest at- 
tack. The blow was well concealed, and it was well delivered 
under the most favorable conditions. It was nevertheless as 
complete a failure as any assault of the war. 

At 3 p. m. the enemy in masses rushed from the woods. A 
division attacked Newton in front ; another passed his left 
flank altogether, and thrust itself between Peavine and Peach- 
tree creeks, and a third attacked his right flank. As the 
vol. n — 8 



114 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 

menace to his left flank involved the greatest danger, General 
Newton first repulsed the column on his left, and drove it to 
the woods, with Bradley's brigade and his reserve artillery. 
Wagner's and Blake's brigades next repelled the front attack, 
and dn>vc back the enemy with heavy loss. The latter 
changed front at right angles, and engaged the enemy's third 
division. "While this division had advanced between Newton 
and Geary, in evident belief that then there was a complete 
opening in the line, and had faced to the east to engage New- 
ton, Ward's division advanced from cover, and the heavy 
Bkirmish line, far in advance, composed of the Twenty-second 
Wisconsin and One Hundred and Thirty-sixth New York, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Blooclgood commanding, held the enemy 
in check until the whole division had reached a hill to the 
right and rear of Newton. The unexpected appearance of 
this division and its destructive fire threw the enemy into 
confusion, and he fell back with shattered ranks. General 
Ward then advanced to another eminence abreast of Newton 
and Geary, and formed his division so as to connect with the 
right of the one and the left of the other. The hill he occu- 
pied commanded the open space for six hundred yards in 
In 1 1 1 1 , and the enemy for a time refrained from attack. During 
this interval, General Ward fortified his position. The enemy 
first attacked the right of Geary's line, then passed round to 
at tack him in flank and rear. Williams' division not being fully 
abreast, this advantage was possible. Geary was therefore 
compelled to change front to the right with almost all of his di- 
vision, and extend his line to connect with Williams, leaving 
only five regiments, with his artillery, on his first line. When 
the noise of severe battle was first heard by General Williams, 
he was in the act of moving artillery to his skirmish line, to 
dislodge the enemy from his fortified outpost; but warned by 
the heavy volleys of musketry on his left, he deployed his 
division at double-quick— Knipe's brigade on the right, Robin- 
son's on the left, and Ruger's in reserve— to await the devel- 
opment of the attack. He placed his batteries by sections, to 
command his front and flanks, and held three sections in re- 
serve. Hardly had these dispositions been made before the 
enemy advanced upon Williams in great force, and having 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 115 

•driven in his skirmishers, with his line of battle under cover 
of the thickets and undergrowth, approached very near with- 
out being seen. His attack, as in other cases, was direct in 
part, but heavy masses sw r ept down the ravines to right mid 
left. Hearing heavy firing on his right, General Williams sent 
the Twenty-seventh Indiana to reinforce Knipe's right, This 
regiment and the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania speedily checked 
and drove back the enemy, and held the ground until the 
close of the action. On the left, the attack was more threat- 
ening, because made with stronger columns ; but Robinson's 
brigade, the artillery, and Geary's line upon the other hill, 
poured a destructive fire upon the enemy, and here, too, he 
was completely repulsed. This first attack swept from New- 
ton's position to Colonel Anson McCook's brigade of John- 
son's division of the Fourteenth Corps ; but though signally 
repulsed, General Hood did not desist, and soon again, from 
Newton to Johnson, the battle raged furiously. 

The second general action was commenced upon Newton's 
left in effort to double up the line by taking it in reverse as 
well as in flank. This time General Thomas sent the artillery 
of Ward's division, and in person urged the artillery horses 
to the greatest possible speed to meet the emergency, and then 
directed their action. These guns, and all of Newton's, with 
all kinds of metal most destructive at short range, opened 
upon the heavy assaulting columns, and they were again 
repulsed. Again the battle raged to the right; but as the 
national line was now compact, the enemy exhausted himself 
in direct attacks. His infantry assaults, as at first, extended 
from Newton to Johnson, and further to the right his forti- 
fied artillery was most active, but charge after charge from left 
to right was repulsed, until at 6 p. m., when he abandoned his 
effort to turn or break the line. In this action, artillery was 
used with fearful effect, and so skillfully was it posted, and so 
bravely defended, that the enemy did not reach a single gun. 

When it is considered that four divisions and one brigade, 
in open field, repulsed an attack of the army which was in- 
tended to initiate such offense as should destroy Sherman's 
armies, the grandeur of this victory becomes apparent. Not 
General Hood alone, but General Johnston also, was defeated 



116 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 

in the " Battle of Peachtree Creek." A new policy demanded 
by the authorities at Richmond, and by the Southern people, 
and a plan of battle elaborated by an able general and put 
upon trial under conditions far more favorable than had been 
anticipated, was defeated by less than half of the infantry and 
artillery of the "Army of the Cumberland." Four divisions, 
and a third of another, parried a blow intended to initiate the 
ruin of three armies, comprising more than five times as 
many men, and the significance of the miscarriage should have 
bc.n accepted as the prophecy of the doom of the rebellion. 
The national troops fought great odds, introducing aggression 
as the policy of a new commander, to stop the further advance 
of General Sherman and save Atlanta. It was seemingly a 
grand opportunity, but the issue was positive defeat and im- 
mense loss. An opportunity for the enemy, it was an 
.11 urgency for the exposed flank and the fraction of the na- 
tional army subjected to attack. But there were those in 
chief and subordinate command, who, by personal direction and 
vigor, inspirited the troops made veteran by participation 
in numerous battles. Generals Thomas and Hooker were 
with their troops at the points of extreme danger, and officers 
and men in proportionate service contributed to the emphatic 
repulse of the enemy in a combination planned for grandest 
effect. 

General Hood lost from three to five thousand men. He 
left over six hundred dead on the field, and several hundred of 
his men were captured. Ward's division captured seven 
battle flags and two hundred and forty-six prisoners. 

The total loss of the Army of the Cumberland was sixteen 
hundred. Colonel Cobham, One Hundred and Eleventh 
Pennsylvania ; Colonel Logie, One Hundred and Forty-fourth 
New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Randall, One Hundred and 
Forty-ninth New York, and many other officers were killed ; 
and Lieutenant-Colonel "W. H. H. Brown, Sixty-first Ohio, 
and Major Lathrop Baldwin, One Hundred and Seventh New 
York, were mortally wounded. A number of field and line 
officers were severely wounded. General Newton's loss was 
only one hundred, though his division was on the flank and 
in extreme exposure. 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 117 

Generals Stanley and Wood were somewhat heavily engaged 
during the afternoon and evening, the enemy using artillery 
freely. They drove in his outposts, and came up in sight of 
intrenchments, with the usual skirmish line in front. Late in 
the evening, General Stanley captured a portion of the pickets, 
drove in the remainder, and worked up close to the enemy. 

The night following, the enemy withdrew from General 
Newton's left. The next morning, General Wood advanced 
his right a mile and a half, and during the day, the Army of 
the Cumberland, from left to right, advanced close to the 
enemy's works. Heavy skirmishing was maintained ; batteries 
were put in position and kept in continuous action wherever 
there was probability of effect, and the new front was strongly 
intrenched. 

In the night, the enemy retired to the immediate defenses 
of the city ; comprising a strong line of redoubts, connected by 
curtains, covered by abatis and cheveau de frise. The next 
morning, General Thomas advanced his line and intrenched 
as close as practicable to the enemy's works. The Fourteenth 
Corps fortified a line west of the railroad, the Twentieth Corps 
from the railroad to the Buckhead road, and the Fourth 
Corps from that road to General Schofield's right — the con- 
traction of the line now permitting the reunion of the three 
divisions in continuous front. General Thomas' position was 
strong, affording commanding points for batteries within easy 
range of the city, and bearing directly upon the fortifications 
of the enemy. Constant skirmishing and cannonading were 
maintained. General McCook's cavalry was thrown on Gen- 
eral Thomas' right, along Proctor's creek, and covering the 
Macon and Turner's Ferry roads. 

On the 22d, while the Army of the Tennessee was changing 
position to close in upon Atlauta, General Hood put upon 
trial General Johnston's suggestion to sally from the fortifi- 
cations and strike the most exposed flank. This time he 
gained a temporary advantage, but in the final issue was 
defeated with heavy loss. 

General McPherson was killed early in the engagement, 
while making dispositions to save his left flank. 

The same day, General Rousseau arrived at Marietta, having 



118 ADVANCE UPOX ATLANTA, ETC. 

accomplished his raid through Alabama and Georgia. He- 
sui;^cstt'<l the expedition, and had organized and commanded 
it by permission of General Sherman. He destroyed over 
thirty miles of railroad, several trestle-bridges, many station- 
buildingSj and quantities of supplies and materials. He met 
and defeated General Clanton at the Coosa river, and another 
e at Chehaw station, and having suffered a loss of about 
forty men from a command of twenty -five hundred, reached 
the tin: iter of war at a time when cavalry reinforcements were 
niiu-h needed. 



EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOS. E. 

JOHNSTON. 

The character of Peachtree creek, and the numerous fords in the 
Chattahoochee above its mouth, prevented my attempting to defend that 
part of the river. The broad and muddy channel of the creek would 
have separated the two parts of the army. It and the river, below its 
mouth, were therefore taken as our line. A position on the high ground 
south of the creek was selected for the army, from which to attack the 
enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of ne- 
groes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta, and 
mount on them seven heavy rifles, borrowed from General Maury. The 
chief engineer was instructed to devote his attention, first, to the works 
between Marietta and Decatur roads, to put them in such condition that 
they might be held by state troops, so that the army might attack the 
enemy in flank when he approached the town. This, in the event that 
we should be unsuccessful in attacking the Federal army in its passage 
of Peachtree creek. 

In transferring the command to General Hood, I explained my plans 
to him. First, to attack the Federal army while crossing Peachtree 
creek. If we were successful, great results might be hoped for, as the 
enemy would have both it and the river to intercept his retreat. Second, 
if unsuccessful, to keep back the enemy by intrenching, to give time for- 
th.- assembling of the state troops promised by Governor Brown ; to garri- 
son Atlanta with those troops, and when the Federal army approached 
the town, to attack it on its most exposed flank with all the Confederate 
troops. 

These troops, who had been for seventy-four days in the immediate 
presence of the enemy, laboring and fighting daily, enduring toil, ex- 
posure, and danger with equal cheerfulness, more confident and high 
spirited than when the Federal army first presented itself near Dalton, 
were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy. 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 119 

I commenced the campaign with General Bragg's army of Missionary 
Ridge, with one brigade added (Mercer's), and two taken away (Baldwin's 
and Quarles'). That opposed to us was Grant's army of Missionary Ridge, 
then estimated at eighty thousand by our principal officers, increased, as 
I have stated, by two corps, a division, and several thousand recruits — in 
all, at least thirty thousand men. The cavalry of that army was esti- 
mated by Major-General Wheeler at fifteen thousand. 

The reinforcements which joined our army amounted to fifteen thou- 
sand infantry and artillery, and four thousand cavalry. Our scouts 
reported much greater numbers joining the United States army — the 
garrisons and bridge-guards from Tennessee and Kentucky relieved by 
"one hundred clays' men," and the Seventeenth Corps, with two thousand 
cavalry. 

The loss of our infantry and artillery, from the 5th of May, had been 
about ten thousand in killed and wounded, and four thousand seven 
hundred from all other causes, mainly slight sickness produced by heavy 
cold rains, which prevailed in the latter half of June. These and the 
slightly wounded were beginning to rejoin their regiments. For want of 
reports, I am unable to give the loss or the services of the cavalry, which 
was less under my eye than the rest of the army. Its effective strength 
was increased by about two thousand during the campaign. 

The effective force transferred to General Hood was about forty-one 
thousand infantry and artillery, and ten thousand cavalry. 

According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily re- 
ports of prisoners, and statements of Northern papers, the enemy's loss 
in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours. In 
the cases in which we had the means of estimating it, it ranged from 
seven to one to ninety to one, compared to ours, and averaged thirteen 
to one. The Federal prisoners concurred in saying that their heaviest 
loss was in the daily attacks made in line of battle, upon our skirmishers 
in their rifle-pits. Whether they succeeded in dislodging our skirmishers 
or not, their loss was heavy and ours almost nothing. 

Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee, we could have given battle 
only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that 
the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into 
them, while defeat would have been our ruin. 

In the course pursued, our troops always fighting under cover, had 
very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the en- 
emy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could 
reasonably have expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground 
by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of that 
river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of 
refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be in- 
vested. 



120 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S COMMUNICATION TO 
GENERAL GRANT, OF JULY 12, 1864. 

As soon as I hear from General Stoneman, I will shift all of General 
McPherson'e army to Roswell, and cross General Thomas three (3) miles 
above the railroad bridge, and move against Atlanta — my left well to the 
East, to get possession of the Augusta road about Decatur or Stone Moun- 
tain. I think all will be ready in three (3) days. I will have nearly one 
hundred thousand (100,000) men. 

I fe< 1 certain we have killed and crippled for Joe Johnston as many 
as we have sent to the rear ; have sent back six or seven thousand pris- 
oners. 



City Point, Va, July 16, 1864—10 a. m. 
-General Sherman : 
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy 
a firm foothold north, they are now returning with possibly twenty-five 
thousand (25,000) troops. All the men they have here beyond a suffi- 
■v to hold their string of fortifications, will be a,n element of weak- 
ness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that 
you will find in the next fortnight, reinforcements on your front to the 
number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get Atlanta, 
you set about destroying the railroad as far to the east and south of you 
as possible. Collect all stores of the country for your own use, and 
select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a 
lerate effort, to get a position here which will hold the enemy without 
the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for 
other enterprises, looking much to your assistance, or anything else- 
where. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Washington, July 16, 1864—4.30 p. m. 
r-General Sherman : 

Lieutenant-General Grant wishes me to call your attention to the pos- 
sibility of Johnston's being reinforced from Richmond, and the impor- 
■ of your having prepared a good line of defense against such an 
increase of rebel force. Also, the importance of getting as large an 
amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as possible. 

H. W. HALLECK, 
Major- General and Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, on Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864. 
Generals Thomas and McPherson : 

Dispatches from General Grant and Halleck to-day speak of the enemy 
having failed in his designs in Maryland, and cautioning me that Lee 



ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 121 

may, in the next fortnight, reinforce Johnston by twenty thousand 
(20,000) men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will move to- 
morrow as far as Nancy's creek. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 36.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Chattahoochee, July 17, 1864. 
The operations of the army for to-morrow, the 18th July, will be as 
follows : 

I. Major-General Thomas will move forward, occupy Buckhead, and 
the ridge between Nancy's creek and Peachtree, also all the roads 
toward Atlanta as far as Peachree creek. 

II. Major-General Schofield will pass through Cross Keys, and occupy 
the Peachtree road where intersected by the road from Cross Keys to 
Decatur. 

III. Major-General McPherson will move toward Stone Mountain, to 
secure strong ground within four (4) miles of General Schofield's position, 
and push Brigadier-General Garrard's cavalry to the railroad, and destroy 
some section of the road, and then resume position to the front and left 
of General McPherson. 

IV. All armies will communicate with their neighbors. The com- 
mander-in-chief will be near General Thomas' left, or near General Scho- 
field. 

Bv order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 
J L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de- Camp. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, at San House, Peachtree Road, 
Five Miles Northeast of Buckhead, Ga., July 18, 1864. 
General : — I have reports from General McPherson to 2 p. M. He has 
reached the railroad at a point two (2) miles from Stone Mountain and 
seven (7) miles from Decatur; had broken the telegraphs and road, and 
by 5 p. m. will have four (4) or five (5) miles broken. To-morrow I 
want a bold push for Atlanta, and have made my orders, which I think 
will put us in Atlanta or very close to it. Hold on about Howell's mill 
and the main road, and let your left swing across Peachtree creek, about 
south fork, and connect with General Schofield, who will approach 
Decatur from the north, whilst General McPherson moves down from 
the East. It is hard to realize that Johnston will give up Atlanta without 
a fight, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major- General Commanding. 
Major-General Thomas, Buckhead. 



122 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 

[SPECIAL FIELD OEDERS, NO. 39.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Decatdr, July 19, 1864. 
The whole army will move on Atlanta by the most direct roads to- 
morrow, July 20th, beginning at five (5) o'clock a. m., as follows: 

I. Major-General Thomas from the direction of Buckhead, his left to 
connect with General Schofield's right, about two (2) miles northeast of 
Atlanta, about lot 15, near the houses marked as Howard and Colonel 
1 1 « (oker. 

I I. Major-General Schofield, by the road leading from Dr. Powell's to 
Atlanta. 

III. Major-General McPherson will follow one or more roads direct 
from Decatur to Atlanta. 

Each army commander will accept battle on anything like fair terms, 
but if the army reach within cannon range of the city without receiving 
artillery or musketry fire, he will halt, form a strong line, with batteries 
in position, and await orders. If fired on from the forts or buildings of 
Atlanta, no consideration will be paid to the fact that they are occupied 
by families, but the place must be cannonaded without the formality of a 
demand. 

The general-in-chief will be with the center of the army, viz., with 
or near General Schofield. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

After the 22d, the situation at Atlanta conformed in the 
main to the type of the campaign developed north of the Oos- 
tanaula. The two armies presented to each other fortified 
fronts, each inviting the attack of the other. The stronger not 
being able to secure a general battle on fair terms, was restricted 
again to a choice between assault and flank movement. As 
the issue of previous assaults did not warrant the attempt to 
carry the defenses of Atlanta, the alternative of a movement 
by the flank was inevitable. The railroad on the east having 
been greatly damaged by General Garrard to Covington, and 
nearer Atlanta by the Army of the Tennessee, there remained 
but one railroad — that from Macon to Atlanta — which had not 
been greatly damaged. If this road were held by the national 
forces or damaged beyond use, General Hood could no longer 
remain in the city. General Sherman resolved to change the 
Army of the Tennessee from the left to the right, and to reach 
toward the Macon road from his right flank, and at the same 
time throw his cavalry in two heavy columns upon it — five 
thousand under General Stoneman to pass to the east of the 
city to McDonough, and four thousand under General McCook 
to the west to Fayetteville, to meet at Lovejoy's Station and 
there destroy the road effectually. This accomplished, General 
Stoneman had permission to make effort with his own division 
to liberate the prisoners — two thousand at Macon, and twenty 
thousand at Andersonville. The object of these movements 
was to force the enemy to come out, of Atlanta to fight or be 
invested, or force him to extend his lines to the south, and 
choose between Atlanta and East Point. 

(123) 



12-4 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

The cavalry started on the 27th. General McCook crossed 
the Chattahoochee at Eiverton, and moved rapidly on Palmetto 

station, on the West Point road. Here he destroyed a section 
of the track two and a half miles long, and advanced to Fay- 
v\ teville. There he burned a hundred bales of cotton, destroyed 
railroad trains, burned a train of four hundred wagons, 
killed eight hundred mules, saving a large number, and cap- 
tured two hundred and fifty prisoners. He then moved to 
Lovejoy's Station to meet General Stoneman. He there burned 
the depot and having commenced the destruction of the rail- 
road, only desisted when there was such an accumulation of 
the enemy that he was forced to defend himself. Hearing noth- 
ing of General Stoneman and being strongly opposed on the 
east, he turned south and west to Newnan, on the West Point 
road. At Xewnan he encountered an infantry force that had 
been stopped on its way to Atlanta by the break he had made 
in the road at Palmetto. The pursuing cavalry and the infantry 
now hemmed him in completely, and he was compelled to drop 
his captives and fight. He cut his way out with a loss of five 
hundred, and reached Marietta in safety with the remainder of 
his command. 

General Stoneman went farther and fared worse. He sent 
Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, and moved through Covington, 
down the Ocmulgee, to East Macon. In endeavoring to return, 
he was hemmed in and captured with seven hundred of his 
command, the remainder escaping. General Garrard engaged 
successfully two divisions of cavalry at Flat Rock, and then re- 
turned to Atlanta. These cavalry expeditions in the main were 
failures, and made no impression upon the situation at Atlanta. 

On the 27th, General Howard was assigned to the command 
of the " Army of the Tennessee " by order of the President, 
and General Stanley, by seniority of rank, to the command of 
the Fourth Corps. At this time the Army of the Tennessee 
was in motion to the right, and the next morning went into 
position on the right of General Thomas, with its line trending 
to the south. As a support to this movement, General Davis' 
division was ordered to make a detour to Turner's ferry on the 
Chattahoochee, and thence to Howard's right, to take the en- 
emy in flank should he sally forth as on the 22d. This change 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 125 

of the Army of the Tennessee was so threatening that General 
Hood threw two corps upon it — Hardee's and Lee's — with great 
impetuosity. Attacking again and again, they were repulsed 
with immense loss. To create a diversion during the progress of 
this action, there was heavy skirmishing on the whole front of 
the " Army of the Cumberland ;" but Davis' division, General 
Morgan commanding, was unable, through absence of a direct 
road, to reach the enemy's flank in time to participate in the 
action. 

General Morgan was not only embarrassed in not finding 
such roads as had been anticipated, but he was left in igno- 
rance of the object of his movement— his orders, which were 
received late in the morning, not being explicit as to his duty 
nor definite in description of the road which he was to pur- 
sue, and the consequence was, that the movement so far mis- 
carried that he did not reach his camp until very late at night. 
The next day he was joined by General Ward's division of/; 
the Twentieth Corps, when the two divisions advanced, and 
driving back the enemy, ascertained that he had strong in- 
trenched lines in their front. Strong reconnoissances from 
the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps developed the fact that 
General Hood's lines were still strong on his right, although 
he had greatly extended his left. 

On the 30th, the picket line of the Twentieth Corps was 
advanced to high ground, and captured one hundred and 
twenty of the enemy, including eight ofiicers. The dash was 
a bold one, but the ground was permanently held. The next 
day General Davis made a reconnoissance toward the Macon 
railroad, and found the enemy within a mile, posted in earth- 
works, from which his artillery opened with canister. It 
was the old story of extension and counter-extension of lines 
and intrenchments, and the weaker army having inner lines 
could keep fully abreast, and at the same time have easy con- 
centration for sally or defense. 

During the month the Army of the Cumberland lost forty 
commissioned ofiicers, one hundred and sixty wounded, and 
seventeen missing ; five hundred and forty-seven enlisted men 
killed, two thousand five hundred and ninety-two wounded, 
and three hundred and forty-four missing — total, three thou- 



126 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

.-and seven hundred and nine. General Hooker was relieved 
of the command of the Twentieth Corps, at his own request, 
and General Williams was assigned to temporary command. 
The President gave General Stanley the permanent command 
of the Fourth Corps. 

On the first of August, General Schofield moved from the 
left to relieve Davis and Ward, and the "Army of the Cum- 
berland" was holding the left of the investing line. The 
Fourth Corps refused its left to cover the Buckhead road; two 
divisions of tin* Twentieth were in the center and two divis- 
ions of the Fourteenth between the railroad and Turner's 
Ferry road ; Garrard's division was on the left of the Fourth 
Corps, guarding the approaches from Decatur, and Roswell's 
and Kilpatrick's divisions, having been relieved on the line of 
the Etowah by McCook's, was on the railroad from Chatta- 
hoochee bridge to Marietta. When Davis and Ward gave 
room for Schofield on Howard's right, and then moved to the 
right of Schofield, the former was on the left in line, and the 
latter refused, to form a strong flank. 

After the failure of General Hood's third effort at aggres- 
sion, he relapsed into the defensive, and General Sherman was 
again forced to choose between assault and the " turning move- 
ment." The investing line had been moved far to the west 
and south, and yet Hood's left flank had not been found. The 
supposition was that the main portion of his army was on his 
left, extending his intrenchments as far or farther than General 
Sherman's, and that his main works on the north of Atlanta 
were held by state troops or a slender line of regular troops. 
General Sherman's armies had been on a strain for three 
months, in frequent battles, and perpetual skirmishing and 
watching. But though the enemy had been roughly handled 
during July, his army was yet as much out of reach as at any 
period of the campaign. General Sherman decided to again 
extend his line still farther to the right, so as at least to reach 
the Maeon railroad with artillery at short range, and force 
General Hood to fight or abandon the city. In the execution 
"I' t his plan it was necessary that his right flank should be kept 
.•xrredingly strong, while his line throughout its length should 
have such firmness as would insure its safety and at the same 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 127 

time menace Atlanta from the north so strongly as to prevent 
an overwhelming concentration against the advancing right 
flank. 

On the 3d, Johnson's and Baird's divisions of Palmer's 
corps were moved to the right in support of Schofield, while 
"W^kTh division moved to the right of the Fourth Corps, and 
assisted in covering the space previously held by the Four- 
teenth. The Fourth and the Twentieth now held a line of 
intrenchments live miles long. During the day, while General 
Schofield was rushing to reach the railroad, there was great 
activity along the whole line from General Thomas' left to 
General Howard's right, in skirmishing and cannonading, to 
relieve the pressure upon the right flank in its aggression. 
General Schofield succeeded in getting two divisions, one of 
his own, and General Baird's, across the head of Utoy creek. 
General Baird formed his division on the right of General 
Hascall's, with his right swung back toward the creek. 

The next morning, General Baird readjusted his line in 
expectation of supporting the divisions of General Schofield in 
an assault. But no movement was made of a general char- 
acter, and late in the day General Palmer directed him to feel 
the enemy's works in his front with a brigade. He designated 
Colonel Gleason's brigade for this service, which advanced in 
double lines with skirmishers in front. Colonel Gleason car- 
ried the first and second line of rifle-pits, and approached so 
near the enemy's main line, as to develop its location and 
character, and drew from it an artillery and musketry fire. 
At night he withdrew his brigade, but held with shirmishers , 
the outer line of rifle-pits which he had carried. 

The next morning at 8 a. m. General Baird's division was 
in line ready to advance. He was instructed to pay no atten- 
tion to his connections on his left, as General Cox's division 
was to fill the space between him and General Hascall, and 
was informed that the latter was already so near the enemy 
that he would not advance during the day. He was promised 
support on his right by the other two divisions of his own 
corps, although he was not yet in communication with them. 
Regarding his orders to advance as imperative, he threw for- 
ward skirmishers in double the usual strength, and moved tjpr- 



128 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

ward in perilous insulation. As he advanced, he found that 
the enemy had reoccupied the inner line of rifle-pits which 
Colonel Gleason had carried the evening previous. This line 
he again carried against stubborn resistance, capturing one 
hundred and forty prisoners. He was then within short 
urn-lot range of the enemy's main works. He could advance 
n. » farther, unless he assaulted without support, but held the 
position, refusing two regiments on his right, and intrenched 
himself as rapidly as possible under the fire of musketry and 
artillery. The main lines were now four hundred yards apart, 
while only thirty yards separated the skirmishers. Baird lost 
in this engagement, five officers, and seventy-eight enlisted 
men killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Myron Baker, 
commanding Ninety-fourth Indiana, was killed. 

Soon after General Baird attained position near the enemy, 
General Davis' division, General Morgan commanding, formed 
on his right, and later, General Johnson's division took po- 
sition in the rear of Morgan. As on the 3d, there was great 
activity along the line of the left to divert attention from the 
advance on the right. 

Thus there was just sufficient extension and action on the 
right to advise the enemy of what was intended, without gain- 
in- any advantage that promised ultimate success. The line 
had only been extended by one division. General Sherman's 
orders required that the attack on the right should be pressed, 
and he had given promise that if it was too hard pressed, 
Generals Thomas and Howard should attack somewhere, but 
the indications were emphatic that General Hood was rapidly 
extending his intrenchments toward East Point, and yet Gen- 
eral Sherman was so shut up to counter-movement, that he 
said to General Thomas in the evening, " We will try again 
to-morrow, and proceed to the end." 

Accordingly, the next morning a new effort was made to 
reach beyond the enemy's left flank. The Fourteenth Corps, 
under command of Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, by 
virtue of seniority, General Palmer having been relieved at 
his own request, held its own line and that occupied by the 
Twenty -third Corps, and the latter moved to the right, beyond 
what appeared the day before to be the left flank of the en- 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 129 

emy. General Schofield then threw forward Reilly's brigade, 
but it was found impossible to penetrate the obstructions be- 
fore the enemy's parapets. General Schofield then made a 
still larger circuit to the right, for the purpose of " breaching" 
his line at a point not protected by abatis, but he found his 
lines extended beyond the main Utoy creek. While General 
Schofield was operating against General Hood's left, the latter 
evinced great activity on his right. He felt General Thomas' 
line from right to left, and was so demonstrative against Gen- 
eral Stanley, as to make it evident that he was either looking 
for a weak point to assault, or was endeavoring to ascertain 
the strength of his line, as throwing light upon General Scho- 
field's movements. General Hood was now holding his works 
north of the city by state troops, supported by movable divis- 
ions of regular troops. The main portion of the army was 
on his left, extending his defenses to hold the Macon railroad. 
General Sherman's line was also greatly attenuated, and as a 
compensation for it, the defenses on the north were made ex- 
ceedingly strong, and from them shells were constantly thrown 
to the city. 

In the evening of the 6th, General Sherman said to 
General Schofield : " There is no alternative but for you to 
continue to work on that flank with as much caution as 
possible, and it is possible the enemy may attack us, or draw 
out." To General Thomas, he said : " Instead of going round 
East Point, I Avould prefer the enemy to weaken, so we 
may break through at some point, and wish you to continue 
to make such effort. I will instruct General Howard to do 
the same at the head of Utoy creek, his right." But Gen- 
eral Thomas did not deem it prudent to assault such works, 
as there was a certainty of great loss, and with such a column, 
as he could form from his attenuated line, there was little 
probability of success. His response was : " I will keep the 
attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening all along 
my front ; but I have no hopes of breaking through his lines 
anywhere in my front, as long as he has a respectable force to 
defend them. My troops are so thinned out that it will be 
impossible to form an assaulting column sufficiently strong to 
VOL. II — 9 



130 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

make an attack sure." In the emergency, General Sherman 
ordered heavy rifled guns from Chattanooga to " batter the 
town." 

On the 7th, General Hood withdrew his troops from the 
intrenchments assaulted by General Schofield, which, though 
strong and well protected by entanglements, formed no part 
of his main line, and their abandonment did not greatly en- 
danger his possession of the Macon railroad. During the day 
the Fourteenth Corps advanced, carried a line of rifle-pits in 
front of the position previously occupied by the Twenty-third 
( '<>rps, and established a line close to the enemy's works. The 
loss of the corps was seventy men killed, and four hundred 
and thirteen wounded. One hundred and seventy-two prison- 
ers were taken. 

From the 8th to the 10th, General Sherman continued his 
effort to reach the Macon road, by the extension of his line to 
the right. lie thought it impossible that the enemy could 
reach much farther in that direction, but it was finally ascer- 
tained that his well-fortified line extended from the Decatur 
road, on the east of Atlanta, to East Point, a distance of fif- 
teen miles. And as the farther attenuation of the investing: 
line was not considered safe, and as the enemy's works were 
too strong to be assaulted, General Sherman began to cast 
about for a new plan. In the meantime, the heavy guns were 
at work throwing solid shell into the city with great fre- 
quency, night and day, in expectation that their agency would 
reduce ihe value of Atlanta as a " large machine-shop and 
depot of supplies." 

On the 11th, General Sherman received intelligence through 
General Garrard, that General Hood was collecting an im- 
mense force of cavalry to operate upon his communications. 
It was important to General Hood to cut short General Sher- 
man's supplies, but in the effort to do it, by breaking his rail- 
road for to the north, he was depriving his own communica- 
tions of protection. As soon as General Sherman learned 
that Wheeler, with eight or ten thousand troopers, was mov- 
ing to the north, he determined to throw his cavalry upon the 
railroad south of Atlanta. 

The news from the north on the 14th gave confirmation to 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 131 

previous reports of Wheeler's intended raid. Early in the 
morning of that day he attacked a party guarding a large 
herd of cattle near Calhoun, dispersed a portion of the guard 
and captured a large number of the cattle, some portions of 
which were recaptured by Colonel Faulkner, who pursued 
upon receipt of the news. At 3 p. m. General Steedman, at 
Chattanooga, was informed that Wheeler was going toward 
Dalton. He at once relieved all the troops that could be 
spared from the garrison to prepare to move to Dalton. Be- 
ing delayed by trains running on unusual time, General Steed- 
man did not reach the vicinity of Dalton until midnight ; and 
having been informed that the garrison had surrendered, he 
awaited daylight, and then moved forward and engaged the 
enemy's skirmishers. Hearing firing in Dalton, and learning 
that the garrison was still holding out, he dashed into the town 
and cleared it of the enemy. He remained for a day, and 
learning that the enemy had moved oft', through fear for the 
bridges over the Chickamauga, he hastened back to Chatta- 
nooga. Colonel Laiboldt had held his position against a supe- 
rior force, and General Steedman's quick relief gave him final 
safety. The troops under General Steedman were the Second 
Missouri, Twenty-ninth, Fifty-first, and Sixty-eighth Indiana, 
Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, 
and the Fourteenth United States Colored troops, in all about 
eighteen hundred effective men. Wheeler's loss was about 
two hundred. He left thirty-three dead and fifty-seven badly 
wounded on the field. Steedman's, was one officer and eight 
men killed, one officer and twenty-nine men wounded, and 
twenty-three men missing. 

From Dalton, General Wheeler moved north, injured the 
railroad slightly at Graysville, threatened Cleveland with a 
detachment, and then turned to the northeast. Soon after, 
however, he changed his course to meet in Middle Tennessee 
another cavalry force under General Eoddy. The latter had 
crossed the Tennessee river, near Decatur, to strike the Nash- 
ville and Decatur railroad. General Wheeler's primary object 
was to damage the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. 
About the same time, the enemy was active near Fort Donel- 
son, thus giving a third intimation of purpose to disturb the 



132 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

communications of the national armies before Atlanta. There 
however, less force in the raiding columns or more in the 
troops defending the railroads than had been anticipated, as 
little injury was effected. The failure resulted from the com- 
bined opposition of General Rousseau, commanding at Nash- 
ville, General Steedman at Chattanooga, and General R. S. 
Granger at Decatur. 

General Granger sallied forth from Decatur and encountered 
Roddy near Athens, Alabama, which place he was besieging. 
The garrison had been upon the defensive previously, but 
upon his arrival the barricades were removed, and the enemy 
was attacked and routed. General Granger then marched up 
the Nashville and Decatur railroad to Pulaski, to intercept 
"Wheeler, who was moving to the west, followed by General 
Rousseau. From Pulaski he moved upon Linnville with 
three regiments of infantry, expecting General Starkweather 
to join him with a brigade of cavalry in time to give battle. 
He met his advance and drove it back, but his cavalry did not 
arrive in time to engage the enemy. During the night, 
Wheeler abandoned the line of the railroad and moved in the 
direction of Lawrenceburg. Granger then left his infantry to 
guard the railroad, and assuming personal command of his 
cavalry went in pursuit ; and overtaking the enemy as he was 
leaving Lawrenceburg, he fell upon Wheeler's rear-guard and 
harassed him as he retreated. At this juncture, General 
Rousseau ordered General Granger to halt and form a junc- 
tion with his own force. For a time the order was not obeyed, 
upon the supposition that General Rousseau was ignorant of 
the fact that he was up with the enemy and was retarding his 
retreat. A second order was received, requiring him to discon- 
tinue the pursuit and move upon Athens to intercept Roddy. 
The result was that both "Wheeler and Roddy succeeded in 
crossing the Tennessee river without loss or embarrassment. 
The enemy thus escaped serious punishment, but utterly 
failed to interrupt General Sherman's communications. 

Having despaired of flanking Hood out of Atlanta, on the 
16th General Sherman announced his new plan of operations, 
but suspended them first to learn the results of a raid by Kil- 
patrick to Fairburn, and subsequently until his cavalry could 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 133 

make one more effort to break up General Hood's communi- 
cations and compel him to fight or abandon the city. General 
Kilpatrick drove back Jackson's division of cavalry from 
Fairburn on the 15th, destroyed the station and public build- 
ings, and the telegraph and railroad for about three miles. On 
the 18th, he, with his own division and two brigades from Gen- 
eral Garrard's, in all about five thousand cavaliw, dashed out 
from his camp at Sandtown to the "West Point road, and broke 
it near Fairburn, and thence moved to Jonesborough, defeated 
Ross' cavalry, and commenced the destruction of the road ; 
but while thus engaged he was attacked by Jackson's cavalry 
and a brigade of infantry, which had hurried up from the south, 
and he was compelled to draw off toward McDonougk. He 
then made a circuit to Lovejoy's Station, where again, while 
breaking the road, he was attacked by the same force. Per- 
ceiving that he was almost surrounded, he charged the cav- 
alry and cut his way through, capturing four guns and many 
prisoners ; but being hard pressed could not incumber himself 
with all of his captives, and brought in but seventy men, 
three flags, and one gun. He then returned by McDonough 
and Decatur. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL MORGAN'S REPORT OF HIS ACTION 
ON THE 28TH OF JULY. 

July 28th, received orders to be ready with my brigade at 8 a.m.; re- 
ported to General Davis for orders ; was informed by him that he was too 
unwell to take command of the division in the field. At 9 a. m. took 
command of the division on the Turner Ferry road, to move under the 
following order : 

v> " July 28, 1864. 

Major-General G. H. Thomas; 

" Order General Davis to leave camp and move to Turner's ferry, and 
then by a road leading toward East Point, to feel forward for Howard 
right back with some known point at Turner's ferry. I will be over on 
that flank all day, and await to reach out as far as possible. 

(Signed,) " W. T. Sherman." 

In compliance with above order, I did move to Turner's ferry, halted 
an hour for rest and dinner. Having no guide, no correct map of the 
country, I had to rely upon such information as I could obtain from resi- 
dents. Returning from the ferry, turned to the right at the church, one 
mile from the river, and took the road leading toward East Point. The 
enemy's pickets were soon met upon the road ; they were well posted and 



134 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

<l numbers, requiring the deployment of a whole regiment to clear 
the front. After movingupon this road about one and a half miles, a staff 
r of 1 he general commanding division overtook the command, and I re- 
1 verbal orders to return as soon as possible to the Turner's Ferry road, 
the enemy having attacked General Howard's right. Heavy skirmishing 
continuing in front, I determined to advance and take the first road to the 
left. This was done, and the division was moved with all possible dispatch 
1. 1 Turner's Ferry road, arriving late in evening, and owing to a bad swamp 
and a very dark night, was nearly all night in getting into camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of tiie Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 30, 1864. 
Generals Tlwmas and Howard : 
I am just back from an interview with General Schofield. . . . 
I think General Stoneman has gone to Macon, east of Yellow river, and 
that is well. I have ordered General Garrard in on our left, and to-mor- 
row night will let him fill with a skirmish line General Schofield's position, 
and move all of Schofield's to the right of General Howard, and with the 
divisions of General Davis and Ward kept in reserve on the right, to strike 
a blow beyond our new right flank when intrenched. Our right flank 
must be advanced in close and absolute contact with the enemy; and with 
General Schofield on that flank, I think we can make him quit Atlanta, 
or so weaken his line that we can break through somewhere, the same as- 
our Kenesaw move. . . . 

(Signed,) W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 48.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 1, 1864. 

I. During the next series of operations, General Thomas will be the 
left, General Howard the center, and General Schofield the right army. 
The two divisions of Generals Davis and Ward will continue to be held 
in reserve toward the right, and in case the enemy attack that flank, 
these divisions will report to, and during the action, obey General 
Schofield's orders. When not engaged, General Thomas will post them 

to cover his communications from danger coming from the South- 
east. 

II. Brigadier-General Garrard's cavalry will relieve General Schofield 
on the left, and occupy in part his trenches, patrol the road about Decatur, 
and picket toward Roswell. He will report to General Thomas, and be 
prepared to sally out as cavalry from his trenches in case of necessity. 

III. All trains of wagons going to and from the depots of Vining's and 
Marietta will follow roads converging at the railroad bridge, and never 
go north of Buckhead or south of Turner's. 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 135 

IV. General Thomas will cause a new infantry flank to be prepared on 
the left, north of the Buckhead road, connecting General Stanley's lines 
with the old rebel parapet near Peachtree creek. 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 51.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 18G4. 
The order of movement of the army to-day will be as follows : 

I. Major-General Schofield, with his own command and General 
Palmer's corps, will move directly on the railroad which leads south out 
of Atlanta, at any point between Whitehall and East Point, and will not 
stop until he has absolute control of the railroad, but must not extend 
more to the right than is absolutely necessary to that end. 

II. Major-Generals Thomas and Howard will press close on the enemy 
at all points, and reinforce well the points of the line where the enemy is 
most likely to sally — viz., on the Decatur, Buckhead, and Turner's Ferry 
roads; but more especially watch the outlet along the railroad — viz., 
General Williams' front. 

III. On the right we must assume the offensive, and every man be pre- 
pared to fight, leaving knapsacks, etc., in present trenches. Wagons will 
not be taken east of Utoy creek, until General Schofield has secured 
position on the railroad, or so near it that it can be reached by musket- 
balls and canister. If necessary to secure this end, ordinary parapets 
must be charged and carried, and every hour's delay enables the enemy 
to strengthen ; therefore, let it be done to-day. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864. 
General Palmer : 

You will, during the movement against the railroad, report to and re- 
ceive orders from General Schofield. General Thomas will personally 
look to the front of Atlanta. General Howard will co-operate with Gen- 
eral Schofield, and General Schofield, reinforced by your corps, is charged 
to reach the railroad. Obey his orders and instructions. Acknowledge 
receipt. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General Commanding. 



136 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864. 

General Schofield : 

Dispatch received. All right. Press the attack on the right. I will 

by the sound ; and if I judge you are too hard pressed, will order 

ralfl Thomas and Howard to assault somewhere. Get some part of 

your command where you can easily reach the railroad with short-range 

guns, and then intrench a strong flank. It is worth a battle, and the 

;■ the first advantages are followed up, the better. The weakest point 

of the enemy must be mathematically at some point between Atlanta 

and East Point. Keep me often advised of your progress, and I will 

come over any minute you say, but can better handle the whole army 

from here by telegraph. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864. 
General Tliomas : 

General Schofield has been at work to-day with his two divisions, and 
holds Johnson's in support. . . . 

He tried to break through the enemy's lines by a brigade to-day, but 
failed, losing five hundred (500) men. Instead of going round East 
Point, I would prefer the enemy to weaken, so we may break through at 
Borne point, and wish you to continue to make such an effort. I will in- 
struct General Howard to do the same about the head of Utoy creek — 
his right. 

TV. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864. 
General Schofield: 

I have your dispatch. There is no alternative but for you to continue 
to work on that flank with as much caution as possible, and it is possible 
the enemy may attack us or draw out. He must defend that road. 

TV. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, August 7, 1864. 
Mi 'jor-General Sherman : 

I will keep the attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening 
all along my front as long as he has a respectable force to defend them. 
My troops are so thinned out that it will be impossible to form an assault- 
ing column sufficiently strong to make an attack sure. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major- General. 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 137 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864. 

General JIalleck, Washington : 

********* 

I do not deem it prudent to extend more to the right, but will push 
forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be 
endured. 

I have sent to Chattanooga for two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts, with which 
I can pick out almost any house in the town. I am too impatient for a 
siege, but I do n't know but here is as good a place to fight it out as 
further inland. One thing is certain — whether we get inside of Atlanta 
or not, it will be a used-up community by the time we are done with it. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864. 
General Howard : 

I thank you for the suggestion. I am studying all the combinations 
possible, and beg you to think also, and communicate to me; but be care- 
ful to keep your own confidence. I spoke of the same thing to-day to 
General Thomas, and he goes to look at the railroad bridge, to see to a 
proper cover there for the wagons and a corps. I want to expend four 
thousand (4,000) heavy rifle shots on the town before doing anything new, 
and then will be prepared to act quick. General Schofield has been re- 
connoitering the right all day, and after he has answered a few more of 
my questions, I will give you the substance of his report. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864. 
General Thomas : 

I have your last dispatch. I hear the guns. I hear the guns and shells 
also. The enemy's battery of 32-pounders, rifled, are firing on us here 
from the Whitehall fort, to draw off or divert our fire. Keep up a steady, 
persistent fire on Atlanta with the 4|-inch guns and 20-pounder Parrotts, 
and order them to pay no attention to the side firing, by which the en- 
emy may attempt to divert their attention. I think those guns will 
make Atlanta of less value to them as a large machine-shop and depot 
of supplies. The inhabitants have, of course, got out. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 



138 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Misissippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., Avgust 16, 1864. 
General Thomas : 

********* 

I do think our cavalry should now break the Macon road good. If we 
cau save our rations at Marietta and Allatoona, and break the Macon road 
for many miles, we can wait as long as Hood. 

********* 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864. 
Generals Thomas, Howard, and Schqfield : 

We will commence the movement against the railroad about Jonesboro, 
Thursday night, unless something occurs in the meantime to mar the 
plan. 1 will make my orders, and the preliminary preparations may be 
begun. 

I f Wheeler interrupts our supplies, we can surely cut off those of Hood, 
and see who can stand it best. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 57.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864. 

The movement of the army against the Macon railroad will begin 
Thursday night, August 18th, and will be continued on the following gen- 
eral plan : 

I. All army commanders will send across the Chattahoochee river, and 
within the old rebel works at the bridge, and down as far as Turner's ferry, 
all surplus wagons, horses, men, and materials not absolutely necessary to 
the success of the expedition, and will collect in their wagons, with best 
is, bread, meat, sugar, coffee, etc., for fifteen (15) days, after the nine- 
teenth (19th) instant, and ammunition, and park them near Utoy creek. 

First move. — General Kilpatrick's cavalry will move to Camp creek; Gen- 
eral Schofield will cover the Campbelton road, and General Thomas will 
move one corps (General Williams') to the Chattahoochee bridge, with 
orders to hold it; Paice's ferry bridge, and pontoon bridge (Captain 
Kossack's) at Turner's ferry, ready to be laid down if necessary. The 
other corps (General Stanley's) will move south of Proctor's creek, to near 
Utoy, behind the right center of the Army of the Tennessee, prepared to 
cover the Bell's Ferry road. General Garrard's cavalry will fall behind 
Peach tree creek, and act against the enemy should he sally against Gen- 
eral Williams or General Stanley's corps during the movement. 

',/ move.— The Army of the Tennessee will withdraw cross Utoy 
creek, and move by most direct road toward Fairburn, going as far as Camp 



SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 139 

creek. General Thomas will mass his two corps (General Stanley's and 
Johnson's) below Utoy creek, and General Garrard's cavalry will join Gen- 
eral Thomas by most direct road, or by way of Sandtown bridge, and act 
with him during the rest of the move. 

General Schofield will advance abreast of and in communication with 
the Army of the Tennessee as far as Camp creek. 

Third move. — The Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee will move direct 
for the West Point road, aiming to strike it between Ecd Oak and Fair- 
burn. General Thomas will follow, well closed up into two columns, the 
trains between. General Kilpatrick will act as advance, and General 
Garrard will cover the rear, under direction of General Thomas. 

The bridges at Sandtown will be kept and protected by a detachment 
of cavalry, detailed by General Elliott, with a section of guns or four (4) 
gun battery. 

II. During the movement, and until the army returns to the river, the 
utmost care will be taken to expose as little as possible the trains of cars 
and wagons. The depots at the bridge, at Allatoona and Marietta, will 
be held against any attack, and communication kept up with the army 
as far as possible by way of Sandtown. On reaching any railroad, the 
troops will at once be disposed for defense, and at least one-third put to 
work to tear up track and destroy iron, ties, and all railroad material. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, August 17, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Information from all sources seems to confirm the report that Wheeler 
has taken off the greater part of his cavalry. I therefore think this will 
be as good a time as could be taken to make another raid on the Macon 
railroad ; but if you send Kilpatrick, I would insist on his taking the most 
practicable route, and avoid the enemy's infantry as much as possible. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 19, 1864 — 10.45 a. m. 
General Grant, City Point : 

I have your dispatches of 14th and 16th, and also that of 18th. I will 
never take a step backward, and have no fears of Hood. I can whip him 
outside of his trenches, and, I think, in time can compel him to come out. 
I think at this time I have a fine cavalry force on the only road which can 
feed him, and, if necessary, will swing my whole army across it also. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 



} 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE FLANK MOVEMENT CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF JONESBORO 
AND THE FALL OF ATLANTA. 

Pending General Kilpatrick's movements the shelling of 
Atlanta was actively maintained, and feints of various kinds 
were employed by General Stanley on the left to confuse the 
enemy and lead to the belief that a movement was intended 
in that direction; but when, after General Kilpatrick's return, 
it was ascertained that the damage to the railroads was not 
such as to greatly embarrass the enemy, General Sherman re- 
peated his order for the grand movement by the right flank, 
which involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, 
and using his armies against the communications of the enemy 
rather than against his intrenchments around the city. To 
take the place by siege would require too much time, and to 
lake it by assault would cost too many lives. His sick, and 
all surplus supplies, wagons, and incumbrances, having been 
sent to the intrenchments beyond the Chattahoochee, the 
Fourth Corps was, on the 25th, withdrawn to the high ground, 
in the rear of the Twentieth Corps, to cover the retirement of 
the latter to the farther side of the Chattahoochee, to hold the 
railroad bridge and the bridges at Paice's and Turner's ferries, 
and guard the material there accumulated. Garrard's cavalry 
covered the movement of the Twentieth Corps to the rear, 
and that of the Fourth Corps to the right, to take position on 
the high ground along Utoy creek. This change was effected 
on the 26th with but slight molestation, and the night following, 
the Fourteenth Corps, now in permanent command of Brevet 
Major-General J. C. Davis, was withdrawn from position and 
formed on the right of General Stanley, on Utoy creek. The 

(140) 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 141 

same night the Army of the Tennessee moved rapidly by a 
circuit toward Sandtown. General Schofield alone remained 
in position. 

The next day the Fourth Corps advanced to Mount Gilead 
Church, and, forming line of battle on the road to Fairburn, 
skirmished with the enemy's cavalry. The Fourteenth Corps 
remained in position, as it was necessary that one corps should 
cover another until out of reach of the enemy. General 
Garrard's cavalry operated upon the rear and left of the armies 
during these movements, and Kilpatrick's having crossed the 
Chattahoochee, at Paice's ferry, and recrossed at Sandtown, 
was charged with similar service on the right. The Twentieth 
Corps, at the Chattahoochee, passed to the command of Major- 
General H. W. Slocum. 

On the 28th, the Fourteenth Corps passed the Fourth at 
Mount Gilead, and reached its designated camp, near Red Oak, 
late in the afternoon. General Morgan's division, in the ad- 
vance, skirmished with the enemy's cavalry during the day. 
The Fourth Corps followed, and the two corps encamped in 
line across the "West Point railroad, facing east. The Army 
of the Tennessee was on the same road above Fairburn, and 
General Schofield was on this road below East Point. Shortly 
after dark, orders were received to destroy the railroad, by 
heating and twisting the rails and burning the ties. The work 
of destruction was continued through the night and a portion 
of the following day, by each army, and twelve and a half 
miles of the road were thoroughly dismantled. But this was 
not the road of most importance to the enemy. The Macon 
road passes to Jonesboro, from Atlanta, on the ridge dividing 
the waters of the Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and offered a 
good position as a strategic base for ulterior movements, and 
on the 30th the armies advanced eastward to reach it, more 
directly in rear of Atlanta. 

The Fourth and Fourteenth Corps moved to Couch's house, 
formed a line trending to the northwest, and went into camp. 
The leading divisions of each corps skirmished with infantry 
and cavalry, and at night it was ascertained that there was a 
force of the enemy at Morrow's mill, on Crooked creek, 
three-fourths of a mile from General Stanley's left. General 



1 1_> FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

Thomas was in communication with General Howard beyond 
1 Renfrew's, but not with General Schofield on the left. General 
< rarrard was guarding the left and rear, at Red Oak, and Gen- 
eral Kilpatrick was on General Howard's right. 

General Sherman having ascertained that General Howard 
was near Jonesboro, directed General Thomas to send Stan- 
Ley's corps toward Rough and Ready, in connection with 
Schofield, and to send forward a strong detachment from the 
Fourteenth Corps to " feel for the railroad." In compliance, 
Genera] Baird, with his own division, and Mitchell's brigade 
of Morgan's division, was sent forward from the center, and 
an early advance discovered that the enemy's trains were in 
motion on a road to the east toward Jonesboro, and later in 
the day it was ascertained from captured stragglers that Har- 
dee's and Lee's corps had passed. 

In the afternoon General Baird's leading detachment reached 
the railroad about four miles from Jonesboro. Although 
greatly in advance of other columns, General Baird determined 
to hold the railroad by strengthening Colonel Carleton's party 
in the advance, and sending Colonel Gleason's brigade for- 
ward in support. The Fourth Corps formed a junction with 
the Twenty-third, at the railroad, and rested on the road south- 
east of Rough and Ready, in a barricaded line facing Jones- 
boro. Carlin's division, formerly Johnson's, moved to Ren- 
frew's to cover the trains, and late in the afternoon was 
ordered to support General Howard, who had been attacked 
by Hardee's and Lee's corps. Carlin moved as ordered, but did 
not reach the field until after General Howard had completely 
repulsed the enemy. 

The situation was now partially developed. Two corps of 
Hood's army were at Jonesboro. It was not known that Stew- 
art's corps had left Atlanta, but as the army was in force at 
Jonesboro, General Sherman determined to move against that 
place, and if Stewart was not there to thrust his forces between 
the two portions of Hood's army. Deeming it probable that 
the third corps would abandon Atlanta, he directed General 
Thomas to order General Slocum to. make a reconnoissance 
toward Atlanta to determine the state of affairs, and also to 
send a cavalry force toward Decatur to observe the enemy in 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 143 

that direction. Circumstances now indicated a speedy solution 
of all problems having connection with Atlanta. 

General Sherman's orders for September 1st required all the 
forces to turn upon Jonesboro. General Howard was already 
before it, and General Davis, with Morgan's and Carlin's divis- 
ions, joined Baird's on the railroad, and the whole corps was 
soon on Howard's left. Generals Schofield and Stanley, having 
a longer march, and owing to railroad destruction and other 
causes, were greatly delayed. General Garrard was still in the 
rear, and General Kilpatrick was sent down the west bank of 
Flint river to threaten the railroad below Jonesboro, and Gen- 
eral Blair's corps of the Army of the Tennessee was sent in the 
same direction. This immense combination had been directed 
against Hardee's corps alone, which had been left behind to 
cover the retreat to a point where the dissevered army could 
be reunited. 

After occupying the position vacated by General Blair's 
corps, General Davis directed General Carlin to send a brigade 
to explore the ground toward the railroad upon which General 
Stanley was advancing. The reconnoissance was made by Edie's 
brigade of regulars, and was strongly resisted by the enemy. 
It was, however, pressed until a commanding hill beyond Mo- 
ker's creek was carried, from the front of which the enemy's 
works could be attacked with advantage. 

At this juncture General Thomas reached the head of column, 
to whom General Davis reported the condition of affairs, and 
suggested a plan of operations. Having received permission 
to make the attack directly before the hill which Edie had 
gained, General Davis pushed his troops in column to that point, 
and deployed for action. Carlin's second brigade was formed 
on the right of Edie's. General Morgan crossed the creek and 
connected the left of his division with Carlin's right. General 
Baird formed his division in rear of Carlin's left, which rested 
on the railroad. General Morgan's movement was executed 
over rough ground, and in exposure to the enemy's artillery. 
About the time that the formation of the Fourteenth Corps 
was completed, General Stanley's head of column appeared on 
Carlin's left, and Grose's and Kirby's brigades of Kimball's 



144 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

division were deployed, under instructions to push the enemy 
vigorously on the left of the railroad. 

The troops of the Fourteenth Corps designated for the at- 
tack, were < reneral Carlin's two brigades and General Morgan's 
entire division, and were formed in double lines, and as nearly 

< tiguous as the ground would permit. The distance to the 

enemy from Morgan's division, when deployed, was about one 
thousand yards ; the intervening space was open, but swampy, 
and cut with ditches. The distance to the enemy's works in 
General Carlin's front could not be determined, as a dense 
thicket interposed. The defenses of the enemy were in the 
woods on a ridge, at various distances from the edge of the 
wooded ground, but in no case exceeding one hundred yards. 
Morgan's division was formed by brigades in column of regi- 
ments in echelon, from left to right — Lum's, Mitchell's, and 
Dihvorth's — and were ordered to assault with the bayonet 
alone. 

At 4 p. m., after a heavy cannonade from Prescott's and 
Gardner's batteries on Carlin's ridge, the troops moved for- 
ward, but owing to the thickets in Carlin's front, and the 
swampy ground and ditches before Morgan, their progress 
was slow, and there was difficulty in maintaining alignments 
and direction. When the whole line had advanced to the 
slope of a hill, and an open field within three or four hundred 
yards of the enemy's position, it was halted for readjustment, 
the ground offering some protection. Thus far the enemy's 
fire had been only slightly felt, except by Edie's brigade, which 
was some distance in advance of the troops on the right, and 
had already carried a projection of the enemy's works, and 
was exposed to a most galling fire. To give Edie support, or 
rather to relieve him from position in the line, Este's brigade 
of Baird's division was thrown forward, and took part in the 
general attack which followed. The other two brigades of 
Baird's division were retained on the left, to push the advan- 
tage on that flank, should a general assault prove successful. 

At 5 p. m., the rectified lines again moved forward, and the 
attack was quickly and vigorously made along the whole bat- 
tle front. There had been so many unsuccessful assaults made 
by both armies during the campaign, that the enemy regarded 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 145 

this attempt to carry his intrcnchments, so strongly defended, 
as an exhibition of folly and harmless audacity. But it was 
soon revealed that the most determined resistance could not 
arrest or defeat the bold assault. 

Morgan's division carried its entire front, and gloriously re- 
versed the issue of its assault near Kenesaw Mountain on the 
27th of June. The brigades of Mitchell and Dilvvorth there 
clung to the hillside under the enemy's guns, having failed 
in assault ; here they leaped the fortifications, and under 
sword and bayonet held captive the troops set for their de- 
fense. 

Este's brigade was successful at once on its riffht, the Tenth 
Kentucky and Seventy : fourth Indiana gaining the intrench- 
ments in their front ; but the Fourteenth and Thirty-eighth 
Ohio, on the left, met such obstructions, as compelled them to 
halt. They, however, held their ground under a fire of fearful 
effect. Colonel Este, who had been in the charge on his right, 
now turned his attention to his left, and meeting with Colonel 
W.T.C. Grower, Seventeenth New York, of General Morgan's 
left brigade, requested him to put in his regiment, which he 
did with great gallantry and success, though he was himself 
one of the first to fall. Joined by this regiment, Este's left 
carried the works in front, and captured a large number of 
prisoners. Moore's brigade, Carlin's left, encountered such 
obstructions as held it in check for a time, but finally joined 
the remainder of the assaulting troops in the enemy's works. 

Equal success on the part of the Fourth Corps might have 
resulted in the capture of Hardee's command ; but Kimball's 
and Newton's divisions were so delayed by the thick under- 
growth, and the enemy's skirmishers, that they did not get 
before his main lines until 5 p. m., and then Grose and Kirby 
only succeeded in breaking through the entanglements in 
front of his barricade, while Newton, who was compelled to 
make a larger circuit, passed beyond the right flank of the 
enemy, when it was too dark to take advantage of his position. 

Although Hardee's corps was neither captured nor annihi- 
lated — a conjectured result, had the troops on the left reached 
the field earlier — the action was the most brilliant and success- 
VOL. II — 10 



146 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

ful of its type during the campaign. All other assaults of 
main lines by either army li ad resulted in failure, and, as a 
general rule, the defensive in positive battle had been success- 
ful; but here a strongly intrenched line was carried, with the 
capture of nearly a thousand men, including one general offi- 
cer, and many of inferior grades, also eight guns, and seven 
battle (lags. During the night, about one thousand men in 
addition cither surrendered or were captured. 

The contest closed so late in the evening that pursuit was 
impossible, and the troops bivouacked in the enemy's works 
connecting with the Fourth Corps at the railroad. During 
the night, Hardee fell back to Lovejoy's Station. The next, 
morning the national forces followed, except the Fourteenth 
Corps, left behind to bury the dead and collect the material 
abandoned by the enemy. The troops in pursuit reached the 
vicinity of the station at noon. The Fourth Corps formed 
line of battle, and made preparations to attack the enemy who 
was busy fortifying a line across the railroad, a mile north. 
The necessity of resistance at this point had not been antici- 
pated, and the enemy was extemporizing defenses. General 
Stanley's line was formed with Wood's division in the center, 
and Newton's and Kimball's on the right and left. As his 
attack was to be co-operative with the Army of the Tennessee, 
he waited for General Howard to fix the time, and at 3 J p. m. 
as directed, advanced his line. Upon reaching the immediate 
vicinity of the enemy, he did not deem it advisable to attack 
at the railroad, as Hood's artillery swept this point completely. 
Supposing that the Army of the Tennessee would so hold the 
enemy by attack, that he could reach his right flank, General 
Stanley advanced his center and left. The ground, however, 
was so unfavorable, on account of roughness, streams, and 
marshes, that Wood's and Kimball's divisions did not get near 
the position until nearly 6 p. m. While General Wood was 
selecting a point for attack, he received a wound which obliged 
him to relinquish his command. However, his left brigade, 
Kncil. r's, charged and carried the enemy's works, but could 
not maintain its hold, as it was subjected to an enfilading fire 
<>n both flanks. Kimball's column was exposed to a sweeping 
artillery fire, and the ground before them being open, the 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 147 

order to charge was countermanded. Both divisions in- 
trenched. General Sherman did not deem it advisable subse- 
quently to press the attack, as he was led to believe that 
Hood had halted merely to cover the roads to McDonough 
and Fayetteville, and that it was then too late to intercept 
Stewart's corps, reported to be in retreat from Atlanta upon 
McDonough. 

Pending the movement south of Atlanta, General Slocum 
strengthened the position at the Chattahoochee, and watched 
the enemy closely toward Atlanta. The explosions during 
the night of the 1st called forth a special reconnoissance. As 
Colonel Coburn, commanding the advance, approached the 
city on the 2d, he was met by the mayor, who made to him a 
formal surrender of the place. After entering Atlanta, Colonel 
Coburn exchanged a few shots with Ferguson's cavalry, act- 
ing as a rear-guard of the retreating army, and captured one 
hundred men. General Slocum soon after occupied the city 
with seven brigades, and found twenty pieces of artillery and 
several hundred small arms ; but General Hood had destroyed 
almost all valuable material which he could not remove, in- 
cluding eight locomotives and eighty-one cars loaded with 
ammunition and supplies. The explosion of the ammunition 
had been heard at Jonesboro, and was the first indication of 
the total abandonment of the place. As General Sherman had 
interposed between Stewart's corps at Atlanta, and Hardee's 
and Lee's on the Macon road, the retreat of the former was 
the only condition of safety. 

The losses in the engagements south of Atlanta amounted 
in the aggregate to twelve hundred men. Fifteen hundred 
of the enemy were captured, and he left three hundred dead 
on the field of battle. 

September 3d, General Sherman announced the conclusion 
of the campaign, and gave orders for the return of his armies 
to Atlanta, to rest and recuperate until the enemy's move- 
ments or some new plan of his own should call them again to 
action. As the enemy remained in his intrenchments at Love- 
joy's Station, General Sherman did not withdraw his army at 
once. Both commanding generals sent their trains to the 



148 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

rear; and thus indicated a mutual disposition to widen the 
breach between them for a time at least. 

On the 5th, the Fourth Corps quietly withdrew from posi- 
tion and joined the Fourteenth at Jonesboro, at daylight on 
the 6th. Though the general withdrawal was impeded by a 
rain-storm and consequent bad roads, it was successfully con- 
ducted. The enemy manifested a disposition to annoy the 
two corps at Jonesboro, but there was no action beyond the 
exchange of a few shots. The next day, the army moved 
to Rough and Ready, the enemy refraining from pursuit, and 
went into camp on the 8th, on the outskirts of Atlanta — the 
Fourteenth Corps on the right of the Campbellton road, and 
the Twentieth and Fourth Corps to the east in reserve. Pick- 
et s were thrown out well to the front upon commanding posi- 
tions. Thus, Atlanta was gained after a campaign of four 
months, involving strategical and tactical combinations on a 
grand scale, but without a general decisive battle. General 
Sherman did not risk a general assault, and the Confederate 
generals did not offer battle with a broad front, except with 
intrenched lines ; but there were many engagements of great 
severity, and constant skirmishing on a scale that produced 
great waste of life. 

The fall of Atlanta was hailed by the Northern people as a 
result of great moment. The noise of cannon all over the 
land, orders of congratulation from Washington and army 
commanders gave expression to the general appreciation of 
the campaign and its issue. The moral effect of the consum- 
mation was indeed great North and South, and yet, as no army 
had been destroyed or signally defeated, the possession of 
Atlanta was only a partial solution to the war problem in the 
West. The march southward of Sherman's armies, despite 
the heaviest concentration that could be made in resistance, 
the destruction of extensive manufactories of materials of 
Avar, and the palpable diminution of the central insurgent 
forces, were grand results indeed; but the Confederate Army 
of the Tennessee was not annihilated, and until it and the 
one in Virginia should be, the end of the war could not come. 
The end was indeed foreshadowed by the fact that the national 
armies could force their way into the South anywhere, sub- 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 149 

ject to the one condition of supplies. But this war, beyond 
most wars, was a conflict of ideas, and the persistence of the 
parties to it revealed the overmastering force of the antago- 
nistic opinions. The protraction of the war had intensified 
the original antagonisms, and had, besides, involved the two 
sections in debt to such an enormous extent that financial ruin 
was inevitable in the defeat of either. The success of the 
North would restore the Union and place its debt upon the 
whole country. The success of the South would be a division 
of the country, with a burden of debt to each portion of crush- 
ing weight. So that now, not only the primal causes of the 
war and the extreme reluctance of a proud people to yield to 
an enemy, but financial considerations, precluded peace so long 
as the South could maintain armies. The campaigns of the 
summer had made a heavy draft upon the strength of the Con- 
federate armies; but the two which unfurled their banners 
before Grant and Sherman in May were intact, though one 
had been shut up in Richmond and the other had been bat- 
tled and flanked out of Atlanta. General Canby and Admiral 
Farragut had neutralized Mobile, though the former had been 
bereft of the corps intended for its complete reduction to rein- 
force the Army of the Potomac. There were troops yet in the 
Gulf States, east of the Mississippi, to raise Hood's army to its 
maximum strength, though their accretion would reveal the 
desperate straits of the insurgents. There were forces beyond 
the Mississippi, whose isolation hitherto, through the viligance 
of General Canby, had prevented a more potential combination 
against General Sherman in Georgia. These troops were raid- 
ing in Missouri, and by predatory warfare were doing local 
mischief without affecting the general issue. The rebellion, 
then, was palpably resting upon the armies of Lee and Hood. 
The former, by political considerations, if not by purely mili- 
tary ones, was restricted to the defense of the Confederate cap- 
ital. Hood's army alone had freedom of motion, and to de- 
termine how best to use that freedom was to the insurgent 
leaders the great problem of the hour. 

The aggregate casualties of the Army of the Cumberland, 
during the campaign, from the 1st of May to the 6th of Sep- 
tember, were as follows : One hundred and ninety-six officers 



150 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

and two thousand eight hundred and forty-five men enlisted 
were killed; eight hundred and ten officers and fourteen 
thousand nine hundred and seventy-three enlisted men were 
wounded; one hundred and four officers and two thousand 
six hundred and throe enlisted men were captured — in all, 
twenty-one thousand five hundred and thirty-four men. Dur- 
ing the campaign forty-three thousand one hundred and fifty- 
three were reported sick to Major George E. Cooper, surgeon 
United States army, medical director of the department.. Of 
these, twenty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-four were 
sent to the rear ; two hundred and seven died from disease, 
and one thousand and sixty-seven died from wounds. Almost 
all others, sick or wounded, were returned to duty. 

General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, reported the cap- 
ture of four guns by the Twentieth Corps, at Resaca, in battle, 
and four left by the enemy in his fortifications; ten guns 
captured by General J. C. Davis, at Rome ; twenty left by the 
enemy in Atlanta, and eight captured by the Fourteenth 
Corps, at Jonesboro. He also reported the expenditure of 
86,611 rounds of artillery ammunition, 11,815,299 rounds oi 
infantry ammunition, and the loss of 1,439 artillery horses. 

During the period the army captured 8,067 men from the 
enemy and received 2,162 deserters, as reported by Colonel 
Parkhurst, provost marshal general of the department. These 
statistics reveal the cost of war. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864 — 8 p. m. 
General Hallcck, Washington, D. C. : 

We have now pressed the enemy's lines from the east around to East 
Point on the south. The nature of the ground, with its artificial defenses, 
makes it too difficult to assault, and to reach the road hy a further exten- 
sion will be extra hazardous. I have ordered army commanders to pre- 
pare for the following plan: Leave one corps strongly intrenched at the 
I liattahoochee bridge in charge of our suplus wagons and artillery ; with 
-uxty thousand (00,000) men reduced to fighting trim, to make circuit of 
devastation around the town, with a radius of fifteen or twenty miles. 

To do this, I go on faith that the militia in Atlanta are only good for 
the defense of its parapets, and will not come out. 

I would like the utmost activity to be kept up in Mobile Bay, and if 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 151 

possible, about the mouth of Apalachicola ; also, to be assured that no 

material reinforcements bave come here from Virginia. 

If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. 

Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864. 
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

In making the circuit of Atlanta, as proposed in my dispatch of to-day, 
I necessarily run some risk. If there be any possibility of Admiral Far- 
ragut and tb e land forces of Gordon Granger taking Mobile (which rebel 
prisoners now report, but the report is not confirmed by Macon papers of 
the 1 1th, which I have seen), and further, of pushing up to Montgomery, 
my best plan would be to wait awhile as now, and, at proper time, to move 
down to West Point, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there. 

Before cutting loose, as proposed, I would like to know the chances of 
our getting the use of the Alabama river this campaign. I could easily 
break up the railroads back to Chattanooga, and shift my whole army 
down to West Point and Columbus, a country rich in corn, and make my 
fall campaign from there. 

I know Fort Morgan must succumb in time. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864. 

Generals Thomas, Scliojicld, and Howard: 

I now have positive and official information that General Wheeler has 

gone up into East Tennessee, beyond Spring Place. We will repair all 

damages to railroad and telegraph to-night. I will not move our infantry 

now, but break the Macon road all to pieces with our cavalry to-morrow 

night. Therefore, be active, and demonstrate against Atlanta, to occupy 

the entire front, and make them believe we will attack them in their 

trenches during to-morrow and next day. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Maj 'or- General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 24, 1864 — 8 a. m. 
Generals Thomas, Schoficld, and Howard : 

I will ride down to the bridge to-day, to see the lay of the ground and 
the character of the redoubts there. Go on and make all preparations 
possible, so that our movement, when begun, may proceed rapidly and 
safely. Our maps should be compiled, and as many roads laid down be- 
tween Red Oak and Jonesboro as we can be sure of existence. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-Gcncral Commanding. 



152 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

Ukadquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 

August 24, 18C4. 
Major-Gcncral Sherman : 

A tire seems to be raging in Atlanta, direction ten (10) degrees south 
of east from my tree. Can see heated air rising in dense columns; seems 
to be spreading. Town is filled with smoke. 

I have directed my heavy guns to fire on the town. 

0. 0. HOWARD, 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Lovejoy's Station, Ga., September 2, 1864 — 8 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Until we hear from Atlanta the exact truth, I do not care about your 
pushing your men against breastworks. Destroy the railroad well up to 
your lines. Keep skirmishers well up, and hold your troops in hand for 
anything that may turn up. As soon as I know positively that our troops 
are in Atlanta, I will determine what to do. 

I have ordered General Schofield to feel for the McDonough road, to 
prevent reinforcements coming to the enemy from that direction. 

Yours, etc., W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 63.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Lovejoy's, September 3, 1864. 

I. Army commanders will, during to-day, send to Jonesboro all sick 
and wounded men, all empty wagons and prisoners of war, also all surplus 
wheels not needed for a five days' stay in front, ready to start to-morrow 
morning, at 6 o'clock, from Jonesboro to Atlanta. Each army will send 
a regiment to escort these wagons, and General Thomas will send an ex- 
perienced colonel to conduct the train into Atlanta, there to wait further 
orders. 

I I. The army will be prepared to move back to-morrow or next day — 
the Army of the Cumberland to Atlanta and Chattahoochee bridge, the 
Army of the Tennessee to East Point, and the Army of the Ohio to De- 
catur. Major-General Thomas will have General Garrard's cavalry ready 
to act as rear guard. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 66.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In TnE Field, near Jonesboro, Ga., September 6, 1864. 
I. The General-in-Chief communicates, with a feeling of just pride and 
satisfaction, the following orders of the President of the United States. 



FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 153 

and telegram of Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, on hearing of the cap- 
ture of Atlanta : 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, D. C, September 3, 1804. 
The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General 
W. T. Sherman, and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command 
before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance 
displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has re- 
sulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, 
and other military operations that have signalized the campaign, must 
render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have 
participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation. 

(Signed,) ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 

President of the United States. 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington City, Septmber 3, ] 864. 
Ordered: 

1st 

2d. That, on Wednesday, the 9th day of September, commencing at 
the hour of 12 it., there shall be fired a salute of one hundred (100) guns, 
at the arsenal at Washington, and at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, Pittsburg, Newport, Kentucky, St. Louis, New Orleans, Mobile, 
Pensacola, Hilton Head, and Newbern, or the day after the receipt of this 
order, for the brilliant achievements of the army under command of 
Maior-General Sherman, in the State of Georgia, and the capture of At- 
lanta. The Secretary of War will issue directions for the execution of 
this order. 

^Signed,) ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 

President of the United States. 

City Point, Va., September 4, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
Major-General Sherman : 

I have just received your dispatch, announcing the capture of Atlanta. 
In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with 
shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute 
will be fired within an hour, amidst great rejoicing. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 

II All the corps, regiments, and batteries composing this 

army, may, without further orders, inscribe "Atlanta" on their colors. 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 134] 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Atlanta, Ga., September 9, 1864. 
Soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland: 

The major-general commanding, with pride and pleasure, congratu- 
lates you upon the fact that your achievements during the campaign 



154 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 

which has just closed, in connection with those of the Armies of the 
Tennessee and Ohio, have received such distinguished marks of appre- 
ciation as the thanks of the President of the United States, and of the 
major-general commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi. 

ir commander now desires to add his to those you have already re- 
1 for th" tenacity of purpose, unmurmuring endurance, cheerful 
obedience, brilliant heroism, and all those high qualities which you have 
displayed to an eminent degree, in attacking and defeating the cohorts 
of tnason, driving them from position after position, each of their own 
choosing, cutting their communications, and in harassing their flanks and 
rear, during the many marches, battles, and sieges of this long and event- 
ful campaign. 

It is impossible, within the limits of an order like this, to enumerate 
the many instances in which your gallantry has been conspicuous, but 
among them may be mentioned the actions of Rocky Face Mountain 
and before Dalton, fought between the 8th and 13th of May; of Resaca, 
on the 14th and 15th; of Adairsville, on the 17th, and of New Hope 
Church, on the 20th of the same month ; of Culp's Farm, June 22d ; Peach- 
tree creek, July 20th, and the crowning one of Jonesboro, fought Sep- 
tember 1st, which secured the capture of the city of Atlanta, the goal 
for which we set out more than four months ago, and furnished a brilliant 
termination to your struggles for that long period. 

Let these successes encourage you to the continued exercise of those 
same high qualities, and to renewed exertions in the cause of our country 
and humanity when you shall again be called upon to meet the foe; and 
mred, the time is not far distant when your prowess will conquer 
\ hit territory now remains within the circumscribed limits of the re- 
bellion. A few more fields like those whose names now crowd your 
standards, and Ave can dictate the terms of a peace alike honorable to 
yourselves and our country. You can then retire to your homes amid 
the plaudits of your friends, and with the proud consciousness that you 
have deserved well of the country. 

Our rejoicings are not unmixed with a proud regret for our brave com- 
rades who have fallen. Their graves mark the spots where they went 
down amid the din and roar of battle, dotting every field and hillside, 
or lying beneath the spreading boughs of the forest along our route; they 
will, in future days, serve like finger-boards, to point out to the traveler 
the march of your victorious columns. Those silent mounds appeal to us 
to remain true to ourselves and the country, and to so discharge the 
high duty devolving upon us that their lives, which they so freely offered 
up, may not prove a useless sacrifice. 

By command of Major-General Thomas. 

WM. D. WHIPPLE, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE MARCH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES TO THE NORTH AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF NEW CAMPAIGNS. 

"When General Sherman, August 13th, informed General 
Halleck that he would make the circuit of Atlanta with his 
armies, he suggested that.it might be prudent to break up the 
railroad to Chattanooga, and shift his armies to West Point 
and Columbus, and there make his base for the fall campaign. 
To this General Grant replied, advising that there should be 
no backward movement, even if his roads should be so cut as 
to preclude the possibility of supplies from the North, and 
said : " If it comes to the worst, move South as you suggest." 
After General Sherman had taken the city, without overthrow- 
ing the army which had so long defended it, he was occupied 
with the question of its use in future operations. That he 
might hold it for purely military purposes, he banished the 
citizens, giving them choice to go North or South ; and as the 
defenses constructed by the enemy were so extensive that only 
an army could utilize them, he established an inner line of 
works, which, held by an ordinary garrison, would protect his 
depots. That he might accumulate supplies for future enter- 
prise, he restricted the railroads to persons connected with the 
army, and the transportation of military stores. But under- 
lying these essential preparations, even to hold Atlanta defen- 
sively, there was the grand problem of farther aggression. To 
hold Atlanta and the long railroad to his primary base, and 
have forces to advance, in the manner of his previous move- 
ment, required an impracticable augmentation. As the enemy 
was now free to detach heavily, to break his communications, 
he was compelled to send troops to the rear, and, besides this 

(155) 



156 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

draft, he was constantly losing regiments by expiration of 
term of service. Despairing of being able to cling to the rail- 
roads in advancing from Atlanta, he, in common with General 
Grant, was looking for a southern base to which he might 
hap, without intervening communications. General Grant 
suggested that General Canby should act upon Savannah, and 
General Sherman upon Augusta. General Sherman in reply 
expressed his willingness " to move upon Milledgeville, and 
compel Hood to give up Macon and Augusta, and then turn 
upon the other," if he could be assured of finding provisions 
at Augusta or Columbus; but without such assurance he 
w< >uld risk his. army by going far from Atlanta. The country, 
in any direction southward, would supply an army that could 
maintain motion and freedom to forage, but the contingency 
of slow maneuvers or stopping to dislodge an intrenched 
enemy, coupled with constraint in foraging, was the barrier to 
a campaign having a remote objective. The questions of the 
direction and object of an advance, though discussed at length 
by Generals Grant and Sherman, remained unsettled until 
General Hood's movements gave a turn to affairs which had 
not been anticipated by either. 

Soon after the fall of Atlanta, the Southern President left 
Hichmond to confer with his western generals with regard to 
the next campaign, and to use his eloquence to rouse the 
people from despondency. His removal of General Johnston 
from command had not averted disaster. He had watched the 
closing in of the national lines around his capital, but the con- 
ditions of warfare were there inveterately denned, and he sped 
to the West to give shape to some new enterprise in solution 
of the problems imposed by the issue of the preceding dis- 
astrous campaign. 

It would have been well had he called General Johnston to 
Palmetto, and this he doubtless would have done, had his sole 
object been to give a successful issue to a new campaign; but 
even in this supreme moment, personal considerations were 
dominant, and the justification of his removal of his ablest 
western general from command, took rank with the projects 
which involved the fate of the Confederacy. He now needed 
judicious counsel, for another campaign of dire issue would be 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 157 

fatal. Nearly one hundred thousand national troops were 
holding Atlanta, and preparing to utilize all the advantages 
gained in the previous campaign. It was not possible to in- 
crease Hood's army promptly to such an extent as to justify 
direct ofl'ense in open field, much less against Atlanta. The 
Confederate leaders were then restricted to the continuance 
of the defensive, wherever General Sherman should invite de- 
fense, or to some diversion that would retard or avert the 
blow which he was meditating. It was decided that Hood's 
army should be thrown upon General Sherman's communica- 
tion, and the forces under Smith and Magruder called over 
the Mississippi river for conjunction in Northern Alabama ; 
that the united armies, gathering recruits as they advanced, 
should sweep through Tennessee and Kentucky, and stand a 
hundred thousand strong upon the banks of the Ohio. Critics 
have been swift to condemn Hood's advance to the North, 
and considered as an independent movement, it is seemingly, 
at least, open to criticism ; but regarded as a part of a compre- 
hensive plan, it is not apparent that his army could have been 
used to better advantage. That the expectation of gathering 
a vast army on the Tennessee river was the inspiration of 
Hood's movement, which in itself promised no mean results, 
is plainly true ; for before he had crossed the Chattahoochee, 
the Confederate President sent an order (which General 
Canby intercepted) to Smith and Magruder to cross the 
Mississippi river with their forces. The assumption of the 
practicability of their conjunction with Hood, is the explana- 
tion of Mr. Davis' prophetic declarations in speeches through- 
out the South, that should the absent soldiers return to their 
colors, General Sherman should be forced into a retreat as dis- 
astrous as that of Napoleon from Moscow, and the Confeder- 
ate army would advance in triumph to the Ohio river. The 
precedents of the war were against the plan itself, as even in 
the first flush of the rebellion all aggression with remote ob- 
jectives had resulted in failure ; while in no case during the 
conflict, had a Confederate army been thrown with ultimate 
advantage upon the communications of a national army whose 
aggressive pressure could not be resisted. Latterly, all de- 
fense in the West had been unsuccessful, and the disparity of 



158 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

aggregate forces forbade all sober-minded Southerners the 
hope that any plan could be devised whose execution would 
arrest, much Less avert the downfall of the rebellion. 

General Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, quietly recu- 
perating and reinforcing his army, until the 20th of September, 
when tiiose on the outlook informed General Sherman that he 
w as in motion. General Sherman's first thought was that he 
was drawing back to Macon, and would send reinforcements 
to Richmond. The next day, however, it was apparent that 
( General Hood had only shifted his army to Palmetto Station, 
and was there intrenching. This movement, and the appear- 
ance of Forrest with a force of six or eight thousand men in 
Tennessee, were the first steps in the execution of the new plan 
of operations. General Sherman now surmised that General 
Hood had resolved to throw his army on his flanks, to prevent 
the accumulation of supplies, and made dispositions to thwart 
] iii n. He sent General Newton's division to Chattanooga, and 
ordered General Corse to unite his division at Rome, to act 
against any force that might threaten Bridgeport from the di- 
rection of Gadsden. Having provided for the defense of these 
important points, he left the disposition of Forrest to the dis- 
trict commanders — Generals Steedman, Granger, and Rousseau. 

A raid from Forrest into Middle Tennessee had been ex- 
pected by those in the rear, though not by those in the front. 
About the 12th of the month, General Granger received through 
his scouts information, which he deemed reliable, that such was 
his purpose, if the corps of General A. J. Smith had been re- 
in ived from West Tennessee. He therefore expressed his con- 
victions to General Sherman, and asked if Smith's corps had 
lefl Tennessee. General Sherman directed General Thomas to 
inform him that he need feel no uneasiness about Forrest, as he 
had gone to Mobile. Notwithstanding this positive assurance 
that there was no danger, General Granger sent a force to re- 
connoiter in the direction of Forrest's anticipated approach. 
In obedience to his order, Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, command- 
ing the Sixth Tennessee Cavalry, advanced toward Florence, 
and having returned to the main road, after a short detour, 
found himself in the rear of a cavalry force of eight or ten 
thousand men. And thus was positively revealed the first of 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 159 

a scries of aggressive movements on the part of the enemy, 
which gave a new complexion and unexpected issues to mili- 
tary operations in Tennessee and Georgia. 

September 25th, it was supposed that General Hood was 
moving toward the Alabama line, and this opening of the way 
for a march to the sea, turned General Sherman to the consid- 
eration of a movement thither without an intermediate base 
of supplies. General Grant, however, suggested that his at- 
tention should first be given to affairs in his rear, and appre- 
ciating the situation in Tennessee, and knowing that desperate 
efforts would be made to force Sherman to relax his grasp 
upon Georgia, ordered all the spare troops in the West to 
Nashville, that no further redaction of forces at Atlanta might 
be necessary. On the 28th, General Sherman said to General 
Grant : " I want Apalachicola arsenal taken, also Savannah, 
and if the enemy does succeed in breaking my road, I can 
light my way to one or the other place, but I think it better 
to hold on to Atlanta and strengthen to my rear, and there- 
fore I am glad that you have ordered troops to Nashville." 
And to President Lincoln, he said : " It would have a bad 
effect, if I am forced to send back any material part of my 
army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that I 
could not act offensively, if the occasion calls for it." Cling- 
ing thus to Atlanta, he was nevertheless so apprehensive with 
regard to his communications, that he sent General Thomas 
to the north to provide for their security, having previously 
ordered General Morgan's division to Chattanooga, and a bri- 
gade of the Army of the Tennessee, and the cavalry from 
Memphis, to Eastport, to operate against the flank of any force 
going into Tennessee by any of the fords near Florence. 
General Thomas started on the 29th, and the same day there 
came to General Sherman the first intimation that Hood was 
crossing the Chattahoochee. The day following it was known 
that a portion of his army was across, and by the first of Oc- 
tober the movement was well developed, except in respect to 
its ultimate object. The direction of the march did not indi- 
cate an advance to Blue Mountain, but toward General Sher- 
man's communications, and citizens reported that Rome was 
General Hood's destination. In doubt of his purpose and 



160 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

destination, General Sherman made provision for two contin- 
gencies — the enemy swinging across to the Alabama line and 
thence into Tennessee, or striking the railroad south of King- 
ston. In the one case, he proposed to send back to Chatta- 
nooga all the troops from Kingston north, and with all south 
of Kingston to move to the sea-board, and in the other, he 
would turn upon Hood and attack him. 

To ascertain the direction of the enemy's march before put- 
ting his own armies in motion, General Sherman sent General 
Garrard to Powder Springs, General Kilpatrick to Sweet- 
water, General Howard to reconnoiter to Fairburn, and Gen- 
eral Cox, commanding the Twenty-third Corps in absence of 
General Schofield, to send a division to Flat Rock. His ob- 
ject, in addition, was to get the bridges over the Chattahoo- 
chee, and then place his armies between them and General 
Eood. But the latter was indifferent to all such designs, as 
li-> had cut loose from all connections in his rear. General 
Sherman regarded his movement as ostentatious, but it was 
one of desperation rather, and right boldly did he and his 
army dash on to the issues involved. He was vigorously ex- 
ecuting his part of the grand combination which had been 
projected, to change, if possible, the theater and the issue of 
the war in the West. Having crossed the Chattahoochee, he 
tli icw Stewart's corps upon the railroad north of Marietta, 
and with the remainder of his infantry forces, moved toward 
J ►alias, his cavalry, under Wheeler, being already in Northern 
Georgia. Stewart reached the railroad, and commenced its 
destruction, October 2d, and citizens reported that it was Gen- 
eral Hood's purpose to attack Acworth and Allatoona, after- 
ward Rome, and in the event of repulse, to retreat to Blue 
Mom i tain, Jacksonville, and Selma. General Sherman now 
ordered General Stanley to move with ten days' rations to 
Ruff's Station, and open communications with General El- 
liott, who, with his cavalry divisions, was over toward Sweet- 
water and Nose's creek. The next day, he ordered all his 
remaining forces, except the Twentieth Corps, which was left 
to bold Atlanta and the railroad bridge over the Chatta- 
hoochee, to follow Stanley. In the evening of the 4th, the 
advance of the latter encamped near Little Kenesaw Moun- 



MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 161 

tain. General Hood's infantry was then advancing upon Al- 
latoona, having captured the garrisons at Big Shanty and 
Acworth, and destroyed the track of the road for several 
miles. The same day, General Elliott found the enemy be- 
tween Dallas and Big Shanty, occupying the old works of the 
national army, in more force than could be dislodged by dis- 
mounted cavalry. 

General Sherman had been convinced of General Hood's 
audacity too late to protect his communications, and was now 
anxious with regard to his depot of supplies at Allatoona. 
He had previously ordered General Corse to reinforce the gar- 
rison from Rome, should the enemy approach from the south ; 
and this provision saved the place. General Corse reached 
Allatoona with a few regiments, on the 4th, and the next 
morning he was attacked by French's division of Stewart's 
corps. General Sherman, while signaling his presence at 
Kenesaw Mountain, and his purpose to give the earliest pos- 
sible support, witnessed the repeated repulse of the enemy. 
The gallant resistance of the garrison, and the movement of 
General Cox to his left, induced General French to withdraw 
entirely during the afternoon, having lost at least a thousand 
men. This was not a promising initiative for General Hood, 
and its probable bearing upon his plans was added to other 
circumstances of positive character to conceal again, for a few 
days, his ultimate purpose. French's division remained in the 
rear of the army, and offered such resistance to General El- 
liott, that it was impossible to ascertain in what direction the 
enemy's standards were pointing. From the 5th to the 10th, 
it was not known whether they were pointing northward or 
westward. 

During this period, General Sherman again proposed to 
General Grant to break up the railroad to Chattanooga, and 
move with wagons to Savannah, entertaining the opinion that 
Hood would move to the West. But on the 10th, learning 
that he was marching toward Rome, he ordered his generals 
to move upon Kingston with a view to support General Corse 
at Rome, should the enemy approach in force. General Hood 
crossed the Coosa river twelve miles below, in feint upon 
VOL. II — 11 



1G2 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

Rome, to cover another dash upon the railroad and his march 
northward. General Sherman's forces were concentrated in 
the vicinity of Kingston on the 11th, but again General Hood's 
movements were in doubt, as he disappeared from the vicinity 
of Rome without indicating where he was going. General 
Sherman, on the 12th, made effort to develop his movements, 
by sending Garrard's division* and the Twenty-third Corps 
across the Oostanaula, while a brigade from Hazen's division 
moved down the Coosa from Rome. In the meantime, Hood 
moved rapidly toward Rcsaca with his whole army. Here, 
again, provision had been made to reinforce the garrison, as, 
in compliance with General Sherman's contingent orders, the 
troops at Cassville, Colonel Watkins' brigade of cavalry, and 
General Bauni, with three hundred and fifty infantry, moved 
forward before the place was invested. Colonel "Watkins left 
his horses on the left bank, and placed his men in the intrench- 
ments on the other side. General Hood demanded the sur- 
render of the place on the 11th, under the threat that no pris- 
oners would be taken if he should be compelled to carry the- 
works by assault. But though General Baum refused to 
capitulate, and General Hood had a heavy force, probably two 
corps present, and threw a line around the town from the river 
above to the river below, he may have been deterred from 
attack by the uncertainty -of the issue, or may have considered 
the temporary possession no compensation for the cost of tak- 
ing it. 

While halting before Resaca, General Hood sent detach- 
ments to destroy the railroad toward Dalton, and having him- 
self withdrawn on the 12th, he demanded the surrender of 
the latter place the next day. Colonel Johnson, commanding 
the Forty-fourth Colored regiment, was convinced that resist- 
ance was useless, and accepted terms. The garrison at Tilton 
was also captured. Early in the day, General Schofield had 
reached Dalton on his way to join General Sherman, but not 
being able to go farther, and learning that the enemy was ad- 
vancing, he returned to Cleveland with his train and what 

* General Garrard drove a brigade of the enemy through the entrance 
to Chattooga valley, and captured two guns. 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 163 

public property it was practicable to save. From Dalton, 
General Hood, with Lee's and Cheatham's corps, passed into 
Snake Creek Gap. Stewart's corps destroyed the railroad to 
Tunnel Hill. General Sherman reached Resaca on the 14th, 
and disposed his forces to strike the enemy in flank, or force 
him to fight by shutting him up in Snake Creek Gap. He 
sent General Howard to the southern entrance, and General 
Stanley, with his own and Davis' corps, by Tilton, to the 
northern entrance. But though General Howard skirmished 
to hold General Hood in the pass until General Stanley should 
reach his rear, his effort was ineffectual, as he retreated to the 
north before Stanley could intercept him by closing the Gap. 
Having emerged from the pass, General Hood had freedom of 
motion north and west. On the 16th, General Sherman threw 
his columns to Lafayette to cut off his retreat, but he was able 
to unite his forces in time to attain a safe position between 
the Coosa and Lookout Mountain. 

Reference should here be made to operations by which For- 
rest was expelled from Tennessee. This bold trooper crossed 
the Tennessee river at Waterloo, September 20th, and two days 
afterward appeared before Athens, Alabama. Colonel Camp- 
bell, commanding the post, after skirmishing with the enemy 
for a short time, withdrew from the town to the fortifications. 
This step exposed the public buildings and stores, and Forrest 
immediately applied the torch. The next day he invested the 
fort, which had been constructed for defense by a small force, 
and opened with his artillery. Colonel Campbell responded with 
spirit, and refused two calls to surrender, but finally, through 
a personal interview with Forrest, was induced to conclude that 
resistance was useless. Forrest adopted the policy, which in 
many instances was successful, to make a show of force to in- 
duce surrender, when there was no intention to attack, or at 
least a great reluctance to do so, in view of inevitable loss or 
uncertain issue. The garrison surrendered consisted of four 
hundred and fifty men of the One Hundred and Sixth, One 
Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundred and Eleventh Colored 
regiments, and one hundred and thirty men of the Third Ten- 
nessee Cavalry. A half hour later, the Eighteenth Michigan 
and One Hundred and Third Ohio arrived, and were surren- 



164 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

dered after an engagement. This was an auspicious beginning 
for Forrest, but fortunately proved to be his only important 
success. 

From At In -I is he advanced toward Pulaski, and destroyed 
the Nashville and Decatur railroad for several miles. At Pu- 
laski, General Rousseau was awaiting his coming with such 
force that Forrest withdrew after a skirmish. The same day, 
the 29th, one of his detachments appeared on the JSTashville and 
( 'liattanooga road, north and south of Tullahoma, cut the tele- 
graph wires, and injured the track. The road was soon repaired, 
bu1 the party having touched it, was the advance of Forrest's 
main force, which passed Fayetteville the night following, 
moving toward Decherd. Having learned, however, that 
heavier forces were before him than he wished to meet, he 
changed direction and divided his forces. General Rousseau 
had moved by rail, the day previous, to Tullahoma, and Gen- 
eral Steedman had crossed the Tennessee river, and was ad- 
vancing north upon the road with five thousand men, and in 
the face of the two columns, Forrest turned back, sending Bu- 
ford with four thousand men to Huntsville, and moving him- 
self with three thousand toward Columbia. Buford reached 
Huntsville the night of the 30th, and made an ineffectual de- 
mand for the surrender of the place. Remaining during the 
night, he repeated his demand with similar issue the next morn- 
ing, and then moved off toward Athens. Here he made an 
attack at 3 p. m., and was repulsed by the Seventy-third Indiana, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Slade commanding, which had been sent 
thither by General Granger to regarrison the post, immediately 
: 1 1 1 1 ■ r Colonel Campbell's surrender. Buford anticipated an easy 
victory, but was twice repulsed, and was pursued after with- 
drawal, by a small party of General Granger's cavalry. He 
crossed the Tennessee, at Brown's ferry, on the 3d of October. 

General Forrest succeeded no better. He reached Columbia 
on the 1st, but refrained from attack. He remained in the vi- 
cinity until the 3d, and then moved in the direction of Mount 
Pleasant, destroying five miles of railroad between Cartersville 
and Spring Hill. By this time, four columns were converging 
upon him, under the direction of General Thomas. General 
"Morgan's division having arrived at Huntsville the night of 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 165 

the 1st, moved through. Athens to secure the crossing at Bain- 
bridge ; General Rousseau was on his way from Nashville with 
four thousand men, who had been hastily mounted ; Croxton 
was advancing throughLawrenceburg,andGeneralWashbii]-iK', 
with three thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, was 
passing up the Tennessee river, under instructions to leave his 
infantry at Johnsonville and join General Rousseau at Pulaski, 
with his cavalry. In addition to these dispositions, Lieutenant- 
Commander Forrest, commanding the naval force on the Up- 
per Tennessee, was requested to send gunboats to Florence, if 
the stage of water would permit, This combination might 
have resulted in Forrest's capture, had not the high water in 
Elk river detained Morgan, who did not reach Rogersville until 
the night of the 4th, while Forrest passed through Laurence- 
burg the same night, and crossed at Bainbridge on the 6th, his 
rear forces having been reached by Washburne's advance. But 
if Forrest was neither captured nor defeated, the main line of 
railroad was saved from serious damage, and to break it was 
doubtless the chief object of his raid. 

As soon as General Thomas was advised of Hood's north- 
ward march, he made dispositions to offer resistance on the 
line of the Tennessee river, and especially to defend Chatta- 
nooga and Bridgeport — the most important points on the 
direct line of supply. He first directed General Rousseau to 
destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the river 
below Decatur, and then take post at Florence, Alabama, 
and ordered General Morgan to return to Athens. When the 
direction of General Hood's march was clearly indicated, he 
directed General Croxton, with his brigade of cavalry, to cover 
the crossings of the river from Decatur to Eastport, and hur- 
ried Morgan's division from Athens to Chattanooga, Steed- 
man's from Decatur to Bridgeport, and Rousseau's from Flor- 
ence to Athens. The garrisons at Decatur, Huntsville, and 
Stevenson were not reinforced, that there might be the heavi- 
est concentration possible, should the enemy advance toward 
Chattanooga or Bridgeport. 

The northward march of Hood's army, on General Sher- 
man's communications, created an intense alarm all over the 
North, from which the highest military circles were not free. 



166 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

A - a consequence, all available troops in the Department of 
the Ohio, and all, in fact, far and near, were directed to Gen- 
eral Thomas; and so threatening was the emergency in the 
estimation of the lieutenant-general, that he advised the with- 
drawal of all the forces on the railroad " from Columbia to 
Decatur, and thence to Stevenson." General Thomas, how- 
•. did not adopt the suggestion, and subsequent events jus- 
tified his action. 

When, on the 13th, General Thomas ascertained that Hood's 
advance was at Lafayette, Georgia, he directed General Wag- 
in a\ in command at Chattanooga, to call in all the detachments 
from Tunnel Hill, north, and make preparations to hold his 
important post. Accordingly, a very large number of guns 
were mounted in the fortincatious, which had been made 
exceedingly strong by Colonel Merrill, with his engineer regi- 
ment and the forces left as a garrison, while all the outlying 
troops were concentrated for the defense of the town and sup- 
plies. 

Upon General Schofield's return from Dalton to Cleveland, 
General Thomas directed him to assume command at Chat- 
tanooga, and add to the garrison all the troops within reach. 

But though General Hood was so near, he had no thought 
of putting his army between the mountains, south of Chatta- 
nooga, at least while General Sherman was in his immediate 
rear, and soon moved westward to avoid battle and pursue the 
accomplishment of the ultimate object of his march to the 
north. As soon as he turned westward, General Thomas sent 
General Schofield, with Morgan's and "Wagner's divisions, up 
Will's valley to watch against the approach of the enemy 
toward Bridgeport, but soon recalled him, having gained 
knowledge of General Hood's movement upon Gadsden. 

When General Sherman learned that Hood had turned west- 
ward, he proposed to follow him wherever he might go, but 
did not believe that he meditated the invasion of Tennessee, 
though the declarations of the Confederate President and Gen- 
eral Hood gave assurance of this design. The pursuit of Hood 
was maintained by various routes to Gaylesville, and there 
General Sherman halted his armies to await the repair of the 
railroad and the developments of the enemy. He stationed 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 167 

the Army of the Tennessee near Little river, to support the 
cavalry and observe the enemy toward Will's valley; the 
Army of the Ohio at Cedar Bluffs, to feel forward to Center 
and in the direction of Blue Mountain ; and the Army of the 
Cumberland at Gaylesville. While in this region the armies 
drew their supplies from the country. 

Although General Hood had not achieved the grand results 
which the sanguine President had predicted, he had neverthe- 
less been so far successful as to perplex the national com- 
manders and give hope to the insurgents. He had not forced 
General Sherman into a disastrous retreat, but he had drawn 
him to the north, not in abandonment of Atlanta and his forti- 
fied positions, but with nearly all his forces. He had twice 
thrown his armies between General Sherman and his base ; 
had maneuvered with skill; had captured the garrisons at 
Big Shanty, Acworth, Tilton, and t Dalton; had destroyed 
nearly thirty miles of railroad, and, except in his attack upon 
Allatoona, had received no harm. He had moved in boldest 
disregard of railroads and communications, contrary to the 
precedents of the previous campaign, and, in fine, his north- 
ward march had been brilliantly executed. The resulting 
problems were freighted with the gravest issues. The insur- 
gents were now too far exhausted to bear the overthrow of 
his army in its perilous adventure to the north, and yet Hood 
held boldly to his plan, as though assured of success. A new 
base, with railroad communications, was in preparation for 
him in Northern Mississippi, under the direction of General 
Beauregard, now in supreme command in the West, not for 
defense, but for aggression of the boldest type, whose expla- 
nation is found in the expectation that the trans-Mississippi 
forces would swell Hood's army for its resistless sweep through 
Tennessee and Kentucky. General Canby's dispatch to Gen- 
eral Sherman, dated October 18th, gives evidence of the 
effort to reinforce Hood's army from the West ; as, without 
heavy reinforcements, aggression, in the face of General 
Sherman's armies, was palpably impossible. ISTo doubt the 
minor object was to decoy General Sherman from the Chatta- 
nooga and Atlanta railroad, and the undoing of the campaign 
on that line ; but the main one was the invasion of Tennessee 



108 jfAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

and Kentucky. Subsequently, General Sherman's movement 
to the south so changed the situation that this invasion was 
attempted without the trans-Mississippi forces. 

While the rebel generals were preparing to invade Ten- 
Dessee and Kentucky, General Sherman was engrossed with 
the project which he first suggested as a contingency when 
aboul to make the circuit of Atlanta, in August, and which 
he had since repeatedly brought to the attention of General 
Grant. At Atlanta, Allatoona, Kingston, and now, while 
awaiting, at Gaylesville, the repair of the railroad, he made 
suggestions to General Grant, from day to day, concerning 
the " march to the sea." He was unwilling to follow Hood 
farther west, as in this way, it had been planned that he should 
be decoyed from Georgia. By the 20th of October his plans 
for a counter-movement were well matured, and his utterances 
and orders foreshadowed, their early execution. He proposed 
to leave General Thomas in command of the military division in 
his absence — which at first he thought would be ninety days, as 
in that time he could go to the sea and return — giving him as 
an army for defense the Fourth Corps, the garrisons in Ten- 
] ii Bsee and Alabama, and the new troops that had been ordered 
to Nashville. For himself he would retain the Fourteenth, 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third Corps, 
and a cavalry corps of three divisions, comprising twenty -five 
hundred men each, under the command of Brevet Major-Gen- 
eral J. II. Wilson, recently sent by General Grant to be chief 
of the cavalry of the military division. These troops were to 
be trimmed to perfect efficiency. The railroad was to be re- 
paired to Atlanta, for use in preparation for the march beyond, 
and then to be destro}~ed. 

Telegraphic communication between Chattanooga and At- 
lanta was established October 20th, and on the 28th the rail- 
road was in running order. In the meantime General Hood 
assumed the offensive. Advancing from Gadsden, he appeared 
before Decatur on the 26th and made an attack, but not with 
such force as indicated a purpose to storm the place — his 
tlnve corps of infantry being near, and his cavalry being dis- 
posed on the south bank of the river, from Guntersville to 
Eastport. General Thomas sent two regiments to General 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 169 

Granger, from Chattanooga, and instructed him to hold his 
post at all hazards. This was a feehle reinforcement, hut he 
had no other spare troops to throw before the enemy. The 
divisions of Morgan and Wagner had been recalled from Ten- 
nessee by General Sherman, and for the defense of the line of 
the Tennessee river there were the usual garrisons, and Gen- 
eral Croxton's brigade of cavalry spread out on the north bank. 
In the emergency General Sherman ordered General Stanley 
to report with his corps to General Thomas, and, by order, 
placed the latter in command of all troops and garrisons in his 
military division, not in his own presence, contingent upon 
his separation from his division " by military movements -or 
the accidents of war." 

On the 27th, General Hood intrenched his position before 
Decatur, skirmished during the day, but used no artillery, 
though he put guns in position. Under the cover of darkness, 
he drove in General Granger's pickets with a strong force, and 
established a new line within five hundred yards of the town. 
The next day, General Granger made a successful sortie. His 
troops advanced, under cover of the guns of the fort, down 
the river bank and round to the rear of the enemy's rifle-pits, 
and by a bold charge cleared them, killing a large number of 
men and capturing one hundred and twenty. A battery above 
the town was also captured by the Fourteenth United States 
Colored troops, Colonel T. J. Morgan commanding, but the 
position being too much exposed to be held, the guns were 
spiked and the regiment under orders retired to the fort. In 
the charge, Colonel Morgan lost forty men killed and wounded, 
including three officers killed. This resistance to the estab- 
lishment of his investing lines, and his lack of provisions, in- 
duced General Hood to withdraw his forces altogether at 4 
a. m. on the 29th. He could neutralize the place by passing to 
the west and meet his supplies, while he could secure crossings 
at less cost down the river ; and these considerations doubtless 
induced his withdrawal. He lost several hundred, perhaps 
more than a thousand men, while inflicting a loss of eighty, 
and kept his troops in action in almost utter destitution of 
provisions. 

General Hood has not reported his objects in the various 



170 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

movements of his campaign, and hence his purpose in oper- 
ating against Decatur has not been authentically revealed. 
All circumstances, except his own statement of his plan, lead 
to the belief that he expected to cross the Tennessee river at 
Decatur and move rapidly upon General Sherman's communi- 
cations in Middle Tennessee, and cut off his supplies entirely. 
The press in the South, and his own officers, entertained and 
expressed the opinion that this extreme aggression was medi- 
tated. The opposition of General Granger's small force at 
Decatur was so positive, even showing the purpose of offense, 
thai he was deterred from the effort to carry the position by 
assault. There was a diversity of opinion among his gen- 
eral officers as to the wisdom of his withdrawal from Decatur, 
as it involved the abandonment, for a time, of his advance to 
.Nashville. 

During the 29th, General Croxton discovered that the enemy 
was crossing the Tennessee river at the mouth of Cypress 
creek, two miles below Florence. He concentrated his forces 
as far as practicable, but was unable to regain the north bank. 
Having been informed of this turn of affairs, General Thomas 
directed General Hatch, at Clifton, commanding a cavalry 
division of General Howard's army, and under orders to join 
< General Sherman in Georgia, when ready for the field, to move 
to General Croxton's support, and urged both commanders to 
keep the enemy from crossing other forces, if possible, until 
the Fourth Corps could arrive from Georgia and get into posi- 
tion to meet him. It was, however, too late to defend the line 
of the Tennessee river, as Hood was master of too many 
crossings ; and when General Wood's division, the advance of 
the corps, arrived at Athens, on the 31st, General Thomas 
ordered General Stanley to unite his command at Pulaski and 
await further instructions. The same day, General Schofield 
was ordered to move from Eesaca, Georgia, to Columbia, Ten- 
Qessee, to combine with General Stanley and the cavalry to 
resist the advance of the enemy into Middle Tennessee. That 
an invasion was meditated had become evident from Southern 
newspapers, and prisoners and deserters from Hood's army 
bore testimony to this purpose. The conjecture that he could 
not supply his army on the Tennessee or north of it was now 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 171 

plainly groundless, as he had established communications by 
the repair of the Ohio and Mobile railroad, and supplies were 
coming to him from Selma and Montgomery, through Corinth, 
and thence eastward to Cherokee Station, on the Memphis 
and Charleston railroad. And while he had thrust the heads 
of infantry columns over the river at Florence and at points 
above and below, he had sent Forrest with his bold troopers 
up the Tennessee river to break up General Thomas' line of 
supply by the river and the Northwestern railroad. 

Forrest appeared at Fort Heiman, an earthwork on the west 
bank of the Tennessee, about seventy-five miles from Padu- 
cah, where, three days later, he captured gunboat No. 55, and 
two transports, having previously burned the steamer Em- 
press. On the 2d of November, he planted his batteries above 
and below Johnsonvillc, the western terminus of the North- 
western railroad, and an important depot of supplies. His 
guns blockaded the river, and shut in before the town three 
gunboats, eight transports, and about a dozen barges. The 
garrison comprised a thousand men from the Forty -third 
Wisconsin and the Twelfth United States Colored regiment, 
and a detachment of the Eleventh Tennessee cavalry, under 
the command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, of the Twelfth Col- 
ored regiment. The naval forces, under Lieutenant E. M. 
King, attacked the enemy's guns below the town, but though 
repulsed after a severe conflict, they recaptured a transport 
having on board two 20-pounder Parrott guns and quarter- 
master's stores, and forced Forrest to burn the gunboat cap- 
tured on the 31st of October. On the 4th, the enemy opened 
fire upon the gunboats from the opposite bank. The guns on 
boats and land responded briskly, but were soon disabled, and 
for fear that they would fall into the hands of the enemy, both 
gunboats and transports were fired. The flames reached the 
stores on the levee, and property worth a million of dollars 
was consumed. It was fear rather than necessity that caused 
this waste, as Forrest withdrew soon after altogether, having 
delivered a furious cannonade. He crossed the river above 
the town, by means of extemporized flat-boats, and moved to- 
ward Clifton, with evident design of co-operating with the 
main army. 



172 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

On the evening of the 5th, General Schofield reached John- 
sonville with a portion of his command, having moved rapidly 
by rail, in compliance with instructions from General Thomas 
to save the gunboats and supplies. Having left a sufficient 
force to defend the place, he then proceeded to join General 
Stanley at Pulaski, to assume command of the forces before 
the enemy. He was assigned to this position, byreason of his 
rank as a department commander, though General Stanley 
was his senior as a major-general. 

General Hood was now free to invade Tennessee, as the low 
stage of water in the river prevented the effective use of the 
gunboats against his pontoon bridges, and General Thomas 
could not offer a strong army on the north bank. He was 
also free to move to the southwest should General Sherman 
concentrate his armies against him; but General Sherman 
was unwilling to do this. His preparations for his march 
through Georgia were nearly completed, and he was unwilling 
to take a step backward, to pursue Hood. He made provis- 
ion, however, for reinforcing General Thomas, by calling two 
divisions, under General A. J. Smith, from Missouri, and by 
sending back General Wilson, and the cavalry of McCook's 
and Garrard's divisions to give a good remount to Kilpatrick's 
division, retained by himself. 

General Hood's threatening attitude called forth a fresh 
discussion of General Sherman's projected march between him 
and General Grant, but induced no change of plan. The 
conclusions reached were these, that turning back would undo 
the work of the preceding campaign, give up the territory 
which had been gained, and fulfill the predictions of Mr. Davis 
with regard to the effect of Hood's advance to the North, and 
that he could not be overtaken if followed ; and on the other 
Land, going forward would destroy the railroads of Georgia, 
inflict immense damage, and produce a most potent moral 
effect, in illustrating the vulnerability of the South. In his 
last communication to General Grant, General Sherman said : 
" If we can march a well-appointed army right through this 
territory, it is a demonstration to the world — foreign and do- 
mestic — that Ave have a power which Davis can not resist. 
This may not be war, but rather statesmanship. Nevertheless 



MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 173 

it is overwhelming to my mind, that there are thousands of 
people abroad and in the South who will reason thus : If the 
North can march an army right through the South, it is proof 
positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving 
only its willingness to use that power:" This moral effect was, 
indeed, the justification of the movement, as General Sherman 
proposed to use the territory which he had gained in Georgia 
as a track simply for his march, and not hold any part of 
Georgia except his objective on the Atlantic shore, while he 
left behind him one of the two great armies upon which the 
existence of the rebellion depended. It is true, however, that 
even in his last dispatches before starting, he expressed the 
conviction that Beauregard and Hood would be forced by 
public clamor to follow him. He retained for himself from 
his three armies the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Twentieth Corps, and one large division of cavalry, in all 
sixty thousand infantry, and five thousand five hundred cav- 
alry, and one piece of artillery to every thousand men. 



City Point, Va., September 10, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

As soon as your men are properly rested and preparations can be made, 
it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. 

We want to keep the enemy continually pressed to the end of the war. 
If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end can not be far dis- 
tant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know 
but it will be the best move for Major-General Canby's troops to act 
upon Savannah, while you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from 

you on this matter. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Atlanta, Ga., September 14, 1864. 
Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, Decatur : 

General Sherman informs me that General Smith has been directed to 
Missouri by orders from Major-General Halleck; also, that he has official 
information that Forrest and his command reached Mobile on the 8th 
instant. You must therefore apprehend no trouble from any but Roddy, 
Wheeler, and the parties which have already been in Tennessee. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



174 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864. 
ant-General U. S. Grant, City Point: 
Hood is evidently on the west side of Chattahoochee, below Sweet- 
water. If he tries to get on my road this side of the Etowah, I shall at- 
tack him; but if he goes on to the Selma and Talladega road, why would 
it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has and 
the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta, and 
then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and 
<loing irreparable damage? We can not remain on the defensive. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864 — 2 p. m. 
General G. H. Thomas, Chattanooga : 

I have your dispatch of noon. Use your own discretion as to matters 
north of the Tennessee river. If I can induce Hood to swing across to 
Blue Mountain, I shall feel tempted to start for Milledgeville, Millen, and 
Savannah or Charleston, absolutely destroying all Georgia, and taking 
either Savannah or Charleston. In that event, I would order back to 
Chattanooga everything the other side of Kingston, and bring forward all 
else; destroy Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely scour the Southern 
Confederacy. In that event, Hood would be puzzled and would follow 
me ; or if he entered Tennessee he could make no permanent stay. But 
if he attempts the road this side of Kingston or Rome, I will turn against 
him. Forrest will not attack our forts — that is manifest; but will try and 
get possession of Decatur. All the infantry and cavalry not in forts or 
blockhouses should be directed against him by roads — say the Shelby ville 
pike and Favetteville. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 68.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864. 
The following movements are ordered : 

I. Major-General Slocum, with Twentieth Corps, will hold Atlanta and 
the Chattahoochee bridge, and all detachments of other troops or corps 
will report to him and be assigned by him to posts looking to the secu- 
rity of the depot. 

II. All the rest of the army, provided with ten (10) days' rations, will 
move by the Chattahoochee bridge to Smyrna Camp-ground— the Army of 
the Cumberland, Major-General Stanley on the center, looking west; the 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 175 

Army of the Ohio, Brigadier-General Cox, on the right, and the Army of 
the Tennessee, Major-General Howard, on the left. 

III. The commanding general will be near the center. 
By order of General W. T. Sherman. 

(Signed.) L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 85.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In tiie Field, Kenesaw Mountain, October 6, 1864. 

I. Major-General Stanley, Army of the Cumberland, will occupy a strong 
defensive position across the Marietta and Burnt Hickory, and Marietta 
and Dallas roads, his right near Pine Hill and left behind Nose's creek. 

II. Major-General Howard, Army of the Tennessee, will join on to the 
left of Stanley, and make a line covering the Powder Spring road, and 
the cavalry on the flank ; General Kilpatrick will prevent the enemy from 
reaching the railroad below Marietta. 

III. Brigadier-General Cox, Army of the Ohio, will move on the Burnt 
Hickory road, via Pine Hill and Mount Olivet Church, west, until he 
strikes the road by which the enemy have moved on Allatoona. He will 
have his columns ready for a fight, but not deployed. He will park his 
wagons near Kenesaw. 

IV. General Elliott will send cavalry to-day to Big Shanty, Acworth, 
and Allatoona, and bring official reports. 

V. . . . 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 87.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kenesaw, October 8, 18G4. 

I. The armies will march at once toward Allatoona — that of the Ohio by 
the roads southwest of Acworth ; that of the Cumberland by roads south 
and west of Kenesaw Mountain, leading through Acworth, and that of 
the Tennessee by roads north and east of Kenesaw, via Big Shanty and 
Acworth. 

II. The Army of the Ohio will halt for orders near good grass and 
water, two or three miles this side of Allatoona; that of the Cumberland, 
this side Acworth, and that of the Tennessee this side of Big Shanty, 
all giving attention to the grazing of their animals when not on the 
march. 

IV. Until further orders, General Elliott will keep his cavalry force 
watching the enemy, but ready to march rapidly to Stilesboro and the 
Etowah bridge, if the enemy turns north toward Rome or Kingston; 
otherwise the cavalry will remain at the front or left flank of the army. 



176 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

V. Should the enemy attempt our road about Kingston or to invest 
Rome, the army must be prepared to leave at Allatoona the principal 
wagon trains, and to march rapidly to the points threatened; but if the 
enemy simply moves off toward Jacksonville or Blue Mountain, the army 
will remain, its right at Alatoona and left at Kenesaw, until our roads are 
repaired. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 
3 L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Allatoona, Ga., October 9, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. : 

It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, 
Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without 
home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to 
the end of the Selma and Talladega railroad at Blue Mountain, about 
sixty (60) miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten King- 
ston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. 

I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike 
out with wagons for Milledgeville and Savannah. Until we can repopu- 
late Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its 
roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By at- 
tempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men monthly, and 
will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. We 
have over eight thousand (8,000) cattle and three million rations of bread, 
but no corn; but we can forage in the interior of the state. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Carterville, October 10, 1864. 
General Grant, City Point : 

Dispatch about Wilson received. Hood is now crossing Coosa, twelve 
(12) miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and 
Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel 
Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to 
defend the state ? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements 
ordered reach Nashville. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 89.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., October 11, 1864. 
The army will move to-morrow morning early on Rome — the Armies of 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 177 

the Ohio and Tennessee by the river roads, and the Army of the Cumber- 
land by a detour via Woodland; all to reach Rome to-morrow night. 
Trains will be taken to Rome. 
By order of Major-Gen eral W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 90.] 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Rome, Ga., October 12, 1864. 
Orders for to-morrow, October 13th, will be as follows : 

I. General Corse will dispatch his division and the brigade of the Fif- 
teenth Corps attached to his garrison, and the First Alabama Cavalry, 
down the Coosa river, on its east bank, toward Coosaville, to develop the 
force guarding the bridge by which the enemy crossed. He will send 
one (1) battery with the expedition, and equip the whole party light. 

II. General Elliott will, at the same time, dispatch down the west bank 
of the Coosa a division of cavalry for the same purpose — viz., to develop 
the force guarding the bridge by which the enemy crossed. 

III. All the armies will be held ready to move at a moment's warn- 
ing. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



BY TELEGRAPH FROM " WASHINGTON, 12 m., NASHVILLE, 

OCTOBER 13, 1864." 
Major- General Geo, H. Thomas, Nashville: 

Two old regiments from General Pope and several new ones from Ohio 
and Indiana are on their way to Nashville. Schotield and Burbridge are 
ordered to send to you everything that can be spared from Kentucky. 
Put yourself in communication with them. General Grant directs that 
you collect your forces, and be prepared to meet Hood wherever he may 
present himself on the Tennessee, and that you take the supplies of the 
country without compunction. By thus supplying your own army, you 
will leave none for him. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Major- General. 



City Point, Va., October 13, 1864. 
Major-General Hallech : 

For Major-General Thomas' information: 

I think it will be advisable for Major-General Thomas now to abandon 
all the railroad from Columbia to Decatur, thence to Stevenson. This 
will give him much additional force. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT. 
VOL. n — 12 



178 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

Washington, October 14, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Lieutenant-General Grant suggests the abandonment of the railroad 
from I !olumbia to Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, in order to give you 
more force against Hood. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 91.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Resaca, Ga., October 14, 1864. 
The first movement will be to free the Snake Creek Gap. 

I. General Howard will bring up all the men of his command he can 
get at 7 a. M. to-morrow, and move direct on Snake Creek Gap, approach- 
ing carefully, and holding his column ready to pass through when relieved 
by General Stanley's movement. 

II. General Stanley will cross over to the hills about two (2) miles 
north of the gap, somewhere south of Tilton, and with infantry, reach 
the summit, and, if possible, find a way across into the valley toward 
Villanow. 

III. General Cox will come up and follow General Howard. 
********* 

V. General McCook will send all the cavalry he can raise boldly to Buz- 
zard Roost Pass, to threaten the enemy in that quarter, and to give Gen- 
eral Stanley notice of any force in that vicinity. As soon as General 
Garrard comes up, he will be dispatched in the same direction. 

********* 

Bv order of Maior-General Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 92.] 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, October 15, 1864. 
The movement to-morrow will be on Lafayette, the primary object 
being to secure possession of Ship's Gap. 

I. (leneral Howard will move rapidly on Villanow and Ship's Gap, to 
secure the summit, and mass to the right. 

II. General Stanley will follow and mass to the left of the gap. 

III. General Cox will halt for orders at Villanow, guarding roads north 
and south. 

] V. General Garrard's cavalry will come through Snake Creek Gap and 
guard the trains. General Elliott will dispatch Colonel Watkins' cavalry 
and scouts to open communication with Chattanoogo, to let them know 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 179 

•that this army is in pursuit of Hood, and to inform me of the state of 
facts along the road and at Chattanooga. 

** * * * * * * * 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. ^ DAyT0N 

Ai d-d e- Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 16, 1864. 
■General Thomas, Nashville : 

Send me Davis' and Newton's old divisions. Re-establish the road, and 
I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move to Blue 
Mountain We can maintain our men and animals on the country. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Atlanta, October 17, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

I have a Montgomery paper of the 12th. The dispatches from Hood, 
as well as the editorials, state that Beauregard is with Hood, and that the 
army is going to cross the Tennessee river. ^ SLOCUM 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 17, 1864. 
General Thomas, Nashville: 

Hood won't dare go into Tennessee. I hope he will. We now occupy 
Ship's Gap and Lafayette, and Hood is retreating toward Alpine and 
Gadsden. I am moving General Garrard to-day to Dirttown, and will 
move General Corse out to Coosaville, and with the main army move on 
Summerville. 

If Hood wants to go into Tennessee, west of Huntsville, let him go, 

and then we can all turn on him and he can not escape. The gunboats 

can break any bridge he may attempt above Decatur. If he attempts to 

cross, let him do so in part, and then let a gunboat break through his 

bridge. I will follow him to Gadsden, and then want my whole army 

united for the grand move into Georgia. 

b W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



New Orleans, October 18, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

I learn by an intercepted dispatch from Jeff. Davis to Kirby Smith, 
dated at Montgomery on the 30th, that the orders to cross the Mississippi 
had been received. I presume that duplicate of this dispatch has reached 
Kirby Smith, as Magruder's force, about eighteen or twenty thousand 
(IS. 000 or 20,000) men, suddenly left General Steele's front and moved 
in the direction of the Washita river. 1 have sent a fast boat to commu- 



180 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

nicate this intelligence to the troops and gunboats on the river, and as 
I have now about eight thousand (8,000) troops afloat, and will at once 
increase the number, I think the crossing can be prevented. The cross- 
ine will probably be attempted in the neighborhood of Gaines' Landing. 

ED. R. S. CANBY, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864 — 12 m. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south. Our ad- 
vance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-office. I shall pursue 
him as far as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venture toward Tennessee, 
except around by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps back to 
General Thomas, and leave him that corps, the garrisons and new troops, 
to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest to push into the 
heart of Georgia, and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads 
of the state. 

The break at Big Shanty is repaired, and that about Dalton should be 
in ten (10) days. We find abundance of forage in the country. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 18G4. 
General G. H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. : 

Make a report to me as soon as possible of what troops you now have in 
Tennessee, what are expected, and how disposed. I propose, with the 
Armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and two corps of yours, to sally forth 
and make a hole in Georgia and Alabama that will be hard to mend. 
Hood has little or no baggage, and will escape me. He can not invade 
Tennessee, except to the west of Huntsville. I want the gunboats and 
what troops are on the Tennessee to be most active up at the head of 
navigation. I want General Wilson and General Mower with me, and 
would like General McCook's division made up to twenty-five hundred 
(2,500) men mounted. I will send back into Tennessee the Fourth 
Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incum- 
brances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons, and will prob- 
ably, about November 1st, break up the railroad and bridges, destroy At- 
lanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston. I want you 
to remain in Tennessee, and take command of all my division not actually 
present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand 
(40,000) of all arms fit for duty ; he may follow me or turn against you. 
If you can defend the Line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3) 
months, is all I ask. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



MAKCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 181 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1S64. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. : 

A reconnoissance pushed down to Gadsden to-day reveals the fact that 
the rebel army is not there, and the chances are it has moved west. If it 
turns up at Guntersville, I will be after it; but if it goes, as I believe, to 
Decatur and beyond, I must leave it to you at present, and push for the 
heart of Georgia. All I want is to get my sick and wounded back to a 
safe place. I start the Fourth Corps back to-morrow, via Muston's and 
"Valley Head, ordering it to Bridgeport or Chattanooga, according to what 
orders Stanley may have from you. Stanley will have about fifteen 
thousand (15,000) men. Beaureguard may attempt Tennesse from the di- 
rection of Muscle Shoals, but when he finds me pushing for Macon, Mil- 
ledgeville, etc., he will turn back. I send you a copy of my order giving 
you supreme command in my absence. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 



Nashville, October 26, 1864 — 2 p. m. 
Major-General Sherman : 

General Granger telegraphs me again, to-day, that Hood's army is threat- 
ening to cross the Tennessee river at various places between Guntersville 
and Decatur. I have sent down to him all the reinforcements I have to 
spare at this time. Have you any information that Hood has moved with 
bis army in the direction indicated in these reports ? 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 105.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1864. 
In the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating 
the general in command from his military division, Major-General Geo. 
H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, will exer- 
cise command over all troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence 
of the general-in-chief. The commanding generals of the departments, 
Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee, will forthwith send abstracts of their 
returns to General Thomas, at Nashville, in order that he may understand 
the position and distribution of troops; and General Thomas may call 
for such further reports as he may require, disturbing the actual condition 
of affairs and mixing up the troops of separate departments as little as 
possible consistent with the interests of the service. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



182 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumrerland,. 
Nashville, November 1, 1864 — 9.30 A. m. 
Brigadicr-GeneralJno. F. Croxton, Shoal Creek, via Pulaski: 

Your dispatch of yesterday, reporting your position on Shoal creek, re- 
d Hold that position as long as possible, so as to enable General 
Stanley to get into position at Pulaski. Should you be compelled to fall 
back do so with the view of covering Stanley's march from Athens. I 
ha v, .'ordered General Hatch to co-operate with you. Acknowledge receipt 
and report state of affairs. geq r THQMASf 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding- 

Nashville, November 1, 1864 — 7 p. m. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

Your dispatch of 11.30 a. m. this date, received. General Croxton re- 
ports that last night he held the fords of Shoal creek, eight miles east 
and ni no miles north of Florence, and that he will retard the enemy as 
long as possible. Stanley's troops are now arriving at Pulaski. I hope 
they will all be there at 12 m. to-morrow. 

I have halted General Hatch at Pulaski, and he is co-operating with 
General Croxton against the enemy. If I had General Schofield, should 
feel perfectly easy. I have given such instructions as ought to expedite 
his arrival. It will be necessary to hold the usual guards on the railroad 
until the troops can pass over. I will give instructions to have them con- 
centrated as soon as the troops have passed. I despair of getting any 
troops from Missouri in time to be of any service. None of my tele- 
grams have been answered by General Eosecrans. Be assured I will do- 

the best I can. m „^,,.^, 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Rome, Ga., November 1, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General XI. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : 

As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the 
full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications 
and defeat this army. His infantry, about thirty thousand (30,000), with 
Wheeler's and Roddy's cavalry, from seven to ten thousand (7,000 to 
10,000), are now in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and 
the water being low, are able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scat- 
tered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee, and Gen- 
eral Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five trans- 
ports. General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski, Stanley's corps, 
about fifteen thousand (15,000) strong, and Schofield's corps, ten thousand 
(10,000), en route by rail, and has at least twenty to twenty-five thousand 
(20,000 to 25,000) men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 183 

the time; also, General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith 
and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in 
less than ten (10) days. If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia, 
and make for Hood, he would, as he did here, retreat to the southwest, 
leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our 
conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost. I have retained 
about fifty thousand (50,000) good troops, and have sent back full twenty- 
five thousand (25,000), and have instructed General Thomas to hold de- 
fensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all fortified and provis- 
ioned for a long siege. I will destroy all the railroads of Georgia, and do 
as much substantial damage as is possible, reaching the seacoast near one 
of the points hitherto indicated, trusting that Thomas, with his present 
troops, and the influx of new regiments promised, will be able in a few 
days to assume the offensive. 

Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson 
back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about four thousand 
five hundred (4,500). This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore, 
when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move south as soon as pos- 
sible. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Citt Point, November 1, 1864 — 6 p. m. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to 
entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign ? With 
Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I 
believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the 
neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now 
that he is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he 
will go in one direction while you are pushing the other. If you can see 
the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make 
your other move secondary. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieidenant-General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : 

If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my 
movements, I have thrown Beauregard well to the west, and Thomas will 
have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until reinforcements 
meet him from Missouri and recruits. Wo have now ample supplies at 
Chattanooga and Atlanta to stand a month's interruption to our com- 
munications, and I do n't belive the Confederate army can reach our lines, 
save by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate 



184 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 

that. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow me in my 

contemplated movement through Georgia. 

F W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



City Point, Va., November 2, 1864—11.30 a. m. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Your dispatch of 9 a. m. yesterday is just received. I dispatohed you 
the same date advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far 
north, ought to be looked upon more as the object. With the force, how- 
ever, you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of 
Hood, and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from 
where you are, to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in 
territory. I say, then, go on as you propose. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864. 
General Thomas, Nashville : 

Your dispatch of 5 p. m. is received. All will be ready to start from 
here the day after to-morrow. Keep me well advised. I think you will 
find Hood marching off, and you should be I'eady to follow him. Decatur, 
Tuscaloosa, Columbus, and Selma are all good points to forage and feed 
an army. 

Let me keep Beauregard busy, and the people of the South will realize 
his inability to protect them. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 11, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. : 

Dispatch of to-night received. All right. I can hardly believe Beau- 
regard would attempt to work against Nashville, from Corinth as a base, 
at this stage of the war, but all information seems to point that way. If 
he does, you will whip him out of his boots ; but I rather think you will 
find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned 
Rome, and in two more will burn Atlanta, and he must discover that I 
am not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart of 
Georgia. About a division of rebel cavalry made its appearance this 
morning south of the Coosa river, opposite Rome, and fired on the rear- 
guard, as it withdrew. Also, two days ago, some of Iverson's cavalry — 
about eight hundred (800)— approached Atlanta from the direction of De- 
catur, with a section of guns, and swept round toward Whitehall, and 
disappeared in the direction of Rough and Ready. These also seem to 



MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 185 

indicate that Beauregard expected us to retreat. I hear of about fifteen 
hundred (1,500) infantry down at Carrollton, and also some infantry at 
Jonesboro, but what numbers I can not estimate. These are all the en- 
emy I know to be in this neighborhood, though a rumor is that Breckin- 
ridge has arrived with some from West Virginia. To-morrow I begin the 
movement laid down in my Special Field Order No. 115, and shall keep 
things moving thereafter. By to-morrow morning all trains will be at or 
north of Kingston, and you can have the exclusive use of all the rolling 
stock. By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your 
fortifications, you will have Schofield and Stanley and. A. J. Smith, 
strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all of Wilson's cavalry. 
You can safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee, and prevent his 
ever returning. I still believe, however, that the public clamor will force 
him to turn, and follow me; in which event, you should cross at Decatur, 
and move directly toward Selma, as far as you can transport supplies. 
The probabilities are the wires will be broken to-morrow, and that all 
communication will cease between us ; but I have directed the main wire 
to be left, and will use it if possible, and wish you to do the same. You 
may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th, 
with about sixty thousand (60,000) men, well provisioned, but expecting to 
live liberally on the country. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. . 

THE RESISTANCE TO GENERAL HOOD'S ADVANCE FROM THE TEN- 
NESSEE RIVER, CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 

The responsibility of repelling General Hood was now 
thrown upon General Thomas, and the most stupendous in- 
terests turned upon his success. Not in figure, but in fact, the 
territory gained by all the battles in Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Georgia was in jeopardy. The peril was not such as is in- 
evitable when two equal armies meet in battle, but such as is 
intertwined with the contingencies of improvising an army 
against a bold invasion. It is true that General Thomas ex- 
pressed himself hopefully in his last dispatch to General Sher- 
man, but his assurance was based upon the fact that General 
Smith's forces were then due at Nashville, and the expectation 
that his cavalry would be speedily remounted, and that the 
coming of the promised reinforcements from the North would 
not be delayed. In these expectations he was disappointed, 
and the situation in Tennessee was most unpromising during 
the month of November. General Hood's army was stronger 
than when, under General Johnston, in May, it boldly con- 
fr< >nted a hundred thousand men. His three corps of infantry, 
under Generals Lee, Cheatham, and Stewart, comprised from 
forty to forty-five thousand men, and his cavalry corps from 
ten to fifteen thousand, under Forrest, one. of the boldest gen- 
erals in the South. Against this compact army, at least fifty 
tin una n d strong, General Thomas had a movable army of 
twenty-two thousand infantry and four thousand three hun- 
dred cavalry. He had, in addition, the garrisons at Chatta- 
nooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Huntsville, Decatur, Murfrees- 
boro, and Nashville, and the detachments in block-houses 

(186) 



BATTLE OF FRAXKLIX, ETC. 187 

on the railroads ; but it was not considered safe to withdraw 
the troops from either of the two railroads leading from. Nash- 
ville to the Tennessee river, until General Hood should indi- 
cate his line of advance. General Hood, with the exception 
of Forrest's raid in West Tennessee, confined himself to oper- 
ations near Florence, during the first half of the month. His 
main reason for clinging to the Tennessee river was doubtless 
the uncertain attitude of General Sherman in Georgia. He 
may have still hoped that reinforcements from the other side 
of the Mississippi might join him as previously anticipated. 
But though refraining from positive offense, he was preparing 
for it. His forces which crossed the Tennessee river on the 
20th of October, drove back General Croxton and covered the 
laying of a pontoon bridge. Lee's corps soon after crossed and 
intrenched, having cavalry in front. November 4th, General 
Croxton was driven across Shoal creek, but the enemy ad- 
vanced no farther. General Hatch, with his division of cav- 
alry, joined General Croxton on the line of Shoal creek on 
the 7th, and these officers then watched closely and reported 
the movements of the enemy. Wishing to ascertain the ene- 
my's strength in his front, General Hatch crossed the creek on 
the 11th, and drove back the enenry's cavalry upon the in- 
fantry, and ascertained that there was a large force on the 
Waynesboro road. The next day telegraphic communication 
between General Sherman and General Thomas was severed ; 
and as soon as it was thus known that General Sherman had 
started on his great expedition, there was the most anxious 
watching in Hood's front, in the endeavor to ascertain how 
the " march to the sea " would affect the situation in Tennes- 
see. The alternative to General Thomas and his little army 
was the defensive in Tennessee, or the offensive in Alabama, 
accordingly as Hood should advance or retreat, and all were 
eager for the development of his intentions. Generals Hatch 
and Croxton watched closely for decisive indications, and 
although the high stage of water in the Tennessee delayed a 
general advance, it was soon evident that such a movement . 
was meditated. To delay Hood's advance as much as pos- 
sible, General Hatch obstructed the roads crossing Shoal 
creek, and sent rafts down the swollen river to break his 



188 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

bridges. Reports were current, subsequently, that his bridges 
did part, and from this or other causes, he did not complete 
the transfer of his army to the north bank until the 19th, 
when his movement was completely developed. Colonel 
Coon, commanding General Hatch's right brigade, crossed 
Shoal creek, which still separated the opposing cavalry, had 
a severe conflict, and did not return until he had discovered 
the advancing infantry. The possibility of General Hood fol- 
lowing General Sherman was now at an end. 

Up to this time General Thomas had hoped that the enemy 
would be so delayed, that he could concentrate his forces to 
give battle south of Duck river, but this was now plainly im- 
possible. General Smith had not arrived, new regiments had 
not come as fast as old ones had been discharged upon expira- 
tion of terms of service, and the dismounted cavalry had made 
but little headway in securing horses, arms, and accouterments. 
His only resource then was to retire slowly, and delay the 
enemy's advance, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive 
and concentrate. It was hoped that the state of the roads 
would prevent the advance of infantry, but Hood appreciated 
the effect of delay, and pressed forward. He advanced on the 
19th, on the Waynesboro and Butter Creek roads, with his 
cavalry mainly on his left. The direction of his advance indi- 
cated that he would strike Columbia, rather than Pulaski, and 
General Thomas authorized General Schofield to move to the 
former place, if Hood's approach to that point should be 
developed. General Hatch concentrated his division at Lex- 
ington, and on the 21st, withdrew to Lawrenceburg, where he 
was attacked the following; morning-. 

A severe fight continued through the day, but General Hatch 
held the position against a heavy force of cavalry, with nine 
pieces of artillery in action. The same day, General Schofield 
commenced the removal of the public property from Pulaski, 
preparatory to falling back to Columbia, and moved with the 
divisions of Generals Cox and Wagner to Lynnville, the latter 
covering the passage of the trains. The next day General Cox 
advanced ten miles toward Columbia, and General Stanley, with 
the divisions of Generals Wood and Kimball, reached Lynnville. 
Colonel Capron was before the enemy on the Mount Pleasant 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 189 

road, and Generals Hatch and Croxton covered the movement 
from Pulaski, the latter having a severe fight at the junction 
of the roads to Pulaski and Campbellsville, maintaining his po- 
sition and retiring at leisure by night to Campbellsville. 

In the meantime, General Thomas made dispositions looking 
to the defense of the line of Duck river, and the Nashville and 
Chattanooga railroad. He ordered the two brigades of Gen- 
eral Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps to move from 
Johnson ville — one by rail through Nashville to Columbia, and 
the other by road through "Waverly — to occupy the crossings 
of Duck river at Williamsport, Gordon's ferry, and Centerville. 
General Granger was instructed to withdraw his command from 
Decatur, Athens, and Huntsville, and reinforce the garrisons 
of Stevenson and Murfreesboro, to protect the Nashville and 
Chattanooga railroad. He sent Colonel Yon Schrader, his 
inspector-general, to Chattanooga to assist in the organization 
of the detached troops belonging to General Sherman's army, 
and another officer — Lieutenant M. J. Kelley — to Paducah, to 
hasten the coming of General Smith. His engineers were busy 
with the construction of fortifications at various points, espe- 
cially at Nashville, while effort was made to provide pontoon 
trains in room of those which had gone to Savannah. 

General Hood's rapid advance from Florence had been made 
with the hope of cutting off General Schofield from Columbia, 
and barely failed in this object, as the national troops gained 
the place by a night march. General Stanley, having been in - 
formed after midnight that Colonel Capron had been driven 
from Mount Pleasant by an infantry force, roused his corps 
and hastened toward Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. Gen- 
eral Cox started at the same hour, and reached Columbia in 
time to save Capron from defeat and the town from capture. 
"When within three miles of Columbia, General Cox crossed 
to the Mount Pleasant road and intercepted the enemy's forces, 
which were pressing Capron back upon the town. As the di- 
visions of the Fourth Corps arrived, they formed in line of bat- 
tle south of Duck river and intrenched. General Hatch was 
attacked at Campbellsville by cavalry supported by infantry. 
Colonel Wells, commanding first brigade, at first repulsed the 
enemy, but subsequently the whole command was compelled 



190 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

to retire to Lynn vi lie ; there the fighting was continued until 
after dark, when General Hatch withdrew to Columbia. 

With a view to check the enemy and hold the place, heavy 
works were thrown up before Columbia, and the cavalry, Gen- 
eral Wilson commanding in person, was disposed to watch 
against turning movements up and down the river. Hatch's 
division and Croxton's brigade were stationed on the Shelby - 
ville road, six miles east of Columbia, and Capron's brigade at 
Rally Hill, on the Lewisburg turnpike. Colonel Stewart, with 
three regiments from Hatch's division, was sent to the right to 
the lords between Columbia and Williamsport ; Capron's bri- 
gade, and the Eighth Iowa and Seventh Ohio Cavalry regiments 
were here formed into a provisional division under command 
of General R. W. Johnson. 

During the 24th and 25th, the enemy skirmished before Co- 
lumbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry, until the 
20th, when his infantry appeared, and during that day and the 
next lie pressed the lines, but made no assault. General Scho- 
field constructed an interior line of works, but these were soon 
regarded as untenable, as the enemy manifested an intention 
to pass round the position. An effort was made to cross to the 
north bank the night of the 26th, but failed on account of a 
severe storm and entire darkness. The night following, the 
movement was accomplished, and General Schofield left Gen- 
eral Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge ; placed 
( reneral Cox's division before the town, and directed General 
Stanley to station his corps on the Franklin turnpike, in read- 
iness to meet the enemy should he attempt to cross near Co- 
lumbia. These dispositions were made by General Schofield 
in hope that he could hold the line of Duck river, until 
reinforcements should arrive ; but the promised reinforce- 
ments had not reached Nashville. General Thomas had re- 
ceived twelve thousand raw troops, and had sent North, 
either on final discharge or to vote, fifteen thousand veterans. 
General Smith had not come, and only one thousand cavalry 
had found horses and the front. General Thomas had ob- 
tained permission to call upon the governors of the Western 
States lor troops, but was cautioned to use such troops spar- 
ingly. 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 191 

The 28th was passed in quietness, at Columbia, though 
there were palpable indications that quietness there meant ac- 
tivity in another quarter. At noon the enemy's cavalry ap- 
peared at various fords, between Columbia and the Lewisburg 
turnpike, in such force as to indicate plainly the purpose to 
cross. General Hood's cavalry was especially massed at 
Huey's Mills, eight miles above Columbia, and having there 
driven in General Wilson's pickets, began to pass over the 
river. At 2.10 p. m. General Wilson notified General Scho- 
iield of the enemy's movements, and informed him that he 
would concentrate his cavalry at Hunt's creek, on the Lewis- 
burg turnpike, expressing the belief that the enemy would 
swing in between them and strike the road to Franklin, at 
Spring Hill. 

General Wilson's cavalry detachments, at the various fords, 
held their respective positions as long as possible, but all were 
finally driven back, and it was then evident that three divisions 
•of cavalry— Chalmers', Buford's, and Jackson's— had crossed 
Duck river. By 7 p. m. General Wilson had concentrated his 
command, as far as practicable, at Hart's Cross-roads. Major 
Young, of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, commanding detachments, 
was intercepted, but cut his way through the enemy's lines 
with trifling loss. During the night General Wilson ascer- 
tained that General Forrest was moving toward Franklin, 
and also that General Hood's infantry forces were expected to 
cross before morning. In view of the palpable peril, he ad- 
vised General Schofield to withdraw to Franklin, and sug- 
gested that his command should be at Spring Hill by 10 a. m. 
the next day. When General Thomas was informed of the 
probable state of things at Columbia, he directed General 
Schofield to withdraw to Franklin, as soon as he should gain 
certain knowledge of the reported movements of the enemy. 
And very soon afterward, at 3.30 a. m. on the 29th, he directed 
him to withdraw from Columbia, as by this time he was con- 
vinced that General Hood had turned General Schofield's 
position. 

The situation at Columbia on the morning of the 29th, and 
during that day, was exceedingly critical. General Hood's 
infantry forces were crossing the river during all the early 



192 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

hours, at Huey's Mills, on a road leading directly to Spring 
Hill ; his cavalry forces had very early cut off all communica- 
tion between Generals Schofield and Wilson, and were press- 
ing the latter back upon Franklin, on the Lewisburg turn- 
pike, General Wilson having chosen this line of retreat as 
the one upon which he could best resist General Forrest, and 
cover the retirement of the infantry on the direct road from 
Columbia to Franklin. 

To develop the facts fully, before withdrawing altogether 
from Columbia, General Schofield directed General "Wood to 
Bend a brigade up the river to watch the enemy ; ordered Gen- 
eral Stanley to move with two of his divisions to Spring Hill, 
to hold that point and cover the trains and spare artillery ; left 
General Cox to guard the crossing at Columbia, and ordered 
Ruger's division to take position on the turnpike, in rear of 
Rutherford's creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford at 
Columbia, near the railroad bridge — this bridge having been 
partially destroyed and all the others entirely. 

General Wood sent Post's brigade early, to reconnoiter up 
the river; and at 8 a. m. General Stanley moved toward 
Spring Hill with Wagner's and Kimball's divisions. Before 
reaching Rutherford's creek, four miles distant, he learned 
that the enemy was crossing infantry and trains above Colum- 
bia, and was moving to the north on a converging road which 
touched General Schofield's line of retreat at Spring Hill. 
Apprehending that the forces that Colonel Post reported to be 
crossing the river might make a flank attack upon the troops 
between Duck river and Rutherford's creek, he halted Kim- 
ball's division and formed it facing east, and then proceeded 
to Spring Hill with Wagner's division. When within two 
miles of the place, at 11.30 a. m., he was informed that the 
enemy's cavalry was approaching from the direction of Rally 
Hill. The noise of firing east of the village immediately 
called the division to rapid motion, and the town was gained 
in time to meet the enemy, who was driving back a small force 
of national toops, composed of infantry and cavalry. Colonel 
Opdycke immediately deployed his brigade and drove back 
the enemy's cavalry, when General Stanley threw forward the 
division to hold the town and protect the trains. Opdycke's 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 193 

and Lane's brigades were deployed to cover such space as 
served to park the wagons, and Bradley's was advanced to 
hold a wooded knoll nearly a mile to the east, which com- 
manded the approaches from that direction. 

At the time these dispositions were made, it was not known 
that heavy forces of infantry were near ; but this fact was soon 
after developed by a fierce assault upon General Bradley. The 
nature of the attack, confirming the jirst reports of the ad- 
vance of the Confederate army to the cast of Columbia, gave 
demonstration of the greatest peril, not only to General Stan- 
ley, but to the four divisions behind him. General Hood's 
columns had now passed General Schofield's left flank, and 
were enveloping a single division, twelve miles in his rear, or 
twelve miles in advance, when he should face to the north to 
retreat. 

"When the enemy's infantry attacked General Bradley from 
the east, his cavalry on the west of the town threatened the 
railroad station, and then fell upon a small train, composed of 
some baggage-wagons, at Thompson's Station, three miles north. 
About the same time, General Stanley received a dispatch 
from General Schofield, confirming the reports that had first 
indicated the strategy of General Hood, and led him to fear 
that a heavy force was enveloping his position. He could not 
therefore reinforce General Bradley, lest he should thereby 
expose his trains to capture or destruction. 

General Bradley repulsed two fierce attacks, but in the third 
his right flank was overlapped by the enemy's line, and he was 
compelled to fall back to the town, where his shattered bri- 
gade was rallied and reformed. The enemy followed, but fell 
under the fire of eight pieces of artillery, at good range for 
spherical case shot, and was also taken in flank by a section 
on the turnpike, south of the town. A portion of the attack- 
ing troops then fled to the rear, and other portions sought 
cover in a ravine between the opposing lines. General Stan- 
ley reported Bradley's loss at one hundred and fifty men killed 
and wounded, and the enemy's at five hundred. General 
Bradley received a severe wound while encouraging his men 
VOL. II — 13 



194 BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC. 

to resist the last attack, and the command of the brigade 
passed to Colonel Conrad. 

As darkness fell, the enemy's lines were extended until a 
corps of infantry was in order of battle facing the Franklin road. 
Two other corps were near a little later, one deployed also, and 
Forrest's troopers were on the main road, both north and 
south of Spring Hill. It seemed hardly possible in this post- 
ure of affairs that General Schofield's forces and trains could 
elude tlii* involution by General Hood's army, and yet this 
result was achieved without a serious contest. 

During the day, the enemy covered his movement past 
General Schofield's left to his rear by earnest efforts, as Gen- 
eral Schofield believed, to force a crossing and lay a pontoon 
bridge at Columbia, that he might thus secure a passage for 
his artillery, which was impracticable at Huey's Mills. His 
repeated attacks were all repulsed by General Cox, and at 3 
p. m. General Schofield became satisfied that the enemy would 
not attack on Duck river, but was moving two corps directly 
to Spring Hill. He then gave orders for the withdrawal of all 
the troops when darkness would cover the movement, and 
with General Ruger's division hastened forward to open com- 
munications with General Stanley. At dark, he brushed away 
the enemy's cavalry from the road, three miles south of Stan- 
ley, and joined him at 7 p. m. Whittaker's brigade of Kim- 
ball's division followed Ruger's closely from Rutherford's 
creek, and upon arrival was posted parallel to the turnpike, 
where the enemy's left rested within eight hundred yards of 
the road, to cover the passage of the troops still in the rear. 
General Schofield, leaving the management of the march and 
the safety of the trains to General Stanley, then moved again 
with Ruger's division to clear the road to Franklin. As he 
approached Thompson's Station, the enemy's cavalry disap- 
peared, and then the road was open from Columbia to Frank- 
lin, though an army of at least fifty thousand men was in 
closest proximity to it, and along its front four divisions and 
an immense train were at rest or in motion, and yet there was 
only slight skirmishing here and there, and occasional picket- 
firing. There was momentary expectation that this great 
army would take a step forward, and press troops, artillery, and 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 195 

trains from the road in confusion and rout; but still the move- 
ment went on without interruption by the enemy. 

Having cleared the road at Thompson's Station, General 
Schofield returned to Spring Hill to make arrangements and 
dispositions to avert his extreme peril. He did not anticipate 
the possibility of his getting his army out of the reach of the 
enemy that night, and feared that he would be forced to fight 
a general battle the next day, or lose his wagon train. In the 
emergency he had dispatched a staff officer to Franklin to 
bring forward the command of General A. J. Smith, which he 
supposed had reached Franklin. 

At 11 p. m. General Thomas, believing that General Scho- 
field had, in obedience to his order of 3.30 a. m., withdrawn 
from Columbia earlier in the day, telegraphed to him at Frank- 
lin to withdraw from that place also, should the enemy attempt 
to get on his flank with infantry. As General Smith's troops 
had not yet arrived at Nashville, he considered it necessary, 
should the enemy advance quickly upon General Schofield, to 
concentrate his forces at Nashville. 

General Cox left Columbia at 7 p. m., followed by General 
Wood, and the latter by General Kimball. There was some 
delay at Rutherford's creek, as the bridge was inadequate for 
the emergency, but nevertheless the divisions, one after an- 
other, arrived at Spring Hill — the foremost of the three at 11 
p. m. The enemy's pickets fired into the column frequently, 
but when they did not come upon the road, the national troops 
gave no response. The enemy was so close to the road, that 
when a column was not moving upon it, it was difficult for a 
single horseman to pass. 

The danger did not end with the arrival of the last division 
at Spring Hill. It was 1 a. m. before a train of eight hundred 
wagons, including artillery and ambulances, could move to- 
ward Franklin, in rear of Cox's division, as at starting the 
wagons had to pass singly over a bridge. This caused delay, 
and consequently peril, as an attack was inevitable, unless the 
train and troops could be put on the road and in motion be- 
fore daylight. General Stanley was advised to burn at least a 
portion of the wagons, to avoid an attack, but he determined 
to save all, if practicable. At 3 a. m. an attack upon the head 



196 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

of the train, north of Thompson's, was reported, and all 
wagons on the road were stopped until General Kimball could 
rush forward to clear the road, and General Wood deploy his 
division on the east of the road. The attack was repulsed by 
Major Steele, with stragglers that he had gathered together, 
and then the train, bereft of ten wagons burned by the enemy, 
moved on, with Wood's division on the right and Wagner's 
in the rear. At 5 a. m. the last wagon crossed the bridge, and 
then all was in motion. The enemy's cavalry was on the hills 
to the right for awhile, and made one or two dashes, but these 
were easily repulsed by Wood's skirmishers, with the help, at 
one time, of a section of Canby's battery. Colonel Opdycke's 
brigade formed the rear-guard, and though skirmishing 
with tin- pursuing forces of the enemy, kept them so well in 
check as to save the weary and lame from capture. Rarely 
has an army escaped so easily from a peril so threatening. It 
has been accepted as true that General Hood ordered one corps 
general and then another to attack the national troops when 
passing so near the front of his army, at Spring Hill; but 
these generals disobeyed the orders, so plainly imperative from 
the situation itself, as well as from the voice of the com- 
mander-in-chief. From whatever cause the failure resulted, 
the opportunity of the campaign was lost to the Confederate 
army. 

General Schofield, with the head of his column, reached 
Franklin before daylight, and he immediately made prepara- 
tion to pass the Harpeth river, as he had been ordered by 
General Thomas to fall behind this stream. The railroad 
bridge was fitted as rapidly as possible for the passage of 
wagons, and a foot-bridge was constructed, which also proved 
adequate for them. General Schofield's aim was to get his 
train and artillery over the river before the enemy could at- 
tack him, but he nevertheless instructed General Cox to put 
the troops in line around the town, as the several divisions 
should arrive. The Twenty-third Corps formed the left and 
center — Cox's division on the left with its left flank ou the 
river, Ruger's on its right, and Kimball's completing the cir- 
cuit to the river on the right. Wood's division crossed to the 
north bank to be directed to the support of either flank in the 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 197 

event of a turning movement, and Wagner's was left in front 
to check the enemy, should he form his army to attack. Colonel 
Opdycke reached the heights two miles south of the town at 
noon, and was ordered to halt to observe the enemy. Crox- 
ton's brigade of cavalry was pushed back by infantry on the 
Lewisburg turnpike, and at 1 p. M. Colonel Opdycke re- 
ported heavy columns of infantry advancing on the Columbia 
and Lewisburg roads, when the division was withdrawn to 
the more immediate front of the army on the Columbia road. 
Colonel Opdycke, at his own notion, came inside the main line, 
and halted his brigade on the Columbia road in rear of the 
junction of the right and left flanks of Cox's and Ruger's di- 
visions of the Twenty-third Corps. 

The line as formed, was about one mile and a half long, 
inclosing the town, except on the north where the Harpeth 
river was the boundary, with its flanks touching the river. 
The line rested on a slight elevation, or series of low hills, 
which encompassed the town. The troops threw up breast- 
works, and a slight abatis was also constructed in places. 
The artillery of the Twenty-third Corps was on the north side 
of the river, and a portion of it placed in Fort Granger — a 
fortification previously constructed so as to command the rail- 
road, which leaves the town near the river, and runs in paral- 
lelism with it for some distance. The batteries of the Fourth 
Corps were held on the south side, some of them having been 
placed on the line and others in reserve. The Sixth Ohio Light 
Artillery and the First Kentucky battery were in position 
on the right and left of the Columbia road, before the bat- 
tle opened. Battery "M," t Fourth United States Artillery, 
and battery " G," First Ohio Light Artillery, were placed 
with the left brigade of the Twenty -third Corps, and Bridge's 
battery, Illinois Light Artillery, was posted in the center of 
Strickland's brigade of Ruger's division. The position was a 
good one for defense, and the undulations of the ground in 
front exposed the enemy in approaching. The key-point was 
Carter's Hill on the Columbia road, and was opposite the cen- 
ter of General Hood's army, which was advancing on the 
Lewisburg, Columbia, and Carter's Creek turnpikes. 

General Croxton resisted the enemy's infantry on the Lewis- 



198 BATTLE OF FRAXKLIX, ETC. 

burg road until 2 P. M., when, having learned that Forrest was 
moving to his left, as if to cross at Hughes' ferry, he crossed 
at McGarock's ford. He had hardly gained the north bank 
before it was reported that the enemy's cavalry were endeavor- 
ing to cross at several points above Franklin. General Wil- 
son now threw his whole force before General Forrest, and 
held him in check during the day and following night, in 
some cases driving back detachments after they had succeeded 
in crossing the river. Had General Forrest succeeded in 
crossing with his whole force, he could have caused a heavy 
detachment of forces from the little army to protect the trains 
already in motion toward Nashville, in anticipation of the 
withdrawal of the army from Franklin at 6 p. m., should Gen- 
eral Hood make no attack. 

At the time that General Croxton was forced to cross the 
river. General Hood's infantry began to appear in great force 
in front of Wagner's two brigades, but it was not believed by 
the ranking generals of the national army, until 4 p. m., that he 
would attempt to carry the position by assault. But at this 
hour his army emerged from the woods, in splendid array, 
heavily massed on the Columbia road, two corps in front and 
one in reserve, and soon brushed away the two brigades of 
Wagner's division, posted in extreme exposure on the plain, 
opposite the massive center of the Confederate army. Gen- 
eral Wagner had been instructed to check the enemy with 
these brigades, without involving them in an engagement with 
superior forces, but had, notwithstanding, directed their com- 
manders, Colonels Conrad and Lane, to hold their position as 
long as possible. Conscious of their extreme peril they threw 
up barricades, and when General Hood finally advanced 
against them with his main lines, uncovered by skirmishers, 
their effort to check him precipitated a conflict so unequal as 
to have been hopeless from the first. When broken by the 
attack of an army, they fell back in great haste and disorder, 
and formed a shield for the enemy following upon their steps. 
The veteran troops mainly succeeded in reaching the main 
line of the national army, but a large portion of the raw 
troops were captured. The pursued and the pursuers broke 
through the intrenched line in company, carrying away por- 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 199 

tions of Reilley's brigade, on the right of General Cox's divis- 
ion, and Strickland's, on the left of General Ruger's. And 
thus, without conflict on the immediate front of the national 
army or on the parapet, General Hood gained a lodgment at 
the key-point of the position, and commanded the direct ap- 
proach to the bridges. He had gained this advantage, almost 
without firing a shot, after the rout of Conrad and Lane, and 
without receiving one, except that a portion of the troops of the 
brigade of the latter, having loaded guns, wheeled and fired 
as they crossed the intrench ments. Such an advantage, to an 
army of more than double the strength of the divisions 
holding the position, according to the precedents of war, was 
decisive of complete victory. But in this case it was not, 
though at first it seemed to be entirely so. The enemy's cen- 
ter, made strong to thrust itself through the national line, 
had gained its immediate objective, and commenced at once 
to use two captured batteries in enfilading the national line, 
right and left, to double each fraction upon the flanks, and 
grasp the bridges between them. Two of the three brigades of 
Vaguer' s division, the only troops south of the river not in 
the main line, were so shattered that they could not be rallied 
for the emergency, and every moment of delay in attacking 
the enemy's forces that had gained the center, permitted their 
reinforcement from his rear lines. The teams from the cap- 
tured batteries galloped to the rear, and intensified the im- 
pression that the disaster was fatal. Conrad's brigade had 
entered the intrenchments near the Columbia road, and on the 
right of this road the enemy gained at the first dash three or 
four hundred yards of the line. Lane's brigade had crossed' 
the parapet several hundred yards to the right, without dis- 
turbing the troops at that point, and its volley had a marked 
effect upon the enemy. Toward the breach, the enemy's 
heavy central lines began at once to press, and to it his lateral 
lines were turned, in seemingly overwhelming convergence. 
To General Hood, the advantage so easily gained, promised 
the capture or destruction of the national army, and he and 
his army were inspired to quickest action to maintain and 
utilize it for this grand achievement. And he certainly could 
have maintained his hold of the national line, and used it for 



200 BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC. 

extreme success, had time been given him to thrust into the 
breach his rapidly-advancing and massive rear lines; and as 
it was, he began to gain ground right and left from the Co- 
lumbia road. 

When General Stanley first heard the noise of battle, he 
was with General Schoficld, at his headquarters on the north 
bank of the river, a fifteen minutes' ride from Carter's Hill, 
and was entertaining the conviction, from the strength of the 
position and the former course of the enemy, that an assault 
was entirely improbable. But as soon as an attack w T as indi- 
cated to him and others, in their distant view, he rode rapidly 
to his troops, and reached the left of Opdycke's brigade to find 
that a disaster, seemingly prophetic of the overthrow of the 
army, had came with the first onset of the enemy. In quick 
provision for the emergency, he approached this one reserve 
brigade, to order it to charge the enemy in the breach ; but 
seeing its gallant commander in front of its center leading it 
forward, he gave no orders, for none were needed, and taking 
position on the left of the line, the corps and brigade com- 
manders, with common purpose to hurl back the enemy and 
restore the continuity of the line, cheered as they led this 
heroic brigade. When Colonel Opdycke had first seen the 
enemy within the intrenchments, he turned to his men from 
the front of the center of his brigade, to find they had already 
fixed bayonets for the encounter, which they plainly foresaw 
would be desperate and decisive ; for they were veterans who 
had charged the enemy on other fields, and yet they had never 
been called by orders, soldierly instincts, or patriotism to such 
a conflict as was now plainly before them. Their commander 
saw, in this unbidden act of preparation, and in their eyes and 
attitude, the response to his own purpose, and his ringing 
order, " First brigade forward to the lines," was in harmony 
with the stern will of every, officer and man of that brigade. 
And when he dashed on the breach, he gave expression to the 
courage and purpose of every man in that self-appointed for- 
lorn hope, while those near General Stanley shouted: "We 
can go where the general can." Opdycke rode forward until 
he reached the enemy, followed closely by his brigade. He 
first emptied his revolver, then clubbed it in the hand-to-hand 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 201 

conflict, and as the deadly struggle raged more fiercely, he 
dismounted and clubbed a musket. His men fought as did 
their leader, and with bayonets baptized in blood, they hurled 
the enemy from the intrenchments and saved the army. This 
was one of the supreme moments of battle which heroes rec- 
ognize, and by which only the bravest of the brave are in- 
spired to deeds of daring, transcendent from motive and mo- 
mentous results. Four regimental commanders fell in the 
charge, but other officers of similar temper maintained the 
gallant leadership. Colonel Oydycke, foremost in the charge 
and throughout the ensuing conflict in the intrenchments, es- 
caped injury. General Stanley also escaped for a time, but in 
leaving this brigade to look after other dispositions, was pierced 
in the neck by a bullet, and was compelled to leave the field. 

Colonel Opdycke's brigade recaptured eight pieces of artil- 
lery, and with them four hundred prisoners ; wrenched ten 
battle-flags from the hands of the enemy, and left the ground 
behind them strewn with a greater number, which dropped 
under their blows. The number of prisoners and battle-flags, 
shows most plainly that General Hood was holding the po- 
sition with an exceedingly strong force. 

The recaptured guns again changed the direction of their 
missiles of death, while the sheet of flame from Opdycke's bri- 
gade and others in reach revealed to the enemy the necessity 
of other charges upon new and less promising conditions, or 
the abandonment of the conflict. Opdycke's charge regained 
nearly all the line that had been lost, but the enemy still held 
a small salient to the right of the Columbia road, and to main- 
tain this point and widen the breach, General Hood and his 
subordinate commanders exerted themselves to the utmost. 
In counter effort, small portions of Conrad's and Lane's bri- 
gades were directed to Opdycke's support. The enemy's first 
heavy line in his front was not more than fifty yards distant, 
and in addition to a direct fire from this line, he was subjected 
to an enfilading one from the troops still in the intrenchments 
on his right. It was. next to impossible for his brigade to 
maintain position under this deadly cross-fire, but yet, in 
twenty minutes, through the vigorous support of troops on 
right and left, the enemy was entirely expelled, and the con- 



202 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

tinuity of the line re-established. Then, in seeming retribution 
for General Schofield's escape at Spring Hill, and his own dis- 
lodgment from his hope-giving grasp of the key-point of the 
national line, General Hood repeated his assaults with the 
expression of frenzied vengeance and valor. His subordinates, 
with a recklessness of life in keeping with the charge of 
( >pdycke and his heroic brigade, led their columns to the mus- 
kets of the national troops, charging repeatedly, mainly at 
Carter's Hill, and only desisted with the fall of night. In 
leading a charge, General Cleburne, the most dashing division 
commander in the Confederate army, fell upon the parapet in 
front of Opdycke's brigade, and in the whole contest, five, 
other generals were killed, six wounded, and one captured — 
a fact which reveals how the columns of the enemy were led ; 
while the loss of thirty-three battle-flags manifests the 
strength of the columns which gained the national lines. 

The defensive fire was so rapid from 4 p. m. to nightfall that 
it was difficult to supply the troops with ammunition. One 
hundred wagon-loads of artillery and infantry ammunition 
were used from the Fourth Corps train alone, and this ex- 
penditure wrought fearful havoc in the ranks of the enemy, 
whose boldness placed them much of the time at short range. 

Firing, of more or less severity, was maintained until nearly 
midnight, the enemy continuing his activity to determine the 
time of the withdrawal of the national army, and to embarras 
such a movement. 

General Hood buried seventeen hundred and fifty men on 
the field. He had three thousand eight hundred so disabled 
as to be placed in hospitals, and lost seven hundred and two 
captured — an aggregate of six thousand two hundred and fifty- 
two, exclusive of those slightly wounded. 

General Schofield lost one hundred and eighty-nine killed, 
one thousand and thirty-three wounded, and one thousand one 
hundred and four missing — an aggregate of two thousand three 
hund red and twenty-six. More than half of this loss was from 
AVagncr's division, from the exposure of Conrad's and Lane's 
brigades, and from the charge and subsequent fighting of Op- 
dycke's brigade. 

The battle of Franklin, for its proportions, was one of the 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 



203 



grandest of the war. The salient features of this battle were 
the position and action of the two brigades posted in front of 
the main line, and the gallantry of the third, after the enemy 
had carried the intrcnchments on Carter's Hill. 

The reports of Generals Schofield, Stanley, and Cox declare 
that it was not the expectation that the brigades in front should 
resist until they should be compromised in an engagement with 
superior forces, and that General Wagner was so instructed. 
Nevertheless, the two brigade commanders were instructed by 
General Wagner to hold their position as long as possible, and 
having been thus impressed with the necessity of extreme re- 
sistance, they did not abandon their position until forced to do 
so by the bayonets of the enemy, and then their hurried retreat 
brought disaster to their own army. Their resistance, if not 
prudent, was exceedingly gallant, and veterans and new troops 
alike displayed the highest qualities of soldiers in confronting 
in actual conflict an army of three corps, and deserve mention 
in history as brave and heroic, under circumstances of extreme 
trial and peril. 

With regard to the second prominent feature of this battle, 
it may be said that seldom in the history of war has a single 
brigade* made itself so conspicuous in saving an army, and its 
transcendent action must be accepted as proof that its previous 
training and experience, and the manhood of its members had 
given the morale— the elan requisite for such an emergency. 
It was no new experience for Colonel Opdycke to ride in a 
charge in advance of his men, for this he did in developing the 
enemy in front of General Thomas' right, after the great dis- 
aster at the battle of Chickamauga. He charged, too, with a 
demi-brigade on Missionary Ridge, and with his regiment, the 
One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, on Rocky Face Ridge, 
and the officers and men of his brigade were meet for such a 
leader. And General Stanley, sick as he was, manifested his 
appreciation of the emergency as well as his personal gallantry, 
in descending from the command of a corps to take the left 

*This brigade comprised the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio; the 
Twenty-fourth Wisconsin ; the Thirty-sixth, Fourty-fourth, Seventy-third, 
Seventy-fourth, and Eighty-eighth Illinois regiments. 



204 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

of a brigade, in an action plainly decisive of the battle. For 
beyond all power of generalship to mold the battle or control 
i t s issue, the simple charge of Opdycke's brigade stands in bold- 
est relief. 

The enemy having been repulsed and the trains transferred 
to the north bank of the Harpeth river, the problem to solve 
was the safe withdrawal of the army to Nashville. It was 
still in General Hood's power, having great superiority in both 
infantry and cavalry, to cross the river above General Scho- 
field's position, and unless prevented by battle or withdrawal, 
to throw his army between Franklin and Nashville. As to 
the propriety of withdrawal, there was no question, either 
with the general officers at Franklin, including General Scho- 
field, or with General Thomas. So that the movement to the 
rear, meditated before the battle, was commenced as soon as 
the quietness of the enemy permitted. During the early part 
of the night the artillery was transferred to the north bank, 
and at midnight the army crossed the river without loss or 
special hinderance. General Wood retained his position until 
3 a. m., and then moved northward as the rear-guard of the 
army. General Hood perceived the retirement early, and 
though following closely, wrought no damage. General Wood 
had destroyed the bridges before leaving position, and his divis- 
ion in rear of the army, with Wilson's cavalry on its flanks, 
was able to beat back General Hood's head of column, which 
he could not under the circumstances make strong in time, 
even to greatly harass so strong a force. With the exception 
of a brush between Hammond's brigade of cavalry and some 
portion of Forrest's command at Brentwood, the enemy pro- 
voked no engagement, and the army marched quietly to Nash- 
ville. The rear column reached that city at 1 p. m., and the 
different corps were assigned to positions on the defensive line 
which General Thomas had selected. The Twenty-third Corps, 
under General Schofield, was assigned to the left, extending 
to the Nolensville turnpike ; the Fourth Corps, General Wood 
commanding, in room of General Stanley, disabled by his 
wound, took position in the center; and the corps from the 
" Army of the Tennessee," General A. J. Smith commanding, 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC. 205 

having arrived the day before, held the right, with its flank 
touching the river below the city. 

In view of General Hood's superiority of force, his opera- 
tions thus far had fallen behind just expectations. He had 
allowed General Schofield to pass safely before his army, after 
he had touched his communications, while he was yet at Co- 
lumbia, and he had met most disastrous defeat at Franklin, in 
assaults that could not be repeated with greater vigor. The 
consequent depression in his army was doubtless excessive. 
Thus far, none of the grand results of his northward march, 
as announced with prophetic emphasis by Mr. Davis, had been 
achieved, although General Sherman had swept southward 
from Northern Georgia and on toward Savannah, with sixty- 
five thousand men ; and the Confederate army, of which so 
much had been expected, was now far from its base, thus far 
defeated in the accomplishment of its great aims, with the 
consciousness that the conditions of ultimate success were 
passing day by day beyond the range of possibilities. To go 
back would express total defeat; and before General Hood 
was a fast-increasing army, posted on a strong defensive line, 
with a deep river behind, and its key-points fortified early in 
the war ; and as he could not at once go round Nashville, he 
sat before the city and extended his lines in semblance of a 
siege, which should last until General Thomas should be fully 
ready to throw him upon the defensive. 

General Thomas had hoped to deliver battle at some point 
farther to the south; but his reinforcements had come too 
slowly, and his cavalry horses had come as tardily as his acces- 
sions of troops. His forces were not fully in hand, and those 
that had fought their way from Columbia were physically ex- 
hausted beyond the ordinary experience of veterans on long 
marches and months under fire. During the seven days of 
Hood's advance from the Tennessee, he had hurried his prep- 
arations for the battle now palpably imminent. On the 29th 
of November, he had ordered General Milroy to abandon 
Tullahoma and retire to Murfreesboro, leaving a garrison in 
the block-house at Elk River bridge. The same day, he had 
ordered General Steedman, with a provisional division of five 
thousand men, composed of detachments from the corps with 



206 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

General Sherman and a brigade of colored troops, to move to 
Nashville. Nashville had been placed in a state of defense; 
additional fortifications had been constructed under the direc- 
Bion of Brigadier-General Tower, and the whole had been 
manned by the regular garrison, reinforced by a provisional 
force, under Brevet Brigadier-General Donaldson, chief quar- 
termaster, composed of the employes of the quartermaster 
and commissary departments. No other forces were now ex- 
pected, except the brigade of General Cooper, of Euger's 
division, which having watched the fords of Duck river, below 
Columbia, was now marching to Nashville by a detour to 
evade the enemy. With the cavalry remounted, and this hete- 
rogeneous force organized, General Thomas proposed to 
assume the offensive and dispute with General Hood the pos- 
session of Tennessee. 



Nashville, November 12, 1864 — 8.30 a. m. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Your dispatch of 12 o'clock last night received. I have no fears that 
Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I 
will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then 
thoroughly organize, and, I believe, shall have men enough to ruin him, 
unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. The country of Middle Ala- 
bama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to 
our advantage. I have no additional news to report from the direction 
of Florence. I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's 
army is near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a 
clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully 
equal your expectations. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, 

Major- General. 

Vicksburg, November 8, 1864, via Cairo, November 14, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman : 

Major-General Thomas: 
Your dispatch of October 30th was received yesterday. Hatch's divis- 
ion of cavalry was at the Tennessee river at last account. Two infantry 
divisions under General A. J. Smith, and a brigade of cavalry, are in Mis- 
souri in pursuit of Price. They have been ordered to Memphis by nearest 
route, but this is contingent on where the orders may reach them, and the 
time uncertain. The effective field force left on the river is very light, and 
the posts from Cairo to Natchez are held by small garrisons, but I will, to 
the extent of my force, carry out your instructions. A demonstration of 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 207 

three thousand cavalry from Baton Rouge promised into Lower Missis- 
sippi. Magruder is moving in force on Major-General Steele, at Little 
Rock. The enemy is threatening to (move on) cross to the east side of 
the Mississippi, at Gaines' Landing, where Major-General Reynolds is 

ready for them. 

N. J. P. DANA, 

Major-General. 



IIeadquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 10, 1864 — 9 a. m. 
Adjutant-General U.S. A., Washington, D. C. : 

Please direct the return to this department immediately of all conva- 
lescents belonging to the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twen- 
tieth Army Corps, to report at Chattanooga, and those of the Fourth and 
Twenty-third Army Corps to report at Decatur, Alabama. These men 
were furloughed by direction of the War Department to permit them to 

vote in their several States. 

GEORGE II. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 11, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
Major-General Stanley, Pulaski : 

Have Capron make a scout out in the direction of Clifton, and ascertain 
the truth of rumors which are constantly coming to these headquarters, 
that a large force of the enemy's cavalry is on the Lawrenceburg road, 
between Lawrenceburg and Columbia. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 14, 1864. 
Brigadier-General Hatch, Tyler Springs via Pxdaski : 

Your telegram of 2 a. m. to-day is received. Keep a good lookout. 
Report all you observe, to General Schofield, at Pulaski, as well as myself. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 14, 1864. 
Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, St. Louis : 

Your dispatch received. Please send a courier to overtake Colonel 
Winslow and direct him to this place, via Louisville, as rapidly as 
he can. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, 

Major- Gen eral. 



208 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

City Point, November 15, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville: 

If Hood commences falling back, it will not do to wait for the full 
equipment of your cavalry to follow. He should, in that event, be pressed 
with such forces as vou can bring to bear upon him. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 

Nashville, November 15, 1864 — 4 v. m. 

Lieutenant- General Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your telegram of this morning just received. I am watching Hood 

closelv, and, should he move after General Sherman, will follow him with 

what force I can raise at hand. The reports this morning are that he is 

moving in the direction of Waynesboro. A cavalry force has been sent 

to ascertain the true state of facts. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 16, 1864 — 10 a. m. 
Major-General Schqfield, Pulaski : 

Your dispatch of yesterday just received. Send me the first reliable 
news you have from Hatch. Smith telegraphed me two days ago, that 
his troops had been delayed by bad roads and impassable streams, but 
that he would make all possible speed. I can not say when he will be 

here. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Military Division of the West, 
Tuscumbia, November 17, 1864. 
General J. B. Hood, Commanding, etc., General : 

General Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will take the 
offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal the enemy rapid 
and vigorous blows, striking him whilst thus dispersed, and by this 
means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. . . . 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE W. BRENT, 
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General. 



Cherokee, Ala., November 17, 1864 — 3.30 p. m. 
Major-General Howell Cobb, Macon or Griffin, Ga. : 

Have ordered General Taylor to send at once all troops he can possibly 
spare, and General Hood to send immediately one brigade of Jackson's 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 209 

cavalry division, or the whole division, if it can possibly be spared at this 
juncture. A victory in Tennessee will relieve Georgia. 

********* 

G. T. BEAUREGARD, 

General. 



Pulaski, November 18, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas . 

I have received no report from General Hatch this evening. His re- 
port yesterday indicated that Hood was about to move, but I think there 
is no probability of his moving this way while this weather continues. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 19, 1864. 
Major-General A. J. Smith, or commanding officer of troops en route for Nashville, 
Paducah, Ky. : 
Start for Nashville, via Cumberland river, as soon as possible after re- 
ceiving this, with what troops you have, and leave orders for the balance 
to follow the same route. 

Acknowledge receipt, 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 19, 1864 — 2.30 p. m. 
Major-General Schofield, Pulaski : 

If the enemy advance in force, as General Hatch believes, have every- 
thing in readiness to fight him at Pulaski, if he advances on that place, 
or cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia. Should he attempt 
to turn your right flank, in the latter case — that is, the attempt to turn 
your right flank — General Hatch should cover the fords and ferries across 
Duck river, and hold them when you concentrate at Columbia. Report 
to me at once, should you be compelled to leave Pulaski, that I may give 
the. necessary orders for the concentration of the troops on the Nashville 
and Chattanooga railroad. I can hardly think, however, that the enemy 
will attempt to advance in such weather as we now have. I shall send 
an officer to-morrow morning to hurry General Smith's troops along as 
fast as possible to this place. Give the necessary orders to Hatch and 
Croxton, in case of a decided advance of the enemy. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. 8. V. Commanding. 

vol. n — 14 



210 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

Pulaski, November 19, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Your dispatch of 2.30 p. m. is received. I have already given the neces- 
sary preliminary instructions to Hatch, and will have everything ready 
to carry out your orders in the event of Hood's advance. I do not be- 
lieve he will attempt to move his infantry in this state of roads, but 

Forrest may make a raid on our railroads. 

y J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 20, 18G4 — 2.30 p. si. 
Major-General Schojield, Pulaski : 

If Forrest makes a decided advance, I think it would be best for you to 
go to Lynnville with two divisions, leaving Stanley two at Pulaski. In 
order to have everything out of your way, the construction party which 
went to Pulaski a few days since had better come back to Columbia, and 
all surplus stores should be prepared to be sent back in case Hood's army 
advances. Give Hatch instructions according to your movements, and 
urge upon him the necessity of getting the most reliable information he 
can. I will order Ruger with one brigade to Columbia. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 20, 1864 — 5.30 p. m. 
Major-General A. J. Smith, St. Louis, Mo.: 

Your dispatch of this date just received. I wish you to make every 
exertion to reach this place with all possible dispatch. Bring with you 
all the troops ordered to report to you at Paducah, as well as all others 
belonging to your command. You will come to Nashville, via the Cum- 
berland river. I have sent an officer with orders to bring Winslow's cav- 
alry to this place without delay. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 21, 1864. 
Major-General Schojield, Pulaski : 

Have you seen General Hatch's dispatch from Lexington at 8 a. m. to- 
day? It is very detailed, and he thinks it reliable. I have just received 
your two telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12 m., and approve the move. I have 
sent General Wilson out to take general charge of the cavalry, and di- 
rected him to report to you. He will reach Lynnville to-morrow morning. 

GEO. II. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 211 

Nashville, Tenn., November 23, 18G4— 10 p. M. 
Major-General H. W. Ilallcck, Washington, D. C. : 

It has occurred to me since my last dispatch was sent to you that it 
might be advisable to call on the governor of Indiana for some of the 
militia of that state, and I would like to know whether 1 am authorized 
to make the application. There are no available troops in Kentucky. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, Tenn., November 23, 1864 — 1 p. m. 

Major-Gencral W. S. Rosecrans, St. Louis, Mo. : 

Has General Smith and command embarked for this place yet? If so, 

when ? They should hurry forward as rapidly as possible. Please answer 

on receipt of this. 

1 GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 23, 1864. 

Colonel Wm. E. Merrill, Chattanooga : 

The major-general commanding directs that you organize a pontoonier 

battalion out of your regiment. Yours about the canvas received ; will 

be attended to. „ 

WM. D. WHIPPLE, 

Brigadier- General. 



Columbia, November 24, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas : 

I now have your dispatch of 9 a.m. I do not believe Forrest has had 
time to get across Duck river yet, and hope the troops you have sent will 
be in time to prevent him. Capron was driven in very rapidly, and by a 
pretty large force. Cox arrived just in time to beat it back, and punished 
it very severely. Hood had ten miles the start of Stanley at noon yester- 
day, but Stanley outmarched him, and reached here at 10 o'clock to-day. 
His troops are all here and in position. Colonel Moore got here last 
night. My orders to Hatch are as you suggested. I have not heard from 

him to-day. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 

Columbia, November 24, 1864 — 1.30 p. m. 
Major-General G. H. Thomas : 

Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large 
enough to cover the town and the railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter 
line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and the railroad depot 
outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by crosssing above 



212 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

or below, and rendering withdrawal to the north bank very difficult. 
Please give me your views soon. ^ ^ SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 24, 1864 — 3 p. m. 
Major-General Scho field, Columbia : 

If you can not hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north 
bank of the river. From the description given, I supposed the line was 
sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely and have 
a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially check the enemy 
than to run the risk of defeat by resisting too much. Where is Stanley? 

Is he with you? 

3 GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. iS. V. Commanding. 



Washington, November 25, 1864 — 12 m. 

Major-General Thomas : 

Secretary war authorizes you, if you deem it necessary, to call upon the 

governor of Indiana and of any other Western states for troops. As this 

force is very expensive, if compared with its value against an enemy, it 

should be used as sparingly as circumstances will admit. Dispatches just 

received from Hilton Head indicate that General Sherman has captured 

Milledgeville and Macon, and that Beauregard has been recalled from 

Tennessee to fall on General Sherman's rear. This is also indicated 

through Beauregard's proclamation to the people of Mississippi, sent 

from Corinth through Selma. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Major-General and Chief of Staff. 



City Point, Va., November 24, 1864: — 4 p. m. 

Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville : 

Following proclamation just taken from papers of 21st. Do not let 

Forrest get off without punishment. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 25, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your dispatch of 4 p. m. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army 
is in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbering mine at this time, 
that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's 
troops have arrived yet, although they embarked at St. Louis on Tuesday 
last. The transportation of General Hatch's and Griersdn's cavalry was 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 213 

ordered by General Washburne, I am told, to be turned in at Memphis, 

ivhich has crippled the only cavalry I have at this time. All of my cavalry 

Kras dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went 

with General Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained at 

Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. Horses arc arriving slowly, and 

arms have been detained somewhere en route for more than a month. 

General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas and 

from Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he will reach here. Since 

being in charge of affairs in Tennessee, I have lost nearly fifteen thou 

sand men, discharged by expiration of service, and permitted to go home 

to vote. My gain is probably twelve thousand of perfectly raw troops ; 

therefore, as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me, both in infantry and 

cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The 

moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood, and if Forrest 

can be reached, he will be punished. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major- General TJ. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 25, 1864 — 11.20 a. m. 
Major-General Schofield, Columbia: 

In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck river, I wish you 
to keep some cavalry on the south side of it, to observe and delay Hood's 
advance on Chattanooga railroad as much as possible. I hope to have 
five (5) regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro to-day. Have 
made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to Murfreesboro on this side 
of Duck river ; also, if the enemy advances, the cavalry on the south side 
of Duck river should cover the approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at 
that place, and hold the bridge in case of an advance in force. I have 
asked Steedman how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's 
rear, should he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. 
About one thousand of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Mem- 
phis dismounted, and they will be mounted here as soon as possible, and 
sent to the front. Three regiments should start to-day, making about 
one thousand men. Have not heard of any of Smith's troops yet. Some 
of them will surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga 
road, I will send Smith to Murfreesboro, as we shall be enabled thereby 
to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south side of 
Duck river, I think we shall be able to drive him back easily after con- 
centrating. Answer, giving your views. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General TJ. S. V. Commanding. 



214 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumbebland 
Nashville, November 26, 1864. 
Rear- Admiral Lee, Mound City : 

If you have any iron-clads which can resist heavy shot, I will be obliged 
if you will order them up the Tennessee river as far as they can go, on a 
reconnoissance. Hood is threatening Columbia, and I am anxious to know 
positively whether he has all his force with him or not. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Washington, November 26, 1864 — 12 m. 
Major-General TJwmas : 

All troops ordered from Missouri are under your orders, and will 
be subject to your disposal. Any others, embracing all officers and 
troops belonging to Sherman's force in the field, left behind by their com- 
mands, will be under your orders till they can again join their proper 
corps. If you call for any militia, notify adjutant-general's office. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 27, 1864. 
Major-General Schqfeld, Columbia, via Franklin : 

Your dispatch of 10 a. m. yesterday received. I will send you all the 
available infantry I can raise. I expect some of Smith's command here 
to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly as possible. Sent you two 
regiments of cavalry day before yesterday, two yesterday, and will send 
another to-day. If you can hold Hood in check until I can get Smith 
up, we can whip him. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Paducah, November 27, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas : 

I have just arrived at this point. The brigade, Seventeenth Army 
Corps, and First division, Sixteenth Army Corps, will proceed immediately 
to destination, in obedience to your telegram of the 19th inst. The Third 
division will be up early in the morning. Telegraph me at Smithland. 

A. J. SMITH, 

Major- General, 



Ducktown, November 27, 1864 — 12.30 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not 

mean to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory, leads me 

to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck river above Columbia, and as 

near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north bank to-night, and en- 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 215 

deavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson is operating mainly on my 
left, with a portion of his command south of the river. I have no late in- 
formation from him. I have succeeded in getting your cipher of the 
25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise. 

J. M. SCIIOFIELD, 

Major-Gcneral. 



Near Columbia, November 28, 18G4— 3.30 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

The enemy has crossed in force a short distance this side of the Lewis- 
burg pike, at noon to-day, and has driven our cavalry back across the 
river on that pike at the same time. The force is reported to be infantry, 
but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson has gone with his main 
force to learn the facts, and drive the enemy back, if possible. 

J. M. SCIIOFIELD 

Major-Gcneral. 



Nashville, November 28, 18G4. 
Major-Gcneral Schoficld, near Columbia : 

Your dispatch of 3.30 is just received. If General Wilson can not suc- 
ceed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he has crossed 
the river, you will necessarily have to make preparations to take up a new 
position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, immediately, if it becomes neces- 
sary to fall back. GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 28, 1864. 

Major-General Schofield: 

You can have some of the pontoons you used at Columbia sent to 

Franklin, to lay a bridge there. I will answer your other telegram in a 

few moments. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
Major-General Thomas: 

I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future opera- 
tions, to hold this position or retire to some point from which we can 
move offensively. Of course, we can not recross the river here. I could 
have easily held the bridge-head at the railroad, but it would have been 
useless, as we could not possibly advance from that point. Please give me 

vour views and wishes. „ T _ 

y J. M. SCIIOFIELD, 

Major-Gcneral. 



;21(3 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — 6 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg 
pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson is trying to go on 
the Franklin road ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing in 
between him and me and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's bri- 
gade halted there. Please give orders, if you know where it is. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major-Gcneral. 



Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — p. m. 
Major-General Thomas: 

If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you 
propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary, and Smith's 
troops should be placed with reference to the proposed point of concen- 
tration. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major-General. 



Nashville, November 29, 1864 — 3.30 a. m. 
Major-General Schofield, near Columbia : 

Your dispatches of 6 p. m. and 9 p. m. yesterday are received. I have 
directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill, and re- 
port to you for orders, if he can not communicate with General Wilson, 
and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the enemy's move- 
ments. I desire you to fall back from Columbia, and take up your posi- 
tion at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill to contest the 
enemy's progress until you are securely posted at Franklin. The troops 
at the fords below Williamsport, etc., will be withdrawn, and take up a 
position behind Franklin. General A. J. Smith's command has not yet 
reached Nashville. As soon as he arrives, I will make immediate disposi- 
tion of his troops, and notify you of the same. Please send me a report 
as to how matters stand, upon your receipt of this. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. 3. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters, Hart's Cross-roads, on Franklin and Lewisburg Pike, 
November 29, 1864 — 3 a. m. ; via Franklin, 9.30 a. m. 
Major-General Thomas: 

Forrest's cavalry, Buford's, Chalmers', and Jackson's brigades, a part of 
Hanley's and Biffle's regiments, crossed Duck river on this road, and at 
several fords between it and Iluey's Mills, seven miles above Columbia, 
yesterday. A pontoon train, sufficient for three bridges, had arrived at 
Iluey's just before dark. The bridges were expected to be ready by 11 
o'clock last night, and their infantry across by daylight this morning. 
The cavalry began crossing about noon, at Davis' fords, near Iluey's, but 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 217 

could not get across at Hardison's, on the pike. Capron's and Garrard's 
brigades were struck in flank and rear by rebels, at Rally Hill. I have 
kept Major-General Schofield fully informed, and, at 1 a. m., sent him 
the information above, advising him to get back to Franklin at once. I 
have all of my command, except Hammond's and Hatch's first brigade, 
here. I do n't know where the former is. The latter has been watching 
the river at Knobgrass creek, and was ordered, at sunset last night, to 
join him at Spring Hill. I shall delay the enemy all in my power, if he 
presses me, and follow him wherever he goes. I have information from 
Franklin's Hill to-day. The Sixth Illinois is now probably near that 
place to-night, having gone to Shelbyville on a scout. I am sure, from 
what prisoners tell me, that the enemy is aiming for Nashville, via Frank- 
lin ; his present direction, location of his bridge, and other circumstances 
point clearly to that conclusion. This being so, I shall probably cross the 
Harpeth midway between Triune and Franklin, and aim for Nolensville. 
Everything should be got off the railroad to-day. Hurry forward all cav- 
alry, via Nolensville. I think everything should be concentrated at 

NashviUe - J. H. WILSON, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Army of the Ohio, November 29 — 8.30 a. m. 
Major- General Thomas : 

The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force, on the Lewisburg pike, and 
General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mills, about 
five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnoissance to 
learn the facts. If it prove true, I will act according to your instructions 
received this morning. Please send orders to General Cooper,* via 
Johnsonville ; it may be doubtful whether my messenger from here will 

reach him. _ 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 

Headquarters, 4J Miles Southeast of Franklin, 
November 29, 1864 — 2 p. m., via Franklin. 
Major-General Thomas: 

The enemy pressed the rear of my column closely as far as the Ridge 
Meeting-house, and by marching around my left prevented me from 
getting upon the Fayetteville road. My impression is that Forrest is 
aiming for Nashville, via Triune and Nolensville. A part of his force 
may have cut into Spring Hill. Heavy artillery firing heard in that 
direction since 1 1 a. m. I can not hear from Schofield, but fear he may 
not have reached Franklin. I shall hold Hatch's second - brigade and 

* Commanding a brigade of General Ruger's division. 



218 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

Hammond's here till I know all is clear. In the meantime, Johnson and 
Croxton are crossing the Harpeth at Henderson's ford, with orders to 
push strong parties to Triune Zend Grove, and thereby to push on 
to Nolensville to-night, if they find the enemy moving in that direction. 
I shall go in the same direction as soon as I can leave here with safety. 
You had better look out for Forrest at Nashville to-morrow noon. I '11 
be there before, or very soon after he makes his appearance. 

J. H. WILSON, 

Brevet Major-General. 



Nashville, November 29, 1864 — 11 p. m. 
Major-General Schofield, Franklin : 

General Wilson has telegraphed me very fully the movements of the 
enemy yesterday and this morning. He believes Forrest is aiming to 
strike this place, while the infantry will move against you, and attempt 
to get on your flank. If you discover such to be his movement, you had 
better cross Harpeth at Franklin, and then retire along the Franklin 
pike to this place, covering your wagon train and the railroad. I directed 
General Cooper, in accordance with your wishes yesterday, to withdraw 
from Centreville, by the Nashville road, crossing Harpeth at widow Dean's, 
and to report to you from that place for further orders. You had better 
send orders to meet him. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Franklin, November 29, 1864 — 10 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Major-General Schofield directs me to inform you that the enemy's 
cavalry crossed Duck river in force at daylight this morning, at Huey's 
Mills, six miles from Columbia, and pushed at once for Spring Hill. Their 
cavalry reached that point at 4 p. m., and their infantry came in before 
dark, and attacked General Stanley, who held the place with one division 
very heavily (engaged?). General Schofield's troops are pushing foi 
Franklin as rapidly as possible. The general says he will not be able to get 
farther than Thompson's Station to-night, and possibly not farther than 
Spring Hill. He regards his situation as extremely perilous, and fears ha 
may be forced into a general battle to-morrow, or lose his wagon train. 
General Wilson's cavalry have been pushed off toward the east, and do 
not come with our infantry, nor cover the pike. Thinking that the troops 
under General A. J. Smith's command had reached Franklin, General 
Schofield directed me to have them pushed down the Franklin pike to 
Spring Hill, by daylight to-morrow. I left General Schofield two hours 
ago, at Thompson's Station. 

W. J. TWININGS, 
Captain, Aid-de-Camp, and Chief Engineer, Army of Ohio. 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 219 

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT. 

The important result of this signal victory can not be too highly appre- 
ciated, for it not only seriously checked the enemy's advance and gave Gen- 
eral Schofield time to move his troops and all his property to Nashville, 
but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, 
making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements. Not 
willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accom- 
plished the object of the day's operations — viz., to cover the withdrawal of 
his trains — General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during 
the night, to Nashville; in front of which city, line of battle was formed, 
by noon of the 1st of December, on the heights immediately surrounding 
Nashville. 



EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT. 

The troops rested in this position on the 28th, and I had strong hopes 
of being able to hold the line of Duck river until reinforcements should 
arrive; but I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a. m. on the 29th, that 
the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike, and 
about daylight in the morning, that his infantry was also crossing at 
Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the 
Franklin pike, at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the 
latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat, or strike me 
in flank near Duck river, or both. He had already forced a column of 
cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication 
between us. I therefore sent General Stanley with a division of infantry 
to Spring Hill, to hold that point and cover the trains ; General Cox was 
left in his position, to hold the crossing at Columbia ; Generals Wood and 
Kimball were put in line facing Huey's Mills, with a brigade thrown for- 
ward to reconnoiter, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the 
pike, in rear of Rutherford's creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford 
near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed. 

* * * * * * * * * 

About 3 p. m. I became satisfied that the enemy would not attack my 
position on Duck river, but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill. 
I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops after 
dark, and took General Ruger' s troops and pushed for Spring Hill, to re- 
open communication with General Stanley, and was followed at a short 
distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry 
at dark, about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away 
without difficulty, and reached Spring Hill about seven o'clock. . . . 

I arrived at Franklin with the head of the column a little before day- 
light on the 30th, and found no wagon-bridge for crossing the river, and 
the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be pre- 
pared for crossing wagons, and had a foot-bridge built for infantry, which 
fortunately proved available for wagons, and used the ford as much as 
possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material, in- 



220 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 

eluding the public property and a large wagon train, across the river, and 
move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to 
attack me; but I put the troops in position as they arrived on the south 
side — the Twenty-third Corps on the left and center, covering the Colum- 
bia and Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division of the Fourth 
Corps on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of 
Wagner's division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and 
General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved to the north 
bank of the river, to cover the flanks, should the enemy attempt to cross 
above or below. The enemy followed close after our rear-guard ; brought 
up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved 
rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held 
their ground too long, and hence were compelled to come in at a run. 
In passing over the parapet, they carried with them the troops of the 
line for a short space, and permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get 
in ; but the reserves sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and capturing 
those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently 
and continuously with his whole force, from about 3.30 p. m. until after 
dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until 
about 10 o'clock p. m. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line 
of attack. . . . 

It is to be observed that more than half our loss occurred in Wagner's 
division of the Fourth Corps, which did not form part of the main line 
of defense. This loss arose in two brigades of that division, from their 
remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had 
been accomplished, and after they should have taken their position in 
reserve ; and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdycke's), in its hand-to- 
hand encounter with the enemy over the parapet, which had been tem- 
porarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades. 

->:- -x- * •;:- **.*** 

My experience on the 29th had shown how entirely inferior a force 
my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank 
and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was en- 
tirely without protection. I could not even rely upon.getting up ammu- 
nition necessary for another battle. To remain longer at Franklin, was 
to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving the enemy another 
chance to cut me off from reinforcements, which he had made three 
desperate futile attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long 
enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and 
had succeeded in inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the 
primary object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to 
get reinforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry 
and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in 
battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December, for these 
reasons. After consulting with corps and division commanders, and ob- 
taining your approval, I determined to retire the night of the 30th toward 
Nashville. 



BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 221 

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL STANLEY'S REPORT. 

From 1 o'clock until 4 p. m. in the evening, the enemy's entire force 
was in sight, and forming for attack; yet, in view of the strong position 
we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the 
campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. 

I felt so confident in this belief, that I did not leave General Schofield's 
headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy 
advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and 
persistent assault, which, upon part of the line, lasted forty minutes, 
when Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin. 
Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve, in rear of our main line on the 
Columbia pike; Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed, the former 
on the right, the other on the left of the pike, and about three hundred 
yards in advance of the main line. By whose mistake I can not tell, it 
certainly was never a part of my instructions, but these brigades had 
orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced 
to do so by the fighting of the enemy. 

Speaking of the effect of their retreat, General Stanley said : " It was at 
that moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town 
on the Columbia pike. The moment was critical beyond any I have ever 
known in battle. Could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was 
nearer our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's 
brigade was lying down about one hundred yards in rear of the works. 
I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge ; at the 
same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line, urgin» his 
men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in 
doing the very thing to save us, namely, to get possession of our line 
again." 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL J. H. WILSON'S REPORT. 
At 1 a. m. (November 29), I sent a dispatch to General Schofield, in- 
forming him that the force at Huey's Mill was Forrest's cavalry, consisting 
of Chalmers', Jackson's, and Buford's divisions, and Biffle's regiment; 
that the rebel infantry were to have began crossing two hours before, by 
three pontoon bridges under construction at the same place. Believing 
the information to be perfectly correct, I therefore suggested that our 
infantry should reach Spring Hill by 10 a. m. of that day. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND PURSUIT OF THE ROUTED ENEMY. 

The arrival of General Steedman with his command from 
Chattanooga, December 1st, in the evening, completed the 
concentration of forces, which had been so unexpectedly de- 
layed. Three lines of defence had been abandoned because 
the promised troops had not appeared in Tennessee. And 
now that the concentration had been effected, the improvised 
army contained three corps, each one of which represented a 
distinct department ; a provisional division made up of de- 
tachments from almost every organization, large and small, 
embraced in the sixty-five thousand men, then on " the march 
to the sea ;" an infusion of raw infantry regiments ; the greater 
portion of the cavalry of the Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, but still largely dismounted ; and colored soldiers, who 
were to have their first opportunity in the central theater of 
war, to fight by brigades. 

General Thomas had held General Steedman's command, 
on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad for two 
reasons — one, the complications in East Tennessee, of which a 
narrative will be given in another chapter ; and the other, the 
probability that General Hood would strike that important 
railroad south of Nashville. Having arrived, General Steed- 
man took position about a mile in advance of the left center 
of the main line, and east of the Nolensville turnpike. Gen- 
eral Wilson, with his cavalry, had previously taken a strong 
position at Thomson's Chapel, on the Nolensville turnpike, 
covering the space between General Schofield's left and the 
Cumberland river. 

General Hood being still greatly superior in cavalry, there 

(222) 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 223 

was clanger that he would detach a large portion of it to inter- 
rupt the vital communications with Louisville. To guard 
against the passage of his cavalry over the Cumberland, above 
Nashville, General Hammond's brigade of cavalry was sent 
to Gallatin on the 2d, to watch the river as far up as Carthage. 
And the day following General Thomas threw all the remain- 
ing cavalry across to Edgefield, and then General Steedman's 
command covered the space between General Schofi eld's left 
and the river. 

General Hood's infantry did not approach Nashville until 
the 3d, when General Thomas' outposts were driven in, and 
soon after the enemy began to establish his main line. The 
next morning his salient was seen on Montgomery Hill, within 
six hundred yards of the center of the national line. Gen- 
eral Hood's investing lines occupied the high ground on the 
southeast side of Brown's creek, extending from the JSTolens- 
ville turnpike, across the Granny White and Franklin turn- 
pikes, in a southwesterly direction, to the hills south and south- 
west of Richland creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro 
turnpike. From his right, on the Nolensville road to the 
river, above the city, and from his left, on the Hillsboro road 
to the river below, his cavalry were posted. Intent upon com- 
pleting and strengthening his line, General Hood made no re- 
sponse to the fire of artillery, which opened upon him from 
several points. It was doubtless necessary, too, that he should 
be economical in the use of his ammunition, as it was difficult 
for him to replenish from his base at Corinth. 

Although not active, at Nashville, General Hood was enter- 
prising in other directions. He sent Bate's division of Cheat- 
ham's corps to reduce Murfreesboro and other minor points 
in the vicinity, and on the 4th the block-house, at Overall's 
creek, five miles north of Murfreesboro, was attacked by this 
force. But such was the strength of the block-house con- 
structed for the defense of the railroad bridge, that although 
seventy-four artillery shots were fired against it, the garrison 
held out until General Milroy arrived with reinforcements 
from Murfreesboro, consisting of three regiments of infantry, 
four companies of cavalry, and a section of artillery. General 
Bate was then attacked and driven away. During the 5th, 



224 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

6th, and 7th, having been reinforced by a division from Lee's 
corps, and twenty -five hundred cavalry, General Bate demon- 
strated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, near Murfrees- 
boro, held by eight thousand men, under General Rousseau. 
The enemy declining to make a direct attack, General Milroy 
was sent against him on the 8th, with seven regiments of in- 
fantry. He was found on the Wilkinson turnpike behind rail 
barricades, which were carried by assault — General Milroy 
capturing two hundred and seven prisoners and two guns, and 
suffering a loss of thirty men killed, and one hundred and 
seventy-five wounded. The same day Buford's cavalry, after 
shelling Murfreesboro, entered the town, but were driven out 
by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. The 
whole force then moved to Lebanon and down the bank of 
the Cumberland river to Nashville, threatening to cross, to in- 
terrupt the Louisville and Nashville railroad. 

A portion of the enemy's cavalry, under General Lyon, suc- 
ceeded in crossing the Cumberland river above Clarksville, on 
the 9th. The object of the movement was to reach the Louis- 
ville and Nashville railroad, at some point in Kentucky, and 
to prevent its accomplishment General Thomas directed Gen- 
eral McCook, who was in Kentucky, to remount Watkins' and 
La Grange's brigades of cavalry, and to look after Lyon with 
these brigades. 

During the first half of December, General Grant felt great 
uneasiness with regard to the situation in Tennessee, fearing 
that General Hood would pass round Nashville and march 
into Kentucky reproducing the scenes and issues of the sum- 
mer and autumn of 1862. Believing that General Thomas 
should have delivered battle immediately after the engagement 
at Franklin, he urged him thereafter, from day to day, to at- 
tack General Hood. General Thomas, on the other hand, 
thought it advisable to remount his cavalry and make other 
preparations, that he might be assured of victory, before as- 
suming the offensive, and at the same time gain the full results ' 
of victory by a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, when defeated 
and routed. He was confident of final success, and was vigi- 
lant in guarding the river with his cavalry, and secured the 
services of the gunboats of the Eleventh Division of the Mis- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 225 

sissippi Squadron, under Lieutenant-Commander Leroy Fitch, 
to patrol the river above and below the city. During the 
first eight days of the month, General "Wilson had raised his 
cavalry to good strength, by the influx of new horses and 
by ransacking the corrals for convalescent animals, and in 
this time much had been done to supply the army with the 
transportation essential to successful pursuit, and with pon- 
toons for the full rivers. But delay for any cause was dis- 
pleasing to General Grant, as besides the supposed danger 
to Kentucky, the troops under General Canby on the Mis- 
sissippi river, intended for co-operation with General Sher- 
man, were detained to prevent the trans-Mississippi Confed- 
erate forces, from joining General Hood, and on the 9th of 
December at the suggestion of the lieutenant-general, an 
order was issued by the President, relieving General Thomas, 
and placing General Schofield in command. General Thomas 
himself preferred to be relieved rather than be responsible for 
a battle fought under unfavorable conditions. The order re- 
lieving him, however, was subsequently suspended ; but there 
was no respite to the urgent communications requiring the 
deliverance of battle without dcla}~. 

General Thomas at first hoped to be ready for battle on the 
7th, but on account of delay in remounting his cavalry, he 
was not ready until the 9th. But with the completion of his 
preparations there came a sleet which rendered the movement 
of troops for any purpose, especially for battle, an impossi- 
bility. Reconnoissances on the 11th and 13th — the first by 
Colonel J. G. Mitchell, and the second by Colonel A. G. Mal- 
loy — developed the fact that infantry could move only with the 
greatest difficulty upon the surface of the uneven ground. 
On the 9th, General Thomas ordered General Wilson to move 
his command to the south side of the river to take position 
between the Hillsboro and Harding turnpikes, to be in readi- 
ness to participate in the attack, projected for the next day ; 
but even this movement could not be executed upon the ice 
with cavalry, except with horses shod expressly for such a 
surface. As the refusal of General Thomas to give battle, 
after a peremptory order on the 6th to attack without waiting 
VOL. II — 15 



226 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

longer for a remount for his cavalry, called for the order re- 
lieving him from command, with General Schofield as his suc- 
cessor, so his unwillingness to attack upon the ice first 
elicited an order from General Grant, on the 11th, to delay no 
Longer for weather or reinforcements, and then another on the 
13th, directing Major-General John A. Logan to proceed to 
Nashville, reporting arrival at Louisville and Nashville. And 
on the 15th, General Grant reached Washington, on his way 
to Nashville to take command in person. 

However, by midday on the 14th, the ice had so far melted 
that General Thomas resolved upon attacking the enemy the 
next day, and at 3 p. m. he called together his corps com- 
manders to announce to them his plan of battle, and give 
thern instructions with regard to the specific action of their 
respective commands in its execution. The following is the 
text: "Major-General A. J. Smith, commanding detachment 
of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on 
and near the Harding pike in front of his present position, will 
make a vigorous assault upon the enemy's left. Major-Gen- 
eral Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps Military Division 
of the Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and sup- 
port General Smith's right, assisting as far as possible in car- 
rying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to 
throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable 
opportunity occurs. Major-General Wilson will also send one 
division on the Charlotte pike, to clear that road of the enemy 
and observe in the direction of Bell's landing, to protect our 
right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it 
will rejoin the main force. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, 
commanding Fourth Corps* after leaving a strong skirmish 
line in his works from Lawrens' Hill to his extreme right, will 
form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsboro 
pike to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left 
and rear of the enemy's advanced position on Montgomery 
Hill. Major-General Schofield, commanding Twenty-third 
Army Corps, will replace Brigadier-General Kimball's di- 
vision of the Fourth Corps with his troops, and occupy the 
trenches from Fort Negley to Lawrens' Hill with a strong 
skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force 

* Gen. D. S Stanley was absent on account of wounds received at Franklin. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 227 

in front of the works, and co-operate with General Wood, 
protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the 
enemy. Major-General Steedman, commanding District of 
Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his presenl 
position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland 
river to Fort Neglcy, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the 
remainder of his force in its present position, to act according 
to the exigencies which may arise during these operations. 
Brigadier-General Miller, with troops forming the garrison of 
Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on 
hill 210, to the extreme right, including the inclosed work on 
the Hyde's Ferry road. The quartermaster's troops, under 
the command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, will, if neces- 
sary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the 
battery on hill 210. The troops occupying the interior line 
will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who 
is charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the 
operations around the city. Should the weather permit, the 
troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 a. m. on 
the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable." 

General Thomas modified this plan, by ordering General 
Steedman to make a most positive feint against the enemy's 
right, to divert his attention from the dominant movement 
against his left, and also by calling General Schofield's corps, 
first to the reserve, and afterward directing it to move upon 
General Smith's right, after other movements had been suc- 
cessfully accomplished. 

The weather and the ice, which from the 9th had prevented 
General Thomas from assuming the offensive, had also for six 
days barred all activity on the part of the enemy, who was 
meditating a movement* round Nashville from the conscious- 
ness that he could not successfully assault the army intrenched 
before it. The morning of the 15th being favorable for the 
tactical dispositions required by General Thomas' plan of 
operations, the two armies were thrown into deadly conflict, 

* This statement is not supported by official testimony, but upon the 
declarations of prisoners and citizens within General Hood's lines. Hei 
too, was delayed bv the ice-covered ground. 



228 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

to contest not only the possession of Tennessee, but to decide 
the supremacy of the national arms in all the West. 

At 4 a. m. on the 15th, the provisional division composed 
of troops from corps and other organizations of General Sher- 
man's army, under command of Brigadier-General Craft, 
moved forward and relieved the Fourth and Twenty-third 
Corps, occupied their exterior line of works, and picketed the 
front of this line from the Acklin place to Fort Negley, com- 
manding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, 
Franklin, and Kolensville turnpikes. At the same hour, Gen- 
eral J. F. Miller occupied the works with the garrison of the 
city, from Fort Negley to the Lebanon turnpike, covering the 
approaches by the Murfreesboro, Chicken, and Lebanon turn- 
pikes. Brigadier-General Donaldson, with his command, occu- 
pied the defenses from General Cruft's right to the Cumber- 
land river, commanding the approaches by the Harding, 
Hillsboro, and Charlotte turnpikes. General Steedman was 
instructed to support General Wood's left, when his corps 
should take position, and make a vigorous demonstration in 
his front to cover the grand effort to turn the enemy's left 
flank. 

About daylight the other commands began to move to their 
several positions as prescribed in the modified plan of battle. 
General Smith advanced his second division, Brigadier- 
General Garrard commanding, on the Harding turnpike, and 
deployed to the left of that road ; he threw forward his nrst 
division, Brigadier-General J. McArthur commanding, on the 
Harding and Charlotte turnpikes, and formed it on the right 
of Garrard; his third division, Colonel J. B. Moore, Thirty- 
third Wisconsin commanding, he held in reserve opposite the 
junction of the right and left flanks of the other two divisions. 
Owing to the divergence of the roads upon which he moved, 
and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, McArthur did not 
get into position until 8 a. m. He silenced a batttery, and 
skirmished heavily as. he advanced. 

General Wood formed the Fourth Corps, with the Second 
division, Brigadier-General Elliott commanding, on the right ; 
the First division, Brigadier-General Kimball commanding, 
in the center; and the third division, Brigadier-General S. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 229 

Beatty commanding, on the left. Elliott's right was refused, 
in echelon with Smith's left. The other divisions were formed 
in similar manner — the right of each in echelon — to facilitate 
the wheel of the whole line to the right, on the left of ili< i 
Fourth Corps as a pivot. The formation of the Fourth Corps 
was a double battle-line — the first deployed, and the second in 
column, by division, opposite the intervals in the first. The 
front was covered with a line of skirmishers, and a similar 
force remained in the works in the rear. 

The Twenty-third Corps, when relieved from position on 
the left of the Fourth, moved to the right of Wood. The 
Third division, Brigadier-General J. D. Cox commanding, 
excepting one brigade left to support General Steedman, 
moved by the Hillsboro turnpike, and formed in the rear of 
Elliott's right; the Second (recently General Ruger's), Major- 
General D. 'jST. Couch commanding, advanced on the Harding 
turnpike, and took position in rear of Garrard's left. 

"When the infantry on the right had given room for the 
movements of the cavalry, General Wilson at once assumed 
position. The Fifth division, Brigadier-General E. Hatch 
commanding, took position on the right of McArthur, of 
Smith's corps. General Croxton, with his brigade of the First 
division, formed on the right of Hatch. The Seventh divis- 
ion, one brigade mounted, Brigadier J. F. Knipe commanding, 
was held in reserve, to render aid wherever emergency might 
demand. The Sixth division, Brigadier R. W. Johnson com- 
manding, one brigade mounted, was ordered to move by the 
Charlotte turnpike, to clear that road of the enemy, and keep- 
ing connection with Croxton by skirmishers or patrols, to push 
as far as Davidson's house, eight miles from the city, so as to 
cover the remainder of the corps from the enemy's cavalry, 
and look well to the guns of the enemy at Bell's landing, 
commanding the Cumberland river, and the force supporting 
them. 

A dense fog hung over the two armies during the early 
morning, which, with the undulations of the ground, con- 
cealed the movements of the national army, though from 
these causes the evolutions were also greatly retarded. When, 
about noon, the fog lifted, there was doubtless to General 



230 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Hood an unexpected revelation. He had thus far in the cam- 
paign monopolized the offensive, and during the days of en- 
forced inaction, he had been maturing his plans to turn 
Nashville and move into Kentucky. This would have been 
an exceedingly rash adventure, and after his experience at 
Franklin, where three divisions beat back his army, with the 
help of extemporized intrenchments, he could not, even in the 
wildest forecast of the consequences of an attempt .to carry 
Nashville, with its elaborate fortifications, held by an army 
of equal strength, decide to take such a risk. Neither could 
he stay long before the city, and supply his army. It was 
imperative that he should move in some direction, and in his 
desperate extremity, he no doubt meditated an early advance 
into Kentucky, hoping, despite all the dangerous contin- 
gencies, that he could at least escape destruction. He had 
not anticipated the necessity of so soon acting on the defen- 
sive, and even when he saw an army deployed before him in 
aggressive attitude, he did not expect an attack upon his left 
flank. The troops opposite his right, during the twelve 
days of his nominal investment, alone had made the pretense 
of aggression, in contesting the defenses which General 
Steedman had constructed when he was before Wilson, on 
the left of the national line. And now, while the strength of 
the Army of the Cumberland was on his left, he was to be 
still further misled by a feint, which, from its spirit and 
force, might easily be mistaken for a positive assault. 

When the combination to turn General Hood's left had 
been fully completed, Brigadier-General Whipple, chief of 
staff to General Thomas, bore an order to General Steedman 
to advance against his right, in semblance of actual assault. 
General Steedman had previously formed a column for this 
movement, composed of three strong detachments — the first 
under Colonel T. J. Morgan, embracing his own regiment, 
the Fourteenth Colored, the Seventeenth, Forty-fourth, and a 
detachment of the Eighteenth; the second under Colonel 
Thompson, including his own regiment, the Twelfth Colored, 
and the Thirteenth and One Hundredth; and the third under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, of the Eighteenth Ohio, com- 
posed of his regiment, the Sixty-eighth Indiana, and the Sec- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 231 

ond battalion of the Fourteenth Army Corps; and in addi- 
tion, the Eighteenth Ohio and Twentieth Indiana batteries. 
At 8 A. m. the detachments of Morgan and Grosvenor, the 
former commanding both, moved forward from the Murfrees- 
boro turnpike to Riddle's hill, drove in the enemy's pickets, and 
assaulted his works, between the turnpike and the Nashville 
and Chattanooga railroad. These troops gained a lodgment 
in the works, but were exposed, while holding thorn, to a se- 
vere tire from General Hood's massed forces on that flank, 
and General Steedman withdrew them. The charge was so 
gallantly made, that General Hood was so deceived as to its 
ultimate aim, that he drew troops from his center and left to 
give strength to his seemingly endangered flank. 

Soon after this action on the extreme left, the forces on the 
opposite flank moved forward on the Hording and Hillsboro 
roads with resistless force, in executing the grand initiative of 
the battle. McArthur's division moved rapidly behind its 
skirmishers, who were soon sharply engaged, and gradually 
wheeling to the left, the direction of the line, was parallel to 
the Harding road. Advancing thence a short distance, the 
division was before a detached earthwork of the enemy, situ- 
ated on the top of a hill, and inclosing four brass guns. This 
fort was covered by a stronger one, some four hundred feet to 
the right, and containing the same number of guns. In the 
meantime, Hatch's division of cavalry, with its left connected 
with McArthur's right, had swept round on a longer curve and 
was in readiness to co-operate in assaulting the forts. Hatch 
had previously engaged Ecton's brigade of infantry beyond 
Richland creek, and had driven it past Harding's house, near 
which Colonel Spalding, commanding the Twelfth Tennessee 
Cavalry, charged and captured forty-three prisoners and the 
headquarter-train of Chalmers' division. Hatch's right bri- 
gade, under Colonel Coon, having diverged too far from the 
direction of the general movement, was now moved by the 
left flank till it joined his other brigade on the flank of the 
four-gun redoubt, which covered the extremity of the enemy's 
line. Here, by direction of General Hatch, Coon's brigade 
dismounted to charge, planting its battery— "I," First Illinois 
Artillery— so as to enfilade the enemy's line. Four batteries 



232 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

then opened upon the guns in the redoubt and soon silenced 
them, and Coon's brigade charged the supporting infantry 
force, and though under the fire of the second redoubt, cap- 
tured the four guns. The skirmishers of McMillen's and Hub- 
bard's brigades of McArthur's division were also charging 
from an opposite direction, and entering the redoubt at the 
same moment contributed to the successful issue. One hun- 
dred and fifty prisoners were taken with the guns. 

The two divisions immediately moved to the right, cavalry 
and infantry vieing with each other in the effort to carry the 
stronger redoubt on a hill whose acclivity greatly increased 
the hazard of an assault. This position, however, was carried 
in the same manner as the other. Coon's brigade, armed with 
the Spencer rifle, supported by two fresh brigades, charged 
up the hill and drove the enemy from position ; while Mc- 
Arthur's brigades were in such close proximity, in a sweeping 
charge, as to lay claim to the guns and two hundred and fifty 
prisoners. 

During these successful movements, by the direction of Gen- 
eral Thomas, General Schofield moved his corps to the right 
of General Smith, and formed it for battle. This change be- 
came necessary, as the latter had moved farther to the left 
than had been anticipated, and the enemy's true flank had not 
been found. General Schofield was directed to attack his 
flank, which rested upon a group of hills near the Hillsboro 
turnpike, that the cavalry might operate in his rear. In order 
to preserve continuity of line, General Smith threw Ward's 
brigade of his reserve division to the front, to fill a space of a 
half mile between his right and Schofield's left; and to give 
full space to General Schofield, General Hatch moved to the 
right, across the Hillsboro turnpike, and with his other bri- 
gade attacked the enemy on another range of hills, drove him 
from it, and captured a battery in the valley beyond. In the 
meantime, Generals Schofield and Smith advanced their lines. 
Colonel Hill's brigade of McArthur's division carried a small 
earthwork containing two guns, but lost its commander in the 
assault. Colonel Wolf's brigade of Garrard's division crossed 
the Hillsboro turnpike and gained the works on the left. 
General Schofield moved to the riedit of the two redoubts first 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 233 

captured, crossed the Hillsboro road and a valley beyond, and 
carried a series of hills overlooking the Granny White turn- 
pike — one of the two remaining lines of retreat available to 
the enemy. The charge was made by General Cooper's bri- 
gade of Couch's division. The enemy here made his first 
attempt on his left to give a counter-blow. He had previously 
massed a heavy force on his left to hurl it against General 
Thomas' right flank. When General Cooper had .crossed the 
valley to carry the hills beyond, this force appeared in his rear 
in the low ground. General Couch then sent Mehringer's 
brigade against it, and though the enemy was of superior 
strength, Colonel Mehringer checked him until Doolittle's and 
Casement's brigades of Cox's division advanced in his sup- 
port. The engagement was continued with sharp fighting 
until dark. 

The action of the Fourth Corps was equally successful. As 
soon as General Smith became engaged on General Wood's 
right, the latter moved his corps toward Montgomery Hill, the 
salient of the enemy's defensive line. This position was very 
strong, being an irregular cone rising about one hundred feet 
above the general level of the country. The ascent, except on 
the left and rear, is quite abrupt, and was covered with forest 
trees. The intrenchments concealed the hill a little below the 
crest, and the approaches were covered with abatis and sharp- 
ened stakes firmly planted in the ground. During the forma- 
tion of the corps for assault, the guns in position expressed 
defiance, and in response and menace General Wood's guns 
opened with vigor. As the corps advanced, it swung to the 
left, in order that the more easy ascent should be in fronl 
of Beatty's division, which had been required to furnish an 
assaulting column, of which Colonel Post's brigade was desig 
nated for the front and Colonel Streight's for immediate sup 
port. At 1 p. m. Colonel Post dashed up the hill and over the 
intrenchments on the summit, and held the enemy's stronghold 
This action was anterior to the more positive success of Smith 
and Wilson on the right, and opened the way for General Scho- 
field to move to the right of General Smith. When the Twenty- 
third Corps was transferred to the right, General Thomas di- 
rected General Wood to throw his reserves on his right, to extend 



234 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

his line to as great an extent as was compatible with the se- 
curity of his front. In obedience, General Wood put the re- 
serve brigade of each division on his right, and then engaged 
the enemy with his entire corps. He brought three batteries 
into play and pressed forward a strong skirmish line, but at 
first made no threat of assaulting. Soon, however, he made 
preparations to carry the enemy's works in his front; moving 
his right division, whose right had extended in rear of General 
Smith's left, farther to his own left, and then advanced it and 
his central division, so as to bring Kimball's division opposite 
a fortified hill near the center of General Hood's main line. 
Placing two batteries so as to throw a converging fire upon 
the hill, he used them vigorously for an hour, and then ordered 
General Kimball to charge with his whole division. "With loud 
cheers, the division ascended the hill and leaped over the in- 
trenchments, capturing several pieces of artillery, stands of 
colors, and a large number of prisoners. At the same time, 
General Elliott carried the intrenchments in his front, and Gen- 
eral Beatty crowned the enemy's works before his division with 
captures of artillery and prisoners. In this general advance, 
the right of General "Wood's line became involved with the 
left of General Smith's, and conflicting claims for the fruits of 
victory were preferred. At 5 p. m. General "Wood received an 
order from General Thomas to move to the Franklin turnpike, 
two and a half miles distant, and facing southward, to drive 
the enemy across it. The corps moved as directed, but the 
night fell too soon for it to reach its destination, but it bivou- 
acked on a line parallel to the Granny "White turnpike con- 
necting with General Smith's left. 

On the extreme left, other advantages were gained after 
the feint of the morning. Colonels Morgan and Grosvenor 
pressed the enemy from Kaine's house and held the position, 
using the buildings for defense. Colonel Thompson, with 
his detachment, advanced across Brown's creek, between the 
Murfreesboro and Nolensville turnpikes, and carried the left 
of the front line of fortifications on the latter road, holding his 
ground firmly. In this succession of aggressive movements, 
the colored troops were prominent and successful. 

During the day the enemy had been driven from his original 



BATTLE OF NASHYILLE, ETC. 235 

line of works, and forced back to a position on the Harpeth 
hills, and his left liad been completely turned, though he still 
held two lines of retreat — one on the Granny White road, and 
the other on the direct road to Franklin. Seventeen pieces of 
artillery had been taken from him, also twelve hundred pris- 
oners and several hundred small arms. The cavalry had clear* i< 1 
its front, covered the extremity of the infantry line, enveloped 
the enemy's left flank and taken it in reverse, and had only 
failed in the extreme possibility of reaching the Franklin turn- 
pike in rear of Hood's army. General Wilson at dark directed 
General Hatch to bivouac on the Hillsboro road, to cover Gen- 
eral Smith's right flank. He placed General Knipe's division 
on Hatch's right ; Hammond's brigade had reached the six- 
mile post on the Hillsboro road, and turned thence up a branch 
of Richland creek for three miles, bivouacking on the Granny 
White turnpike. General Johnson's division had moved far 
to the right during the day, to co-operate with the gunboats 
in dislodging the enemy from Bell's landing, and bivouacked 
in the vicinity, in prospect of co-operating with Lieutenant- 
Commander Fitch in an attack the next morning. General 
Croxton had moved on Johnson's left for several miles, and 
having turned to the left, rested for the night at the six-mile 
post on the Charlotte turnpike. The brigade of dismounted 
cavalry took position on the Hillsboro turnpike, to cover Hatch 
and Hammond against a possible advance of the enemy's cav- 
alry on that road. 

The whole army bivouacked with assurance of complete 
victory on the morrow. The authorities at Washington and 
the people of the country, after ten days of impatience at 
General Thomas' delay in preparation for a battle now so glori- 
ously begun, were in full sympathy with the troops lying on 
their arms before the defeated enemy. General Grant, on his 
way to Nashville from City Point, Virginia, stopped at Wash- 
ington, while General Logan, farther advanced toward the 
same destination, halted at Louisville. Official congratu- 
lations from the President, Secretary of War, and Lieutenant- 
General sped their swift way to General Thomas and his army. 
The defeat, total and immediate, of one of the two great 
armies upon which the existence of the rebellion depended 



236 BATTLE OF XASHVILLE, ETC. 

was now assured, and the reaction from the historic uneas- 
iness which had obtained throughout the country with re- 
gard to the situation at Nashville to the extreme of hope- 
fulness with respect to the immediate issue and the ultimate 
consequences of the battle, was one of the most marked revul- 
sions of opinion and feeling during the war. The army had 
felt no uneasiness, and now looked forward with calm as- 
surance to the result which had been anticipated during all 
the days of peparation for battle. 

During the night, General Hood drew back his center and 
right to a stronger position, his right then resting on Overton 
hill, and his left remaining on the Harpeth or Brentwood 
range. His line extended along the base of the hills, his artil- 
lery was massed at points most available for its effective use, 
and his troops spent the night in fortifying the position. The 
battle-front now presented by the enemy was on its left nearly 
perpendicular in trend to the right of the national line, the 
latter having so far wheeled to the left that its direction was 
nearly at right angles to its original linear course. This rela- 
tion of the army lines made General Schofield fearful with re- 
gard to his right flank, and during the night he requested re- 
inforcements from General Smith, who sent to him Colonel 
Moore's division. Before daylight, Colonel Moore was in re- 
serve on General Schofield's right. 

As General Hood's retreat was now probable, General 
Thomas gave orders for movements on the 16th having ref- 
erence to attack should he accept battle, and to pursuit should 
he retreat. Each corps was ordered to move forward rapidly 
at 6 a. m. until the enemy should be met. As General Hood's 
left remained in proximity to General Schofield's line, he did 
not move early in the morning. The Fourth Corps advanced 
promptly as ordered toward the Franklin road. The enemy's 
skirmishers were soon encountered, but were speedily driven 
back, and the Franklin road was gained. Here the corps was 
deployed — Elliott's division across the road facing southward, 
Beatty's on the left, and Kimball's in reserve behind Elliott. 
It then advanced rapidly three-fourths of a mile, and met a 
strong skirmish line behind barricades, the main line being 
plainly in view a half mile beyond. Simultaneously with the 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 237 

movement of the Fourth Corps, General Steedman advanced on 
the left, and General Smith on the right. The former soon 
found that the enemy had left his front, and pressing forward, 
took position between the Nolensvillc turnpike and General 
Wood's left, his own right resting on the railroad, and his left 
on the IsTolensville road. To cover his rear against dashes of 
cavalry, he ordered Mitchell's brigade of Cruft's division from 
the defenses, to occupy Riddle's hill. General Smith ad- 
vanced with two divisions, Garrard's and McArthur's, going 
into position under the fire of the enemy's artillery, about 
eight hundred yards from his main line. The Twenty-third 
Corps was still at right angles with this his new offensive line, 
facing eastward. General Smith's right was opposite very 
strong intrenchments of the enemy — in fact, was at the base 
of the hill upon which they rested. He simply held position 
until 1 p. M., waiting for General Schofield, who was to take 
the initiative againt General Hood's left. There being an in- 
terval between his left and General Wood's right, the latter 
threw into it Kimball's division, and completed the continuous 
alignment of the infantry from left to right. In the meantime, 
the artillery from all parts of the line kept up a measured fire, 
and even muskets were used freely to induce the enemy to ex- 
pend his limited ammunition. 

Pending the movements of the infantry to perfect their 
array, General Wilson was active in the formation of the cav- 
alry on the right. Early in the morning, Hammond's pickets 
on the Granny White turnpike had been attacked and driven 
back ; but in compliance with orders, General Hammond had 
strengthed his line and regained his position. During this 
action, Hatch's division had been directed to the enemy's rear, 
passing to Hammond's left. The country being hilly and 
covered with a dense forest, was impracticable for the move- 
ment of cavalry, mounted, and hence the whole force was dis- 
mounted and pushed forward. General Croxton moved to the 
front to support either Hatch or Hammond, and General 
Johnson, who had ascertained early in the morning that the 
enemy had abandoned Bell's landing, had been ordered to 
move across to the Hillsboro turnpike. By noon, the cavalry 



238 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

formed a continuous line from General Schofield's right to the 
Granny White turnpike. General Thomas' object now was 
to turn both flanks of the enemy. His flanks were stronger 
than his center, but success in turning either or both prom- 
ised better results than to break through his center, as the}* 
covered his lines of retreat. Could one or the other be turned, 
there was the possibility of reaching his rear and cutting oil' his 
retreat, and could both be turned at once, he would be thrown 
in confusion on his only line of retreat through the Brentwood 
Pass, and the probability would be doubly strong of cutting 
him off. Having rode along his line from Wood to Schofield, 
he ordered the latter and Smith to attack the enemy's left, and 
the former and Steedman to move against Overton hill. 

The Brentwood hills, rising about three hundred and fifty 
feet above the level of the country, consist of two ranges 
trending from their northernmost summits, on the one hand 
to the southeast, and on the other to the southwest, and ter- 
minating on opposite sides of the Brentwood Pass, through 
which the direct road to Franklin courses, and situated about 
nine miles from Nashville. These hills were the background 
for General Hood's army ; his battle line coursed over the 
detached hills in front, covered in great part with native for- 
ests. Overton hill commanded the Franklin turnpike, run- 
ning along its base, and was intrenched around its northern 
slope, half-way from base to summit, with a flank running 
round its eastern descent, and the approaches were obstructed 
by abatis and other entanglements. This position was ex- 
ceedingly strong, and the troops holding it had been heavily 
reinforced during the forenoon. 

General Wood sent Colonel Post to reconnoiter the position, 
who reported that the northern slope was most favorable for 
assault. As before, his brigade was chosen to form the head 
of the assaulting column, with Streight's in support. General 
Steedman designated Thompson's brigade of colored troops, 
and Grosvenor's, to co-operate in the assault. As preparatory 
to the advance of these columns, Major Goodspeed, chief of 
artillery of the Fourth Corps, was ordered to pour a converg- 
ing fire upon the enemy's batteries, and continue it as long as 
It could be done with safety to the advancing troops. At 3 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 239 

p. m. the assaulting columns moved up the steep ascent, cov- 
ered with a strong line of skirmishers, to draw the enemy's 
fire and annoy his gunners. The instructions required that 
the columns should move steadily until near the intrench- 
ments, and then to dash up the ascent and leap the abatis 
and parapets. The movement promised success until the 
moment of final issue. The leading men in each col inn n 
reached the parapets, and a few had gained the works, when 
the enemy's reserves opened a fire so destructive as to drive 
hack hoth lines with heavy loss. The colored soldiers suffered 
equally with the veteran white troops, and with them shared 
the glory of a gallant but unsuccessful assault. The survivors 
were reformed at the base of the hill, in readiness for another 
attack ; but Colonel Post was not for the third time to lead, as 
had received a severe wound. 

The advance on the right soon followed the attack upon 
Overton hill. It had been anticipated that the Twenty-third 
Corps, facing east, would first advance ; but there was so much 
delay that General McArthur requested permission to carry 
the strong position before him and General Schofield equally, 
and although General Thomas desired him to wait until he 
could hear from General Schofield, and went himself to the 
right, McArthur, fearing that an opportunity would be lost, 
directed Colonel McMillen to charge with his brigade and 
take by storm, the hill upon which rested the left flank of 
the main line of the enemy. McMillen was directed to ascend 
from the west, while the other brigades of the division should 
attack in front, when he should be half-way up to the summit. 
Colonel McMillen ordered his men to refrain from firing a 
shot, and from all cheering, until they had gained the works. 
The One hundred and Fourteenth Illinois, Ninth Indiana, and 
Eighth Minnesota formed his first line, and the Seventy-second 
Indiana and the Ninety -fifth Ohio his second. A heavy line 
of skirmishers moved rapidly forward, and as it advanced, the 
artillery, in sympathy, gave roar after roar with quick repeti- 
tion, while between these sheets of flame and smoke, in the 
stern silence of desperate valor, the brigade moved up the hill. 
Hubbard, " eager in emulation," started directly up, followed 
by Hill's brigade with another leader, and all by Garrard's 



240 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

division. The enemy opened with musketry, and the death- 
dealing short-range missiles of his artillery; but on, without 
halt or waver, moved the columns, and soon the position was 
carried, with three general officers and a large number of 
lower grades, and a corresponding number of men as prisoners, 
and twenty-seven pieces of artillery, and twelve stands of 
colors. The shout of these divisions in victory called forth 
responsive cheers from those charging on right and left. 
Wilson, with his dismounted troopers, swept eastward, and, 
with Coon's brigade, gained the hill, against which the Twenty- 
third Corps was advancing. Soon after, Doolittle's brigade of 
Cox's division crowned a fortified position on the right of the 
salient of the enemy's left flank, the division capturing eight 
guns and from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pris- 
oners. The noise of Smith's victory moved "Wood and Steed- 
man to renew their assault upon Overton hill — their entire 
commands rushing forward and sweeping all before them, on 
the summit and beyond as they moved in rapid pursuit. 
Beatty's division crowned the hill, and captured four pieces of 
artillery, a large number of prisoners, and two stands of colors ; 
Kimball's cleared the intrenchments in its front, and captured 
a large number of prisoners and small arms ; and Elliott's car- 
ried the line throughout its front, and captured five guns and 
several hundred prisoners and small arms. This general 
charge was resistless, and the enemy was hurled from every 
position in utter rout and demoralization. The success of 
the first day was the inspiration of the second, and officers 
and men vied with each other in personal daring and persist- 
ent, steady courage. General Hood must have regarded his 
second position stronger than his first, or he would not have 
attempted to hold it, for all other conditions of the second 
battle were much more unfavorable to successful resistance 
than those of the first. The prestige was with the national 
army, and, on the second day of his last battle, he ought to 
have known that a victorious iniatitive by a Northern army 
had more significance than when attained by a Southern one. 
The Northern armies seldom lost a battle which had a prom- 
ising beginning, and they often gained them, after the South- 
ern people had been electrified by the rash assumption of vie- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 241 

tory by their generals, when afterward, on the same field, 
their initial success was turned into positive defeat, by the 
pluck and persistence of Northern soldiers. 

When General Wilson's command had gained their saddles, 
which unfortunately was delayed in consequence of the fact, 
that they had gone far from their horses, as those leading them 
made slow progress over the broken ground and dense forests, 
Hatch and Knipe hurried in pursuit. General Hatch was di- 
rected to move on the Granny White road and make effort to 
reach the Franklin turnpike that night. He had, however, 
proceeded but a short distance, when he met Chalmers' divis- 
ion, strongly posted across the road behind a barricade of rails. 
Dismounting a portion of his command, he deployed on both 
sides of the road. While his skirmishers were advancing, 
Colonel Spalding charged, broke the line, and scattered the 
force in all directions, capturing Brigadier-General Rucker, 
for the time in command of the division. The cavalry then 
bivouacked for the night — Hatch, Knipe, and Croxton on the 
Granny White road, and Johnson on the Hillsboro road, near 
the Harpeth river. 

The Fourth Corps followed the enemy on the Franklin 
turnpike, and the frequent discharges of its artillery increased 
the confusion of the retreat. At dark the corps bivouacked 
a mile from the village of Brentwood. The line of retreat 
revealed the fact that General Hood's army had abandoned 
itself to a most disorderly withdrawal. Small arms and ac- 
couterments were strewn thickly along the road, while no 
effort was made to carry off the wounded or dispose of the 
dead. The army was not only defeated, but it was broken 
and crushed, and had the conditions of pursuit proved favor- 
able, even the fragments would have been gathered in capture. 

The action of the 15th removed from all in the North the 
fear of disaster at Nashville, or the invasion of Kentucky. 
That of the 16th announced the overthrow of the rebellion in 
the West, and foretold its speedy utter annihilation. There 
was now no formidable Confederate army between the Missis- 
sippi river and Virginia. One of the two armies, upon whose 
organic life, strength and activity the rebellion rested, was 
VOL. II — 16 



242 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

fleeing southward in disorganization and dismay. On no 
other field of the war had two armies of equal proportions 
fought with similar issue. Drawn battle or indecisive victory 
had usually resulted. But now, the Confederate Army of the 
Tennessee, which had fought with historic honor at Donel- 
son, Shiloh, Perry ville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Lookout 
Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Resaca, New Hope Church, 
Kenesaw Mountain, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Jonesboro, in 
all the minor battles of " the hundred days under fire," and at 
Franklin and Nashville, found its grave on a field in close 
proximity to its first line of defense. Neither was its demor- 
alization rife before its last conflict. There were too many 
officers and men captured with swords, guns, and colors, within 
their intrenchments, to warrant the supposition that this his- 
toric army, with its traditions of valor and unity on every 
previous field, came far north in the mere semblance of the 
boldest agression, to throw down its arms in shameless dis- 
regard of its glorious antecedents. There was, indeed, less 
loss of life to the victors than usual, but may not this result 
find explanation in the nice adjustment of strategic and tac- 
tical combinations and the almost unprecedented vigor of as- 
sault. Successful assaults are never as costly as those which 
fail, all other things being equal. Thompson's brigade of 
colored troops lost twenty-five per cent, of its strength in 
thirty minutes, on the slope of Overton hill ; but had not the 
gallant leader of the main column fallen at the critical mo- 
ment when a leader's presence and heroism is the ruling condi- 
tion of successful assault, the soldiers who fell on the parapets 
and within the enemy's lines might have lived to plant their 
banners in room of those of treason and rebellion. The story 
is half told, and the philosophy of the victory is half revealed, 
by the declaration of a captured general officer, " that powder 
and lead were inadequate to resist such a charge." The other 
half of the history of the battle, and the cause of victory, 
come to light in the palpable co-operation of the chief sub- 
ordinates with the commander-in-chief in the execution of a 
definite plan of battle, and the personal supervision of the 
vital movements by General Thomas. There were no exposed 
flanks, and no opportunities for stunning offensive returns. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 243 

There was only one unsuccessful assault, and that was upon 
the strongest position of the enemy, manned by the heaviest 
concentration on his line. No battle of the war manifests 
more complete prevision of contingencies, or more full pro- 
vision for emergencies and possibilities. This battle moved 
•on gloriously from its initial feint to the final charge, in the 
revelation of the highest type of generalship and the highest 
martial virtues of an entire army. Its immediate fruits were 
four thousand four hundred and sixty-two prisoners, including 
■one major-general and three brigadiers, and two hundred and 
eighty officers of lower grades, all the wounded upon the field, 
fifty-three pieces of artillery, thousands of small arms, and 
twenty -five battle-flags. 

General Thomas and the officers and men of his army were 
fully alive to the importance of vigorous pursuit. But it had 
been impossible to make full preparations before the battle, 
and the bridges on the line of retreat being at the mercy of 
the enemy, the difficulties in prospect were by no means slight. 
It was the season of rain, and there were bad roads, and the 
rivers and creeks which crossed the line of pursuit were full, 
as well as bridgeless in prospect. In the conduct of the pur- 
suit, General Thomas was put under orders and exhortations, 
as he had previously been to fight the battle before he con- 
sidered himself prepared and the conditions promising. 
During the evening of the 16th, he gave orders for the move- 
ments of the next day, and in one single direction to a staff 
officer he failed to express what he intended. Being roused 
from rest in his tent, by an officer who was to receive instruc- 
tions regarding the movement of the pontoon train, he di- 
rected it upon the Murfreesboro road instead of the one to 
Franklin. He did not discover his mistake until the next 
morning, when he asked as he was riding on the latter road, 
if the train had passed to the front. It was immediately re- 
called from the wrong road, and hurried forward, but never- 
theless a serious delay resulted. 

Having given orders for the care of the wounded, and the 
collection of the captured and abandoned property, General 
Thomas commenced the pursuit early in the morning of the 
17th. The Fourth Corps pushed on to Franklin through 



244 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Brentwood, and the cavalry followed the Granny White road 
to the junction of the two roads, and then General Wilson 
hurried past the infantry. In moving upon Franklin, General 
Wilson kept General Knipe's command on the direct road, 
and sent Generals Hatch and Croxton to cross the Harpeth 
above the town. 

General Knipe found the enemy strongly posted at Hollow 
Tree Gap, four miles north of Franklin, and charging him, 
front and flank, carried the position, and captured four hun- 
dred and thirteen men and three flags. At Franklin, he again 
made a show of resistance, but upon Johnson's approach on 
the south bank of the river, he retreated toward Columbia. 

Beyond the town, Generals Knipe and Hatch moved in par- 
allel columns on the Columbia and Carter's Creek roads, while 
Johnson followed Knipe, and Croxton advanced on the Lewis- 
burg road. The extreme flanking columns were instructed to 
press round the flanks of the enemy's rear-guard, composed 
almost entirely of infantry, while a strong line of skirmishers 
should attack in the rear — the object being to break up the 
last organized force which was covering the fugitive and 
broken columns in rapid retreat. This rear-guard, however, 
proved very efficient and subtle, preventing any successful 
flanking, and skirmishing with spirit in the rear, while moving 
rapidly. Late in^the evening, the enemy took a strong posi- 
tion in the open field, about one mile from the West Harpeth. 
The rapid movement of the cavalry had thrown them into 
some confusion and intervolution with the enemy, which, 
with the fog and falling darkness, caused some doubt as to the 
fact that the force in front was the rear-guard of the enemy. 
The consequent hesitation gave the enemy opportunity to 
form his line and post his batteries. As soon as the true state 
of affairs was ascertained, General Wilson ordered Hatch and 
Knipe to charge both flanks. The batteries from both sides 
opened briskly, when Lieutenant Hedges, commanding the 
Fourth United States Cavalry, with his regiment in column by 
fours, dashed forward in a saber charge, and broke through the 
battery. Hatch's division and Hammond's brigade, dismounted, 
charged at the same time, and the enemy was completely 
routed. Lieutenant Hedges was three times captured, but 



BATTLE OF XASHVILLE, ETC. 245 

escaped at last. The pursuit was vigorous, notwithstanding 
the darkness. General Hatch, with the Tenth Indiana Cav- 
alry, forded the West Harpeth, and struck the enemy in flank. 
Being pressed on all sides, the enemy abandoned his guns, 
and fled in disorder, under cover of the darkness. This rear- 
guard was Stevenson's division of Lee's corps, under Forrest. 

The Fourth Corps reached Franklin a little after noon, but 
the river had risen so rapidly after the cavalry had crossed, 
that the infantry were delayed to extemporize a bridge. Gen- 
eral Steedman followed General Wood, and encamped near 
by on the north bank of the Harpeth ; the other two corps 
were in the rear. Trains followed, with rations for ten days, 
and a hundred rounds of ammunition to each man. 

Early on the 18th, General "Wilson pursued and endeavored, 
with Johnson's and Croxton's commands, to strike the enemy 
at Spring Hill, but he had passed on over Rutherford's creek, 
destroying the bridges behind him. The roads, even the turn- 
pikes, had become exceedingly bad from the heavy rains and 
their use by the enemy, and in consequence the pursuit was 
greatly retarded. General Wood crossed the Harpeth in the 
morning, and joined General Wilson at night at Rutherford's 
creek. 

The difficulties of the pursuit were now fully apparent, and 
anticipating the failure of all efforts to intercept Hood's army 
with his own in direct advance, General Thomas, on the 18th, 
ordered General Steedman to march his command to Murfrees- 
boro ; that passing through Stevenson by rail, he should take 
the troops of General R. S. Granger, including the former gar- 
risons of Huntsville, Athens, and Decatur, and proceed to the 
latter place. His instructions required that he should re- 
occupy the important posts on that line, abandoned at the time 
of General Hood's advance, and with the remainder of his 
forces cross the Tennessee river, and threaten the enemy's com- 
munications west of Florence. 

On the morning of the 19th, Generals Wilson and Wood 
advanced to Rutherford's creek, whose deep swift current 
formed a better rear-guard for the enemy than his dispirited 
infantry and cavalry. During the day, several efforts were 
made to cross the stream, but all were fruitless. The rain con- 



246 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

t hmed and the pontoon train was still in the rear. While the- 
leading columns were thus detained, General Smith reached 
Spring Hill, and General Schofield crossed the Harpeth at 
Franklin. 

The next morning, General Hatch formed a floating bridge 
from the debris of the railroad bridge, and crossing with his 
division advanced rapidly to Columbia, to find that the enemy 
had succeeded, the evening previous, in passing Duck river 
and lifting his pontoon bridge. General Wood also crossed 
by various expedients and encamped near Columbia. 

The pontoon train reached Rutherford's creek at noon on 
the 21st. A bridge was immediately thrown, and the troops 
and trains passed over and moved to Columbia. The weather 
now changed from excessive rain to extreme cold ; and this 
greatly retarded the throwing of the bridge over Duck river. 
The rapid subsidence of the water caused repeated alterations 
in the length of the bridge, and protracted the delay. Gen- 
eral Wood, however, crossed in the evening of the 23d, and 
encamped two miles south of Columbia. The cavalry crossed 
the next day and the pursuit was resumed ; but by this time 
General Hood had reformed his rear-guard, and this accom- 
plishment was one of the conditions of his escape. All his 
best troops had been thrown to his rear, and the interval 
between his disorganized forces and their pursuers had been 
greatly increased. Such, too, was the topography of the coun- 
try, that a small force could compel the deployment of the 
leading troops, with loss of time. Another difficulty was the 
impossibility of moving the cavalry off the turnpike on the 
flanks of the infantry column, as General Thomas had directed, 
on account of the softness of the soil. As a consequence, the 
infantry fell in rear of the cavalry ; and in this order Gen- 
erals Wilson and Wood moved toward Pulaski. The former 
encountered the enemy in the vicinity of Lynnville, and the 
country being open he was driven rapidly. At Buford's Sta- 
tion, while Hatch was pressing directly forward, Croxton struck 
the enemy's flank, when he was thrown into rapid retreat. 
A number of prisoners were captured, and General Buford was 
wounded. 

The enemy moved hurriedly through Pulaski, closely fol- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 247 

lowed by Colonel Harrison's brigade. Harrison's quick move- 
ment compelled the enemy to leave the bridge over Richland 
creek, aDd hurrying forward he found him intrenched at the 
head of a ravine through which the road passed. Here his 
infantry leaped quickly from the intrenchments, brushed back 
Harrison's skirmishers, and captured one gun of Smith's bat- 
tery—" I," Fourth United States Artillery. The enemy 
retained the gun, but left fifty prisoners when Hatch and 
Hammond moved upon his flanks. On the 26th, the pursuit 
was continued to Sugar creek, where the enemy was again 
found in intrenchments, but which he abandoned upon the 
development of a line of attack. 

Here the pursuit was abandoned, as it had been ascertained 
that General Hood's infantry forces had effected the passage 
of the Tennessee river at Bainbridge. The gunboats under 
Admiral Lee had reached Chickasaw, Mississippi, on the 24th, 
and soon after captured two guns from a battery at Florence. 
General Steedman reached Decatur on the 28th, having met 
resistance in crossing the river at that place. 

When the pursuit terminated, General Thomas gave orders 
for the disposition of his forces in winter cantonments, on the 
line of the Tennessee river, having ulterior aggressive aims. 
His orders located the Fourth Corps at Huntsville and Athens, 
Alabama ; the Twenty-third Corps at Dalton, Georgia ; General 
Smith's corps at Eastport, Mississippi, and General Wilson's 
cavalry at Huntsville and Eastport. On the 30th, he an- 
nounced in orders the conclusion of the campaign, and con- 
gratulated his army upon its eminent success. 

This was the last invasion of the State of Tennessee by the 
Confederate Army of the Tennessee, composed largely of 
troops from that state, many of whom, in the final rout, scat- 
tered in all directions, and never again stood under their ban- 
ners. Indeed, the banners of this army, as such, were never 
again borne in battle. Exclusive of the multitudes who wan- 
dered from his army, General Hood lost by capture thirteen 
thousand one hundred and eighty-nine men, including seven 
general officers, sixteen colonels, and nearly one thousand of 
lower grades, and two thousand by formal desertion. He lost 
seventy-two pieces of serviceable artillery, seventy stands of 



248 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

colors, and immense quantities of small arms, wagons, pon- 
toons, and other material. If, to the fifteen thousand men 
reported as prisoners and deserters, there should be added his 
losses in battle and the never-reported desertions, it is safe 
to conclude that scarcely one-half of his army recrossed the 
Tennessee river. The portion of it which did cross, was too 
dispirited to give further support to the sinking cause. 

In the whole campaign, General Thomas lost, in all the 
forms of casualty, about ten thousand men, a large portion 
of this aggregate having been slightly wounded. 

This campaign, as also the Atlanta campaign, had intimate 
relations with the operations of General Canby on the Missis- 
sippi river. Twice had the Confederate President ordered the 
armies under Generals Smith and Magruder, west of the great 
river, to cross to the east — once to aid General Johnston 
against General Sherman, and again, to join General Hood in 
his projected advance through Kentucky. General Canby 's 
success in preventing the transfer of these forces in the two 
cases, eliminated from each the ruling condition of success. 
He achieved this result by holding the best crossings with 
strong detachments, and keeping a floating army, in con- 
junction with the gunboat fleet, in constant motion up and 
down the river. 



Nashville, November 29, 1864. 
Major-Gcneral Steedman, Stevenson: 

Your dispatch of 11.30 a. m. to-day received. Concentrate your troops 
at Cowan, as previously directed, and if the enemy moves over to the N. 
& C. railroad, act according to instructions given in my telegram of the 
25th. When General Smith arrives, and he begins to push the enemy 
back, you can then proceed to execute the Tuscumbia expedition. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 30, 1864 — 3 p. m. 
Admiral S. P. Lee : 

As soon as the iron-clads return to Paducah, please order them into 
the Cumberland river, to patrol that river and convoy transports up and 
down. Hood at present has a cavalry force so much larger than mine 
that I have been compelled to fall back and concentrate on Nashville. 
But as soon as I can get my cavalry back from Louisville, I feel confident 

I can drive him back. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 249 

Nashville, December 1, 1864 — 9.30 p. m. 
Admiral S. P. Lee : 

Your communication by Commander Fitch and telegram of 1 p. m.. this 
date are received, and I am much indebted to you for having changed 
the destination of the iron-clads. Commander Fitch thinks if the iron- 
clads you expect at Smithland were stationed at Clarksville, the river 
then would be made perfectly safe. Will you please order them to 
Clarksville ? 

• GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major- General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, December 3, 1864. 
Admiral S. P. Lee, Mound City : 

Your telegram of yesterday received last night. My force of cavalry 
and infantry at Franklin being so much less than that of the enemy, I 
determined to fall back to this place to concentrate my infantry and give 
time to General Wilson to arm and equip sufficient cavalry to meet For- 
rest. I have here now nearly as much infantry as Hood, and in a few 
days hope to have cavalry enough to enable me to assume the offensive. 
In the meantime, Captain Fitch has cheerfully complied with my request 
to patrol the river above and below the city. I am therefore in hopes we 
shall, in a few days, be able to take the offensive on pretty even terms 
with the enemy. I regret much that my telegram of the 30th implied 
.an order to you, which was not intended. With many thanks for your 
previous prompt co-operations, 

I am, yours truly, 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
December 9, 1864. 
Major-General J. M. Schqfield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps : 

Owing to the severity of the storm raging to-day, it is found necessary 
to postpone the operations designed for to-morrow morning until the 
breaking up of the storm. I desire, however, that everything be put in 
condition to carry out the plan contemplated as soon as the weather will 
permit it to be done, so that we can act instantly when the storm clears 
away. Acknowledge receipt. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 

Sent to Major-General A. J. Smith, commanding detachment Army of 

Tennessee; Major-General J. B. Steedman, commanding District of 

Etowah, and Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, commanding Fourth 

Army Corps. 



250 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 

December 10, 1864. 

Brigadier-General TJiomas J. Wood, Commanding Fourth Army Corps: 

What is the condition of the ground between the enemy's line and 

your own ? Is it practicable for men to move about on it with facility ? 

I would like your opinion about it. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, December 11, 1864. 

Major- Generals Schojield, Steedman, Smith, and Brigadier-General Wood: 

Have your commands put in readiness to-morrow for operations. I 

wish to see you at my headquarters at 3 r. m. tomorrow. Acknowledge 

receipt. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, December 1, 1864 — 9.30 p. m 
Major-General Halleclc, Washington, D. C. : 

After General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced that the 
enemy very far outnumbered him both in infantry and cavalry, I deter- 
mined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville, until General Wilson 
can get his cavalry equipped. He has now but about one-fourth the 
number of the enemy, and consequently is no match for him. I have 
two iron-clads here with several gunboats, and Commander Fitch assures 
me that Hood can neither cross the Cumberland nor blockade it. I 
therefore think it best to wait here until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. 
If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than he was 
yesterday. If he remains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, 
and will move against him at once. I have Murfreesboro strongly held, 
and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, 
Stevenson, and Elk river bridges have strong garrisons. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



War Department, 

Washington, December 2 — 10.30 a. m. 

Lieutenant- General Grant, City Point: 

The President feels solicitous about the disposition of Thomas, to lay 

in fortifications for an indefinite period "until Wilson gets equipments." 

This looks like the McClellan and Eosecrans strategy of do nothing, and 

let the enemy raid the country. The President writes you to consider 

the matter. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 251 

City Point, Va., December 2, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville : 

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, we will lose 
all the roads back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line 
of the Tennessee river. Should he attack you, it is all well, but if he 
does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the 
trenches your quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



City Point, Va., December 2, 1864—1.30 p. m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville: 

With your citizen employes armed, you can move out of Nashville with 
all your army, and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your 
own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me 
that instead of falling back to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive 
against the enemy, but at this distance may err as to the method of deal- 
ing with the enemy. You will suffer incalculable injury upon your rail- 
roads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every pos- 
sible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating, give 
him no peace. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, Tenn., December 2, 1864 — 10 p. m. 
General XJ. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your two telegrams of 11 a. m. and 1.30 p. m. to-day are received. At 
the time Hood was whipped at Franklin, 1 had at this place but about five 
thousand (5,000) men of General Smith's command, which, added to the 
force under General Schofield, would not have given me more than 
twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. Besides, General Schofield felt con- 
vinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the five thou- 
sand could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered 
only about one-fourth that of Forrest, I thought it best to draw the troops 
back to Nashville, and await the arrival of the remainder of General 
Smith's force, and also a force of about five thousand (5,000) commanded 
by General Steedman, which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The 
division of General Smith arrived yesterday morning, and General Steed- 
man's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume 
the offensive, if I had more cavalry ; and will take the field anyhow as 
soon as the remainder of General McCook's division of cavalry reaches 
here, which I hope it will in two or three days. 

We can neither get reinforcements nor equipments at this great dis- 
tance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my 
command was made up of the two weakest corps of General Sherman's 



252 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

army, and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade; and the task 
of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays, which have en- 
abled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly 
hope, however, in a few more days, I shall be able to give him a fight. 
(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 
f 

City Point, Va., December 5, 18C4 — 6.30 p. m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. : 

Is there not danger of Forrest's moving down the Tennessee river 
where he can cross it? It seems to me, while you should be getting up 
your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be 
attacked where he is. 

Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you. 
(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Nashville, December 6, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point: 

Your telegram of 6.30 p. m., December 5th, is just received. As soon 
as I get up a respectable force of cavalry I will march against Hood. 
General Wilson has parties out .now pressing horses, and I hope to have 
some six or eight thousand cavalry mounted in three days from this time. 
General Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the 
cavalry to remount as rapidly as possible. I do not think it prudent to 
attack Hood with less than six thousand (6,000) cavalry to cover my 
flanks, because he has under Forrest at least twelve thousand (12,000). 
I have no doubt Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes 
the gunboats will be able to prevent him. The enemy has made no new 
developments to-day. Breckinridge is reported at Lebanon with six 
thousand (6,000) men, but I can not believe it possible. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



City Point, Va., December 6, 1864 — 4 p. m. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville: 

Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount for your cav- 
alry. There is great danger in delay, resulting in a campaign back to the 
Ohio. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Nashville, December 6, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point : 

Your dispatch of 4 p. m. this day received. I will make the necessary 
disposition and attack Hood at once, agreeably to your orders, though I 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 253 

believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my 

service. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



War Department, 
Washington, December 7, 1864 — 10.20 a. m. 
Lieutenant-General Grant : 

You remember that when Steele was relieved by Canby he was ordered 
to Cairo, to report to this department. What shall be done with him? 
The order superseding Rosecrans by Dodge has been issued. Thomas 
seems unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was any 
but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blow- 
ing his last horn. 

EDWIN M. STANTON. 



City Point, Va., December 8, 1864. 
Major-General HallecJc, Washington : 

Please direct General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare to Gen- 
eral Thomas. With such an order, he can be relied on to send all that 
can properly go. They had probably better be sent to Louisville, for I fear 
either Hood or Breckinridge will go to the Ohio river. I will submit 
whether it is not advisable to call on Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, for 
60,U00 men for thirty days. If Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to 
be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better 
man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take 

the initiative. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



War Department, 
Washington, D. C, December 8, 1864. 
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point : 

If you wish General Thomas relieved, give the order. No one here 
will, I think, interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no 
one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed. 

H. W. HALLECK, 
Major-General, Chief of Staff". 



Nashville, Tenn., December 7, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
3faj or- General H. W. HallecJc, Washington, D. C. : 

The enemy has not increased his force on our front. Have sent gun- 
boats up the river above Carthage. One returned to-day, and reported 
no signs of the enemy on the river bank from forty miles above Carthage 
to this place. Captain Fitch, U. S. navy, started down the river yester- 
day, with a convoy of transport steamers, but was unable to get them 
down, the enemy having planted three batteries on a bend of the river, 
between this and Clarksville. Captain Fitch was unable to silence all 



254 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

three of the batteries yesterday, and will return again to-morrow morn- 
ing, and, with the assistance of the Cincinnati, now at Clarksville, I am 
in hopes will now be able to clear them out. So far the enemy has not 
materially injured the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. 

(Signed), GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



City Point, Va., December 8, 1864 — 7.30 p. M. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville : 

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evidently the 
enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland, and are scattered. Why not 
attack at once ? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see 
which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary, call 
on the governors of states to send a force into Louisville to meet the 
enemy if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross, ex- 
cept in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the fairest opportunities ever 
presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If de- 
stroyed, he can never replace it. Use the means at your command, and 
you can do this and cause a rejoicing from one end of the land to the 

other. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 



City Point, Va., December 8, 1864 — 10 p. m. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington : 

Your dispatch of 9 p. m. just received. I want General Thomas re- 
minded of the importance of immediate action. I sent him a dispatch 
this evening, which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve 

him until I hear further from him. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 



Nashville, Tenn., December 8, 1864 — 11.30 p. m. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your dispatch of 7.30 p. m. is just received. I can only say, in further 

extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate 

my troops, and get their transportation in order, in shorter time than it 

has been done, and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible 

to complete the task. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Washington, December 9, 1864 — 10.30 a. m. 
Major-General George H. TJwmas, Nashville, Tenn. : 

Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay 
in attacking the enemy. If you wait till General Wilson mounts all his 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 255 

cavalry, you will wait till doomsday, for the waste equals the supply. 
Moreover, you will be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year, 
with so many animals that you can not feed them. Reports already come 
in of a scarcity of forage. 

(Signed,) H. W. HALLECK, 

Major-Gcneral and Chief of Staff. 



City Point, Va., December 9, 1864 — 11 a. m. 
Major-General Hallcck, Washington, D. C. : 

Dispatch of 8 p. m. last evening, from Nashville, shows the enemy scat- 
tered for more than seventy miles down the river, and no attack yet made 
by Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him at once, and placing 
Schofield in command. Thomas should be ordered to turn over all orders 
and dispatches received since the battle of Franklin, to Schofield. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



[GENERAL ORDERS NO. — .] 

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 

Washington, December 9, 1864. 

The following dispatch having been received from Lieutenant-General 

Grant, viz, " Please telegraph orders relieving him (General Thomas) at 

once, and placing (General) Schofield in command," the President orders : 

I. That Major-General J. M. Schofield relieve at once Major-General 
G. H. Thomas in command of the Department and Army of the Cumber- 
land. 

II. General Thomas will turn over to General Schofield all orders and 
instructions received by him since the battle of Franklin. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



Nashville, December 9, 1864: — 2 p. m. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

Your dispatch of 10.30 a. m. this date is received. I regret that Gen- 
eral Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. 
I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and 
that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this. And if he 
should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur. 

A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight, which 
will render an attack impossible till it breaks. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



256 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 9, 1864 — 1 p. m. 
Lientcnant-General U. S. Grant, City Point : 

Your dispatch of 8.30 p. m. of the 8th is just received. I have nearly- 
completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but 
a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it 
impossible for our men to fight to any advantage. I am therefore com- 
pelled to wait for the storm to break, and make the attack immediately 
after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and 
I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no 
doubt but Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river, with 
the view of attempting a crossing, but it has been impossible for me to 
organize and equip the troops for an attack at an earlier time. Major- 
General Halleck informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my 
delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my power to pre- 
pare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit 

without a murmur. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General TJ. S. V. Commanding. 



War Department, Washington, December 9, 1864 — 4 p. m. 

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point : 

Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out when his telegram 

of this p. m. was received. If you still wish these orders telegraphed to 

Nashville, they will be forwarded. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Chief of Staff. 



City Point, Va., December 9, 1864 — 5.30 p. m. 
Major-General Halleck; Washington : 

General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the 
enemy ; even to the giving the positive order. He did say he thought 
he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he 
given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to 
an officer who has done so much good service as General Thomas has, 
however, and will therefore suspend the order relieving him until it is 

seen whether he will do anything. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



City Point, Va., December 9, 1864 — 7.30 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas, Nashville: 

Your dispatch of 1 p. m. to-day is received. I have as much confidence 
in your conducting the battle rightly as I have in any other officer, but it 
has seemed to me you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of 
affairs to convince me otherwise. Receiving your dispatch to Major- 
General Hallack of 2 p. m. before I did the first to me, I telegraphed to 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 257 

suspend the order relieving you, until we should hear further. I hope 
most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and 
that the facts will show that you have been right all the time. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



City Point, Va., December 11, 1864 — i p. m. 
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville: 

If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be wit- 
nessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio, and you will be forced to 
act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. 
Hood can not stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ord- 
nance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material 
and most of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you 
to-day announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather 
or reinforcements. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 



Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1864 — 10.30 p. m. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your dispatch of 4 p. m. this day is just received. I will obey the order 
as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will 
have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is cov- 
ered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the 
troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my intention to 
attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday 
had it not been for the storm. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 

Nashville, Tenn., December 12, 1864—10.30 p. m. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the 
sleet which now covers the ground has melted sufficiently to enable the 
men to march. As the whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice 
so hard and slippery, it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the 
slopes, or even move over level ground in anything like order. It has 
taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only 
been finally effected with imminent risk, and many serious accidents, re- 
sulting from the numbers of horses falling with their riders on the road. 
Under these circumstances, I believe that an attack at this time would 
only result in a useless sacrifice of life. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 
VOL. II — 17 



258 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

[SPECIAL ORDERS, NO. 149.] 

Headquarters of the Armies of the United States, 
City Point, Va., December 13, 1864. 
I. Major-General John A. Logan, United States Volunteers, will proceed 
immediately to Nashville, Tennessee, reporting by telegraph to the lieu- 
tenant-general his arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at 
Nashville, Tennessee. 

********* 

By command of Lieu tenant-General Grant. 

(Signed,) T. S. BOWERS, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville: 

It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood, with a part of his 
forces, held you in check near Nashville, he would have time to co-operate 
against other important points, left only partially protected. Hence, 
Lieutenant-General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel 
forces in your front, and expresses great dissatisfaction that his order had 
not been carried out. Moreover, so long as Hood occupies a threatening 
position in Tennessee, General Canby is obliged to keep large forces on 
the Mississippi river to protect its navigation, and to hold Memphis, 
Vicksburg, etc., although General Grant had directed a part of these 
forces to co-operate with Sherman. 

Every day's delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with 
General Grant's plans. 

(Signed,) H. W. HALLECK, 

Major-General and Chief of Staff. 



Nashville, December 14, 1864 — 8 p. m. 
Major-General H. W. HallecJc, Washington, D. C. : 

Your telegram of 12.30 m. to-day is received. The ice having melted 
away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning. Much as T 
regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been 
done before with any reasonable prospect of success. 

(Signed,} GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff: 

Attacked enemy's left this morning; drove it from the river, below 
■city, very nearly to Franklin pike, distance about eight miles. 

(Signed,) GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 259 

Washington, December 15, 18o4 — 11.30 p. m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville: 

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van 
Duzen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no farther. 
Push the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. 
Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's 
army, and make it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains 
or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy has done. 
Much is now expected. 

(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 160.] 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 16, 1864. 
The major-general commanding, with pride and pleasure, publishes 
the following dispatches to the army, and adds thereto his own thanks 
to the troops for the unsurpassed gallantry and good conduct displayed 
by them in the battles of yesterday and to-day. A few more examples 
■of devotion and courage like these, and the rebel army of the West, which 
you have been fighting for three years will be no more, and you may 
reasonably expect an early and honorable peace : 

Washington, D. O, December 16 — 11.20 a. m. 
To Major-General Thomas : 

Please accept for yourself, officers, and men the nation's thanks for 
your work of yesterday. You made a magnificent beginning. A grand 
consummation is within your easy reach. Do not let it slip. 

A. Lincoln. 

Washington, December 15, 1864 — 12 midnight. 
Major-Gencral Thomas: 

I rejoice in tendering to you, and the gallant officers and soldiers of 
your command, the thanks of this department for the brilliant achieve- 
ment of this day, and hope that it is the harbinger of a decisive victory 
that will crown you and your army with honor, and do much toward 
closing the war. We shall give you a hundred (100) guns in the morning. 

E. M. Stanton, 
Secretary of War. 

Washingtom, December 15, 1864 — 12 midnight. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville : 

Your dispatch of this evening just received. I congratulate you and 
the army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a convic- 
tion that to-morrow will add more fruits to your victory. 

(Signed,) U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 
By command of Major-General Thomas. 

WM. D. WHIPPLE, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



260 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland 
Six Miles from Nashville, December 16, 1864. 
Hie President of the United States, Hon. E. M. Stanton, and General U. S. Grant, 
Washington, D. ' C. : 
This army thanks you for your approbation of its conduct yesterday, 
and to assure you that it is not misplaced, I have the honor to report 
that the enemy has been pressed at all points to-day on his line of retreat 
through the Brentwood hills, and Brigadier-General Hatch, of Wilson's 
corps of cavalry, on the right, turned the enemy's left and captured a 
large number of prisoners; number not yet reported. Major-General 
Schofield's troops, next on the left of cavalry, carried several heights, 
captured many prisoners and six pieces of artillery. Brevet Major-General 
Smith, next on the left Major-General Schofield, carried the salient point 
of the enemy's line, with McMillen's brigade of McArthur's division, 
capturing sixteen pieces of artillery, two brigadier-generals, and about 
two thousand prisoners. Brigadier-General Garrard's division of Smith's 
command, next on the left of McArthur's division, carried the enemy's 
intrenchments, capturing all the artillery and troops on the line. Brig- 
adier-General Wood's corps, on the Franklin pike, took up the assault, 
carried the enemy's intrenchments in his front, captured eight (8) pieces, 
something over six hundred prisoners, and drove the enemy within one 
mile of the Brentwood Pass. Major-General Steedman, commanding de- 
tachments of the Military Division of the Mississippi, most nobly sup- 
ported General Wood's left, and bore a most honorable part in the 
operations of the day. I have ordered the pursuit to be continued in 
the morning at daylight, although the troops are very much fatigued. 
The greatest enthusiasm prevails. I must not forget to report the opera- 
tions of Brigadier-General Johnson, in successfully driving the enemy, 
with co-operation of the gunboats, under Lieutenant-Commander Fitch, 
from their established batteries on the Cumberland river below the. city 
of Nashville, and the of services of Brigadier-General Croxton's brigade, in 
covering and relieving our right and rear in the operations of yesterday 
and to-day. Although I have no report of the number of prisoners cap- 
tured by Johnson's and Croxton's commands, I know they have made a 
large number. I am glad to be able to state that the number of prisoners 
captured yesterday greatly exceeds the number reported by me last 
evening. The roads, fields, and intrenchments are strewn with the en- 
emy's abandoned small arms, abandoned in their retreat. In conclusion, 
I am happy to state that all this has been effected with but a very small 
loss to us. Our loss does not probably exceed three thousand, very few 

killed. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 261 

Washington, December 18, 1864 — 12 m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

The armies operating against Richmond have fired two prolonged guns 
in honor of your great victory. Sherman has fully established his base 
on Ossabavv Sound, with Savannah fully invested. I hope to be able to fire 
a salute to-morrow in honor of the fall of Savannah. In all your opera- 
tions, we hear nothing of Forrest. Great precaution should be taken to 
prevent him crossing the Cumberland or Tennessee rivers below Eastport. 
After Hood is driven as far as possible to follow him, you want to re- 
occupv Decatur and all other abandoned points. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Washington, December 21, 1864 — 12 m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas: 

Permit me, general, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of 
Hood's army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men 
for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish 
the great result. If you can capture or destroy Hood's army, General 
Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military force in all the South- 
ern States. He begins a new campaign about the first of January, which 
will have the most important results if Hood's army can now be used 
up. A most vigorous pursuit on your part is therefore of vital impor- 
tance to General Sherman's plans. No sacrifice must be spared to obtain 
6o important a result. 

(Signed,) H. W. HALLECK, 

Major-General and Chief of Staff. 



In the Field, December 21, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

Your dispatch of 12 m. this day is received. General Hood's army is 
being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army 
to pursue another. We can not control the elements, and you must re- 
member that, to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to reorganize 
and almost thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought 
the battles of the 15th and 16th insts. with the troops but partially equip- 
ped, and notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial 
equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck river, 
crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from posi- 
tion to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transpor- 
tation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing 
all in my power to crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy 
it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud 
roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and can not 
be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push 
the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took with 
him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, 



262 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

well equipped in every respect, as regards ammunition, supplies, and 1 
transportation, leaving me only two corps, partially stripped of their 
transportation, to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the 
advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of 
the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta, from the 
commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now in addi- 
tion aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, 
T feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and event- 
ually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much 
must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially 
when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, 
which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in 
6pring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that the army is- 
willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any 
other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion. 
(Signed,) GEO. IT. THOMAS, 

Major- General.. 



City Point, December 22, 1864. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas: 

You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which 
you are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon 
bridge at Tuscumbia before he gets there. Should you do so, it looks to- 
me that Hood is cutoff. If you succeed in destroying Hood's army, there 
will be but one army left to the so-called Confederacy capable of doing 
us harm. I will take care of that, and try to draw the sting from it, so- 
that in the spring we shall have easy sailing. You have now a big oppor- 
tunity, which I know you are availing yourself of. Let us push and do 
all we can before the enemy can derive benefit either from the raising 
of negro troops on the plantations, or white troops now in the field. 
(Signed,) U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Washington, December 22, 1864 — 9 p. m. 
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas : 

I have seen to-day General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday, and your 
reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the 
most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to 
employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and 
destroy the enemy. No department could be inspired with more pro- 
found admiration and thankfulness for the great deed which you have 
already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could do no- 
more, and no more than will be done by you and the accomplished gal- 
lant officers and soldiers of your command. 

(Signed,) E. M. STANTON. 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 263 

Washington, December 22, 1864 — 9 p. M. 
Major-General Thomas: 

In order that the department may, as fully as the case will permit, award 
due promotions to your army, please forward, some time before the 5th of 
next month, a list of such promotions as you desire to recommend. There 
is no vacancy in the number of major-generals by law, and only two — 
but brevets can be granted, and some vacancies may be created by muster- 
ing out useless officers. 

E. M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Columbia, December 23, 1864 — 8 p. m. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

The troops are still crossing Duck river, and all close up to the enemy's 
rear-guard, on the Pulaski road. I hope to get the whole force across to- 
morrow, and continue the pursuit. The railroad bridges between Spring 
Hill and this place, five in number, have been destroyed, but the con- 
struction corps is hard at work, and I am in hopes will have the road re- 
paired up to Columbia in the course of four or five days. The railroad 
between Chattanooga and Murfreesboro is in running order, and I am 
assured that the road between Nashville and Murfreesboro will be re- 
paired in a few days. General McCook has routed and scattered the rebel 
General Lyon, who succeded in crossing the Cumberland river, and with 
General Long, will soon join General Wilson, thus increasing my cavalry 
force sufficiently to enable me to completely destroy Forrest, if I can 
overtake him, which I shall make every exertion to do. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
December 23, 1864—8 p. m. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 

Your two dispatches of 9 p. m., 22d, are received. I am profoundly 
thankful for the hearty expression of your confidence in my determina- 
tion, and desire to do all in my power to destroy the enemy, and put 
down the rebellion; and in, the name of this army, I thank you for the 
complimentary notice you have taken of all connected with it, for the 
deeds of valor they have performed. I will forward the list of merito- 
rious officers to-morrow or next day. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General V. S. V. Commanding. 



264 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In tiie Field, Savannah, G-a., December 23, 18G4. 

Dear General :— Major Dixon arrived last night, bringing your letter 
of the 10th December, for which I am very much obliged, as it gives me 
a clear and distinct view of the situation of affairs at Nashville up to that 
date. I have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas' 
dispatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was 
successful, but not complete. I await further accounts with anxiety, as 
Thomas' complete success is necessary to initiate my plans for this cam- 
paign, and I have no doubt that my calculation, that Thomas had in hand 
(including A. J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in 
fair fight, was correct. I approved of Thomas' allowing Hood to come 
north far enough to enable him to concentrate his own men, though I 
would have preferred that Hood should have been checked about Colum- 
bia. Still, if Thomas followed up his success of the 15th, and gave Hood 
a good whaling, and is at this moment following him closely, the whole 
campaign in my division will be even more perfect than the Atlanta cam- 
paign, for at this end of the line I have realized all I had reason to hope 
for, except in the release of our prisoners, which was simply an impos- 
sibility. 

December 24. — I have just received a letter from General Grant, giving 
a detail of General Thomas' operations up to the 18th, and I am gratified 
beyond measure at the result. 

Show this letter to General Thomas, and tell him to consider it ad- 
dressed to him, as I have not time to write more now. I want General 
Thomas to follow Hood to and beyond the Tennessee, and not hesitate 
to go on as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama, as I know 
that he will have no trouble whatever in subsisting his army anywhere 
below Sand Mountain, and along the Black Warrior. In the poorest part 
of Georgia, I found no trouble in subsisting my army and animals, some 
of my corps not issuing but one (1) day's bread from Atlanta to Sa- 
vannah. 

Keep me fully advised by telegraph, via New York, of the situation of 
affairs in Tennessee. I will be here probably ten (10) days longer, and in 
communication for a longer time. 

I am, very truly yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

General J. D. Webster, Nashville, Tenn. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Pulaski, Tenn., December 28, 18G4. 
Major-General Steedman, Decatur, Ala. : 

Your dispatch of the 27th received. I am very much gratified with 
your operations against Decatur. The roads from here to Florence are in 
an almost impassable condition, and the country is so completely devas- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 265 

tated that we scarcely get any supplies; but the enemy has been as vig- 
orously pursued as circumstances will admit. It is reported that Hood 
crossed at Lamb's ferry and Bainbridge, with what force he could get off. 
He is represented as being in a most deplorable condition. I shall try to 
intercept him at luka, if he retreats that way, and I want you to push a 
strong reconnoissance toward Lamb's ferry, to see if he has retreated by 

way of Courtland and Moulton. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 169.] 

Pulaski, December 29, 1864. 

Soldiers: — The major-general commanding announces to you that the 
rear-guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the Ten- 
nessee river, on the night of the 27th instant. The impassable state of 
the roads, and consequent impossibility to supply the army, compels a 
closing of the campaign for the present. 

Although short, it has been brilliant in its achievements, and unsur- 
passed in its results by any other of this war, and is one of which all who 
participated therein may be justly proud. That veteran army which, 
though driven from position to position, opposed a stubborn resistance to 
much superior numbers during the whole of the Atlanta campaign, taking 
advantage of the absence of the largest portion of the army which had been 
opposed to it in Georgia, invaded Tennessee, buoyant with hope, expect- 
ing Nashville, Murfreesboro, and the whole of Tennessee and Kentucky 
to fall into its power, an easy prey, and scarcely fixing a limit to its con- 
quests. Aft er having received, at Franklin, the most terrible check that 
army has received during this war, and later, at Murfreesboro, in its at- 
tempt to capture that place, it was finally attacked at Nashville, and, 
although your forces were inferior to it in numbers, was hurled back from 
the coveted prize, on which it had been permitted to look from a distance, 
and finally sent flying, dismayed and disordered, whence it came, impelled 
by the instinct of self-preservation, and thinking only of how it could 
relieve itself for short intervals from your persistent and harassing pur- 
suit, by burning the bridges over the swollen streams, as it passed them, 
until, finally, it had placed the broad waters of the Tennessee river be- 
tween you and its shattered, diminished, and discomfited columns, leav- 
ing its artillery and battle-flags in your victorious hands — lasting trophies 
of your noble daring, and lasting monuments of the enemy's disgrace and 
defeat. 

You have diminished the forces of the rebel army since it crossed the 
Tennessee river to invade the state, at the least estimate, fifteen thousand 
men, among whom were killed, wounded, and captured eighteen general 
officers. 

Your captures from the enemy, as far as reported, amount to sixty-eight 
pieces of artillery, ten thousand prisoners, as many stand of small arms — 



266 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

several thousand of which have been gathered in, and the remainder 
strew the route of the enemy's retreat — and between thirty and forty 
flags, besides compelling him to destroy much ammunition and abandon 
many wagons; and, unless he is mad, he must forever abandon all hope 
of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed rebellion. 

A short time will now be given you to prepare to continue the work 
so nobly begun. 

By command of Major-General Thomas. 

W. D. WHIPPLE, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 



EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS' REPORT. 

On the morning of the 15th of December, the weather being favorable, 
the army was formed, and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan 
of battle promulgated in the special field orders of the 14th. The forma- 
tfon of troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken 
nature of the ground, as also by a fog, which lifted toward noon. 

Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as 
1 expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his 
command (the Twenty-Third Corps) from position in reserve, to which it 
had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cav- 
alry thereby to operate jnore freely to the enemy's rear. This was rap- 
idly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated, in 
the closing operations of the day. 

#-x-******# 

Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of the 
Hillsboro pike— Schofield' s command on the right, Smith's in the center, 
and Wood's on the left, with cavalry on the right of Schofield, Steedman 
holding the position he had gained early in the morning. The total result 
of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and 
twelve hundred prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small arms, 
and about forty (40) wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all 
points with heavy loss. Our casualties were unusually light. The beha- 
vior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every 
movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, 
strictly adhered to. The whole command bivouacked in line of battle 
during the night, on the ground occupied at dark, while preparations 
were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow. 

* # * -X- * * * -X- -X- 

Immediately following the effort of the Fourth Corps, Generals Smith's 
and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their re- 
spective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in 
a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners — 
among the latter, four (4) general officers. Our loss was remarkably 
small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pur- 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 267 

sued over the tops of Brentwood and Harpeth hills. General Wilson's 
cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield 
and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm possession of 
Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route. Wood's and Steed- 
man's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed 
impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's hill, and although 
meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and many 
prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in 
confusion through Brentwood Pass, the Fourth Corps in close pursuit, 
which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene, 

and the troops rested from their labors. 

********* 

During the two days' operations there were 4,462 prisoners captured, 

including 287 officers of all grades from that of major-general, fifty-three 

pieces of artillery, and thousands of small arms. The enemy abandoned 

on the field all of his dead and wounded. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT. 

On the night of the loth I waited upon the major-general commanding, 
at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy 
on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the 
right and center forward, so that the general direction of the line was 
nearly perpendicular to that before the attack, only the right was in con- 
tact with the enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive 
that the enemy, instead of retreating during the night, would mass and 
attack our right in the morning, I requested that a division of infantry 
be sent to reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major- 
General Smith's command. In response to this order, General Smith 
sent five regiments and a battery (about 1,600 men), which were put in 
reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still 
held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch 
was the key, and bad thrown up considerable breastworks during the 
night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and 
continued to mass troops during the early part of the day. During the 
morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for de- 
fense and co-operation with cavalry, which was operating to strike the 
Granny White pike, in rear of the enemy. 

About noon, the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having 
advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the 
enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen 
his right and center, when I ordered General Cox to advance, in conjunc- 
tion with cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the 
flank of the enemy's intrenched line and overlooking the Granny White 
pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was 
not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or en- 



268 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 

ergy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had reason to 
expect, considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line and 
the great distance and rough ground over which the attacking force had 
to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry 
(dismounted), whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions, 
which came under my observations, cah not be too greatly praised. 
Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the salient 
hill, in front of General Couch, was attacked and carried by General 
Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and 
the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme 
flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel 
Loolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing eight 
pieces of artillery and two to three hundred prisoners. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SMITH'S REPORT. 

During the night a request coming from General Schoefield, command- 
ing Twenty-third Corps, for reinforcements, I sent him the Third division, 
Colonel J. B. Moore commanding, just before daylight. On the morning 
of the 16th, advancing my line in the same order as on the previous day, 
the First on the right and the Second divison on the left, it was discovered 
that the enemy had taken position at the base of a chain of hills, called 
the Brentwood hills, with a front nearly perpendicular to our lines, and 
had strongly intrenched themselves by throwing up breastworks and 
massing artillery in every available position. Changing my front by a 
half-wheel, by brigades the command moved slowly in echelon from the 
right, so as not to break connections with the Fourth Corps, and took a 
position directly in front of the enemy, at a distance of about six hun- 
dred yards, my right resting at the base of a hill, on the top of which was 
the enemy's left, and my line being the whole front of the two divisions, 
extending about one mile. The enemy opening a heavy artillery fire 
upon my brigades, as they went into position, all the batteries of the First 
and Second divisions, six in number, were brought into action at a dis- 
tance of about eight hundred yards, and after a fierce cannonading of 
about two hours, succeeded in quieting the enemy's guns in our front. 
The Twenty-third Corps was on my right in the intrenchments, thrown 
up by them the hight before, and nearly at right angles with my present 
line. Expecting that corps to take the initiative, as they were on the 
flank of the enemy, I held the command in its present position, keeping 
up a slow artillery fire at their line without eliciting any reply. About 
1 o'clock I received a request from General Schofield, and a few min- 
utes later an order from you, to send another division to his assistance, 
he having retained the one sent at daylight that morning, not having any 
reserve, and my whole line' being in front of the enemy, and liable to be 
attacked and broken at any point wherever a brigade should be with- 
drawn, I therefore sent a staff officer to him to state the condition of 



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 269 

my command, and ascertain if he could not get along without my divis- 
ion. The officer reported to me that General Schofield's line was not en- 
gaged, and upon my condition being reported to him, he said he did 
not need the additional force, consequently it was not sent. About 3 
o'clock p. m. General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on 
his left by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was 
referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until ho 
could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. General Mc- 
Arthur not receiving any reply, and fearing if the attack should be longer 
delayed the enemy would use the right to strengthen his works, directed 
the First brigade, Colonel N. L. McMillen, Ninty-fifth Ohio Infantry, to 
storm the hill on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the Second 
and Third brigades of the division to attack in front, when the first should 

be half-way up the hill. 

********* 



CHAPTER XXXVI. 

MINOR OPERATIONS HAVING RELATIONS MORE OR LESS INTIMATE 
WITH THOSE OF THE MAIN ARMY DURING NOVEMBER AND DE- 
CEMBER. 

General Steedman knew, upon reaching Decatur, that it was 
too late to embarrass the enemy in crossing the Tennessee river, 
"but he determined to move toward his line of retreat south of 
the river. He had been joined at Stevenson by Colonel W. 
J. Palmer, of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with a force 
composed of his own regiment and detachments from the Sec- 
ond Tennessee, and the Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana 
Cavalry, in all about six hundred and fifty men. At 8 p. m. on 
the 28th, Colonel Palmer moved from Decatur toward Court- 
land. He encountered the enemy at a point two miles distant, 
and attacking with his advance of thirty men pressed him back. 
The force was Colonel "Wines' regiment of Roddy's command, 
and this commander was resisting to cover his artillery, but 
against thirty men, yielded his position and two pieces of artil- 
lery. Colonel Palmer the next day divided his force, sending 
Colonel Prosser with the detachments on the main road, and 
moving with his own regiment on the Brown's Ferry road. 
Colonel Prosser soon met Roddy's whole force drawn up in two 
lines, and without hesitation charged, broke his lines, captured 
forty-five men, and drove the enemy through Courtland. 

At Leighton, on the 30th, Colonel Palmer learned that Gen- 
eral Hood's pontoon train of two hundred wagons had passed 
through the day before en route for Columbus, Mississippi. 
General Roddy was in the rear to protect this train, and al- 
though Colonel Palmer felt safe in disregarding him in making 
an effort to capture it, it was necessary that he should shun 
(270) 



NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 271 

another cavalry force under General Armstrong, which was 
also near. Making the venture, he moved to the rear of a por- 
tion of Roddy's command, and captured Colonel Warren and 
other prisoners. At Pussellville, another portion was met and 
routed, and Palmer then pressed on after the train and soon 
captured it, consisting of two hundred wagons and seventy- 
eight boats with appointments complete. Such was the con- 
dition of the roads and the teams that it was not considered 
safe to attempt its removal from the presence of the enemy, 
and hence it was destroyed. Then having heard that a supply 
train was moving from Barton Station to Tuscumbia, Colonel 
Palmer moved to capture it. On the 1st of January, this train, 
consisting of one hundred and ten wagons and five hundred 
mules, was also taken in Itawamba county, Mississippi, and 
mules enough saved to mount one hundred and fifty prisoners. 
Losing one man killed and two wounded, Colonel Palmer re- 
turned to Decatur. 

In the meantime, General Steedman had been ordered to 
Chattanooga. He put his sick men and his artillery on trans- 
ports, and started his infantry by rail, under General Cruft. 
When the force reached Huntsville, Colonel Mitchell's brigade 
was hurried forward to Larkinsville, to intercept, if possible, 
General Lyon, who, with a portion of his command, was in re- 
treat from Kentucky. His expedition had proved disastrous 
in the extreme in its general issue. He captured Hopkinsville, 
but was met near Greenbury by General McCook, who had 
been detached from the main army to protect the Louisville 
and Nashville railroad, and to pursue this raiding force. Col- 
onel La Grange first met Lyon with his brigade. Engaging 
him with spirit, after a short conflict he threw his troops into 
confusion and rout, capturing one gun and some prisoners. 
General Lyon then made a detour through Elizabethtown and 
Glasgow, and crossed the Cumberland river at Burksville, and 
thence proceeded through McMinnville and Winchester to the 
Memphis and Charleston railroad. On the 7th of January, Gen- 
eral Cruft's command was disposed to capture him or drive him 
across the Tennessee river at the approaches to Bellefont, Lar- 
kinsville, and Scottsboro ; but he succeeded in eluding all the 
detachments on the watch, and crossed the Tennessee river. 



272 NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 

He was finally intercepted and captured, with one hundred of 
his men and his remaining gun, at Red Hill. He, however, es- 
caped, having shot the soldier in charge of him. 

As General Thomas was in command of all the troops within 
the limits of the Military Division of the Mississippi, the oper- 
ations in East Tennessee were subject to his direction. There 
had been complications there during the summer and early 
autumn, and General Schofield had left his corps at Atlanta, 
to give attention to affairs in that region. General J. H. Mor- 
gan had been killed by General Gillem's troops, but infantry 
had been subsequently sent there, and when General Hood was 
menacing Tennessee from Florence, General Breckinridge, sup- 
ported by Duke and Vaughn, appeared before General Gillem 
at Bull's Gap. At this period, General Gillem, commanding 
three regiments of Tennessee cavalry and a battery, was acting 
under the immediate instructions of Governor Johnson, having 
been detached for this duty. On the 13th of November, Gen- 
eral Breckinridge, with a force estimated at three thousand 
men, attacked and routed the fifteen hundred under General 
Gillem, capturing about one third, including his battery. Gen- 
eral Gillem had repulsed two attacks of the enemy, but rein- 
forcements having come, he concluded to withdraw, and while 
retreating was attacked in rear. There was a lack of co-oper- 
ation between General Gillem and General Ammen, which 
General Thomas considered the cause of the disaster. General 
Gillem fell back upon Knoxville with the remainder of his 
force, followed closely by General Breckinridge. 

In the emergency, General Thomas directed General Steed- 
man to hold troops in readiness to support General Ammen, 
at Knoxville ; and General Stoneman, in command of the De- 
partment of the Ohio, in the absence of General Schofield, 
ordered a concentration of forces in Kentucky, to advance 
from Lexington to Cumberland Gap, either to repel the en- 
emy, should he advance into Kentucky, or to advance into 
East Tennessee, should he continue to operate there. 

On the 18th, General Breckinridge withdrew from the vicin- 
ity of Knoxville, and General Ammen, reinforced by fifteen 
hundred men from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains 
the same day. About the same time, General Stoneman left 



NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 273 

Louisville to take the direction of affairs in East Tennessee 
and on his way received his instructions from General Thomas, 
at Nashville. He was directed "to concentrate the largest 
force possible against Breckinridge, and cither destroy his 
force or drive it into Virginia, and, if possible, destroy the 
salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad from the Tennessee 
line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering 
his command." On the 6th of December, General Thomas 
repeated his instructions upon the receipt of information that 
General Breckinridge was retreating. 

General Stoneman had been delayed in consequence of the 
deficiency of his command in the essential appointments for 
the service proposed. On the 9th, he was ready for active 
operations. His command comprised the infantry and dis- 
mounted cavalry under General Ammen, General Gillem's 
force, and the mounted troops under General Burbridge, forty- 
two hundred men. He first sent the Fourth Tennessee and 
Third North Carolina regiments to Paint Rock, to hold the 
pass over the mountains into North Carolina. December 9th, 
he moved two regiments of Ohio artillery from Strawberry 
Plains to Blair's Cross-roads, and with General Gillem pro- 
ceeded to that point the next day. At Bean's Station these 
forces were joined on the 11th by General Burbridge's com- 
mand. Hitherto the commander alone knew the service and 
destination of the troops, but here the men were supplied 
with all the ammunition and rations that they could carry on 
themselves and horses. On the 13th, at daylight, General 
Gillem reached the north fork of the Holston river, opposite 
Kingston. Here was General John Morgan's command, un- 
der his brother, in the temporary absence of General Duke. 
After a sharp conflict, General Gillem crossed the river and 
totally defeated the enemy, capturing Morgan and a portion 
of his command, and killing or dispersing the remainder. 
During the afternoon, Burbridge was pushed on to Bristol, in 
the endeavor to intercept Vaughn, who had held Greenville 
for some time with a force estimated at twelve hundred men. 
At night, Generals Stoneman and Gillem followed, arriving 
at Bristol early on the 14th. 

Fearing that Vaughn would pass in the night and join 



274 NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 

Breckinridge, Burbridge was sent to Abingdon with instruc- 
tions to send a regiment forward to strike the railroad at 
some point between Saltville and Wytheville. When General 
Gillem had completed the destruction of Bristol, which Gen- 
eral Burbridge had commenced, he moved to Glade Springs, 
followed by Burbridge. At 2 a. m. on the 16th, General 
Stoneman learned that the Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry, sent 
forward from Abingdon, after threatening the salt-works, had 
destroyed two trains which had brought Breckinridge from 
Wytheville with reinforcements, and decided to press on to 
Wytheville, destroy it and the salt-works on New river, and 
give attention to the destruction of Saltville on his return. 
He therefore put his forces in motion eastward, and soon Gen- 
eral Gillem overtook Vaughn at Marion, and attacking, routed 
him, pursuing rapidly to Wytheville, capturing his trains, ar- 
tillery, and one hundred and ninety-eight men, and destroying 
the town. General Burbridge reached Mount Airy the next 
day, where Buckley's brigade was dispatched by order of Gen- 
eral Stoneman to destroy the lead mines twenty-five or thirty 
miles beyond. Nothing now remained but the destruction of 
Saltville, and General Stoneman, by a quick return, interposed 
his command so that General Breckinridge was cut off and 
forced to retreat into North Carolina. The two main columns 
were then ordered to converge upon Saltville. When they 
were near, and General Stoneman was waiting for General 
Burbridge, he sent Colonel Stacy with his regiment, the 
Thirteenth Tennessee, to dash into the town and commence 
the work of destruction with all possible noise. The brilliant 
dash of Stacy put the enemy into retreat, and then the cele- 
brated salt-works with all their machinery and supplies were 
destroyed. 

This expedition brought defeat to the enemy at every step, 
and destruction to important manufactories of the material of 
war, to vast quantities of material of every kind, and to rail- 
roads and rolling-stock. General Burbridge destroyed five 
trains filled with supplies, a thousand stand of arms, a vast 
amount of fixed ammunition, and a large number of wagons 
and ambulances, and captured seventeen officers and two hun- 
dred and sixty privates ; Buckley ruined the lead-works in 



NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 275 

Wythe county ; Major Harrison, of the Twelfth Kentucky 
Cavalry, captured two railroad trains, destroyed all the railroad 
bridges from Glade Springs to Marion, and the large iron- 
works at the latter place, and captured several hundred fine 
horses ; General Gillem's brigade, reinforced by the Eleventh 
Michigan and the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, drove Vaughn 
beyond Wythevillc, destroyed that town, all the railroad 
bridges from Marion to Keedy creek, vast amounts of stores 
and supplies of all kinds, several hundred wagons and ambu- 
lances, two locomotives and several cars, and captured ten 
pieces of field artillery, and over two hundred prisoners. This 
command made an average march of forty-two and a half 
miles per day, completing its work of destruction on the 22d 
of December. Then General Burbridge returned to Kentucky 
by way of the Big Sandy valley, and General Gillem to Knox- 
ville. 



Washington, November 5, 1864 — 2 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 
How much force and artillery had Gillem ? 

A. LINCOLN, 
President United States. 



Headquarters Department op the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 15, 1864 — 10 p. m. 
President A. Lincoln, Washington : 

General Gillem's force consisted of three regiments of Tennessee cav- 
alry, and one hattery of six guns, belonging to the Governor's Guards — 
about fifteen hundred men. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Nashville, November 17, 1864. 
Major-General Stoneman, Louisville, Ky. : 

Your dispatch of this date just received. Your intention and order to 
General Burbridge to concentrate his mounted force is perfectly satisfac- 
tory, and I wish you to report to me as soon as he has the concentration 
of his troops completed. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



276 NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 17, 1864 — 4.30 p. m. 
Major-General Stoncman, Louisville, Ky. : 

Your dispatch of yesterday is received. I wish you to send all the 
mounted force you can raise to East Tennessee. I have directed General 
Steedman to send all the infantry he can spare from Chattanooga. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Nashville, November 19, 1864. 
Brigadier-General Ammen, Knoxville : 

Do not send the reinforcements from Chattanooga further than Knox- 
ville, unless it is absolutely necessary, as they are not able to march. Re- 
turn them to Chattanooga as soon as you can dispense with their services. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



City Point, November 27, 1864 — 9 p. M. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Savannah papers, just received, state that Forrest is expected in the 
rear of General Sherman, and that Breckinridge is already on his way to 
Georgia from East Tennessee. If this proves true, it will give you a 
chance to take the offensive against Hood, and to cut the railroad up in 

Virginia with a small cavalry force. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Nashville, November 28, 1864 — 10 A. M. 
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. : 

Your dispatch of 9 p. m. yesterday received. We can as yet discover 
no signs of the withdrawal of Forrest from Tennessee, but he is closely 
watched, and our movements will commence against Hood as soon as pos- 
sible, whether Forrest leaves Tennessee or not. My information from 
East Tennessee leads me to believe that Breckinridge is either falling 
back to Virginia, or is on his way to Georgia. He now holds Bull's Gap, 
but Stoneman is moving on that place from Knoxville, and Burbridge from 
Cumberland Gap. Stoneman already has orders to destroy the railroad 

into Virginia if he possibly can. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding. 



Knoxville, November 28, 1864. 
Major-General G. H. Thomas: 

As near as I can learn from scouts and deserters, all the mounted force 
Breckinridge brought with him is now in the vicinity of Bull's Gap, say 
2,500; a portion of his dismounted force, under Palmer, say 700, has gone 



NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 277 

back to Ashoville, and Breckinridge, with the rest of the force, say 700, with 
captured wagons and artillery, has gone back to Wytheville. Burbridge' g 
troops will all be through Cumberland Gap to-morrow. They have been 
detained by high water. I wrote you at length yesterday. Have you re- 
ceived the letter ? 

GEO. STONEMAN, 

Major- General. 



Knoxville, November 28, 1864 — 10.30 p. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Your telegram of 3 p. m. is received. A scout, a woman, and a negro 
came in this evening, and report Breckinridge's force at Morristown and 
in that vicinity. Breckinridge is no doubt with his command. He had 
not left yesterday in pursuit of General Sherman, nor do I think he in- 
tends to. His command is not formidable, and he can not get much the 
start of us if he leaves this section to cross the mountains. I will keep 
you informed. Burbridge is ordered forward. 

GEO. STONEMAN, 

Major-General. 

Citt Point, Va., November 30, 1864—11.30 a. m. 
Major-General Thomas: 

The Richmond Enquirer of yesterday says that it is no longer contra- 
band to state that Breckinridge's command is now marching on a cam- 
paign that will fill Kentucky with dismay, and that probably by this time 
Burbridge has felt the shock. The Richmond papers of the 28th state 
that Breckinridge was at Bristol on the 28th. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 



Nashville, December 6, 1864 — 8.30 p. m. 
Major-General Stoneman, Knoxville : 

Your dispatches of 10.30 p. m., 5th inst., and 12.30 p. m. to-day, are just 
received. If you can effectually destroy the railroad for twenty-five or 
thirty miles beyond the Virginia line, East Tennessee will, I think, then 
be perfectly secure from further invasion. After destroying the railroad 
and the salt-works, if you can, you had better draw your main force back 
to the vicinity of Knoxville, for the defense of East Tennessee. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. 8. V. Commanding. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA, AND THE CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF 
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA. 

General Sherman's forces selected for his march to the sea- 
eoast comprised sixty thousand infantry and five thousand five 
hundred cavalry, and one piece of artillery for every thousand 
men. These troops had been so thoroughly sifted that they 
really represented a much larger army than this aggregate, 
with the usual percentage of ineffective men. They were or- 
ganized into right and left wings ; the former embracing the 
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, under the command of 
Major-General 0. 0. Howard, and the latter the Fourteenth 
and Twentieth Corps, under Major-General H. "W. Slocum. 
The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, from the Army of the 
Tennessee, were commanded respectively by Major-Generals 
P. T. Osterhaus and F. P. Blair, and the Fourteenth and Twen- 
tieth, from the Army of the Cumberland, were commanded 
respectively by Brevet Major-General J. C. Davis and Brigadier- 
General A. S. Williams. The appointments were ample be- 
yond precedent, as selection had been made from the material 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi ; in fact, each corps 
had complete army appointments, that each might have the 
independence of a separate army. 

The last ten days of October and the first days of No- 
vember had been devoted to preparation. Supplies had been 
accumulated at Atlanta in such quantities that there were 
forty days' rations of beef, sugar, and coffee, twenty days' of 
bread, and a double allowance of salt for forty days. The 
amount of ammunition was ample for all possibilities. There 
was little forage, only for three days in grain; but it was 

(278) 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 279 

known that the lines of march penetrated regions abounding 
in corn and fodder, and also in substantial supplies for men, 
and those delicacies in great abundance which do not often 
fall to soldiers. All the material at Atlanta not needed for 
the expedition was sent to the rear, or devoted to destruction 
with a large portion of the city. The garrisons north of 
Kingston moved to Chattanooga, and the rails were lifted from 
the railroad track from Resaca north ; but those between 
Resaca and the Etowah river were left in place in view of the 
probable occupancy of the country as far forward as the line 
of that river. 

November 11th, General Corse, in obedience to orders, de- 
stroyed the bridges, foundries, mills, shops, machines, and all 
property useful in war, at Rome, Georgia. The next day, the 
telegraph wires extending northward from Kingston were cut, 
and the several corps moved rapidly toward Atlanta. On 
the 14th, the four corps and cavalry were grouped around that 
city, and on the 15th, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twen- 
tieth Corps moved out upon their respective lines of march, 
and that night the conflagration of a large portion of At- 
lanta gave emphatic announcement that the grand movement 
had begun. 

As the great objects of this expedition were an illustration 
of the weakness of the Confederacy behind its defensive and 
offensive lines, and the diminution of its remaining resources 
by the destruction of railroads and all property useful in war, 
the lines of march diverged widely. Besides, there was an- 
other end to be secured by this broad divergent front in mov- 
ing from Atlanta — the concealment of the ultimate objective, 
that the enemy might not know where to concentrate his 
forces. The right wing, with Kilpatrick's division of cavalry 
on its right flank, marched by Jonesboro and McDonough, 
under orders to make a strong feint upon Macon, and then 
turn eastward and rendezvous at Gordon on the 23d. The 
Twentieth Corps advanced by Decatur, Stone Mountain, So- 
cial Circle, and Madison, to turn southward to Milledgeville, 
under instructions to tear up the railroad from Social Circle 
to Madison, and burn the railroad bridge over the Oconee in 
the same period. On the 16th, the Fourteenth Corps advanced 



280 THE MAECH TO THE SEA. 

upon Milledgeville, through Lithonia, Covington, and Shady 
Dale. 

On the 23d, the right wing and the cavalry reached Gordon 
and the left wing Milledgeville ; and this first stage of the cam- 
paign was the realization of all anticipations. General Sher- 
man had interposed his army between Macon and Augusta, 
and the enemy, in his doubt as to his destination and his utter 
inability to oppose him wherever he might go, was paralyzed 
completely. He had not, in the eight days, shown any great 
strength at any point, and it was evident that no strong force 
was opposing either of the two main columns. His cavalry, 
under General Wheeler, which had been dispatched as a corps 
of observation, had engaged General Kilpatrick several times, 
and General Cobb's militia and regular troops, from Macon 
and Savannah, had sallied from the former place to receive 
severe punishment from Walcntt's brigade ; and besides these 
feeble demonstrations there had been no opposition, and it was 
manifest that no serious resistance could be organized in Cen- 
tral Georgia. The veteran troops were either with General 
Hood, in Tennessee, or in the large cities on the seaboard, and 
General Sherman's plans had been discerned too late for any 
troops in force to be directed to his front. When Genera] 
Beauregard, who was at Corinth directing the great concen- 
tration of forces which was to march in triumph to the Ohio 
■river, learned that General Sherman with a large army was 
marching southward from Atlanta, he committed to General 
Hood the conduct of the Tennessee campaign, and hastened to 
Georgia to arouse the people, by frantic proclamations, to re- 
sist this overwhelming invasion. His own second great plan 
of aggression from Corinth, Mississippi, was now, as far as he 
was personally concerned, as palpabale a failure as was his 
first, when he evacuated Corinth in May, 1862, with an army 
embracing all the available Confederate troops in the West. 
Appeals of similar fervor and futility were issued by the Con- 
federate authorities at Richmond, including the President and 
Congress — at least by the congressional representatives from 
Georgia — and from the governor of the invaded state. While 
there was a veteran army between the homes of the people 
and the invader, there was some basis for appeal ; but now the 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 281 

hopelessness of the situation was so apparent that the people 
were paralyzed with fear and despair, and noisy proclamations 
were as impotent as the cry of women and children. 

The orders for the second stage of the campaign sent the 
two wings on parallel lines toward Millin, and Kilpatrick to 
destroy the railroad between Milledgeville and Augusta, and 
then to hasten to Millin, to rescue the prisoners supposed to 
be there confined. On the 26th, the heads of columns of the 
left wing gained Sandersville, and then swept eastward toward 
the Georgia Central railroad, and the right wing moved from 
Gordon, on the line of the railroad. December 2d, the cen- 
tral columns of the two corps were at Millin, and the extreme 
corps were abreast. Immense damage had been done to the 
railroads, mills, cotton-mills, and gins, and some fighting had 
occurred on the flanks, especially by the cavalry — Kilpatrick 
having had several brushes with Wheeler, but had been vic- 
torious, whether in offense or defense. The heads of columns 
had also been slightly annoyed, but not to an extent to greatly 
embarrass their movements. The greatest obstacles on the 
way to Millin were the Ogeechee and Oconee rivers, and an 
army behind these streams might have been successful in re- 
sistance, but the enemy's slender forces were easily dislodged, 
and the army passed over without delay. There had been no 
rescue of prisoners from the enemy, as all had been removed 
from Millin too soon. 

Instructions for the third and last stage required the con- 
vergence of the wings upon Savannah — the left wing and the 
Seventeenth Corps moving on parallel roads, and the Fif- 
teenth Corps deflecting to the right, on the right bank of the 
Ogeechee, to cross at Eden Station. General "Wheeler followed 
the columns on the east bank, but their rear was protected by 
Kilpatrick's cavalry and Baird's division of the Fourteenth 
Corps. As the army approached Savannah, the country be- 
came more marshy, and the roads more obstructed by fallen 
trees, especially where the roads crossed the swamps on cause- 
ways that traverse the lowlands, which are overflowed arti- 
ficially for the culture of rice. When within fifteen miles of 
the city, the columns were confronted by earthworks and 
artillery, in addition to the ordinary obstructions of the roads 



282 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

and causeways. But these defenses were easily turned, and 
on the 10th of December, the enemy was driven within the 
fortifications of Savannah, and its investment in great part ac- 
complished. The right and left wings closed in with connected 
lines near the main defenses of the city. The left of the Twen- 
tieth Corps rested on the Savannah river, aud the right of the 
Fourteenth Corps connected with the left of the Seventeenth, 
beyond the canal, nearLawson's plantation. General Slocum 
held the bridge of the Charleston railroad and the river itself, 
and General Howard controlled the Gulf railroad and the 
Ogeechee down toward Fort McAllister. Thus General Sher- 
man held firmly all the railroads centering in Savannah, and 
the two rivers forming the main channels of supply, and all 
the roads leading out from the city, except the Union cause- 
way, over which the road to Hardeeville and Charleston 
passes from the shore of the river opposite the town. 

General Slocum grasped the Savannah river firmly with his 
left flank, at a point about five miles from the city, and planted 
batteries so as to command the channel. He was scarcely in 
position, when Captain Gildersleeve, of the One Hundred and 
Fiftieth New York, in command of a foraging party, captured 
the steamer Ida, having on board Colonel Lynch of General 
Hardee's staff, bearing dispatches to the gunboats up the river. 
This boat was burned, to prevent recapture by the gunboats 
patrolling the river below. Near General Slocum's left flank 
were two river islands, Hutchinson and Argyle, whose pos- 
session was essential to his complete mastery of the river. 
These he promptly seized. During the evening of the 16th, 
Colonel Hawley, of the Third "Wisconsin, from Carman's bri- 
gade, by order of General Williams, sent over two companies 
of his regiment to Argyle Island, and the next morning six 
more. While he was crossing with the latter, he discovered 
three steamers descending the river. He hastened across, 
while Winegar's battery from the Georgia shore opened upon 
them. The boats were driven back, and in turning the two 
gunboats disabled their armed tender, which fell into Hawley's 
hands, at the head of the island. The next day, General 
Geary, commanding First division Twentieth Corps, was di- 
rected to occupy the upper end of Hutchinson Island with a 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 283 

detachment, to prevent the approach of the enemy's gunboats. 
A sunken battery was also established on the Georgia shore, 
whose guns commanded the river above and below the island, 
and rano-ed over the island to the Carolina shore. 

The defenses of the enemy had by this time been thoroughly 
developed by reconnoissances along the whole front of the in- 
vesting lines, and it was apparent that by means of irrigating 
canals, traversing the rice plantations, the whole region could 
be so flooded as greatly to embarrass the advance of assaulting 
columns. It was equally apparent that there were but two 
ways to take the city, by assault between the rivers, or the 
completion of the investment by closing the road to Charles- 
ton, which was General Hardee's only avenue of escape, and 
force a capitulation by starvation. 

Before, however, attempting either an assault or the com- 
pletion of the investment, General Sherman made a successful 
effort to open communications with the fleet known to be in 
waiting for his coming, to secure supplies by the passage of the 
boats on the Ogeeehee river, to the rear of his encampments. 
He was not yet in need, as he had large herds of cattle, and 
his trains were filled with supplies, which had been gathered 
on the march from Atlanta and with what had been loaded 
in that city, and there was an open country for foraging in 
his rear. Still he deemed communication with the fleet to be 
of paramount importance. The barrier to this was Fort 
McAllister, a redoubt on the right bank of the Ogeeehee, 
holding heavy guns, and to its reduction he addressed himself, 
while he intrusted the immediate investment to his subordi- 
nate commanders. On the 13th, General Kilpatrick was sent 
over the Ogeeehee on a pontoon bridge, under instructions to 
reconnoiter Fort McAllister and the inlets in that vicinity, 
and if practicable to take the fort ; subsequently he was di- 
rected by General Sherman to examine St. Catherine's Sound 
and open communication with the fleet. General Kilpatrick 
having reported that Fort McAllister was manned by two 
hundred men, and the bridge over the Ogeeehee, known as 
"King's Bridge," having been repaired in an incredibly short 
time by Colonel Buell and his regiment — the Fifty-eighth In 
diana, famous in the Army of the Cumberland for such ex- 



284 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

ploits — General Hazen, commanding the Second division of the 
Fifteenth Army Corps, was ordered to be in readiness to move 
against the fort. Early on the 13th, General Hazen crossed 
King's bridge, and deployed his division before the posi- 
tion, with its flanks resting on the river. Having at 3 p. m. 
signaled his readiness for assault to General Sherman, who, 
with General Howard, had taken post at Chase's rice-mill 
for observation and direction, he received orders to make the 
attack. In compliance, General Hazen assaulted at 5 p. m. ; 
his troops broke through the abatis and leaped over the para- 
pet, announcing their victory by shouts and the elevation of 
the national flag. While observing Hazen's operations, Gen- 
eral Sherman caught sight of a steamer, which came to herald 
the proximity of the fleet at the very moment that the Ogeechee 
was opened for its use. Supplies were now assured, and the 
reduction of Savannah was the immediate problem for solu- 
tion. 

The day following, Generals Sherman and Foster, the latter 
commanding the forces in South Carolina, met Admiral Dahl- 
gren in conference, and arranged for co-operative movements 
against Savannah. Siege-guns were to be brought from 
Hilton Head ; the fleet was to bombard the lower forts, and 
the investing forces were to carry the landward defenses of 
the city. At this time General Sherman thought that he 
could reach the " Union Causeway "—General Hardee's only 
way of escape from his left flank — by throwing a column across 
the Savannah river. He therefore returned from the fleet, 
with announced determination to assault the lines of the 
enemy as soon as the promised siege-guns should arrive. 

On the 17th, General Sherman demanded the surrender of 
the city ; but on the next day received a positive refusal from 
General Hardee, who reminded him that his investment 
was not complete, that his guns were four miles from Sa- 
vannah, and that there would be no justification for capitu- 
lation while he had an open road to Charleston. He had 
probably less than fifteen thousand men, a force that was in- 
adequate for successful defense against the armies and fleet 
that were converging upon him, but the issue proved that the 
necessity of surrender did not exist. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 285 

The problem of reducing Savannah was not the only one 
which now engrossed the attention of General Sherman, as a 
greater one had been devolved upon him by General Grant — 
one in comparison with which the other was merely inciden- 
tal. This was the movement of General Sherman's army, to 
assist in the reduction of Richmond. But as this enterprise 
was contingent upon the accumulation of vessels sufficient to 
transport fifty or sixty thousand men, the operations against 
Savannah were continued as though its capture was paramount, 
except that the ulterior objective induced General Sherman 
to refrain from throwing one of General Slocum's corps across 
to South Carolina. 

Pending the opening of the Ogeechee and the coming of 
the siege-guns, there was some activity on the left flank of the 
army, and General Slocum was urgent to throw one of his 
corps into South Carolina, to close General Hardee's only 
avenue of escape. On the 15th, Colonel Hawley crossed to 
the Carolina shore from Argyle Island, with five companies, 
drove the enemy from Izzard's plantation, and made a recon- 
noissance of the country two miles farther. Being isolated, 
he thought it prudent to return, and in doing this he was vig- 
orously pressed by the enemy, but recrossed to the island in 
safety. Upon his return, he was reinforced by the Second 
Massachusetts regiment, and on the next day the remainder 
of the brigade, Colonel Carman commanding, and a section 
of artillery, crossed to the island and took position on the 
eastern point near the South Carolina shore. During the 
night, Colonel Carman received orders from General Williams 
to cross to South Carolina and take position near the river, 
threatening the Savannah and Charleston road. This was 
not accomplished immediately for want of small boats, and 
barges could not be used on account of low tide. In the 
meantime, General Wheeler appeared on the opposite shore, 
and opened with his light guns upon Carman's troops, the lat- 
ter responding during the 17th and 18th, but made no effort 
to cross. 

In view of these revelations, General Sherman abandoned 
the idea of closing the road to Charleston by operations from 
his left flank, as the enemy held the river opposite the city 



286 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

with iron-clad gunboats, and could, as was conjectured, de- 
stroy pontoons between Hutchinson Island and the Carolina 
shore, and isolate any force sent from that flank. 

Upon the abandonment of this movement, General Slocum 
was ordered to get the siege-guns into position and make 
preparations for assault. The approaches to the city were 
upon the narrow causeways, which were commanded by artil- 
lery ; but nevertheless the reconnoissance from the left wing 
had convinced General Slocum and his subordinate command- 
ers that the works in their front could be carried. Two of 
General Howard's division commanders were confident they 
could attack successfully, though the conditions of assault on 
their portion of the line was less favorable than on the left. 

In abandoning the purpose to close the Charleston road 
from his left flank, General Sherman did not forego the at- 
tempt to shut it from another direction, as it was then threat- 
ened by one of General Foster's divisions from the head of 
Broad river, and on the 19th he set sail for Port Royal to 
arrange with General Foster for a movement upon the cause- 
way, so vital to General Hardee. His instructions, at depart- 
ure, to Generals Howard and Slocum were to get ready, but 
not to strike until his return. 

At daybreak on the morning of the 19th, by order of Gen- 
eral Williams, commanding the Twentieth Corps, Colonel 
Carman threw the Third "Wisconsin, the Second Massachu- 
setts, and the Thirteenth ISTew York regiments, under Colonel 
Hawley, to the South Carolina shore. These troops landed 
without opposition, and advancing to Izzard's mill, skirmished 
into a good position. The enemy expressed his appreciation 
of the position, which he had lost, by charging with his cav- 
alry to regain it, but suffered repulse. During the afternoon 
and evening, Colonel Carman sent forward the remaining reg- 
iments of his brigade, and assumed command at Izzard's mill. 
His position was a strong one for defense, but the ground be- 
fore him presented marked obstacles to an advance. His front 
was a rice plantation, traversed by canals and dikes, the fields 
being overflowed to the depth of eighteen inches. To move 
forward under these circumstances, it was necessary to follow 
the dikes, and these were easily defended. During the night 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 287 

he intrenched his line, which extended from the Savannah 
river, on his right, two and a quarter miles, to an inlet near 
Clyesclale creek. 

The next morning, in obedience to orders from General 
Jackson, his division commander, Colonel Carman detailed 
twelve companies under Colonel Hawley, and directed in per- 
son a reconnoissance to determine the relation of his line to 
Clyesdale creek. This creek was reached, with loss of one 
man. Works were then constructed for a regiment ; two com- 
panies were left to hold them, and with the remainder of the 
force an effort was made to reach the Charleston road. This 
movement had been anticipated by the enemy, and a strong 
force had been thrown before Carman. As he could not ad- 
vance without crossing a canal under fire, he withdrew, but 
remained sufficiently near the road to observe the passage of 
vehicles of all descriptions, in motion toward Charleston. 
During the afternoon he was shelled by a gunboat, and at 4 
p. m. he was reinforced by three regiments. He was so near 
the enemy's pontoon bridge, at Savannah, that from 7 p. m. to 
3 a. m. he could distinctly hear the retreating army crossing 
upon it. This noise was also heard by General Geary from 
his position below Hutchinson's Island. These facts were 
duly reported. 

Thus, under the mantle of darkness, during a moonless 
and windy night, General Hardee withdrew his entire force 
along the front of a brigade of the investing army. The 
approach of this brigade to his only line of retreat may have 
hastened his withdrawal ; but his final haste, whatever its 
immediate cause, was his salvation, and his stay at Savannah 
for ten days with such possibilities in his rear, vindicates him 
from the charge of abandoning his post before there was abso- 
lute need. 

General Sherman returned on the 22d, to find the city of 
Savannah in the quiet possession of his army. General 
Hardee had destroyed as much of his material as the security 
of his retreat permitted ; but he left his guns unspiked, three 
steamboats, his railroad rolling-stock, twenty-five thousand 
bales of cotton belonging to the Confederate government, and 



288 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

vast quantities of other public property of great value, un- 
injured. 

Except the failure to capture General Hardee's army at 
Savannah and release the prisoners at Millin, the march from 
Atlanta to that city was a triumphant success — the full 
realization of all anticipated possibilities. It illustrated with 
fearful emphasis the weakness of the rebellion, for no force 
able to resist one of General Sherman's thirteen divisions was 
met on the way. It left a track of desolation forty miles wide ; 
broke up the railroad system of Georgia and of the South, by 
the destruction of three hundred miles of track, all work- 
shops, station-houses, tanks, and warehouses ; crippled the 
industries of the empire state of the South, by burning all the 
mills and factories on the broad belt of ruin, and made other- 
wise a heavy draft upon the resources of the people, in con- 
suming and transporting supplies in immense quantities, and 
by the destruction of twenty thousand bales of cotton. The 
general significance of these results spread gloom and despair 
over the South. Coupled with the victory at Nashville, " The 
March to the Sea " brought near the collapse of the rebellion. 
The death-throes of treason, organized in magnitude most 
grand, were subsequently in harmony with its proportions and 
persistence ; but all doubt of its quick destruction was now 
removed. When General Lee should surrender, the end 
would come ; and to hasten this result, the victorious Western 
armies were under orders to move northward by sea or land, 
as circumstances should determine. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 115.] 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 4, 1864. 

I. In view of the contemplated movement, the commanding generals 
of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps will hold 
their commands prepared, on short notice, to march, provided with as 
much bread, salt, sugar, coffee, and ammunition as they can transport 
with their present means — each corps independent of all others, and in. 
dependent of the general supply train. . ... 

II. The general plan of movement will be as follows : As much notice 
as possible will be given in advance to General Eaton at Atlanta, and 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 289 

General Steedman at Chattanooga, who are charged with the responsibil- 
ity of causing all the rolling-stock of the railroad to be removed to and 
north of Eesaca, from which point General Steedman will cover its re- 
moval into Chattanooga. The railroad lying between Eesaca and the 
Etowah bridge will be left substantially undisturbed. The bridge at 
Eesaca and the iron north of it will be removed by cars into Chattanooga, 
and stored for future use. The railroad from the Etowah bridge into 
Atlanta will be destroyed. The Fourteenth Corps will bo charged with 
the destruction of that road from Etowah to Big Shanty ; the Fifteenth 
and Seventeenth Corps with that from Kenesaw to Chattahoochee bridge ; 
and the Twentieth Corps from the Chattahoochee into and including At- 
lanta. . . . 

III. The army commanders are enjoined to observe as much caution 
and secrecy as possible, and to act with the utmost energy, as, after our 
railroad communication is broken, every hour of our time is essential to 
success. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



[SPECIAL FIELD OEDEES, NO. 120.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 9, 18G4. 

I. For the purpose of military organization, this army is divided into 
two wings, viz : 

The right wing, Major-General 0. 0. Howard commanding, the Fif- 
teenth and Seventeenth CorjDS. 

The left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, the Four- 
teenth and Twentieth Corps. 

II. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by four 
roads, as near parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter in- 
dicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick command- 
ing, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief. 

***##■*##.* 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 11, 1SG4. 
Major-General HallecJc, Headquarters United States Army, Washington, D. C. : 

My arrangements are now all complete, and the railroad cars are being 
sent to the rear. Last night we burned all foundries, mills, and shops of 
every kind in Eome, and to-morrow I leave Kingston with the rear- 
guard for Atlanta, which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner, and 



290 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

to start on the 16th on the projected grand raid. All appearances still 
indicate that Beauregard has got hack to his old hole at Corinth, and I 
hope he will enjoy it. My army prefers to enjoy the fresh sweet-potato 
fields of the Ocmulgee. I have balanced all the figures well, and am sat- 
isfied that General Thomas has in Tennessee a force sufficient for all prob- 
abilities ; and I have urged him, the moment Beauregard turns south, to 
cross the Tennessee at Decatur, and push straight for Selma. To-morrow 
our lines will be broken, and this is probably my last dispatch. I would 
like to have Foster to break the Savannah and Charleston road about 
Pocotaligo, about the 1st of December. All other preparations are to 

mv entire satisfaction. 
J W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General 

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 124.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., November 14, 1864. 
The armies will begin the movement on Milledgeville and Gordon to- 
morrow, the 15th November, as follows : 

I. The right wing will move viaMcDonoughand Monticello to Gordon. 

II. The left wing (General Slocum's) will move via Covington, Social 
Circle, and Madison to Milledgeville, destroying the railroad in a most 
thorough manner, from Yellow river to Madison. 

III. The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding) will move in con- 
cert with the right wing, feigning strong in the direction of Forsyth and 
Macon, but will cross the Ocmulgee on the pontoon bridge of General 
Howard. 

IV. Each column will aim to reach its destination — viz., Gordon and 

Milledgeville — on the seventh day's march, and each army commander 

will, on arrival, communicate with the other wing and the commanding 

general, who will accompany the left wing. 

Bv order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 

Tuscumbia, Ala., November 16, 1864. 
General iS. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector- General, Richmond, Va. : 

Reports of General Wheeler indicate that Sherman is about to move 
with three corps frorn Atlanta to Augusta or Macon ; thence probably to 
Charleston or Savannah, where a junction may be formed with the en- 
emy's fleet. 

The threatened attack on Wilmington, in that event, must be intended 
for Charleston. I would advise that all available forces which can be 
spared from North and South Carolina, be held ready to move to defense 
of Augusta, or crossing of Savannah river, in conjunction with forces in 
the State of Georgia. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 291 

Should Sherman take Charleston, or reach Atlantic coast, he might 
then reinforce Grant. General Taylor has been ordered to move with 
his available forces into Georgia, and assume command of all troops oper- 
ating against Sherman, should he move as reported. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD. 



Corinth, November 18, 1864 — via Selma. 
To the People of Georgia : 

Arise for the defense of your native soil ! Rally around your patriotic 
governor and gallant soldiers. Obstruct and destroy all roads in Sher- 
man's front, flank, and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst. 
Be confident and resolute. Trust in an overruling Providence, and suc- 
cess will crown your efforts. I hasten to join you in defense of your 
homes and firesides. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Cobb's Plantation, November 22, 1864. 
General : — I am directed by the general-in-chief to write you as follows: 
The march of this wing has been, since leaving Atlanta, in two columns, 
and very successful up to this time. The Fourteenth Corps is now on 
the Hillsboro road, ten (10) ten miles west of Milledgeville, and the 
Twentieth Corps must now be in the capital, having marched by the Eaton- 
ton road. The Georgia railroad, from and including the Oconee bridge, 
west of Lithonia, is well destroyed. Troops in fine condition, having fed 
high on sweet potatoes and poultry. Stock is also doing well, though the 
roads have been very heavy. The general desires you will report to him 
at Milledgeville to-morrow (where he will go early), in detail, your oper- 
ations since leaving Atlanta, and also the position of your command, 
in view of his making further orders. In the meantime, you can not do 
too much permanent damage to that railroad east of Macon and about 
Gordon. You will also notify General Kilpatrick a similar report is de- 
sired of him. 

I am, general, respectfully yours, etc., 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
General Howard, Commanding Army of the Tennessee. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 127.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Milledgeville, Ga., November 23, 1864. 

The first movement of this army having proved perfectly successful, 

and the weather now being fine, the following will constitute the second 

stage of the campaign, and the movement will commence to-morrow, 

November 24th : 



292 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

I. General Kilpatrick, with his cavalry command, unincumbered by 
wagons, will move, via Milledgeville, by the most practicable route east- 
ward, break the railroad between Millin and Augusta, then turn and 
strike the railroad below Millin ; after which he will use all possible effort 
to rescue our prisoners of war now confined near Millin. He will com- 
municate back to the wings of the army, as often as it is safe, any infor- 
mation of roads and the enemy that may be of interest to them. 

II. The right wing, General Howard, will move substantially along, but 
south of the railroad, to a point opposite Sandersville, breaking and de- 
stroying in the most thorough manner the railroad and telegraph; at 
which point further orders will be issued. 

III. The left wing, General Slocum, will move directly from Milledge- 
ville to the railroad opposite Sandersville, and at once commence de- 
stroying the railroad forward to the Ogeechee. 

IV. Great attention should be paid to the destruction of this road, as 
it is of vital importance to our cause. Besides burning bridges and 
trestles, the iron should be carefully twisted and warped, so that it 
will be impossible ever to use it again ; to this end, the rate of travel will 
be reduced to ten miles a day. 

VI. The general-in-chief will accompany the left wing until it reaches 
Sandersville, when he will join the Army of the Tennessee. 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Milledgeville, Ga., November 23, 18G4. 
Major-General Howord, Commanding Army of the Tennessee : 

By instructions of the general-in-chief, I give you the following direc- 
tions : Continue to destroy the railroad eastward to the Oconee, in the most 
complete and thorough manner, burning and twisting every rail, and the 
same for a distance to the west toward Macon ; also destroy the Oconee 
bridge. You may lay your pontoon over the Oconee, but do not cross 
any of your command until further orders. Hardee has probably swung 
around, via Albany, for Savannah, which, the general says, is all right, 
and he do n't care particularly. Kilpatrick will be moved here or in this 
vicinity for the present. The probability is we will concentrate at 
or near Sandersville. Prosecute the railroad destruction in the most 
thorough manner, and communicate with the general-in-chief frequently. 
I am, general, respectfully yours, etc., 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 293 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Millin, Ga., December 2, 1804. 
General: — The army will move on Savannah, delaying only to continue 
the destruction of the railroad from Millin as far as Ogeechee Church. 
General Howard will continue to move along the south bank of the 
Ogeechee, General Elair along the railroad, and General Slocum by the two 
roads lying north of the railroad, between it and the Savannah river. 
The general wishes you to confer with General Slocum, to make a strong 
feint up in the direction of Waynesboro, and then to cover his rear from 
molestation by dashes of cavalry. I send you copies of two letters from 
members of Wheeler's staff, which will interest you. After reading, please 
return them for file in this office. 

I am, general, respectfully yours, etc., 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
General Kilpatrick, Commanding Cavalry Division. 



Headquarters Armies of the United States, 
City Point, Va., December 3, 1864 

General: — The little information gleaned from the Southern press in- 
dicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails, 
which previously had been collected in Baltimore, by Colonel Markland, 
special agent of the post-office department, to be sent as far as the blockad- 
ing squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on 
the coast. Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain 
from congratulating you and those under your command until bottom 
has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result. 

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. 
The enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from de- 
taching against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some 
twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from 
Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get pos- 
session of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and 
General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, and which, while I 
hope for the best, do not believe a particle in, there is delay in getting 
this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and 
that Bragg will not have started back by that time. 

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for 
future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views 
after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran 
army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west, 
possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will 
be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other post 
to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force 
from there can co-operate with you. 



294 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close 
upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, ex- 
cept the main one leading to Chattanooga. . . . 

I hope Hood will be badly crippled or destroyed. After all becomes 
quiet, and the roads up here so bad that there is likely to be a week or 
two that nothing can be done, I will run down to the coast and see you. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Armies near Savannah. 



Headquarters Armies of the United States, 
Citt Point, Va., December 6, 1864. 
General: — On reflection, since sending my letter by the hands of 
Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation 
toward closing out the great rebellion will be to close out Lee and his 
army. You have now destroyed the roads of the South, so that it will 
probably take them months, without interruption, to re-establish a 
through line from east to west. In that time, I think, the job here will 
be effectually completed. My idea now is, that you establish a base on 
the coast, fortify and leave it to your artillery and cavalry, and enough 
infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior 
that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the 
balance of your command come here by water, with all dispatch. Select 
yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. 
Unless you see objections to this plan which I can not see, use every 
vessel going to you for the purpose of transportation. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Savannah, December 11, 1864 — 2 a. m. 

General: — Your dispatch of December 10th, and also Special Field 

Order 191, are just received. The general-in-chief wishes you to secure 

the trains cut off on the Gulf road, and also describe to him what is the 

position of King's bridge and Dillon's ferry ; neither are on the map. I 

have had couriers looking for you since 5 p. m., with orders, but they are 

unable to find your headquarters. I send inclosed another copy. The 

general understands the trains to be between Way's and Fleming's 

Station. 

I am, general, very respectfully, etc., 

L. M. DAYTON, 

A id-de- Camp. 

Major-General 0. 0. Howard, Commanding Army of the Tennessee. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 295 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Savannah, December 16, 1864. 

General : — I received day before yesterday, at the hands of Lieutenant 
Dunn, your letter of December 3d, and last night, at the hands of Col- 
onel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previously made you a hasty 
scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion in Ogeechee river, advising you that the 
army had reached the sea-coast, destroying all railroads across the Stale. 
of Georgia, and investing closely the city of Savannah, and had made 
connection with the fleet. 

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with Gen- 
eral Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made arrangements which I 
deemed essential to reduce the city of Savannah to our possession ; but 
since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have initiated measures looking 
principally to coming to you with fifty or sixty thousand (50,000 or 60,000) 
infantry, and incidentally to take Savannah, if time will allow. At the 
time we carried Fort McAllister so handsomely by assault, with twenty- 
two (22) guns and its entire garrison, I was hardly aware of its importance ; 
but since passing down the river with General Foster, and up with Ad- 
miral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably adapted are Ossabaw Sound and 
Ogeechee river to supply an army operating against Savannah. Sea-going 
vessels can easily come to King's bridge, a point on the Ogeechee river, 
fourteen and a half (14J) miles due west from Savannah, from which 
point we have roads leading to all our camps. The country is low and 
sandy, and cut up with marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad, 
but we have been so favored with weather that they are all now compar- 
atively good, and heavy details are constantly employed in double cordu- 
roying the marshes, so that I have no fear of a bad spell of weather. 
Fortunately, also, by liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea- 
coast abundantly supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing 
on arrival except bread. Of this we started from Atlanta with from 
eight to twenty (8 to 20) days' supply for corps, and some of the troops had 
only one (1) day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty (30) days, and 
yet they did not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well as 
Gorn-meal, and our sojdiers took to them naturally. We started with about 
five thousand (5,000) head of cattle, and arrived with over ten thousand 
(10,000) ; of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep, hogs, and 
the cattle of the country. As for our mules and horses, we left Atlanta with 
about two thousand five hundred (2,500) wagons, many of which were 
drawn by mules which had not recovered from the Chattanooga starva- 
tion ; all of which were replaced, the poor mules shot, and our transporta- 
tion is now in superb condition. I have no doubt the State of Georgia 
has lost by our operations fifteen thousand (15,000) first-rate mules. As 
to horses, Kilpatrick collected all his remounts, and it looks to me, in 
riding along our columns, as though every officer has three or four led 
horses, and each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty (50) 
negroes and foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom 
was for each brigade to send out daily a foraging party of about fifty (50) 



296 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

men on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons 
loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of about 
forty (40) brigades, you can estimate approximately the quantity of horses 
collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my orders, because of 
the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too many idlers mounted. 
General Easton is now engaged in collecting statistics on this subject ; but 
I know that the government will never receive full accounts of our cap- 
tures, although the result aimed at was fully attained, viz., to deprive our 
enemy of them. All these animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or col- 
lected behind Fort McAllister, to bemused by General Saxton in his farm- 
ing operations, or by the quartermaster's department, after they are sys- 
tematically accounted for. 

While Genei*al Easton is collecting transportation for my troops to 
James river, I will throw to Port Royal Island all of our means of trans- 
portation I can, and collect the balance near Fort McAllister, covered by 
the Ogeechee river and intrenchments to be erected, and for which Cap- 
tain Poe, my chief engineer, is now reconnoitering the grounds; but, in the 
meantime, I will act as I have begun, as though Savannah city were my 
only objective — namely, the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, 
making attacks antl feints wherever we have firm ground to stand upon; 
and I will place some thirty (30) pounder Parrots, which I have got from 
General Foster, in position near enough to reach the center of the city, 
and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed, or 
fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise, I will bombard the city, 
but not risk the lives of my own men by assaults across the narrow 
causeways, by which alone we can reach it. If I had time, Savannah, with 
all its dependent fortifications, is already ours, for we hold all its avenues 
of supply. The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from 
above to the city, in both of which he has been foiled ; General Slocum, 
whose left flank rests on the river, capturing and burning the first boat, 
and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and capturing the 
steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a crew of twenty-five sea- 
men. General Slocum occupies Argyle Island and the upper end of 
Hutchinson Island, and has a brigade on the South Carolina shore oppo- 
site, and he is very urgent to pass one of his corps over to that shore. 
But in view of the change of plan made necessary by your orders of the 
6th, I will maintain things in statu quo till 1 have got all my transporta- 
tion to the rear and out of the way, and until I have sea transportation for 
the troops you require at James river, which I will accompany and com- 
mand in person. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick with his cavalry, say five 
thousand three hundred (5,300), and, it may be, a division of the Fifteenth 
Corps; but before determining this, I must see General Foster, and may 
arrange to shift his force — now over about the Charleston railroad, at the 
head of Broad river — to the Ogeechee, where, in co-operation with Kilpat- 
rick's cavalry, he can better threaten the State of Georgia than from the 
direction of Port Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach 
from my regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 297 

that other less valuable troops should be sent to reinforce Foster, from 
some other quarter. My four (4) corps, full of experience and full of 
ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand (G0,000) fighting 
men, will be a reinforcement that Lee can not disregard. Indeed, with my 
present command, I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly 
to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to 
report to you. But this would consume, it may be, six weeks' time, after 
the fall of Savannah, whereas, by sea, I can probably reach you with my 
men and arms before the middle of January. 

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee in Savannah has good 
artillerists, some five thousand (5.000) or six thousand (6,000) good infan- 
try, and it may be, a mongrel mass of eight thousand or ten thousand 
(8,000 or 10,000) militia and fragments. In all our marching through 
Georgia, he has not forced me to use anything but a skirmish line, though 
at several points he had erected fortifications and made bombastic 
threats. In Savannah, he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind 
swamps and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savan- 
nah river, about three miles above the city, around to a branch of the 
Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt marshes and 
boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common corduroy 
roads. There must be twenty-five thousand (25,000) citizens, men, 
women, and children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is 
to feed them beyond a few days, I can not imagine, as I know that his 
requisitions for corn, on the interior counties of Georgia were not filled, 
and we are in possession of the rice fields and mills, which alone could be 
of service to him in this neighborhood. He can draw nothing from 
South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the southeast, and that 
by a disused wagon-road. I could easily get posession of this, but hardly 
deem it worth the risk of making a detachment, which would be in 
danger by its isolation from the main army. 

Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the weather is 
splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personal dislike to turning 
northward. 

I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here until I know the result of my de- 
mand for the surrender of Savannah; but, whether successful or not, 
shall not delay my execution of your orders of the Gth, which will de- 
pend alone upon the time it will require to get transportation by sea. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
. Major-General U. S. A. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Va. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Savannah, Ga., December 17, 1864. 

General: — You have doubtless observed from your station at Rosedew 

that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and the Ogeechee 

to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and 



298 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

more especially of heavy ordnance necessary to the reduction of Savan- 
nah. I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive 
shot as far as the heart of your city ; also, I have for some days held and 
controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah 
can be supplied, and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender 
of the city of Savannah and its dependent forts, and shall await a reason- 
able time your answer before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you 
entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the in- 
habitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to assault, or the 
slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resort- 
ing to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my 
army burning to avenge the great national wrong they attach to Savan- 
nah and other large cities, which have been prominent in dragging our 
country into civil war. 

I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of 
the town of Eesaca, to be used by you for what it is worth. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 

General William J. Hardee, Commanding Confederate Forces in Savannah. 



Headquarters Department South Carolina and Georgia and Florida, 

Savannah, Ga., December 17, 1864. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Federal Forces near Savannah : 

General: — I have to acknowledge receipt of a communication from 
you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah and 
its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have received guns that 
can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the city;" and for 
the further reason that you "have for some clays held and controlled 
every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied." You 
add, that should you " be forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and 
surer process of starvation, you will then feel justified in resorting to the 
harshest measures, and will make little effort to restrain your army," 
etc., etc. 

The position of your forces half a mile beyond the outer line for the 
land defense of Savannah is, at the nearest point, at least four miles from 
the heart of the city. That and the interior line are intact. 

Your statement that you have for some days held and controlled every 
avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied is incorrect. I 
am in free and constant communication with my department. 

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts 
is refused. 

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraph of your 
letter, of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied 
with, I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military opera- 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 299 

tions intrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of 
civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course 
by you that may force me to deviate from them in future. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 

W. J. HARDEE, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Headquarters Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Savannah, Ga., December 18, 18G-1. 
General: — I wrote you at length by Colonel Babcock on the 16th instant. 
As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a demand on General 
Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and to-day received his 
answer refusing. Copies of both letters are herewith inclosed. You will 
notice that I claim that my lines are within easy range of the heart of 
Savannah, but General Hardee claims we are four and a half miles dis- 
tant. But I myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and 
Georgia railroad and the three (3) mile post is but a few yards beyond, 
within the line of our picket. The enemy has no pickets outside of his 
fortified line, which is a full quarter of a mile within the three (3) mile 
post, and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R. Cuyler, president of the 
Georgia Central railroad, who was a prisoner in our hands, that the mile- 
posts are measured from the Exchange, which is but two squares from 
the river. . . . General Slocum feels confident that he can make a 
successful assault at one or two points in front of the Twentieth Corps 
and one or two in front of General Davis' (Fourteenth) Corps. But all of 
General Howard's troops, the right wing lie behind the Little Ogeechee, 
and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of an enemy. Still 
we can make strong feints, and if I can get a sufficient number of boats, 
I shall make a co-operative demonstration up Vernon river or Wassaw 
Sound. I should like very much to take Savannah before coming to 
you; but, as I wrote to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and 
will embark for the James river as soon as Genei'al Easton, who is gone 
to Port Royal for that purpose, reports to me that he has an approximate 
number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force. . . 
In relation to Savannah you will remark that General Hardee refers to 
his still being in communication with his war department. This lan- 
guage he thought would deceive me, but I am confirmed in the belief 
that the route to which he refers — namely, the Union plank-road, on the 
South Carolina shore — is inadequate to feed his army and the people of 
Savannah, for General Foster assures me that he has his force on that 
very road near the head of Broad river, and that his guns command the 
railroad, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah. 
We hold this end of the Charleston road, and have destroyed it from the 
three (3) mile post back to the bridge, about twelve (12) miles above. . . 
I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, 



300 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to de- 
vastate that state in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would 
have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Savanah, Ga., December 19, 18G4. 
General: — The general-in-chief has gone to the bay. lie wishes you 
to push the preparations for attacking Savannah with all possible speed, 
but to await orders for the attack. He will see General Foster and the 
admiral before returning, and will get co-operation from both, if possible. 
Should anything occur that you would like to communicate to the gen- 
eral, I will forward for you. 

I am, general, with great respect, 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Major-General O. 0. Howard, Commanding Army of the Tennessee. 



Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Savannah, Ga., December 19, 1864. 
General: — The general-in-chief has gone to the bay. He directs me to 
further instruct you to push preparations for the attack on the defenses 
of Savannah as rapidly as possible, and then await further directions be- 
fore doing more. 

He will endeavor to get co-operation from Admiral Dahlgren and Gen- 
eral Foster, with whom he will confer before returning. If, in the mean- 
time, anything should occur you would w T ish to communicate to him, 
please to send to me, and I will forward. 

I am, general, with respect, 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 
Major-General Slocum, Commanding Left Wing. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT. 

In the meantime, further reconnoissances from our left flank had de- 
monstrated that it was impracticable or unwise to push any considerable 
force across the Savannah river, for the enemy held the river opposite the 
city with iron-clad gunboats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down by 
us between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore, which 
would isolate any force sent over from that flank. 1 therefore ordered 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 301 

General Slocum to get into position the siege-guns, and make all the 
preparations necessary to assault, and to report to me the earliest moment 
when he could be ready, whilst I should proceed rapidly round by tlio 
right, and make arrangements to occupy the Union causeway, from the 
direction of Port Royal. General Foster had already established a divis- 
ion of troops on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawhatchie and 
Tullifinney rivers, at the head of Broad river, from which position he 
could reach the railroad with his artillery. 

I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrangements to reinforce that 
command by one or more divisions, under a proper officer, to assault and 
carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah, until it occupied 
the causeway in question. 

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWARD'S REPORT. 

It having been intimated that our future plans would be modified by 
specific instructions from the commander-in-chief, General Sherman and 
his officers became anxious to crown our success by the capture of Savan- 
nah. In order to accomplish this, every exertion was made. Heavy guns 
were brought from Hilton Head and McAllister, and placed in position ; the 
lines were worked up closer to the enemy, along the dikes ; good batteries 
constructed for small guns, and every part of the front of General Oster- 
haus and General Blair thoroughly reconnoitered; light bridges were 
constructed, and fascines made, so as to span the streams and fill up the 
ditches ; in brief, every possible preparation was made to assault the en- 
emy's works. The same was the case along General Slocum's front. 

"While these preparations were going on, the general-in- chief, having 
demanded the surrender of Savannah on the 18th instant, and having 
been refused, had gone to the fleet, in order to secure co-operation from 
the admiral and General Foster, in the contemplated attack. He left di- 
rections to get ready, but not to strike till his return. 

Two at least of my division commanders felt perfectly confident of 
success, in case the assault should be made. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SLOCUM'S REPORT 

Our line was established as close as possible to that of the enemy, and 
the time spent in preparations for an assault upon his works. Batteries 
were established on the river, in such positions as prevented any boats 
from passing. The steamer Ida, while attempting to pass up from Savan- 
nah, on the 10th of December, was captured and burned. On the 12th, 
two gunboats and the steamer Resolute attempted to pass our batteries 
from above, but both gunboats were driven back by Winegar's battery, 
and the steamer was so disabled that she fell into our hands. She was 
soon repaired, and has since been transferred to the quartermaster's de- 
partment 



302 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

On the 18th, a brigade of the First division, Twentieth Corps, was thrown 
across the river, and established near Izzard's plantation, on the South 
Carolina shore, in a position which threatened the only line of communi- 
cation still held by the enemy. A bridge, in the meantime, had been 
constructed by the enemy from the city to the South Carolina shore, 
and on the evening of December 20th he commenced the evacuation 
of the city. 



EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF GENERAL WILLIAMS. 

During the day of the 20th, the fire from the enemy's works and gun- 
boats was unusually heavy and continuous. Reports from Carman's brig- 
ade, that large columns were crossing to the Carolina shore, either to cover 
their only line of communication, or preparatory to a final evacuation of 
the city. In the night, General Geary reported to me that the movements 
across the river were still apparently going on. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GEARY'S REPORT. 

I ascertained this morning, the 20th, that the enemy had completed a 
pontoon bridge across to the South Carolina shore, from Savannah, and 
notified the general commanding the corps of the discovery. This bridge 
was about two and a half miles from my left. The usual artillery fire 
was kept up by the enemy during the day and night. During the night, 
I heard the movement of troops and wagons across the pontoon bridge 
before mentioned, and sent a report of the fact to the general command- 
ing the corps. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS' REPORT. 

During the intervening days between the 12th and 21st, at which time 
the enemy evacuated his position, my troops were assiduously engaged 
in skirmishing with the enemy, reconnoitering his position, and making 
general preparations for an attack. Five (5) points in my front had, 
several days before the evacuation, been reconnoitered, and pronounced 
accessible to an attacking party. This information was duly forwarded 
to the commanding general. 



EXTRACTS FROM COLONEL CARMAN'S REPORT. 

I then moved the remaining regiment of the brigade — One Hundred 
and Fiftieth New York Volunteers — to the South Carolina shore, and es- 
tablished there my headquarters at Izzard's mill. The position occupied 
by the brigade was strong for defense, but the nature of the ground was 
such that an advance was difficult. 

During the night, I transported the two pieces of artillery across the 
river, and put them in position in the center of the line. The line as 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 303 

then formed and held by my brigade was two and a quarter miles long, 
the left resting on the Savannah river, and the right on an inlet near 
Clyesdale creek. . . . 

December 20. . . . During the day, a great number of vehicles of all 
descriptions were seen passing our front, moving from Savannah toward 
Hardeeville, which was reported to the headquarters of the division. 
In the afternoon, a rebel gunboat came up the river in our rear, and 
threw about thirty shells into my brigade, killing one man of the One 
Hundred and Fiftieth New York. I could reach it with my artillery. 
At 4 p. m. the enemy was reinforced by three regiments of infantry from 
Savannah. 

From 7 p. m. until 3 a. m. the noise of the retreating enemy could 
plainly be heard as they crossed the bridges from Savannah to the South 
Carolina shore. 



Charleston, S. C, December 8, 1864. 
Lieutenant-G 'eneral Hardee, Savannah, Ga. : 

Having no army of relief to look to, and your forces being essential to 
the defense of Georgia and South Carolina, whenever you shall have to 
select between their safety and that of Savannah, sacrifice the latter, and 
form a junction with General Jones, holding the left bank of the Savan- 
nah river and the railroad to this place as long as possible. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD. 



Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, December 16, 1864. 

General : — Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that in his last dis- 
patch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Rich- 
mond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire force, 
at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may be given you by 
General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from such base as you 
may establish on the coast. General Foster will obey such instructions 
as may be given by you. Should you have captured Savannah, it is 
thought that by transferring the water-batteries to the land side, that 
place may be made a good depot and base for operations on Augusta, 
Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if 
captured and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort 
would serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most 
valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the most im- 
portant point at which to strike in order to sever all connections between 
the Virginia and the Northwestern railroads. General Grant's wishes, how- 
ever, are that this whole matter of your future actions should be left en- 
tirely to your discretion. 

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of field 
artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire. Also, as soon as 
General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and 



304 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

furloughed men of your army. It is reported that Thomas defeated 
Hood yesterday near Nashville, but we have no particulars nor official 
reports, telegraphic communications being interrupted by a heavy storm. 
Our last advices from you were in General Howard's note, announcing 
his approach to Savannah. 

Yours truly, 

H. W. HALLECK, 
Major-General, Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Sherman, via Hilton Head. 



Headquarters of the Army, 
Washington, December 18, 1864. 
My Dear General: — Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just re- 
ceived. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soon 
expect to hear of the crowning work of your new campaign, in the cap- 
ture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the great. 
one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another wide 
swath through the center of the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate. 
General Grant is expected here this morning, and will probably write you 
his own views. 

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments, having three 
months or more to serve, to rejoin your army, via Savannah. Those hav- 
ing less than three months to serve will be retained by General Thomas. 
Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place 
may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it 
may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession. 

Yours truly, 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Major-General, Chief of Staff. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, Savannah. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Savannah, December 24, 18G4. 

General: — I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the 16th 
and 18th instant to-day, and I feel more than usually flattered by the 
high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which is now 
completed by the occupation of Savannah. 

i am very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about em- 
barking my troops for James river, leaving me free to make the broad 
swath you describe through South and North Carolina, and am still more 
gratified at the news from Thomas in Tennessee, because it fulfills nay 
plans, which contemplated his being fully able to dispose of Hood in 
case he ventured north of the Tennessee river. So I think, on the 
whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis' disappointment in not turning my 
Atlanta campaign into a Moscow disaster. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 305 

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think " salt" 
will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be on the right 
of the right wing, and their position will naturally bring them into it first; 
and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have re- 
marked that they do their work up j:>retty well. The truth is, the whole 
army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South 
Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that 
is in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we 
did not go to South Carolina; and when I answered that I was en route for 
that state, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you make those people 
feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of 
Georgia." I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I 
doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at Milledge- 
ville. 

I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me, but really 
am not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up the " Union 
Causeway," but intervening obstacles were such, that before I could get 
my troops on the road, Hardee slipped out. Still, I know that the men 
that were in Savannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis; for the 
Georgia troops under G. W. Smith declared they would not fight in South 
Carolina, and they have gone north en route for Augusta, and I have rea- 
son to believe North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington — in other 
words, they are scattered. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. 

vol. ii — 20 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS, FROM SAVANNAH TO GOLDSBORO 
AND RALEIGH; THE BATTLES OF AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

Soon after the occupation of Savannah by General Sherman, 
the movement of his army by sea was abandoned, and its 
march through the Carolinas was adopted instead. General 
Sherman had indicated to General Grant, in his letter of De- 
cember 16th, his preference for the overland movement, and 
in subsequent communications emphasized his choice. And 
in view of the apparent advantages of this approach to Vir- 
ginia, General Grant authorized General Sherman, December 
27th, to move his army northward through the Carolinas as 
soon as practicable. It was anticipated that this movement 
would prevent, in great measure, the union of the fragments 
of the defeated Confederate armies in the West and South, 
while it would repeat and intensify the effect produced by the 
march from Atlanta to Savannah. The plan adopted, com- 
passed the permanent occupancy of Savannah by troops from 
a distance, that General Sherman might keep his army intact 
to be able to resist General Lee until General Grant could give 
him help from Virginia, should that general abandon the 
capital of the Confederacy to oppose him. 

The river defenses of Savannah, with slight modifications, 
were deemed adequate. Forts Pulaski, Thunderbolt, and 
McAllister were put in complete order. The forts bearing 
upon the approaches by water were dismantled, and their 
heavy guns sent to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head. The 
obstructions, including torpedoes, were removed from the ad- 
jacent waters, and Admiral Dahlgren had the channels staked 
out and indicated by buoys. Preparations were promptly 

(306) 



A.VERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 307 

commenced and energetically prosecuted, that the army might 
move northward by the 15th of January. 

A portion of General Sherman's forces did move before the 
loth of January ; but rain, swollen rivers, and flooded low- 
lands so delayed co-operative columns, that they did not cross 
the Savannah river until the first week of February. On the 
14th, General Howard, with General Blair's corps, crossed 
from Beaufort Island to the main land, flanked the enemy at 
Gordon's Corner, and followed him to Pocotaligo, and on the 
following morning took possession of the vacant fort at that 
place. This movement was a feint upon Charleston, to deceive 
the enemy as to General Sherman's first and second objectives, 
which were Columbia, South Carolina, and Goldsboro, North 
Carolina. 

A pontoon bridge had been thrown at Savannah for the 
passage of the left wing, and the Union causeway had 
been repaired ; but the flood in the river had borne away the 
bridge and submerged the causeway, and General Slocum was 
compelled to move up the river to find a crossing. Jackson's 
and Ward's divisions of the Twentieth Corps crossed at 
Purysburg, and on the 19th were at Hardeeville, in com- 
munication with General Howard at Pocotaligo. The Four- 
teenth Corps, and Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, 
which had been relieved from garrison duty at Savannah, by 
General Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps from Vir- 
ginia, did not leave Savannah until the 26th of January. 
These troops then moved up to Sister's Ferry, and succeeded 
in crossing the river during the first week of February. In 
the meantime, the Fifteenth Corps, General John A. Logan 
commanding, had crossed the river and lowlands, and joined 
General Howard at Pocotaligo. 

General Sherman's forces were now in readiness to enter 
upon a campaign which involved strategic combinations of 
widest range. When the northward march was first indicated, 
Generals Bragg, Beauregard, and Hardee were intent upon 
concentrating all fragments of armies far and near to oppose 
it. Generals Beauregard and Hardee were in Charleston, and 
General Bragg was in North Carolina. 

North Carolina was open to attack from the coast, and 



308 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

thither General Schofield's corps of twenty-one thousand men 
from the "West and other forces were to move. General Sher- 
man had an offensive army of sixty-five thousand men, and 
forces in his rear to hold Savannah and garrison such other 
fortified places as should fall into his hands. Acting aggres- 
sively on a broad field, with possible objectives in front, or 
right or left, their antagonist could conceal his purposes, and 
strike vital points uncovered by invitation of feints in other 
directions. The disposition of his forces from Sister's Ferry 
to Pocotaligo menaced equally Charleston, Columbia, and 
Augusta, and which was General Sherman's immediate ob- 
jective, the Confederate generals could not discern with cer- 
tainty. And if they could have ascertained his aims, he could 
change them with pleasure with crushing effect. Having 
passed by Augusta in his march from Atlanta that he might 
menace that city with his left flank while feigning against 
Charleston with his right, to concentrate between the divided 
forces of the enemy upon Columbia as his first objective, he 
proposed that his two wings should shake hands where seces- 
sion first found positive expression through the convention of 
South Carolina, and then stride on to Goldsboro and Rich- 
mond. 

The inevitable delay at Savannah was favorable to the 
enemy, as it had given time for a sweeping conscription in the 
states immediately threatened, for the fragments of Hood's 
army to move far toward the Carolinas, and for "Wheeler to 
obstruct the roads before General Sherman's columns, and 
destroy the bridges that could not be utilized for defense. 
These obstructions, the depth of the rivers, and the breadth of 
the immediate lowlands on their margins, doubtless gave hope 
to the enemy that the invasion of the Carolinas would be 
greatly delayed, if not defeated. But though the obstacles 
were almost insurmountable, General Sherman's victorious 
troops did not hesitate to make causeways in the deep cold 
waters for miles, nor to make roads through the swamps of 
South Carolina in midwinter, and made a march not inferior 
to the celebrated passage of the Alps, except in the low lines 
of advance. 

The infantry forces of the enemy occupied the line of the 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 309 

Salkehatchie river, while Wheeler's cavalry hovered around the 
heads of column or on the fianks of the two wings. The left 
wing, with Kilpatrick on its left flank, moved upon Barn- 
well, threatening Augusta; the right wing, accompanied 
by General Sherman, moved westward to the Salkehatchie, 
touching the river at Beaufort and Rivers' bridges, flanking 
Charleston, and neutralizing the elaborate fortifications of that 
city, which had so long defied the heavy guns of iron-clads 
and land-batteries. The bridges of the Salkehatchie were de- 
fended with spirit, but in vain ; and General Howard soon 
forced the passages, when the enemy retired to Branchville, 
burning all bridges behind him. These movements spread 
alarm everywhere. The Confederate forces were feeble at 
best, and there were now so many possibilities to General 
Sherman, all fruitful of ruin, that extreme uncertainty and 
foreboding of crushing disasters palsied the courage of troops 
and citizens. They could only guess at General Sherman's 
objective, and so many were possible and his strategy so be- 
wildering that no positions were held with adequate strength 
for temporary resistance, and Columbia was uncovered almost 
entirely. 

General Sherman threw the Fifteenth and Seventeenth 
Corps on the Orangeburg road — the latter by Binnaker's 
bridge over the south fork of Edisto, and the former by HoU 
man's. Having reached Orangeburg, the right wing moved 
on the direct road to Columbia. The enemy was driven from 
all points where resistance was made, and on the 16th, the 
head of column approached the capital of South Carolina. 
The left wing advanced steadily by Barnwell and Lexington 
as the general direction, and destroyed the Charleston and 
Augusta railroad for several miles. After a well-sustained 
menace to Augusta, General Slocum gathered his forces and 
touched the Saluda river above Columbia simultaneously with 
the arrival of General Howard on the bank of the river oppo- 
site the city. 

General Sherman's maneuvers resulted in marked success. 
Throwing his columns in diverging lines from Savannah, and 
then converging them upon Columbia, he caused the evacua- 
tion of Charleston, and drove General Cheatham, moving 



310 AVERYSBOKO AND BENTONVILLE. 

eastward with the remnant of Hood's army, to the north of 
his projected line. It now remained to reach Goldshoro 
through repetition of the same confusing strategy; hut the 
conditions of its success were now greatly changed, as the gar- 
risons of Charleston, Columbia, and Augusta could be united 
with the "Western troops and other forces on the Atlantic 
coast, and endanger isolated columns. Besides, a great 
strategist, General Joseph E. Johnston, had been appointed to 
the command of all the forces available to resist General Sher- 
man, in tacit recognition of the fact that his management of 
defensive campaigns promised better results than that of any 
other general who could be assigned to command in the Car- 
olinas ; but General Johnston's conduct of the defensive was 
now to be subject to conditions radically different from those 
of the Atlanta campaign. His army, as before, was inferior to 
that of General Sherman's, and was composed of fragmentary 
troops, whose morale was in harmony with the condition of 
the cause which they represented ; and, besides, he was to 
meet his old antagonist, with an army whose spirit had risen, 
if possible, with its successive triumphs, and not now, as before, 
restrained in maneuver by connection with a railroad as its 
only channel of supply. General Johnston could therefore 
have no hope of success, unless he could strike unsupported 
columns and defeat General Sherman in detail ; and past expe- 
rience did not give promise of such an opportunity. 

In advancing from Columbia, General Sherman, as before, 
covered his real object by a menace in a different direction. 
He now directed General Slocum to threaten Charlotte, North 
Carolina, to create the impression that he would strike that 
point on his way to Virginia, while in reality directing his 
army to Goldsboro. Accordingly, General Slocum resumed 
motion on the 17th, crossed the Saluda at Mount Zion Church 
on the 19th, and Broad river at Freshley's mills the day fol- 
lowing, and arrived at Winnsboro on the 21st. On this march 
the left wing and cavalry destroyed several miles of railroad 
north and south of Alston. The right wing, General Sherman 
accompanying, left Columbia on the 20th, on the direct road 
to Winnsboro, and destroyed the railroad between the two 
places. Eighty squares in Columbia were left in ashes from a. 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 311 

conflagration whose origin and progress has been a matter of 
historical controversy. 

From Winnsboro the two wings again diverged. General 
Slocnm moved *to the north with his troops well spread out 
and then turned east, crossed the Catawba, and advanced to 
Snecdsboro. The cavalry on his left demonstrated toward 
Charlotte, and then followed to Sneedsboro. The right wing, 
in the meantime, advanced to Cheraw — the Seventeenth Corps 
entering that place on the 2d of March. The enemy offered 
some resistance, but did not retard a single column. Wheeler's 
cavalry and the forces from Charleston appeared at times 
before the columns. The other forces, including Cheatham's 
from the West, were directed to Charlotte, under the impres- 
sion that this was the objective. 

From Pedee river the two wings moved toward Fayetteville, 
crossing near Sneedsboro and at Cheraw — the corps moving on 
separate roads, and the cavalry maintaining position on the 
left flank. On the 9th of March, General Hampton surprised 
one of General Kilpatrick's brigades, and gained a temporary 
advantage over his whole force. General Kilpatrick barely 
escaped capture on foot. The enemy, however, stopped to 
plunder the camps, and this gave time for the national cavalry 
to rally ; and having done this, General Kilpatrick charged 
and recaptured his camps and repelled all subsequent attacks. 
General J. G. Mitchell, with his brigade of infantry, reached 
the scene of conflict just as the enemy abandoned his effort to 
regain his lost advantage. 

On the 11th, the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Corps arrived 
at Fayetteville and skirmished with Hampton's cavalry, which 
covered General Hardee as he withdrew from the town on the 
bridge spanning Cape Fear river, which he succeeded in burn- 
ing. It was anticipated that General Hardee would contest 
the possession of this place, but he abandoned it without resist- 
ing and with it a vast amount of public property, including an 
immense arsenal. At Fayetteville, General Sherman was met 
by the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth commanding, 
and the gunboat Eolus, Lieutenant-Commander Young, with 
the first intelligence of the fall of Wilmington, and he then 



312 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

dispatched orders fo Generals Schofield and Terry to move 
upon Goldsboro. 

The march through South Carolina had left a track of deso- 
lation more than forty miles wide. That state's special guilt 
in taking the initiative in secession, was assumed by officers 
and men as the justification of its devastation. As many of 
the Southern people who were originally opposed to secession, 
blamed South Carolina for precipitating the movement, and 
having themselves experienced the terrible retributions of the 
war which resulted, desired that South Carolina should feel 
war's heavy hand before peace should come, it was not strange 
that the national troops in marching through the state which 
originally suggested secession, and studiously endeavored to 
induce the Southern States to withdraw from the Union, should 
leave behind them the fearful evidences of vengeance achieved. 
But it was easier for the veterans of the war to find justifica- 
tion for sweeping desolation in their own feelings than it is for 
others to find grounds for its historical vindication. 

As General Johnston had now lost a large number of im- 
portant places without losing their garrisons, and had been 
joined by several thousand troops from the "West, it was now 
possible for him to unite all to resist General Sherman between 
Fayetteville and Goldsboro. Altogether they did not consti- 
tute an army equal to General Sherman's, yet, when united, 
were formidable against either wing or a smaller fraction. Re- 
ferring to these forces, General Sherman thus wrote : " These 
made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable 
enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme cau- 
tion in making the last step necessary to complete the march I 
have undertaken." In a letter to General Schofield, of March 
12th, he said that General Johnston might concentrate at Ra- 
leigh from forty to forty -five thousand men, and wrote:" I can 
whip that number with my present force, and with yours and 
Terry's added, we can go wherever we can live." To General 
Grant, the same clay, he wrote : " Joe Johnston may try to in- 
terpose between me and Schofield about ISTewbern ; but I think 
he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered armies at 
Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get my men 
reclothed and our wagons reloaded." 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 313 

General Sherman's maneuvers, after leaving Fayettevillc, 
were, in type, a repetition of his former strategy. He moved 
his cavalry toward Raleigh, and followed immediately with 
four divisions of the left wing, and more remotely with four 
of the right, throwing all his trains and the four remaining 
divisions farther to the east. He commenced these movements 
on the 15th. At 3 a. m. General Kilpatrick advanced on the 
direct road to Averyshoro to make the feint on Raleigh, and 
then strike the railroad near Smithfield. General Slocum fol- 
lowed with four unincumbered divisions. General Howard 
held four divisions in trim to march to General Slocum's help 
should there be need. The trains of the left wing, with two 
divisions, moved on the direct road to Goldsboro, and the trains 
and two divisions of the right wing, toward Faison Station on 
the Wilmington and Goldsboro railroad. General Sherman ac- 
companied the left wing. 

The heavy rains made quagmires of the roads, and it became 
necessary to corduroy them for the artillery. So much of this 
work had been done in the swamps of South Carolina, that 
great facility had been attained, and the army moved on with- 
out serious delays. During the evening of the 15th, General 
Kilpatrick met a strong force of infantry near Taylor's Hole 
creek, under the command of General Hardee. He skirmished 
with the rear-guard and captured some prisoners, among whom 
was Colonel Rhett of the heavy artillery. The next morning 
General Slocum advanced his infantry columns to the vicinity 
of Averysboro, and found General Hardee intrenched on a nar- 
row neck of swampy land between the Cape Fear and South 
rivers. General Hardee's position was in front of the point 
where the Goldsboro road through Bentonville leaves the main 
road leading in the direction of Raleigh. This was the first 
positive resistance which had been offered by infantry in strong 
force north of Savannah, and was doubtless intended to retard 
General Sherman's advance, until General Johnston could pre- 
pare for still stronger opposition at some point farther north 
or east. At this time the conjecture was that he would con- 
centrate at Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro ; but his point of 
intended concentration was much nearer than either of these 
towns. But the execution of General Sherman's plan, wher- 



314 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

ever General Johnston might offer battle, required that Gen- 
eral Hardee should be dislodged. "Without this, the feint on 
Raleigh could not be sustained or even fully initiated, and the 
ultimate reunion of the columns, as contemplated, could not 
be effected, as General Hardee barred the diverging road to 
Goldsboro. 

General Slocum was therefore ordered to advance against 
General Hardee, whose position was not strong, except from 
intrenchments and the softness of the ground before it, which 
scarcely admitted the deployment and advance of infantry, 
and rendered the movement of horses almost impossible. 
Notwithstanding this obstacle, General Slocum advanced, 
Williams' corps leading and Ward's division deployed. Gen- 
eral Ward's skirmishers soon developed Rhett's brigade of 
artillery, acting as infantry, behind slight intrenchments, 
whose trend was at right angles to the road, and was sus- 
tained by a battery, which enfiladed the line of direct ap- 
proach. Direct attack being perilous, General Williams 
threw a brigade on the left of the enemy's line, when the 
quondam artillerymen, in complete rout, fell back to a 
stronger position. This success opened the way for a general 
attack, to accomplish which Jackson's division formed on* the 
right of Ward and General Davis' two divisions of the Four- 
teenth Corps on his left. General Kilpatrick was directed to 
reach out beyond Jackson's right flank and grasp the Benton- 
ville road. One brigade of cavalry gained the road, but was 
attacked furiously by McLaw's division, and driven back. 
After this repulse, General Slocum's whole line advanced, 
pushed General Hardee within his intrenchments, and pressed 
him there so heavily that during the following dark and stormy 
night he retreated. The next morning, General Ward fol- 
lowed through Averysboro, but soon rejoined the main force, 
in motion on the Goldsboro road, which the engagement had 
opened. General Slocum lost about eighty killed and four 
hundred and eighty wounded. The enemy left one hundred 
and seventy-eight dead on the field, and lost one hundred and 
seventy-five men and three guns by capture. The number 
of his wounded was not ascertained. General Ward's pursuit 



AVERYSBOKO AND BENTONVILLE. 315 

developed the fact that General Hardee had retreated toward 
Smithfield. 

The night previous, General Kilpatrick crossed South river, 
and on the 17th advanced toward Elevation, on the east bank. 
General Slocum built a bridge over the swollen stream, and 
then advanced on the Goldsboro road. General Sherman con- 
tinued with the left wing, and encamped with the head of 
column, on the night of the 18th, on the Goldsboro road, 
twenty-live miles from Goldsboro, and five from Benton vi lie, 
at a point where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses 
the one to Goldsboro. General Howard reached Lee's store, 
a few miles distant, the same night, and the two wings were 
sufficiently near to give support in battle, and were upon 
roads which united a short distance to the east. 

Up to this time, General Sherman had anticipated an attack 
upon his left flank ; but he was now led to believe that Gen- 
eral Johnston would not attack, as it was supposed that he 
had retreated to Smithfield, and he gave orders for the two 
columns to move upon Goldsboro — General Howard, on the 
new Goldsboro road, by Falling Creek Church, to give the 
direct road to General Slocum. His object was to concentrate 
his forces at Goldsboro as soon as practicable, and he moved 
to General Howard's head of column, to open communication 
with Generals Schofield and Terry — the former coming to meet 
him from Newbern, and the latter from Wilmington, having 
conjointly from thirty to thirty -five thousand men. It was 
not known that General Johnston's whole army was in imme- 
diate proximity, but it was supposed that only cavalry would 
be met on the way to Goldsboro. 

Scarcely had General Carlin's division of the Fourteenth 
Corps, in the advance of the left wing, wheeled into the road 
to push on to Goldsboro, when Dibbrell's division of cavalry 
was met, whose stubborn resistance indicated that there was 
support, or that its courage had given a new type to the con- 
flict of cavalry with infantry. Being under orders to press 
on, and supposing that cavalry alone was in his front, General 
Carlin engaged the enemy vigorously, and soon the responsive 
roar of artillery announced the opening of a battle which 
General Johnston was delivering, in expectation of crushing 



316 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

the Fourteenth Corps at least. But the magnitude of the 
conflict was not yet apparent. As the resistance of the enemy 
became more stubborn, Colonels Hobart's and Miles' brigades 
were deployed, the former on the right, and Colonel Buell was 
sent, by order of General Slocum, some distance to the left to 
develop the enemy's line. The resistance offered by the en- 
emy was supposed at first to be done by cavalry, and General 
Slocum so reported to General Sherman, who had gone to the 
right to join General Howard, whose columns were moving 
toward Goldsboro. 

As resistance increased, General Morgan was directed to 
move to the right of Carlin in support. The former threw 
General Mitchell's brigade to the right of Miles' brigade and 
the road, and General Fearing's to the right and rear of 
Mitchell — both in double lines. The Seventy-eighth Illinois 
of the former was sent forward to skirmish. Under this 
stronger formation, both division generals were directed to 
press the enemy closely, and compel him to reveal his position 
and strength. 

General Slocum soon became convinced that he had before 
him a force more formidable than a division of cavalry- 
While still in doubt as to the strength of the enemy, a deserter 
came to him, who had been a national soldier, who gave in- 
formation that General Johnston had, by forced marches, 
massed his entire army in his front. This statement being 
supported by actual developments, induced General Slocum 
to prepare for defense, and immediately ordered General Wil- 
liams to throw his train to the right, gather his forces, and 
hasten to the support of General Davis. He then sent a mes- 
senger to General Sherman to announce that there was evi- 
dence that an army was before him. 

The direction of General Hardee's retreat from Averysboro, 
had led to the belief that the way to Goldsboro was open. 
And this was the impression that General Johnston desired 
to make by all his movements. General Hardee meanwhile 
had changed direction not far from Averysboro, and by a 
detour, had united his command with the other forces con- 
centrated and intrenched near Bentonville. Apparently, the 
coveted conditions of the battle assured the success of General 



AVEEYSBOEO AND EENTONVILLE. 317 

Johnston's strategy, for two divisions in isolation were within 
his reach ; two more were distant a few miles, and the four 
divisions of the right wing, intended for the support of the 
left, in the event of battle, were in rapid motion toward Golds- 
boro, far to the right. General Williams' defeat, in prospect, 
was to follow that of General Davis, and the other corps and 
detached divisions were to be defeated in turn, and the trains 
destroyed. The plan miscarried, mainly, from two unex- 
pected causes — the resistance of two divisions until the Twen- 
tieth Corps could give support, and the lack of complete con- 
cert of action in General Johnston's army, composed of the 
commands of Generals Bragg, Hardee, S. D. Lee, and Cheat- 
ham. 

When General Slocum first ordered the Twentieth Corps 
to move quickly to the field, it was his intention to form it on 
the right of the Fourteenth, but when he became fully con- 
vinced that General Johnston's army was in his front, he di- 
rected General Williams to form his corps, as the several frac- 
tions should reach the field, on the left of General Davis. 
Robinson's being in the advance, was the first to come up, and 
was placed in support of Carlin's division. 

Anticipating that Colonel Bucll would need support in his 
movement, General Carlin was directed by General Davis to 
move Hobart's brigade to the left, and place Robinson's 
brigade in its place in the line, and support a battery, located 
on the main road, which had been responding to the enemy's 
artillery. 

Colonel Buell, in advancing as directed, soon struck the 
enemy's intrenchments, which he assaulted furiously. After 
a somewhat protracted struggle, resulting in heavy loss, Col- 
onel Buell was forced to withdraw his brigade, which had 
been badly broken, when the enemy sallied from his works 
in strong force in pursuit, and pressed him back, until checked 
by Hobart's brigade, which offered most stubborn resistance. 

When the action commenced, the small train of the corps, 
in charge of General Vanderveer's brigade, was moved to the 
right, until this brigade had reached the right of General 
Mitchell, where the troops were formed in double lines, with 
their right resting on a swamp. This was a timely disposi- 



318 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONV1LLE. 

tion, as the advance of the enemy against Colonel Buell was 
merely an incident in General Johnston's plan of aggression, 
which was to wheel his whole line upon its left to envelop 
and capture General Davis' two divisions. Colonel Hobart, 
first, after Colonel Buell, felt the force of this general attack, 
but he was not entirely encompassed, as BuelPs attack ha*d 
broken the continuity of the enemy's movement, and General 
Johnston's troops on the right of the point assaulted by Buell 
failed to move forward promptly. This failure gave time for 
General Davis to make such dispositions as were essential to 
his safety, and afforded General Slocum opportunity to bring 
up his reserve artillery and locate it with reference to the 
arrest of the enemy and the formation of a new line to the 
left and rear. 

The front attack upon Hobart and Robinson on his right, 
was so vigorous as to involve them speed ily in the severest 
conflict, and soon after in retreat upon the artillery, put in 
position far to the rear, on the main road. The recession of 
these brigades exposed the artillery on the right of Robinson, 
three pieces of which were captured, and also caused the re- 
tirement of Miles' brigade between Mitchell's left and the 
road. There were now only two brigades, Mitchell's and 
Vanderveer's, on the original line, and the flank of the former 
was in air. 

At this juncture, General Davis rode to his right and or- 
dered General Fearing's brigade to move to the left, forming 
line of battle as it advanced, and facing the Benton ville road. 
This brigade moved quickly and was soon lost to view in the 
thickly wooded swamp. General Morgan now directed Gen- 
eral Mitchell to throw his second line on his left, but this 
movement had been anticipated by the brigade commander 
in provision for the stability of his left flank. Mitchell's brig- 
ade was now in single line, bent at right angles in the center. 

The full weight of the enemy's attack was soon after felt by 
all the troops on the field. The forces that had driven back 
Carlin's division and Robinson's brigade, pursued toward the 
batteries in the rear, and heavy columns assaulted Mitchell 
and Vanderveer with great impetuosity. General Slocum 
had been active in forming a new line near his artillery, which 



AVERYSBORO AXD BEXTONVILLE. 319 

covered there-formation of the troops that had been driven back 
on the left. To this result General Fearing rendered timely 
co-operation, as he advanced against the flank of the columns 
in parallelism to the road, and brought upon himself a counter 
attack by overwhelming numbers. Wounded himself, and 
his brigade decimated, he persisted in holding his position for 
a time, but was finally compelled to give ground, to the expo- 
sure of Mitchell's flank. In the emergency, General Morgan 
threw Vanderveer's second line to Mitchell's left; but his line 
thus extended, was soon overlapped, and the two brigades, in 
single line, were exposed to attacks in front and rear, as they 
were cut off from all support and from all communication 
with the corps commander, and each brigade was separately 
surrounded. Repulsing the enemy in front repeatedly, they 
leaped their barricades and reversing the direction of their fire 
repelled the enemy from their rear. In this state of affairs, 
General Davis put into the action his escort and_ a train-guard 
of four companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Topping. Gen- 
eral Hoke and a part of his division were captured in the rear 
of Mitchell and Vanderveer, but as a guard could not be 
spared from the engagement, the prisoners passed round Van- 
derveer's right flank and escaped. 

In the meantime, the new line had been formed at right an- 
gles to the road, at the batteries, and Fearing's brigade and 
portions of Carlin's division faced the road, but not in con- 
nection with Mitchell's left. The general line was now bent 
twice at right angles — an improvised formation, but the most 
effective possible for defense ; for the enemy's columns of at- 
tack to the left of Mitchell's salient angle were taken in flank 
in assaulting either the line parallel to the road or the one 
at right angles to it, while batteries enfiladed the road between 
the two angles of the line, and to some extent covered the 
opening between Mitchell and the troops on his left, and also 
swept a wide open space to the left of the road. The firmness 
of Mitchell and Vanderveer contributed largely to break the 
offensive force of General Johnston's army. 

Late in the evening, Cogswell's brigade of the First division, 
Twentieth Corps, moved into the space between Fearing and 



320 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

Mitchell, and drove the enemy back until nearly all the lost 
ground was recovered. 

Viewed in relation to the magnitude of the army, success- 
fully resisted by eight brigades of infantry, and Kilpatrick's 
division of cavalry, which held position on the left and rear, 
the objects and hopes of the enemy and the character of the 
fighting by Morgan's division, this engagement takes rank 
amongst the great decisive battles of the war. The defense, 
tinder such unequal conditions, was triumphantly successful, 
and General Johnston here failed in the only special aggres- 
sive effort against General Sherman in his march from Atlanta 
to Raleigh. That the issue turned upon the action of the 
brigades of Mitchell, Vanderveer, and Fearing, can not be 
doubted. The two former did not give an inch of ground to 
the enemy, though thrown into single lines, cut off from sup- 
port, surrounded, and compelled to fight in front and rear. 
The action of Fearing's brigade was not less important, as it 
disturbed and defeated General Johnston's combination to 
utilize for complete success his first advantage. General Fear- 
ing fought in complete isolation for some time, without de- 
fenses, and when his right flank was struck by the enemy with 
such force as to shatter it, he changed front upon his left, ral- 
lied his shattered troops, and held the ground essential to the 
stability of the new line. The later dispositions and resistance 
by the whole command gave a symmetry and brilliancy to the 
conflict which have seldom found expression in such urgent 
improvision. 

To the enemy the issue must have been dispiriting in the 
extreme. Sadly and hopelessly must the Confederate chief- 
tain have witnessed the failure of his initiative, in destroying 
General Sherman's corps consecutively, in their isolation. He 
had constructed his fortifications, which were strong and elab- 
orate, to accomplish this object. His intrenchments crossed 
the main Goldsboro' road at right angles, then extended to 
the west one mile, and then curved more than two miles to 
the west-northwest, nearly parallel to the road, but concealed 
by distance and forests. He then resisted strongly on the 
Bentonville road to conceal his fortifications at that point, that 
he might throw his whole army around the Fourteenth Corps 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 321 

and interpose between it and the Twentieth, which, at the 
first, was nearly ten miles in the rear, and restrained from 
swift motion by exceedingly boggy roads, made almost im- 
passable by the wagons and artillery of the Fourteenth Corps. 
The failure of the initiative of this elaborate plan, was there- 
fore entirely unexpected to General Johnston, and was doubt- 
less as much a surprise to himself as was the presence of his 
army at Bentonville to General Sherman, who scattered his 
columns the morning before the battle, believing that the Con- 
federate army was far to the north, having abandoned the 
purpose of offering further resistance to his advance to Golds- 
"boro. 

In the evening the remainder of the Twentieth Corps 
reached the field, and was placed on the left of the line of bat- 
tle, with Kilpatrick's troopers covering that flank. 

"When General Sherman was informed by General Slocum, 
through a messenger late iu the day, that General Johnston's 
.army had been developed, he directed him to call up his 
two divisions guarding the wagon trains, and also General 
Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, then in the rear of 
the right wing, but several miles distant, and to act defensively 
until he could direct the remaining divisions of the right wing 
to the enemy's left and rear, from the direction of Cox's bridge 
over the Neuse river. At the time, General Howard's advance 
was near this bridge, about ten miles from Goldsboro. Gen- 
eral Sherman did not give full credit to General Slocum's re- 
ports of General Johnston's concentration at Bentonville, as 
he did not believe that he would accept or invite battle with 
the Neuse river in his rear. 

On the morning of the 20th, Generals Baird and Geary, 
each with two brigades, and General Hazen, with his entire 
division, arrived on the field. General Hazen, by direction of 
General Slocum, formed his command on the right of General 
Morgan, and General Baird moved out in front of the line of 
battle of the preceding day. These three generals received 
orders to press the enemy, and General Morgan gained a por- 
tion of his line on the right. 

At 2 a. m., on the 20th, General Sherman informed General 
VOL. II — 21 



322 AVEEYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

Slocum that lie would go to his support with his whole army. 
He turned back the right wing from the JSTeuse river, ordered 
General Schofield to push for Goldsboro and then move 
toward Smithfield, and instructed General Terry to move on 
Cox's bridge and establish a crossing. By daylight, General 
Howard's columns were in motion toward Benton ville. Cav- 
alry was encountered earlier, but the first infantry was found 
behind barricades near Bentonville, three miles east of the 
battle-field. General Logan, in moving forward, ascertained 
that General Johnston's left was refused behind a parapet, 
connecting with the intrenchments before General Slocum, 
with a salient on the main Goldsboro road between the two 
wings. His flanks rested on Mill creek, covering the road to 
Smithfield, which crosses the stream on a bridge. General 
Sherman directed General Howard to approach cautiously, 
who connected his left flank with General Slocum's right at 
4 p. M., and then a strong line was presented to the enemy. 

On the 21st, General Sherman gave orders to press the 
enemy with skirmishers, use artillery freely, but not give 
battle unless at an advantage. The same day, General 
Schofield reached Goldsboro, and General Terry laid a pon- 
toon bridge at Cox's bridge, and then the three armies, in the 
aggregate nearly one hundred thousand men, were virtually 
united. 

During the day, General Mower's division of the Seven- 
teenth Corps worked round the enemy's left flank, and nearly 
reached the bridge so essential to General Johnston. This 
movement and the approach of Generals Schofield and Terry 
induced General Johnston to abandon his position the follow- 
ing night. General Johnston, in this case as in all others dur- 
ing the war, made a safe retreat. He sacrificed his pickets 
and left his wounded in hospitals, but lost nothing of value 
besides. 

General Slocum lost nine officers and one hundred and 
forty-five men killed, fifty-one officers and eight hundred and 
sixteen men wounded, and two hundred and twenty-three 
captured. The aggregate loss was twelve hundred and forty- 
seven. He buried on the field one hundred and sixty-seven 
of the enemy, and captured three hundred and thirty prisoners. 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 323 

General Howard's total loss was three hundred and ninety- 
nine, and he captured twelve hundred and eighty-seven.* 

General Johnston was pursued at dawn the next morning 
but the troops were soon recalled, when General Sherman 
renewed his orders for the concentration at Goldsboro. 

After the armies had been placed in encampments, General 
Sherman visited General Grant to confer with regard to the 
final operations of the war on the Atlantic coast. He returned 
with the impression that General Lee would unite with Gen- 
eral Johnston after abandoning Richmond. But whatever the 
specific action of the two Confederate generals might be, he 
was to co-operate with General Grant by advancing against 
General Johnston and then mo vine: north. 

At Goldsboro, General Sherman proposed a new organiza- 
tion for his combined armies, giving General Schofield the 
command of the " center," and thus designating his forces, 
retaining for the right wing its old designation, Army of the 
Tennessee, and styling the two corps of the Army of the 
Cumberland, the Fourteenth and Twentieth, the " Army of 
Georgia." The left wing had informally borne this name 
during the march through Georgia and the Carolinas, but 
these corps were only really detached from the Army of the 
Cumberland after they had fought their last battle. 

This fact gives the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Corps 
a community of fame and glory achieved at Nashville and 
Bentonville. General Sherman had assigned them separate 
fields of operation, but had not formally separated them until 
it was too late to give them new historic relations. The fame 
of " Bentonville," quite as much as that of "Franklin" and 
" Nashville," belongs to the Army of the Cumberland. At 
Bentonville, the Fourteenth Corps, long under the personal 
command of General Thomas, and the Twentieth, of more re- 
cent connection with the Army of the Cumberland, but of 
friendly alliance, achieved a great victory. Indeed, all the 
achievements of these three corps, in union or separation, are 
portions of the history of the same army, as by hearty consent 
each has an interest in the aggregate glory. They have an 

* General Sherman's statement in official report. 



324 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

undivided tenure in the fame of the army, achieved in all the 
battles from Lookout Mountain to Jonesboro ; not less do they 
hold in common the glory of the fields so widely separated. 
The shouts of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps at Savan- 
nah for victory at Nashville, in which the Fourth and their 
own representatives had a share, and their beloved commander 
the chief glory, was answered in glad response from every 
camp in Tennessee and Alabama for the repulse of General 
Johnston in his attempt to bring defeat and disgrace to the 
oldest corps of the unequaled Army of the Cumberland. 

On the 9th of April, General Lee surrendered himself and 
his army to General Grant, and on the following morning, Gen- 
eral Sherman's armies moved from the vicinity of Goldsboro 
toward Smithfield and Raleigh, against the only remaining 
Confederate army east of the Mississippi river. General John- 
ston knew well that he could not resist the hundred thousand 
men moving against him, but to make the most of his slender 
possibilities, he retreated through Raleigh as General Sherman 
advanced, and fell back to Greensboro. His objects were to 
avoid the crime of waging a hopeless warfare, to get the best 
possible terms in a surrender which would terminate it, and 
disband his troops on such conditions as would prevent their 
plundering their friends as they sought their homes. The last 
campaigns had inflicted upon the South losses of a magnitude 
transcending approximate estimation* and a desolated country, 
wasted resources and the traditions of a lost cause (but a cause 
which, during the bloody trial of its existence and supremacy, 
had commanded the persistent efforts and strongest aspirations 
of millions) were now the sad inheritance of a proud people. 
And General Johnston sought to save what material resources 
remained, and to return his soldiers to their homes with as 
little demoralization as possible. 

At Smithfield, General Sherman heard of the surrender of 
General Lee, and pressed forward with the conviction. that he 
would soon give the final blow. At Raleigh, he dropped his 
trains, and directed General Howard to follow the line of re- 
treat, and General Slocum to take a route to the south through 
Pittsville and Ashboro, in expectation that General Johnston 
would follow the railroad to Salisbury. On the 14th, he re- 



AVERYSBOItO AND BENTONVILLE. 325 

ceiveda note which opened negotiations and resulted in a con- 
vention embracing conditions of peace as well as the surrender 
of the remaining Confederate forces and armies, and declaring a 
truce until after notice should be given of its discontinuance, 
on account of the disapproval of the government of the terma 
agreed upon. The government did disapprove, and the stipu- 
lated notice of forty-eight hours, as the limit of the truce, was 
given on the 24th. Two days later, there was a second con- 
ference at General Johnston's request, which resulted in the 
surrender of all the forces of the Confederacy east of the Chat- 
tahoochee river. The next day General Sherman announced 
in orders the cessation of hostilities, and made provision for 
the relief of the people. He then directed Generals Howard 
and Slocum to move their armies through Richmond to 
Washington. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Fatetteville, N. C, March 12, 18G5. 



General : — 



We must not lose time for Joe Johnston to concentrate at Golclsboro. 
We can not prevent his concentrating at Baleigh, but he shall have no 
rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his railroad from Newbern 
as fast as he can, and you do the same from Wilmington. If we can get 
the roads to, and secure Goldsboro by April 10th, it will be soon enough, 
but every day is worth a million of dollars. I can whip Joe Johnston, 
provided he don't catch one of my corps in flank ; and I will see that my 
army marches hence to Goldsboro in compact form. 

********* 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Major-General Terry, Commanding United States Forces, Wilmington, N. C. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Fayetteville, N. C., March 12, 1865. 
Dear General : — 

********* 
I hope you have not been uneasy about us and that the fruits of this 
march will be appreciated. It had to be made not only to secure the val- 
uable depots by the way, but its incidents, in the necessary fall of Charles- 
ton, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can add Goldsboro to the list 



326 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

without too much cost, I will be in position to aid you materially in the 
spring campaign. 

Joe Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield 
about Newbern ; but 1 think he will not try that, but concentrate his scat- 
tered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get my 
men reclothed and our wagons reloaded. 

Keep everybody busy and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro or 
Charlotte from Knoxville ; even a feint in that quarter will be most im- 
portant. . . . 

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days. 

Yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Lieutenant- General V. S. Grant, Commanding United States Army, City Point. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, opposite Fatetteville, N. C, Tuesday, March 14, 1865. 

General : — I am now across Cape Fear river, and to-morrow will draw 
out ten miles, and next day, if weather is favorable, will begin to ma- 
neuver on Goldsboro. I shall feign on Raleigh, by approaching, and it 
maybe striking the railroad half-way between Goldsboro and Raleigh; 
then, as soon as the wagons- are well toward Faison's, will swing rapidly in 
front of Goldsboro, but will not cross the Neuse till I hear from you. 
You must push vigorously toward Kingston and Goldsboro, with the ab- 
solute certainty that I will engage the attention of Joe Johnston's army 
to the west and southwest of Goldsboro. . . . 

I take it for granted Joe Johnston now has S. D. Lee's corps, four 
thousand (4,000); Cheatham's, five thousand (5,000); Hoke's, eight thou- 
sand (8,000) ; Hardee's, ten thousand (10,000) ; and detachments, about ten 
thousand (10,000); making thirty-seven thousand (37,000), with near eight 
thousand (8.000) cavalry. Our duty is to effect a junction south of the 
Neuse ; but if you can get Kingston whilst Joe Johnston is engaged with 
me, do so, and push on toward Goldsboro. I will attack the Raleigh 

road. . . . 

I am, yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Schofield, Commanding at Newbern. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, opposite Fayetteville, Tuesday, March 14, 1865. 

Dear General :— I am now across Cape Fear river with nearly all my 

army, save one division, with orders to cross at daylight to-morrow. I 

shall then draw out ten miles, and begin my maneuvers for the possession 

of Goldsboro, which is all important for our future purposes. 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTON VILLE. 327 

T was in hopes that 1 could get some shoes and stockings at Wilming- 
ton, but the tug Davidson has returned with Brigadier-General Dodge, 

chief quartermaster, with word that there is no clothing there; but he 
brings us some forage, sugar, and coffee. I can get along for ten days, 
having forced the army to collect plenty of beef and a good deal oi 
meal. 

I shall to-night move my cavalry (5,000) straight toward Raleigh, and 
follow it with four divisions infantry, without train-, and keep the trains 
off toward the right rear. 1 will hold another four divisions in close sup- 
port, and move toward Smith-field, or to strike the railroad half way be- 
tween Goldsboro and Raleigh; then, when my trains are well across 
toward the Neuse, will move rapidly to Bentonville, and afterward, at 
hisure, move opposite Goldsboro, and open direct communication with 
General Schofield, who is ordered to push against Kingston and Golds- 
boro. T may cross the Neuse about Cox's bridge, and move into Goldsb m > ; 
but will not attempt it till within close communication with General 
Schofield. I have sent full orders to Schofield. It will not do to build 
any determinate plan until I am in full possession of Goldsboro. I have 
ordered Generals Schofield and Terry to push toward Goldsboro as hard 
as possible from the east, as I advance from the southwest. The enemy 
is superior to me in cavalry, but I can beat his infantryman for man; 
and I do n't think that he can bring forty thousand (40,000) men for battle. 
I will force him to guard Raleigh until I have interposed between it and 
Goldsboro. 

Weather is good now, but threatens rain. We are all well. Keep all 
parts busy, and I will give the enemy no rest. 

Yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 

Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, City Point. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, opposite Fayetteville, N. C., March 14, 1865. 

General :— I have notified General Howard that to-morrow night your 
head of column will be near the cross-roads above Kyle's landing; the 
next day across Black river, near Mingo, and third day near Bentonville ; 
and have instructed him to have four (4) divisions in easy support, and a 
little in advance of you— say, five or six miles— so that, on receiving 
orders or hearing battle, he may come promptly up on your right. 

I think Colonel Garber can promise you another boat, in which case it 
would be well to send to Wilmington your prisoners of war You might 
leave them to-morrow where the gunboat lies, two (2) miles below Gen- 
eral Howard's bridge, and the guard, if unable to overtake you the day 
after to-morrow, could follow direct to Bentonville. I want the first 
marches to be made with prudence and deliberation. I am willing to ac- 



328 AVERYSBOEO AND BENTONVILLE. 

cept battle with Johnston's concentrated force, but would not attack him 
in position until I make a junction with General Schofield. 

I am, truly yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major- General Commanding. 
Mojor-General Slocum, Commanding Left Wing. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
[n the Field, opposite Fatetteville, March 14, 1865 — 7 p. m. 

General : — I think I have studied the problem of the next move, and 
will give you in confidence its analysis. 

We must make a strong feint on Ealeigh, and strike with cavalry, if 
possible, the railroad near Smithfield. I take it for granted that the 
bridge will be too strongly guarded for General Kilpatrick to surprise, 
and therefore I will leave him to disable that road, of course only par- 
tially, between the Neuse and Eureka. To this end the cavalry will 
move to-night across the bridge, beginning at 3 a. m., and will push up 
the plank-road to about Averysboro, General Slocum following up with 
four disincumbered divisions to near the forks of the road, moving his 
trains by a cross-road toward Bentonville. The next move will be the 
cavalry to Elevation, and General Slocum will cross Black river. The- 
next move will bring General Slocum to Bentonville, and Kilpatrick, sup- 
ported by a division of infantry, will make a dash for the railroad. This 
is as far as I will now determine. 

I want you to be as near in support as possible. I do think it is John- 
ston's only chance to meet this army before an easyjunction can be effected 
with General Schofield. 

I would like you to have four (4) divisions free to move rapidly to the 
sound of battle in the direction of Mingo creek and Elevation, and, at any 
event, to make a junction by head of column with General Slocum at 
Bentonville. The weather looks bad, and I fear we may have swamps 
about South river. I think it would be well for you to have four divisions 
to get ahead of General Slocum's trains on the direct road from Fayette- 
ville to Bentonville, and keeping ahead of him about five or six miles, so- 
as, in case of action, to come up on his right. 

Yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General 0. 0. Howard, Commanding Right Wine 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, 18 Miles northeast Fayetteville, March 17, 1865 — 7 a. m. 
General : — General Slocum found the enemy covering the narrow neck 
from Taylor's creek to Goldsboro road. He drove them from two succes- 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 329 

sive positions, taking three guns, some prisoners, wounded, but losing 
himself pretty severely — I think as many as three hundred in all; but 
the enemy lost heavily also, from appearances. . . . 

General Slocum will feel out toward Averysboro, but move his column 
on the Goldsboro road, which is that which crosses Black and Mingo 
creeks, just ahead of where we are. Our true tacticswould be to pu 
our columns to Smithfield, but I will only follow Hardee far enough t.> 
give him impulse, when we must resume our course. 

I want you to-day to get to where the Goldsboro road crosses Mingo, 
and have that bridge well repaired. You need not come on to General 
Slocum unless you hear him engaged. We might cut his column at Ele- 
vation, but it will be enough to think of that to-night. 

General Blair is getting too far off; better draw him and all your trains 

toward Troublefield's Store. 

******** * 

Yours, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General 0. O. Howard, Commanding Right Wing. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Camp between North River and Mingo Creek, 

March 17, 1865. 
General : — 

•*#******# 

I have examined your order, and it will do, only get on a right-hand 
road as soon as possible, that you may not delay General Slocum's troops, 
who will all be forced on the one road. Try and keep around the head 
of Falling Water creek, viz., to the south. I will push General Slocum 
to-morrow and next day, and think by day after to-morrow we will be in 
position — viz., you directly in front of Goldsboro, and General Slocum at 
Cox's bridge. 

At the time I so.nt Colonel Ewing to you yesterday, the enemy had 
brought General Slocum up all standing, and it was on the theory that he 
would hold General Slocum there, that I wanted you at Mingo bridge. 
But the enemy retreated in the night on Smithfield, and we are again on 
the march, feigning to the left, but moving trains and troops as rapidly as 
the roads admit on Goldsboro. You may do the same. 

Yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General 

Major-General Howard, Commanding Right Wing. 



330 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Twenty-seven Miles from Goldsboro, N. O, 

March 18, 1865. 

General: — The Fourteenth Corps is here, but the Twentieth is well 
back. It started from Averysboro and North river, with General Kilpat- 
rick to the north of the road. We heard some musketry and artillery in 
that direction, but Colonel Poe left Mingo creek, which he bridged, at 11 
a. m., at which time the Twentieth Corps was a half mile behind. 

We can not get any farther to-day. General Davis may go a couple of 
miles farther to the forks of the road. I think this road, the Averysboro 
and Goldsboro road, will lead to Cox's bridge, though it is represented as 
passing three (3) miles south of Bentonville. 

Get on the right-hand road, so that General Geary and his trains may 
take that to Goldsboro, via Cox's bridge. 

I think the enemy is concentrated about Smithfield, and I can not 
make, out whether Goldsboro is held in force or not. I think it probable 
that Joe Johnston will try to prevent our getting to Goldsboro. 

I fear General Slocum will be jammed with all his trains in a narrow 
space; but, at the same time, I don't want to push you too far till his 
flank is better covered by the Neuse. General Slocum is back with the 
Twentieth Corps, and as soon as I hear from him I will send over to you. 
General Morgan's division found a couple of Hampton's regiments 
here, but they cleared out to the north as soon as he deployed skir- 
mishers. 

I am, general, very respectfully, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General 0. 0. Howard, Commanding Right Wing. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, March 18, 1865. 
General: — General Slocum is up. The firing you heard was General 
Kilpatrick, who found parties picketing the roads to the north. He re- 
ports Hardee retreating on Smithfield, and Joe Johnston collecting his 
old Georgia army this side of Raleigh. I know he will call in all minor 
posts, which embraces Goldsboro. You may therefore move straight for 
Goldsboro, leaving General Slocum the river road, and, if possible, the 
one from Lee's Store toward Falling Waters. Make a break into Golds- 
boro, from the south, and let your scouts strike out for General Schofield, 
at Kingston, though I hope to moet him at Goldsboro. 

Our roads are very bad, but I think the Fourteenth Corps will be at 
Cox's bridge to-morrow night, and will aim to strike the railroad to the 
northwest of Goldsboro. If any change occurs, I will notify you to-night. 

Yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Howard, present. Major-General. 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 331 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In tiie Field, Ten Miles southwest of Goldsboro, 

Sunday, March 19, 1865—2 i». m. 
Major-General Sc ho field, Kingston : 

To-night my left wing will be at Cox's bridge, and my right within ten 
miles of Goldsboro. To-morrow we will cross the Neuse river at ''ox's 
bridge, and be near Goldsboro, to prevent the enemy from occupying 
Goldsboro in force. 

The scout Pike has arrived with dispatch of 17th. Continuo to extend 
to the right as fast as possible, and I expect you to move toward Golds- 
boro, even if it be unnecessary, as I do n't want to lose men in direct attack, 
when it can be avoided. . . . 

We whipped Hardee easily about Averysboro. All retreated on Smith- 
field and Raleigh. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Falling Creek Church, March 19, 1865 — 2 r. M.* 
General : — General Howard, with one division, is now at this point, 
which is just three miles south from Cox's bridge and ten from 
Goldsboro. A scout is just in from General Schofield, who writes that he 
will leave Kingston for Goldsboro to-day or to-morrow. I have sent him 
a courier with orders to march straight for Goldsboro. General Howard's 
four (4) divisions are strung out, but he will push them through to-night. 
We occupy a position dangerous to the enemy, if he thinks he is in front 
of the whole army. You may strengthen your position, but feel the en- 
emy all night. If he is there at daylight we will move to Cox's bridge, 
and then turn toward you. I think you will find him gone in the morn- 
ing. General Howard has sent a regiment to Cox's bridge. It has not 
reported yet. He has the bridge across Falling Creek, two miles east of 
this, toward Goldsboro, and has some mounted men opposite Goldsboro, 
where they find a tcte-de-pont occupied by the enemy. General Blair is 
about five miles south of this with his trains. 

I will order General • Kilpatrick to remain with you. Get up your 
trains between Lee's Store and your camp, and keep the enemy busy 
until we can get up the Fourth division of the Fifteenth Corps. 

If you hear firing to your front, not explained by your own acts, you 
must assault or turn the enemy, for it will not do to let him fight us sep- 
arately. 

Yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Major-General Slocum, Commanding Left Wing. 

*The date of this dispatch is thus given in the " Report of the Committee on the Conduct of 
the War," Supplement, Part I., Second Session, Thirty-eighth Congress, page 358. But this 
must be an error, for the P. S. mentions the reception of a dispatch of 2 p. m. from General 
Slocum, from the battle-field of Bentonville. 



332 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

P. S. — Your note of 2 p. m. is just received. General Howard's regi- 
ments drove the pickets from the cross-roads, one mile this side of Cox's 
bridge. That will disturb the force to your front. General Howard can 
better help you from this quarter than by returning by Lee's Store. 

SHERMAN. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Falling Creek Church, March 19, 1865 — 5 p. m. 
General: — Your report of to-day is received. General Slocum thinks 
the whole rebel army is in his front. I can not think Johnston would 
fight us with the Neuse to his rear. You may remain with General Slo- 
cum until further orders,~x>r until the two wings come together. 

If that force remain in General Slocum's front to morrow, I will move 

straight on its rear. 

Yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
General Kilpatrick, Commanding Cavalry. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Falling Creek Church, March 20, 1865 — 2 a. m. 
General: — Yours of 8 p. m., 19th, is just received, and I acknowledge 
receipt by the direction of the general-in chief, who instructed me to say 
that the whole army is moving to your assistance as rapidly as possible. 
Upon its approach he wishes you to be prepared to assume the offensive 
against the enemy. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

A ssistant A djutant- General. 
Major-General Slocum, Commanding Left Wing. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Bentonville, March 20, 1865 — 2 p. m. 

General Schofield : — Your dispatch of yesterday is received. You can 

march into Goldsboro without opposition. General Terry is at Faison's, 

and I have ordered him to Cox's bridge until the present action is over. 

I am now within two miles of Slocum, but Johnston is between us. We 

are now skirmishing. 

After occupying Goldsboro, if you hear nothing to the contrary, join a 

part of your force with General Terry's, and come to me wherever I 

may be. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. IV.V.l 

Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi, 
In the Field, near Bentonville, N. C, March 22, 1865—10 \. M 
General: — Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. We whipped 
all of Joe Johnston's army yesterday, and he retreated in disorder in the 
night. We are in possession of the field, and our skirmishers are after 
his rear-guard, two miles north of Mill creek. AVe are not in condition 
as to supplies, to follow up, but will gradually draw back to Goldsboro, 

and refit. . . . 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
General Schojield, Goldsboro. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Cox's Bridge, Neuse River, N. C, March 22, 18G5. 
General : — 

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro. I was with the left wing 
until I supposed all danger passed; but when General Slocum's head of 
column was within four miles of Bentonville, after skirmishing as usual 
with cavalry, he became aware that there was infantry at his front. He 
deployed a couple of brigades, which, on advancing, sustained a partial 
repulse, but soon rallied, and he formed a line of the two leading divis- 
ions, Morgan's and Carlin's, of Jeff. C. Davis' corps. The enemy at- 
tacked these divisions with violence, but was repulsed. This was in the 
forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General Slocum brought forward the two 
divisions of the Twentieth Corps, and hastily disposed them for defense 
and General Kilpatrick moved his cavalry on the left. 

General Joe Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole army — 
Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he had from every 
quarter — determined, as he told his men, to crush one of our corps, and 
then defeat us in detail. He attacked General Slocum in position from 3 p. 
m. on the 1 9th till dark, but was everywhere repulsed, and lost fearfully. At 
the time, I was with the Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the 
right; but on hearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps to- 
ward Cox's bridge, and that night brought Blair's corps over, and on the 
20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear. We struck him 
about noon, and forced him to assume the defensive, and fortify. Yester- 
day we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him. 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, Commander-inChief, City Point, Va. 



334 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Goldsboro, N. C, March 31, 1865. 
Dear Sir: — I had the honor and satisfaction to receive your letter and 
telegram of welcome when at City Point and Old Point Comfort. 

I am back again at my post, possessed of the wishes and plans of the 
general-in-chief, and think, in due time, I can play my part in the coming 
campaign. All things are working well, and I have troops enough to ac- 
complish the part assigned me, and only wait the loading our wagons, 
patching up and mending, made necessary by the wear and tear of the 
past winter. . . . 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Goldsboro, N. C, April 5, 1865. 

Dear General: — I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my 
command. It is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that 
you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly can not help you in the way 
of orders or men, nor do I think you need either. General Cruft has just 
arrived with his provisional division, which will at once be broken up, 
and the men sent to their proper regiments, as that of Meagher was on my 
arrival. You may have some feeling about my asking that General 
Slocum should have command of the two corps that properly belonged 
to you — viz., Fourteenth and Twentieth; but you can recall that he was 
but a corps commander, and could not legally make orders of discharge, 
transfer, etc., which was imperatively necessary. I therefore asked that 
General Slocum be assigned to command " an army in the field," called 
the "Army of Georgia," composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. 
The order is not yet made b}^ the President, though I have recognized it, 
because both General Grant and the President sanctioned it, and prom- 
ised to have the order made. . . . 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 

Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Goldsboro, N. C, Aprill, 1865. 
General : — The capture of Richmond, and the retreat of Lee's army to 
the west (Danville and Lynchburg), necessitates a change in our plans. 
We will hold fast to Goldsboro and its lines, and move rapidly on Raleigh. 
I want you to be all ready to move early on Monday, straight on Smith- 
field and Raleigh, by the most direct road. General Schofield will sup- 
port you, with the Twenty-third Corps following you, and on the 10th the 
cavalry will move from Mount Olive and Faison's, by Bentonville and Tur- 



AVERYSBORO AND BEXTONVILLE. 335 

ner's bridge, the right wing by Pikesville and Whitely's mill, with a division 
around by Nahunta and Folk's bridge. If the enemy declines to fight 
this side of the Neuse, I will of course throw the right wing up to llin- 
ton's bridge. 

Yours, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Slocum, Commanding Army of Georgia. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 44.] 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Goldsbouo, N. O, April 1, !865. 
********* 

VI. The following is announced as the organization of this army : 
Right wing — Army of the Tennessee, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, 

Major-General 0. 0. Howard commanding. 

Left Wing — Army of Georgia, Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, Major- 
General H. W. Slocum commanding. 

Center — Army of Ohio, Tenth and Twenty-third Corps, Major-General 
J. M. Schofield commanding. 

Cavalry — Brevet Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding. 

VII. Each of these commanders will exercise the powers prescribed by 

law for a general commanding a separate department or army in the field. 
* ******** 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Aid-de-Camp. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Raleigh, April 14, 1865. 
General: — The general-in-chief has arranged for a meeting with General 
J. E. Johnston, near Durham's Station, North Carolina railroad, at 12 m., 
April 27th, and to accomplish it will leave here at 8 a. m. to-morrow, by rail- 
road. Until further orders he directs that all troops will remain as they 
are at this time, the movements as directed in Special Field Orders No. 
55, being for the time suspended. 

I am, general, with great respect, 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 

General H. W. Slocum, Commanding Army of Georgia. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C, April 24, 1865 — 6 a. m. 
General Johnston, Commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro : 
You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities agreed 



336 AVERYSBORO AND BENTONVILLE. 

upon between us, will cease in forty-eight hours after this is received at 

vour lines, under first article of our agreement. 

J W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General. 



Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Raleigh, April 24, 1865. 

General Johnston, Commanding Confederate Armies : 

I have replies from Washington to my communication of April 18th. 

I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and 

not to attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand the surrender of 

your army on the same terms as were given General Lee at Appomattox, 

of April 9 th instant, purely and simply. 

F W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 

GENERAL GEORGE STONEMAN's CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN TENNES- 
SEE AND NORTH CAROLINA. 

In terminating the pursuit of General Hood's army, Gen- 
eral Thomas' first thought was to put his forces in winter can- 
tonments to rest after their severe service since early spring, 
and to prepare for such operations as the future movements 
of the enemy might render necessary, or such as might promise 
the entire supremacy of the national government within the 
limits of the Military Division of the Mississippi or throughout 
the Southern States ; but General Grant ordered otherwise, 
and on the 31st of December the troops of the military division 
were disposed with a view to immediate active operations. Gen- 
eral A. J. Smith's corps, and four divisions of cavalry under 
General Wilson, were ordered to Eastport, Mississippi, and the 
Fourth Corps to take post at ITuntsville, Alabama, according to 
previous arrangement, for a different purpose, and the Twenty- 
third Corps was left at Columbia, instead of taking position at 
Dalton, Georgia. 

General Sherman was desirous that General Thomas should 
conduct a campaign in Northern Alabama and Georgia, and 
expressed this wish to General Grant; but the latter had 
formed other plans before this wish had been expressed, and 
had ordered General Schofield's corps, and the detachments 
from the corps with General Sherman, to North Carolina, to 
co-operate with him. Subsequently, he directed General 
Thomas to send General A. J. Smith's forces and five thousand 
cavalry, by river, to report to Major-General Canby, at New 
Orleans, to take part in the operations against Mobile. Ac- 
cordingly, General Smith's troops started from Eastport on the 
VOL. 11—22 » (337) 



338 stoxeman's cavalry operations. 

6th of February, and General Knipe's division of cavalry from 
Eastport and Nashville on the 12th. These transfers of forces 
reduced the troops under General Thomas to the Fourth 
Corps, the infantry and artillery garrisons of the military 
division, the cavalry divisions under General Wilson, and the 
one under General Stoneman in East Tennessee. 

Early in February, General Thomas ascertained from various 
sources that a remnant of General Hood's army, under Gen- 
erals Cheatham and S. D. Lee, were on their way from Mis- 
sissippi to South Carolina, moving through Selma and Mont- 
gomery, Alabama, to reinforce the army opposing General 
Sherman, and that other fragments of the Confederate Army 
of the Tennessee — a skeleton corps — under General Richard 
Taylor, and seven thousand cavalry, under General Forrest, 
remained in Mississippi, with headquarters at Meridian. 

February 6th, General Grant directed that General Stone- 
man should be sent on an expedition to penetrate North Car- 
olina and well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, to 
destroy the enemy's railroads and military resources which 
were out of the reach of General Sherman; and on the 13th, 
General Grant directed General Thomas to prepare a cavalry 
expedition to penetrate Northern Alabama and co-operate 
with General Canby in his movement against Mobile. Prepa- 
rations for both expeditions were completed about the same 
time, and on the 22d of March Generals Stoneman and Wil- 
son moved as respectively directed. 

The cavalry division in East Tennessee, commanded by 
Brigadier- General A. C. Gillem, comprised three brigades, under 
the respective command of Colonel Palmer, Brigadier-General 
Brown, and Colonel Miller. It was concentrated at Mossy creek 
on the 22cl of March, in readiness for movement into North 
Carolina under the personal direction of General Stoneman. 
It was known at this time that General Sherman had captured 
Columbia, South Carolina, and was moving into North Caro- 
lina. Rumors were current that General Lee's army would 
evacuate Richmond and Petersburg, and might force a pas- 
sage through Lynchburg to Knoxville. To guard against 
such a contingency, General Stoneman was directed to move 
toward Lynchburg, to destroy the railroad and resources of 



stoxj;man s cavalry operations. 339 

that region, and then sweep through Western North Carolina 
with the same destructive intent; and the Fourth Corps was 

ordered by (leneral Thomas to advance from Kuntsville ae far 
into East Tennessee as it could supply itself, to repair the 
railroad as it advanced, and form at last with General Tillson's 
division of infantry, a strong support to General Stoneman, 
should he meet the enemy in such force as to drive him back. 

On the 24th, General Stoneman moved to Morristown, and 
there detached the Third brigade, Colonel Miller commanding, 
to make a detour from Bull's Gap, to reach the railroad bet ween 
Jonesboro and Carter's Station, in the rear of a force reported 
to be in the vicinity of the former place. The other two bri- 
gades advanced directly forward, and encamped on the night 
of the 25th ten miles west of Jonesboro. Here all incum- 
brances were left, save one ambulance, one wagon, and four 
guns with their caissons. 

At noon on the 26th, the division was reunited at Jones- 
horo. Colonel Miller had complied with his instructions, but 
the Confederate general, Jackson, had fled in haste the night 
previous. General Stoneman then moved forward, and reached 
the Watauga river on the 27th, and the town of Boone, North 
Carolina, on the 28th. At the latter place, Major Keogh, of 
General Stoneman's staff, with a detachment of the Twelfth 
Kentucky, routed a company of home guards, capturing 
sixty. Here the brigades again separated — General Stoneman, 
with Palmer's brigade, moving on Wilkeshoro, by Deep Gap, 
and General Gillem, with the other two brigades and the ar- 
tillery, to the same point, by the Flat Gap road. From Wilkes- 
horo, the whole command moved through Mount Airy, and 
over the Blue Kidge, to Hillsville, Virginia, with no incidents, 
save the capture of a small forage train. At Hillsville, Col- 
onel Miller, with five hundred picked men, moved on Wythe- 
ville, destroyed a depot of supplies there, and a bridge over 
Reedy creek, and another at Max Meadows. The command 
then advanced to Jacksonville, where Major Wagner, of the 
Fifteenth Tennessee, with two hundred and fifty select men, 
dashed on to Salem, Virginia, and destroyed bridges and the 
railroad track extensively. On the 6th of April, two brigades 
were at Christianburg, and had possession of ninety miles of 



340 stoxeman's cavalry operations. 

the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, from TVytheville to Sa- 
lem. From Christianburg, after destroying twenty miles of 
railroad, and several bridges over Roanoke river, and disabling 
the bridge over New river, Colonel Palmer moved to Martins- 
ville, and General Brown to Taylorsville, and at 10 a. m. on 
the 8th, Palmer and Brown united at that place, and then the 
whole command converged upon Danbury, North Carolina, 
arriving there on the 9th. At Germantown, beyond, Colonel 
Palmer was detached, and ordered to Salem, North Carolina, 
to destroy the large factories, which were supplying the Con- 
federate armies with clothing, and then to send parties to 
destroy the railroad south of Greensboro, and between that 
place and Danville, the main column turned south from Ger- 
mantown toward Salisbury, bivouacking at night on the 11th, 
twelve miles north of Salisbury. A little after midnight, the 
South Yadkin river was crossed, without opposition, as had 
not been expected. From the river, the main force advanced 
on a new road on the left, while a battalion of the Twelfth 
Kentucky was sent on the road to the right, to demonstrate 
strongly at the crossing of Grant creek, and, if successful in 
passing that stream, to attack in rear the forces defending the 
upper bridge. At daylight, the head of the main column 
met the enemy's pickets, who were driven back to the bridge 
over Grant creek, and his artillery and musketry opened 
from the other side. A reconnoissance developed the fact 
that a portion of the floor of the bridge had been taken 
up from two spans of the bridge, and trains could be heard 
leaving the town on the South Carolina and Morgantown 
railroads. General Gillem now ordered Colonel Miller and 
General Brown to close up their brigades, and a section of 
Reagan's battery to move forward. At this juncture, Gen- 
eral Stoneman directed that a detachment should cross the 
creek two and a half miles above, cut the railroad, and, if 
practicable, capture the train, and then get in the rear of the 
town, and annoy the enemy as much as possible. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Slater, of the Eleventh Kentucky, was designated with 
his regiment for this service, and Captain Morrow, of General 
Stoneman's staff, joined the detachment. At the same time, 
Major Donnelly, of the Thirteenth Tennessee, with one hum 



STONEMAN S CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 341 

dred men, and Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, with a parly of 
dismounted men, were ordered to cross at lower points. As 
soon as these parties engaged the enemy across the stream, 
and the rattling fire of the Spencer rifles of the Eleventh Ken- 
tucky announced that the enemy's left had been turned, ( Li- 
onel Miller's brigade was ordered to advance on the main 
road. A detachment of the Eighth and Thirteenth Tenne 
regiments restored the floor of the bridge, and Miller charged 
across. By this time the enemy was falling back along his 
entire line. Brown was thrown forward to support Miller, 
who continued to press the enemy back. The retreat soon 
terminated in rout. Major Keogh, who had led the charge of 
the Eleventh Kentucky on the right, having been joined by 
Major Sawyer's battalion of the Eighth Tennessee, charged 
the enemy again at the intersection of the Statesville road 
with the one upon which Colonel Miller was advancing, and 
captured all the artillery which had been used on the enemy's 
left flank. The pursuit was continued until the enemy's 
1-roops lost even the semblance of organization, and all who 
escaped capture, hid themselves in the woods. Three thousand 
men, under command of Major-General W. M. Gardener, with 
eighteen pieces of artillery, in charge of Colonel J. C. Pem- 
berton, recently a lieutenant-general, were thus routed. 
]STearly thirteen hundred prisoners were captured, eighteen 
pieces of artillery, and public property of immense value, 
most of which was destroyed. At 2 p. m. Major Barnes, to 
whom the destruction of public property had been committed, 
reported having destroyed ten thousand stand of small arms, 
one million pounds of (small) ammunition, ten thousand 
pounds of artillery ammunition, six thousand pounds of 
powder, three magazines, six depots, ten thousand bushels of 
corn, seventy -five thousand suits of uniform clothing, two 
hundred and fifty thousand blankets (English manufacture), 
twenty thousand pounds of leather, six thousand pounds of 
"bacon, one hundred thousand pounds of salt, twenty-seven 
thousand pounds of rice, ten thousand pounds of saltpetre, 
fifty thousand bushels of wheat, eighty barrels of turpentine, 
fifteen million of Confederate money, and medical stores 
worth over one hundred thousand dollars in gold. Besides 



342 stoneman's cavalry operations. 

the detachments which hud been sent to Virginia, destroyed 
the railroad nearly to Lynchburg, seven thousand bales of 
cotton and two large factories, and captured four hundred 
prisoners. The railroad south of Salisbury having been de- 
stroyed for some distance, and it having been determined to 
send the prisoners, and captured artillery, not destroyed, to 
East Tennessee, the forces withdrew on the 13th, and reached 
Lenoir on the 15th. 

Here General Stoneman turned over the command to Gen- 
eral Gillem, with instructions as to the disposition and service 
of the troops. Colonel Palmer was to take post at Lincoln- 
ton, and scout down the Catawba ; General Brown, at Morgan- 
town, to connect with Colonel Palmer on the Catawba, and 
Colonel Miller, at Asheville, to open communications through 
to Greenville, Tennessee. The objects in leaving the cavalry 
on this side of the mountains, were to obstruct, intercept, or 
disperse any troops moving south, and to capture trains. 

When General Gillem, with Brown's and Miller's brigades, 
reached the Catawba, two and a half miles from Morgantown, 
he found the bridge torn up, the ford blockaded, and his pass- 
age of the stream disputed by Major-General McCown, with 
about three hundred men and one piece of artillery. He then 
sent Major Kenner, of the Eighth Tennessee, to cross up the 
river and reach the enemy's rear, and threw forward another 
battali.m of the same regiment as directly toward the bridge as 
shelter could be found. Opening with his artillery, he disabled 
the enemy's gun and drove him from his defenses, and the 
dismounted men charging over the sleepers of the bridge, 
drove him from the ford, and captured his gun and fifty men. 

On the 19th, General Gillem moved toward Asheville, by way 
of Swananoa Gap. He found the gap the nex day, to be held by 
about five hundred men, with four pieces of artillery. Leaving 
Colonel Miller to make feints, he moved rapidly to Rutherford, 
forty miles distant, and at sundown on the 22d, he passed the 
Blue Ridge, at Hammond's Gap, and was in the rear of the en- 
emy, who retreated through Andersonville, pursued by Slater,, 
who, in a charge, captured the four guns and seventy men 
At this time he learned that Colonel Palmer had not moved 
as he had been ordered, in consequence of information through 



STONEMAX S CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 343 

General Echols, that a truce had been proclaimed. Deeming 
it essentia] to the safety of his command thai be should bold 
one of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, General Gillem ordered 
Palmer to move as previously directed, and advanced with his 
own column to attack Asheville. At :'> p. m. on the 23d, he re- 
ceived a flag of truce from Asheville, covering a communication 
from General Martin, which stated thai he had received official 
notification of a truce. Later, General Martin proposed a meet- 
ingfor the next day. That night at 11 o'clock, the factof the 
existence of a truce was established by an official announce- 
ment, coming from General Sherman, and at 11 p. M. he received 
an order from him, directed to General Stoneman, requiring 
the command to move to Durham Station or Hillsboro. Being 
convinced that this order had been issued by General Sherman, 
under the conviction that this cavalry division was at or near 
►Salisbury, he decided to draw back to his base at Greenville, 
Tennessee, rather.than advance two hundred miles to Durham's 
'Station. At the meeting with General Martin, he announced 
this decision, and requested three days' rations for his men, to 
save the people on his route from supplying his wants by con- 
straint. General Martin furnished supplies, but demanded the 
rendition of the artillery which had been captured the day be- 
fore ; but General Gillem positively refused to do this, as the 
capture had been made prior to his reception of any authentic 
announcement of a truce. 

This expedition was ably conducted and eminently success- 
ful. General Stoneman's strategy put the enemy under p< >siti ve 
disadvantage, at each objective, in receiving the intended blow. 
When the Blue Ridge was first passed, the enemy supposed 
that Salisbury was menaced. This supposition placed the Ten- 
nessee and Virginia railroad at General Stoneman's mercy, and 
the advance for its destruction was a surprise, and cost the enei i iy 
three trains, and the loss of more than two hundred wagons, 
and twenty-one pieces of artillery, spiked and abandoned, while 
the troops that were separated from the main body by this move- 
ment, returned to Kentucky. Again, when the column turned 
south,Colonel Palmer's divergence toward Danville and G reens- 
boro, by Martinsville, caused the enemy to withdraw troops 
from Salisbury ,which fell more easily in consequence when it was 



344 stoxeman's cavalry operations. 

attacked, as tlie paramount object of the advance southward. 
The enemy discovered his mistake, and made effort to reinforce 
Salisbury when the danger was apparent, but the railroad being 
cut in five places south of Danville, the effort miscarried, as 
the reinforcing division of infantry and brigade of cavalry did 
not reach the vicinity of the town until after the destruction 
of the depots, magazines, and stores. And at last a brigade 
held the enemy at Swananoa Gap, until another passed to the 
rear and surprised and captured a large portion of his force. 
The captures were twenty-five guns taken in action, twenty- 
one abandoned in Southwest Virginia, and over six thousand 
prisoners and seventeen battle-flags. 



Washington, December 31, 1864 — 11.30 a. m. 
Major-General Thomas : 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant directs all of your available force not es- 
sential to hold your communications, be collected on the Tennessee river 
— say, at Eastport and Tuscumbia — and be made ready for such move- 
ments as may be ordered. It is supposed that a portion of the troojDs in 
Louisville, and other parts of Kentucky and Tennessee, can now be avail- 
able for active operations elsewhere. They should be made ready for 
that purpose. General Dodge wishes you to return to St. Louis the 
Thirty-ninth Missouri Infantry, now at Louisville, so that he may com- 
plete its organization. Please give us the earliest possible notice of 
Hood's line of retreat, so that orders may be given for the continuance 
of the campaign. Lieutenant-General Grant does not intend that your 
army should go into winter-quarters. It must be ready for active opera- 
tions in the field. 

H. W. HALLECK, 

Major- General. 



EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT. 

On the 6th of February, a communication was received from Lieuten- 
ant-General Grant, directing an expedition, commanded by General Stone- 
man, to be sent from East Tennessee to penetrate North Carolina and 
well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, to destroy the enemy's rail- 
roads and military resources in that section, and visit a portion of the 
state beyond the control or reach' of General Sherman's column. As the 
movement was to be merely for the purpose of destruction, directions 
were given General Stoneman to evade any heavy engagements with the 
enemy's forces. 



STONEMAN S CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 346 

Again, on the 13th of February, General Grant telegraphed me to pre- 
pare a cavalry expedition of about ten thousand strong, to penetrate 
Northern Alabama, acting as a co-operative force to the movem< nt on 
Mobile by General Canby. Before leaving Eastport, Mississippi. I bad 
directed General Wilson to get his command in readiness for just Buch a 
campaign, of which the above was simply an outline— my instructions 
being for him to move on Selma, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 
and to capture those places if possible, after accomplishing which he was 
to operate against any of the enemy's forces in the direction of Missis- 
sippi, Mobile, or Macon, as circumstances might demand. 



Clifton, Tenn., January 14, 1865. 
H. W. Halleck, Major-General, Washington, D. C. : 

I arrived here this morning, and from all I can learn, ITood has gone 
south of Corinth. Accordingly, Schofield's corps, in obedience to your 
orders, has been ordered to Annapolis, and will commence embarking to- 
morrow. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Eastport, Miss., February 2, 1865. 
H. W. Hallech, Major-General, Washington, D. C. : 

A telegram just received from Louisville, from General Allen, states 
that your order to me of the 26th January, means five thousand cavalry 
instead of five divisions, as I have informed him. Which is correct — five 
thousand or five divisions ? Are they and General Smith to take their 
wagon transportation with them ? 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. A. 



Nashville, Tenn., February 16, 1865. 
U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General, City Point, Va. : 

It seems to be now pretty certain that Cheatham's and Lee's corps of 
Hood's army have left Mississippi, and gone eastward. They left Colum- 
bus and Tupelo about the 17th of January last, and I have traced them 
through different persons so regularly, that I can no longer doubt their 
having gone. The last person reported their having passed Opelika on 
the 27th of January, and all agree in reporting that they were going to 
South Carolina. I have also received two or three reports during the 
past week, that Forrest is about to remove his troops to Georgia, if he 
has not already started. I think my cavalry expedition from Eastport 
will overtake him. It will be ready about the 20th inst. 1 have taken 
measures to equip General Stoneman as rapidly as possible, and have 
substituted another regiment for the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, but would 
like to get that regiment as soon as possible, as I could make it very use- 
ful south of Chattanooga, as there are a number of scouting parties of 



346 STOXEMAX'S CAVALRY OPEEATIOXS. 

the enemy about Rome, Resaca, Lafayette, and other towns in that re- 

gl ° n ' GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. A. Commanding. 



Nashville, Tenn., February 27, 1865. 
U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General, City Point, Va. : 

Your telegram of the 26th inst. is just received. General Stoneman 
has not yet started, but informed my chief of staff a few days since at 
Louisville, that he would be ready to start about the 1st of March. I 
will notify you as soon as he gets off. He has been delayed for want of 
horses. I have just returned from Eastport, having completed the ar- 
rangements for the cavalry expedition from that point. Owing to the 
recent stormy and rainy weather, General Wilson will be delayed a few 
days for the roads to dry up. He will be able to start in a few days with 

at least ten thousand men. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 

Major-General U. S. A. Commanding. 



CHAPTER XL. 

GENERAL J. H. WILSON'S CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN ALABAMA AND 

GEORGIA. 

General Wilson's column of cavalry, comprising Generals 
McCook's, Long's, and Upton's divisions, having crossed the 
Tennessee river on the 18th of March, was put in motion 
southward on the 23d. General Hatch's division not having 
a full remount, was deprived of all horses for the other divis- 
ions, and left at Eastport, to join the column subsequently, 
should horses be obtained in time. General Wilson's wagon 
and pontoon trains, including about two hundred and tit'ry 
teams, were put under the direction of Captain Brown, pro- 
tected by fifteen hundred dismounted men, under M;ij<n- 
Archer. The destitution of forage, in the region immedi- 
ately south of the Tennessee river, imposed the necessity of 
starting the troops in detachments to glean over a broad belt 
of country, what little produce might be left, where war had 
so long and so heavily laid its hand. This diffusion, however, 
involved no hazard, as General Forrest's command was at 
West Point, Mississippi, one hundred and fifty miles south of 
Eastport, and General Roddy's forces were holding Monte- 
vallo, on the Alabama and Tennessee railroad, as remote, to 
the southeast. There was, besides, an important advantage 
in this divergence in the beginning of the enterprise, as 
thereby the enemy was put in doubt as to the first objectives, 
and was compelled to watch equally the roads to Selma, Tus- 
caloosa, and Columbus. 

General Grant's orders required the movement of a force oi 
five or six thousand men, to demonstrate against Tuscakx >sa 
and Selma, to co-operate with General Canby. General 

(347) 



348 wilsox's cavalry operations. 

Wilson expressed the conviction that he could capture these 
places and conduct other decisive operations, and General 
Thomas gave him permission to take with him all his availa- 
ble force, giving him such freedom of action as the nature and 
proposed objects of the expedition, positive and contingent, 
demanded. Thus, by General Grant's instructions, the license 
given by General Thomas, and the conditions of his enterprise, 
General Wilson became an independent commander, at least 
as far as all special combinations and minor objectives were 
concerned. He was subject still to General Thomas, as actual 
commander of all the forces within the geographical limits of 
the military division; but he had discretion within exceed- 
ingly extended limits. 

General Upton's division, followed by his train, moved 
rapidly on the most easterly route, passing Barton's Station, 
Throgmorton's Mills, Russellville, Mount Hope, and Jasper, 
to Sanders' Ferry, on the west fork of the Black Warrior 
river. General Long's division marched through Cherokee 
Station, Frankfort, and Russellville, and then followed the 
Tuscaloosa road to the Black Water creek, twenty -five miles 
from Jasper. General McCook's division followed Long's to 
the Upper Bear creek, then moved on the Tuscaloosa road to 
Eldridge, afterward turning east to Jasper. The crossing of 
the Black Warrior river was beset with difficulties, but the 
knowledge that General Chalmers was moving to Tuscaloosa, 
and the danger of a full river, permitted no delay, and the 
corps was hurried across, with the loss of a few horses, and 
then, with pack-mules bearing supplies, wagons and artillery 
being far in the rear, the command moved rapidly through 
Elyton to Montevallo. At Elyton, General Croxton was de- 
tached with his brigade to advance to Tuscaloosa, to burn the 
public stores, military school, bridges, foundries, and factories 
at that place, and then join the main column at Selma, if 
practicable. The direction of Croxton's movement somewhat 
covered the trains and artillery in the rear, and was intended 
to develop any movement of the enemy in that quarter. On 
the march, General Upton destroyed the Red Mountain, Cen- 
tral, Bibb, and Columbiana iron-works, Cahawba rolling-mills, 
and much valuable property. The other divisions followed, 



WILSONS CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 349 

and when General "Wilson reached Montevallo, on the 31st of 
March, General Upton was ready to move forward. And for 
this there was need, as the enemy had appeared on the Selma 
road, and General Upton, with General Alexander's brigade 
leading, was sent against him. Alexander soon provoked a 
sharp conflict, which he terminated by a charge, driving the 
enemy, a portion of Roddy's division and Grassland's Ken- 
tucky brigade, in confusion toward Randolph. General 
Roddy attempted to make a stand five miles south of Monte- 
vallo, when General Upton threw "Winslow's brigade to the 
front, and opened Rodney's battery. Fourth United States 
Artillery, causing the retreat of the enemy and loss of fifty 
prisoners in the pursuit by "Winslow. This action gave the 
type of the campaign. 

At night, General Upton bivouacked fourteen miles from 
Montevallo, and the next day advanced to Randolph. Here 
he turned to the east by Maplesville to the old Selma road, 
while General Long pushed forward on the new road. A 
message from General Croxton to the effect that he v^as in the 
rear of General Jackson's division, near Trion, and dispatches 
captured from the enemy revealing his plans and the disposi- 
tions of his forces, called for new combinations and their 
prompt execution. General Forrest, with a portion of his 
command, was in the front of the main column ; Jackson's 
division was involved with Croxton. 

General Chalmers was under orders to cross from Union, to 
join Forrest, either in Wilson's front or in the works at Selma, 
and the enemy's dismounted men were holding an important 
bridge over the Cahawba, at Centreville. To secure this bridge 
and prevent the junction of Jackson's division with Forrest, 
General Wilson directed General McCook to strengthen the 
battalion en route to Centreville, by a regiment, and to follow 
with La Grange's brigade with all speed, leaving even his pack 
trains, to seize the bridge, and then hasten to support Croxton 
against Jackson. Having provided for his right flank, he next 
looked to the protection of his rear, against the traditional 
strategy of Forrest, by ordering Upton and Long to push him 
without rest toward Selma. . These officers moved forward 
rapidly, without changing roads, and brushing back small par- 



350 wilson's cavalry operations. 

ties, developed Forrest in position for battle, on the north 
bank of Bigler's creek, his right resting on Mulberry creek, 
and left on a high wooded ridge, covered by a battery of artil- 
lery. A portion of his front was covered by slashed timber 
and rail barricades. His force comprised Crossland's brigade, 
Armstrong's brigade of Chalmers' division, Roddy's division, 
and a battalion just arrived from Selma, in all about five thou- 
sand men. Perceiving the enemy in strength in his imme- 
diate front, General Long reinforced his vanguard by a bat- 
talion of the Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry, with 
the remainder of the regiment dismounted, and formed on the 
left of the road. This regiment drove back the enemy in 
broken ranks. At this juncture General Long ordered forward 
four companies of the Seventeenth Indiana, Lieutenant- Col- 
onel Frank White commanding, with drawn sabers. These 
companies drove the enemy to his works, dashed against his 
main line, broke through it, rode over his guns, and finally 
turning to the left cut their way out, but leaving one officer 
and sixteen men with the enemy. In this charge Captain 
Taylor lost his life, having led his men into the midst of the 
enemy, and engaged in a running fight for two hundred yards 
with General Forrest himself. 

Hearing the noise of this preliminary fighting, Alexander's 
brigade of Upton's division hurried up on the trot, and formed 
on the left of General Long, and as soon as everything was in 
readiness, the brigade advanced, dismounted. In less than an 
Taour, although Forrest resisted stubbornly, his forces were 
completely routed. Alexander captured two guns a.nd about 
two hundred prisoners. Long's division took one gun. Wins- 
low's brigade pressed forward in pursuit, but could not bring 
the enemy to a stand. At sundown the corps bivouacked 
near Plantersville, in sharp conflict with the enemy, who had 
been driven twenty-four miles during the day. 

At daylight the next day, the columns were in motion to- 
ward Selma. General Long advanced to the town and crossed 
to the Summerville road. General Upton moved on the Range 
Line road, sending a squadron on the Burnsville road. Lieu- 
tenant Rundlebrook, with a battalion of the Fourth United 
States Cavalry, followed the railroad, burning stations and 



WILSONS CAVALRY OPERATIONS. 35] 

bridges to Burnsville. By 4 i>. m. the troops were in position 
and ready to assault. General Wilson had previously ob- 
tained a complete description of the defenses, and having cor- 
roborated its correctness by observation and formal recon- 
noissance, he gave orders for t he assault. General Long was 
instructed to move across the road, upon which his troops 
were posted, and General Upton was permitted, as he had re- 
quested, with three hundred picked men, to penetrate a swamp 
on his left, and break the line covering it, thus to turn For- 
rest's right, while the remainder of his division should conform 
to his movements. 

A single gun from Rodney's battery was to be the signal 
for a general advance, and this was to be given as soon as 
Upton's success was revealed. Before this signal gun could 
be fired, General Long was informed that a heavy force of 
cavalry was skirmishing with his rear-guard, and threatening 
an attack from that quarter. He left six companies well 
posted at the creek, in anticipation of the movement which 
General Chalmers was now making in obedience to orders 
from General Forrest. This force was known to have been 
the day before at Marion, and fearing that its appearance on 
the road, as had been expected, might compromise the assault 
upon the town, General Long determined not to wait for the 
development of General Upton's turning movement. He 
simply strengthened his rear with a regiment, and then dis- 
mounting four regiments from the brigades of Miller and 
Minty, he, with these officers, led them in charging over an 
open space for six hundred yards, over a stockade, a deep 
ditch, and the parapet, and drove the enemy in confusion to 
the city. At the moment of victory, General Wilson reached 
that part of the field, and directed Colonel Minty, who had 
assumed command of the division in consequence of a severe 
wound to General Long, to advance toward the town. Tie 
ordered Colonel Yail t© place his own regiment, the Seven- 
teenth Indiana, and the Fourth Ohio, in line inside the works, 
and the Fourth United States Cavalry and the Board of Trade 
battery to participate in the attack. When the division again 
advanced, the enemy was occupying unfinished defenses near 
the town. The Fourth Cavalry, Lieutenant O'Connell com- 



352 Wilson's cavalry operations. 

manding, was repulsed, but formed again on the left. In the 
meantime, General Upton had succeeded in his movement, 
and was now advancing on the left of Minty. A charge was 
again made by the Fourth Ohio, Seventeenth Indiana, and 
Fourth Cavalry dismounted, and the whole line participating 
with wildest enthusiasm, the enemy was hurled from position, 
and the city was penetrated in all directions. 

The charge of General Long, his brigade commanders leading 
with him, and fifteen hundred and fifty men following, was 
brilliant in the extreme. A single line without support 
advanced in utmost exposure for five or six hundred yards, 
leaped a stockade five feet high, a ditch five feet deep and 
fifteen wide, and a parapet six to eight feet high, and -drove 
Armstrong's brigade, the best of Forrest's command, over 
fifteen hundred strong, in rout from works of great strength 
and advantages of wonderful superiority, and this was 
done while sixteen field-guns were playing upon them. In 
the charge, Colonel Dobbs, of the Fourth Ohio, was killed. 
General Long, and Colonels Miller, McCormick, and Biggs 
were wounded. The general loss of the division was forty 
killed, two hundred and sixty wounded, and seven missing. 

The fruits of the victory were in correspondence with the 
gallantry of the troops that won it. Thirty-one field-guns 
and one thirty-pounder Parrott, two thousand seven hundred 
prisoners, including one hundred and fifty officers, and public 
property of great value. Lieutenant- General Taylor sought 
safety in flight early in the afternoon, and under cover of the 
darkness, Generals Forrest, Roddy, Armstrong, and Adams 
escaped with a number of men . A portion of Upton's division 
pursued on the Burnsville road till late in the night, capturing 
four guns and many prisoners. The enemy destroyed twenty- 
five thousand bales of cotton, but left the foundries, machine- 
shops, arsenals, and warehouses of this immense depot of war 
material, for the torch. 

General Wilson placed Brevet Brigadier-General Winslow 
in command of f the city, and instructed Lieutenant Haywood, 
engineer officer, to press the construction of pontoons for a 
bridge over the Alabama river. The next day at daylight, 
General Upton marched to draw General Chalmers to the 



Wilson's cavalry operations. 353 

west side of the Cahawba river and open communications with 
General McCook, who was expected with the train from 
Centerville. This movement looked to an advance of the 
whole command toward Montgomery as soon as it could be 
gathered together and other conditions were favorable. The 
capture of Selma and so large a portion of Forrest's force gave 
General Wilson the assurance of successful movements what- 
ever objectives he might choose. 

Generals McCook and Upton arrived at Selma, April 5th, 
with the train. The former had been successful against Cen- 
treville, but on reaching Scottsboro had found General Jackson 
so strongly posted that he did not attack him, but burning 
the cotton factories and the bridge, turned toward Selma. 
General Croxton had not been found nor even heard from ; 
but his protracted separation from the corps did not cause un- 
easiness, as it was confidently believed that he had taken care 
of himself and gone in a new direction. 

On the 6th, General Forrest requested a conference with 
General Wilson, with reference to an exchange of prisoners. 
His arrogance and manifest hope that he could recapture his 
men made the interview brief, but through it, General Wilson 
learned that General Croxton had had an engagement two 
days before with General Adams at Briclgeville, forty miles 
southwest of Tuscaloosa. His safety being assured, as also 
General Canby's ability to take Mobile without support, there 
was no barrier to the movement to Montgomery but the Ala- 
bama river, whose deep, swift current gave an unsteady resting 
to a pontoon bridge eight hundred and seventy feet long. 
Three times the bridge was broken, but Major Hubbard, aided 
by Generals Upton and Alexander and the staff of General 
Wilson, succeeded in connecting the banks by the floating 
bridge, and the command passed safely over by daylight on 
the 10th of April Selma had been so far destroyed as to be 
of no use to the enemy for military purposes ; and Forrest's 
force had been so greatly diminished and so thoroughly de- 
moralized that General Wilson moved fearlessly forward 
toward Montgomery, intending to destroy railroads and army 
supplies and material, and then sweep on to the theater of op- 
vol. n— 23 



354 Wilson's cavalry operations. 

erations in North Carolina. His mounted force was now 
stronger than at starting, as lie had captured horses for all his 
dismounted men, and he now disincumbered himself of all 
wagons and pontoons which could be spared, to give him 
facility for quick movement. The able-bodied negroes who 
had joined his column were organized into regiments under 
efficient officers. These men, in the first flush of freedom, be- 
came soldiers, keeping pace with the troopers, gathering 
supplies from the country, and marching thirty-five miles 
per day. 

The march from Selma to Montgomery was retarded by bad 
roads and bridgeless streams ; but at 7 a. m. on the 12th, Col- 
onel La Grange, whose brigade was in advance, received the 
surrender of the capital of the State of Alabama, and the first 
capital of the Southern Confederacy. But how great had 
been the changes of four years of civil war ! On the 4th of 
March, 1861, the insurgent Congress had asserted, with the 
pomp and circumstance befitting a nation's birth, the inde- 
pendence of seven slaveholding states. The national govern- 
ment was boldly defied, and blindly ignoring the contin- 
gencies of their venture, the members of this Congress boldly 
assumed the independence of the South as an actuality, and 
talked of war as if its invocation involved no guilt, and its 
progress compassed naught but victories and speedy triumph. 
The outlying crowds of men drawn to Montgomery by the 
culmination of Southern frenzy in the assumption of a new 
nationality, echoed the bold utterances of the provisional Pres- 
ident and Congress in jubilant ecstasy through the streets. 
The illuminated city was a blazing type of the fire that was 
burning in the Southern heart, and all the assumptions of 
prospective empire, in the frenzy of the moment, were removed 
beyond the sphere of doubt. Now, the mayor of the city — the 
dispirited representative of a conquered people — comes meekly 
forth from the provisional capital of the war-broken Confed- 
eracy and tenders its surrender to a commander of brigade. 
How different the beginning and end of Montgomery in the 
" great conflict ! " The burning of ninety thousand bales of 
cotton, the ideal king of commerce, is now the illumination 
which betokens the loss of his crown and the loyalty of his 



Wilson's cavalry operations. 355 

subjects, for it is they who, in their desperation, se1 fire to this 
immense mass of royalty. The quiet streets and silent halls, 
the fleeing troopers and hiding citizens, are in striking an- 
tithesis to the pomp, the boast, and the maddened multitude 
of a former day. 

Having destroyed five' steamboats, several locomotives, one 
armory, and several foundries, General Wilson resumed motion 
on the 14th. General Upton moved thro null Mount Meigs and 
Tuskegee, toward Columbus, Georgia, and Colonel La Grange 
followed the railroad through Opelika, to West Point. Two 
days later, General Upton, with three hundred dismounted 
men, assaulted and carried the breastworks at Columbus, sav- 
ing by the impetuosity of his attack the bridges over the 
Chattahoochee, and capturing fifty-two guns in position, and 
twelve hundred prisoners. The ram Jackson, nearly ready 
for the sea, and carrying six seven-inch guns, was destroyed ; 
also the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, armory, sword and 
pistol factory, accouterment-shops, paper-mills, four cotton 
factories, fifteen locomotives, two hundred cars, and one hun- 
dred and fifteen thousand bales of cotton. The assault was 
made at night, by men from the Third Iowa, Colonel Noble 
commanding,' the Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri being held 
in support. Generals Upton and Winslow directed the move- 
ment in person. The enemy opened a heavy artillery and 
musketry fire as the troops advanced, but their Spencer rifles 
gave response as they rushed through the abatis and over the 
parapet. When this had been accomplished, General Upton 
sent Captain Glassen, with two companies of the Tenth Mis- 
souri, to get possession of the bridge over the Chattahoochee. 
The captain passed through the inner line of defenses, under 
cover of the darkness, and seized the bridge before the enemy 
was aware of his movement. Then General Upton made a gen- 
eral charge, swept away all opposition, seized the bridges, and 
stationed his troops thoughout the city. The fortifications 
were held by three thousand men, and yet three hundred 
penetrated the main line, and this primal success was followed 
by overwhelming victory, with a loss in all of twenty men 
killed and wounded. 

Colonel La Grange had spirited skirmishing on the way to 



356 wilson's cavalry operations. 

West Point, but reached the vicinity with his advance at 10 
a. m., April 16th. Beck's Indiana battery and the Second 
and Fourth Indiana held the attention of the enemy until the 
arrival of the remainder of the brigade. Then after a recon- 
noissance, preparations were made for an assault. Detach- 
ments from the First Wisconsin, Second Indiana, and Seventh 
Kentucky regiments were dismounted to make the charge. 
At 1 p. m. the signal was given, and these troops moved for- 
ward, drove into the fort the skirmishers, and reached the 
ditch, which was too wide to leap and too deep to pass. 
Sharpshooters kept the enemy down until materials for 
bridges were gathered, when the charge was sounded again, 
and the detachments rushed over the parapets, on three sides 
of the square fort and captured the entire garrison of two hun- 
dred and sixty-five men, General Tyler commanding, and 
eighteen officers and men were killed and twenty-eight 
wounded. Colonel La Grange lost seven killed and twenty- 
nine wounded. He captured three guns and five hundred 
stand of small arms. Simultaneously with the storming of the 
fort, the Fourth Indiana dashed through the town, scattered 
a superior cavalry force which had just arrived, and burned 
five locomotives and trains; also securing the' bridges over 
the Chattahoochee. Colonel La Grange here destroyed two 
bridges, nineteen locomotives, and two hundred and forty -five 
cars loaded with quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance 
stores. Before departure, he established a hospital for the 
wounded of both sides, and left for them ample supplies with 
the mayor. He then moved toward Macon, through La 
Grange, Griffin, and Forsyth, breaking the railroad at these 
points. 

April 17th, General Wilson commenced his movement on 
Macon, giving Minty's division the advance, and instructing 
that commander to send forward a detachment to seize the 
double bridges over Flint river. Captain Hudson, of the Fourth 
Michigan, was put upon this service, and, at 7 a. m. the next 
day, gained the bridges, scattering the guards, and capturing 
forty prisoners. The whole command followed the detach- 
ment on the 18th. Two days later, Colonel White, of the 
Seventeenth Indiana in the advance, encountered two hundred 



Wilson's cavalry operations. 357 

cavalrymen, and driving them rapidly toward Macon, saved 
the Echconnee and Tobesofke bridges. When within thir- 
teen miles of Macon, he met a flag of truce in charge of Gen- 
eral Robinson, bearing a written communication addressed to 
the commanding officer United States forces. Colonel White 
halted and sent the communication to Colonel Minis, his 
division commander, who, having read it, sent it to General 
Wilson, but instructed Colonel White to resume his advance, 
and so informed General Robinson. The communication was 
from General Cobb, inclosing a dispatch from General Beau- 
regard, advising that a truce was existing, which was applica- 
ble to all the forces under Generals Sherman and Joseph 
E. Johnston, and declaring that he was ready to comply with 
the terms of the armistice, and proposing a meeting with the 
commander of the United States forces, to make arrangements 
for a more perfect enforcement of the armistice. 

Without giving entire credence to the communication, Gen- 
eral Wilson rode rapidly forward to halt his troops at the de- 
fenses of Macon, and by seeing General Cobb to convince 
himself with regard to the questions at issue, before acknowl- 
edging the armistice. But Colonel White had been too quick, 
and had dashed into the city and received its surrender before 
General Wilson overtook him. The garrison made a show of 
resistance, but promptly laid down their arms at the demand 
of Colonel White. When, however, General Wilson arrived, 
General Cobb protested against what he termed a violation of 
the armistice, overlooking the fact that he could not claim to 
be an authoritative channel of communication for a message 
of such importance, and demanded that he should withdraw 
his forces to the point where General Robinson had met' his 
advance. General Wilson had no reason to doubt the existence 
of the truce, but he was unwilling to give it recognition, until 
he had received notice and instructions from proper authority 
authentically transmitted, especially as his subordinate officers 
had captured the city before he could respond to the message 
which had been sent under the flag of truce. His force, though 
known as the cavalry corps of the Military Division of the 
Mississippi, and organized under General Sherman's order, 
had not yet served under his personal command, but had, by 



358 wilsox's cavalry operations. 

his direction, reported to General Thomas, as commander of 
all the forces of the military division not present with the 
commanding general, and all his orders subsequently had either 
originated with General Thomas or had been transmitted by 
him from General Grant. Without authentic instructions from 
either General Grant, General Sherman, or General Thomas, 
he hesitated to recognize the application of the armistice to 
his command. He therefore determined to hold Generals Cobb, 
Smith, Mackall, Robinson, and Mercer, and the garrison of 
Macon, as prisoners of war, until his conduct was disapproved 
by competent authority, after full investigation. However, to 
relieve himself from suspense, at the earliest possible moment, 
he sent a dispatch in cipher to General Sherman, the evening 
of the 20th of April, and the next day received an official no- 
tification from him of the existence of the armistice. Upon 
receiving it, he suspended all operations until he should receive 
orders to renew them, or until circumstances should justify in- 
dependent action. 

On the 1st of May, General Croxton, who during his sepa- 
ration from the main column, had made a tortuous ride of six 
hundred and fifty miles, arrived at Macon. He skirmished with 
General Jackson near Trion, on the 2d of April, and finding 
that his force was double his own, he declined battle and moved 
rapidly in simulated flight to the Black Warrior river, crossed 
to the west side, and reached Northport, April 4th. Fearing 
that his presence might be known, he moved at midnight, sur- 
prised the force at the bridge, crossed into Tuscaloosa, captured 
three guns and one hundred and fifty prisoners, scattered the 
state militia and cadets, and destroyed the military school edi- 
fice, and the public works and stores. Here he tried to com- 
municate with General McCook, but failed. He then abandoned 
Tuscaloosa, and moved to the southeast to avoid Jackson and 
Chalmers. When near Eutaw, he heard of the arrival of Adams' 
division, and fearing to risk an engagement with a force of cav- 
alry more than double his own strength, supported by militia, 
he countermarched toward Tuscaloosa; then diverging to the 
left, moved through Jasper, crossed the Coosa, and marched to 
Talladega. Near this place he defeated General Hill, capturing 
one gun and one hundred and fifty prisoners, and then marched 



WILSON S CAVALRY OPERATIONS. IIW,) 

through Carrollton, Ttfewnan, and Forsyth, to Macon. During 
the period of his isolation, he had no knowledge of the move- 
ments of the main column, but having faith in the Buccess of 
the general plan, he sought General Wilson at Macon. 



Nashville, Tenn., March 6, 1865. 
J. H. Wilson, Major-General, Eastport, Miss. : 

Your note of the 26th February received. You remember the plan of 
operations you propose in your note is essentially what I mentioned to 
you last winter I should adopt if permitted. But General Grant wants 
all my infantry held in readiness for operations in East Tennessee, and 
has given directions accordingly. 

He expects Canby to take Montgomery and Seima, and hold them after- 
ward, and has directed your expedition as a co-operative one, which is 
also expected to seize either Montgomery or Selma, or both, if you find 
it can be done when the enemy is opposing the progress of Canby. 
After Canby gets to Montgomery, your command will then be relieved 
from further operations in that quarter. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. A. Commanding. 



Nashville, Tenn., March 9, 1865. 
U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General, City Point : 

General Canby telegraphs me, March 1st, from New Orleans, that, in 
consequence of the continued rains during the month of February, that 
he can not start the cavalry expedition from Vicksburg, as he intended, 
and has ordered Knipe to New Orleans. These heavy rains having ex- 
tended as far north as this state, have also swollen the streams to an im- 
passable condition, and General Wilson will be somewhat delayed thereby, 
but will be able to move in time to co-operate with General Canby against 
Mobile, Selma, and Montgomery. . . . 

GEO H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. A. Commanding. 



Chattanooga, Tenn., March 14, 1865. 
J. H. Wilson, Major-General, East-port, Miss. : 

Your telegram of 9 a. m. 12th inst. received. If the report made to you 
by the railroad man be true, then your expedition should be successful. 
Canby will march against Selma the moment he gets to Mobile. He will 
have over forty thousand infantry. General Hatch will get his horses in 
time to have enough to do this summer. I am now on my way to Knox- 
ville to get Stoneman off, and concentrate all my available infantry at 
Bull's Gap, after which I may move on Lynchburg. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General XI. S. A. Commanding. 



360 Wilson's cavalry operations. 

Chattanooga, Tenn., March 19, 1865. 
Geo. Stoneman, Major-General, Knoxvitte, Tenn. : 

Your telegram of 8.10 p. m. yesterday received. From our present 
knowledge of the situation of affairs in Southwestern Virginia, I believe 
the route agreed upon by us for your forces to take will be the most ef- 
fective that can be adopted— viz., to go down the New River valley, strike 
the railroad beyond Christiansburg, unless you learn that Sheridan has 
possession of Lynchburg; then, should you learn the force at Danville is 
weak, attack that place, and destroy the railroad as far as you can with 
safety toward Richmond, and then withdraw toward Tennessee, and ob- 
serve and report all movements of the enemy to me promptly. 

GEO. H. THOMAS, 
Major-General U. S. A. 

Headquarters Department Tennessee and Georgia, 

Macon, April 20, 1865. 

General:— I have just received from General G. T. Beauregard, my 

immediate commander, a telegraphic dispatch, of which the following is 

a copy : nn 

" Greensboro, April 19, 1865, via Columbia, 19; via Augusta, 20. 

"Major-General H. Cobb : 

" Inform general commanding enemy's forces in your front that a truce 
for the purpose of a final settlement was agreed upon yesterday between 
Generals Johnston and Sherman, applicable to all forces under their com- 
mand. A message to that effect from General Sherman will be sent to 
him as soon as practicable. The contending forces are to occupy their 
present position, forty-eight hours' notice being given in the event of the 

resumption of hostilities. 

" G. T. Beauregard, 

"General, Second in Command. 
My force being a portion of General Johnston's command, I proceed 
at once to execute the terms of the armistice, and have accordingly issued 
orders for the carrying out of the same. I will meet you at any inter- 
mediate point between our respective lines for the purpose of making the 
necessary arrangements for a more perfect enforcement of the armistice. 
This communication will be handed to you by Brigadier F. H. Robinson. 
I am, general, very respectfully yours, 

HOWELL COBB, 
Major- General Commanding, etc. 
The Commanding General of the United States Forces. 



Wilson's cavalry operations. 361 

Headquarters Cavalry Corps Military Division Mississippi, 
Macon, Ga., April 20, 1865 9. p. m. 

Major-General W. T. Sherman, through headquarters General Beauregard, Gh 
boro, N. C. : 
My advance received the surrender of this city this evening. ' ioneral 
Cobb had previously sent me, under flag of truce, a copy of a telegram 
from General Beauregard, declaring the existence of an armistice between 
all troops under your command and those under Johnston. With. mi 
questioning the authenticity of this dispatch, or its application to my 
command, I could not communicate orders to my advance in time to pre- 
vent the capture of the place. I shall therefore hold its garrison, in- 
cluding Major-Generals G. W. Smith and Cobb, and Brigadier-General 
Mackall, prisoners of war. Please send me orders. I shall remain here 
a reasonable length of time to hear from you. 

J. II. WILSON, 
Major-General Commanding Cavalry Corps. 



Headquarters, Greensboro, N. C, April 21, 1865 — 2 p. m. 
Major-General Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Army United States, through Major- 
General II. Cobb : 
The following is a copy of a communication just received, which will 
be sent to you to-day by an officer : 

" Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
" Raleigh, April 20, 1865. 
"Major-General Wilson, Commanding Cavalry United States Army in Georgia: 

"General Joseph E. Johnston has agreed with me for a universal suspen- 
sion of hostilities, looking to a peace over the wbole surface of our coun- 
try. I feel assured that it will be made perfect in a few days. You will 
therefore desist from acts of war and devastation until you hear that hos- 
tilities are resumed. For the convenience of supplying your command, 
you may either contract for supplies down about Fort Valley or the old 
Chattahoochee arsenal ; or, if you are south of West Point, Georgia, in the 
neighborhood of Rome or Kingston, opening up communication and a 
route of supplies into Chattanooga and Cleveland. Report to me your 
position through General Johnston, as also round by sea. You may also 
advise General Canby of your position, and the substance of this, which 
I have sent round by sea. 

" W. T. Sherman, 
11 Major-General Commanding." 
Please communicate above to the Federal commander. 

J. E. JOHNSTON. 



CHAPTER XLI. 

CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRESIDENT. 

The two cavalry columns were arrested about the same time, 
by the armistice established by Generals Sherman and John- 
ston, under circumstances of embarrassment to the generals 
commanding them, though fortunately there were no condi- 
tions of great hazard, in suspending their operations, as each 
had swept through the enemy's country in ceaseless success 
and triumph. Their orders were so positive as to allow no 
discretion, even had the suspension of their operations given 
advantage to the enemy, through whom the knowledge of the 
truce was communicated. Neither did the embarrassments 
produced by the truce stop with the commanders in the field, 
but reached General Thomas, who was charged with the man- 
agement of the affairs of the Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, and who had organized these expeditions under orders 
from Lieutenant-General Grant. For, although telegraphic 
communications did not reach either General Wilson or Gen- 
eral Stoneman, General Thomas heard of the armistice through 
each of these generals before he received official information 
of its existence from the lieutenant-general. Referring to the 
time of receiving information from his subordinates, he thus, 
in his official report, mentioned his own embarrassments in 
relation to the armistice and the manner of its announcement : 
" Up to that period I had not been officially notified of the 
existence of any armistice between the forces of Generals 
Sherman and Johnston, and the information only reached me 
through my sub-commanders, Generals Wilson and Stoneman, 
from Macon, Georgia, and Greenville, East Tennessee, almost 
simultaneously. The question naturally arose in my mind, 

(362) 



CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRESIDENT. 363 

whether the troops acting under my direction, bj virtue of 
General Sherman's Special Field Order No. 1" of L864, 

directing me to assume control of all theforcee of the Military 
Division of the Mississippi, 'not absolutely in the presence of 
the general-in-chief,' were to be bound by an armistice 01 
agreement made at a distance of several hundred miles from 
where those troops were operating and of which they were 
advised through an enemy, then in such straitened circum- 
stances that any ruse, honorable a1 leas) in war, was likely 
to be practiced by him to relieve himself from his difficull 
position. Then, again, General Sherman was operating with 
a movable column, beyond the limits of his territorial com- 
mand, viz., the Military Division of the Mississippi, and far 
away from all direct communication with it; whereas 'the 
troops not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief,' 
were operating under special instructions and uot even in co- 
operation with General Sherman against Johnston, but, on the 
contrary, General Stoneman was dismantling the country to 
obstruct Lee's retreat and General Wilson Mas moving inde- 
pendently in Georgia or co-operating with General Canby. 
Before I could come to any conclusion how I should act under 
the circumstances, and without disrespect to nvy superior 
officer, General Sherman, Secretary Stanton telegraphed to me 
from "Washington, on the 27th of April, and through me to 
my sub-commanders, to disregard all orders except those com- 
ing from General Grant or myself, and to resume hostilities 
at once, sparing no pains to press the enemy firmly, at tin- 
same time notifying me that General Sherman's negotiations 
with Johnston had been disapproved." 

Having now full authority for independent action, and hav- 
ing learned that President Davis with a party had started 
south from Charlotte, North Carolina, on the cessation of the 
armistice, General Thomas at once made dispositions to cap- 
ture the fugitive President, and those who still clung to him 
and his fortunes. He directed General Stoneman to send the 
brigades of Miller, Brown, and Palmer, to concentrate at An- 
derson, South Carolina, and SCOUl down the Savannah river 
to Augusta, Georgia, in search of the fugitives. General 
Gillem was absent from the command at the time, and Colonel 



364 CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRESIDENT. 

W. F. Palmer, of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, assumed 
direction of the expedition. By rapid marching, he reached 
and crossed.the Savannah river in advance of Mr. Davis, and 
so disposed his troops as to change the direction of the flight, 
from the west toward the Mississippi river, to the Atlantic 
coast. General Thomas also notified General Wilson, at Ma- 
con, Georgia, of the issue of the negotiations in North Caro- 
lina, and ordered him to resume hostilities at once, with 
special reference to the capture of Mr. Davis. 

These orders had scarcely been issued before the surrender 
of the Confederate forces east of the Chattahoochee river, to 
General Sherman, by General Johnston, was officially an- 
nounced to both General Thomas and General "Wilson, and 
the latter at once adopted measures looking to the surrender 
of the enemy's military establishments at Atlanta, Georgia, 
and Tallahassee, Florida, and to throw a cordon of cavalry 
across the State of Georgia to intercept and capture Mr. Davis 
and his party. He sent General Upton to Augusta.; General 
Winslow, with the Fourth division, to march to Atlanta " for 
the purpose of carrying into effect the terms of the conven- 
tion, as well as to make such a disposition of his forces, cover- 
ing the country northward, from Forsyth to Marietta, so as 
to secure the arrest of Jefferson Davis and party ;" General 
McCook, with five hundred men of his division, to move to 
Tallahassee, Florida, " to receive the surrender of the enemy 
in that state ;" Colonel Minty, " to extend his troops along 
the line of the Ocmulgee and Altamaha rivers, as far as Jack- 
sonville ; and General Croxton, commanding a division (the 
First), " to distribute it along the line of the Ocmulgee," con- 
necting with Winslow, and reaching to Macon. Besides, 
General Wilson directed that detachments should watch the 
crossings of Flint river, and the stations on the railroad from 
Atlanta to Eufala, as well as Columbus, West Point, and Tal- 
ladega. These general and special dispositions, with thorough 
scouting, promised the interception of all large parties and 
the arrest of prominent persons. 

Evading the terms of General Johnston's surrender, Mr. 
Davis moved south from Charlotte, North Carolina, through 
Yorkville, toward Unionville and Abbeville, South Carolina, 



CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE PRESIDENT. 366 

with evident purpose of passing through to the trans-Mi 

sippi Department, with a vague hope thai !0 uld ther n 

tmuethewar. He was, at first, a apanied by his staff and 

cabinet under escort of cavalry, from the commands of F, r 
gnson, Duke, Harris, and Butler. Finding, upon reaching the 
Savannah river from Abbeville, where his last council of war 
was held, which expressed the utter despair of all bul himself 
that he was enveloped by the national cavalry, Mr Davis 
dismissed his retinue, and with a few friends pushed on to 
Washington, reaching that place on the morning of the 3d 
ot May. In dismissing his escort, he abandoned the idea of 

%hting his way to the west, and attempted to accomplish the 

passage by the most secret means. During the day he left 
Washington, by rail, for Atlanta, but abandoned his car a1 
Union Point, and started southwest on horseback. Colonel 
Palmer having ascertained this fact, scattered his forces to in- 
tercept him, and at the same time gather up the fragments f 
the Confederate forces roaming over the country. But, not- 
withstanding great vigilance and activity, Mr. Davis slipped 
through Palmer's detachments, to be caught bv Wilson's 
troopers, farther west and south. On the 7th of May, Colonel 
Harnden, of the First Wisconsin, with one hundred and fifty 
men, having advanced from Macon, ascertained that Mr. 
Davis had crossed the Oconee at Dublin, fifty-five miles south- 
east of Macon, and had fled on the Jacksonville road, lie 
pursued rapidly, marching forty miles on the 8th on the foot- 
steps of the fugitive. On the 9th he crossed the Ocmulgee, at 
Brown's ferry, and at Abbeville learned that Mr. Davis had 
left that point at 1 a. m. on the road to Irwinsville. Hasten- 
ing forward, he reached the vicinity of Irwinsville at nightfall, 
and awaited daylight to make the capture. 

Having learned at Abbeville of the approach of Colonel 
Pritchard of the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Harnden went, after 
halting, to meet him and inform him of his success in tracing 
the steps of Mr. Davis. The former stated that he had been 
sent to Abbeville to watch for Mr. Davis, but that he would 
go no farther that night. However, after making this stipula- 
tion, he moved into Irwinsville during the night, and at dawn 
captured Mr. Davis in disguise, and the small party with him. 



366 CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE TRESIDENT. 

Soon after this accomplishment, Colonel Harnden approached, 
and having been hailed by Colonel Pritchard's detachment, 
answered " friends," and fell back. In the mutual uncertainty 
as to the identity of the two commands, several shots were 
fired, killing several men — a sad issue of a misunderstanding 
that should not have existed. The pursuit had been con- 
ducted with great vigor by all the parties from the two general 
commands. A reward had been offered of which they were 
ignorant, from a conjecture that Mr. Davis was remotely con- 
nected with the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, President of the 
United States. 

Mr. Davis would have made a better appearance in history, 
had he met the final issue with General Johnston in preference 
to seeking, by stealthy flight, the preservation of the life which 
he had often declared should not survive the fall of his 
country. This termination of his vaunted presidency, and 
the disgrace of his flight, were foreign to his grand promises 
and lofty aspirations. His humiliation and helplessness were, 
however, the fitting symbols of the cause and the government, 
of which in the days of his glory and power he was the most 
prominent representative. His descent from power was as 
sudden and as marked as the oft-repeated transfer of kings 
and emperors from thrones to dungeons, but history furnishes 
noparallel to such emphatic loss of a cause which commanded the 
real and nominal allegiance of so many millions of men. And 
the philosophical historian must ask the question, could it 
have collapsed so suddenly, had its foundation been laid at 
the beginning in the hearts of the'Southern people ? 

The overthrow of the rebellion was doubtless due to a 
variety of causes, which were strictly subjective. The mal- 
administration of the Confederate government was a promi- 
nent cause, but could not have been the most potential one. 
It has been claimed, however, by Southern historians, that it 
had this rank, as it demoralized the people and divorced them 
from the cause which they at first so earnestly espoused. 

The palpable immediate cause of the collapse of the rebellion 
was the lack of soldiers to fight for it, not of supplies or strict 
war material. And this need of soldiers did not result from 
the failure of the conscription more than from the desertion 



CAPTURE OP THE CONFEDERATE PR] 3IDENT. 

of both volunteers and conscripts; for, a1 the last, nearly a 

moiety of those who had home arms were d ,,,, v 

&ta rmie8 had been formed fi i volunteers, but soon mer 

enlistment was abandoned, and then soldiers and supplle 
could only be secured by despotic constraint. And £ h« 

been assumed that the final despotic measures of il veTn 

ment produced a fatal disaffection, which did not originally 
exist. But it should be considered, in estimating the force 
and exact influence of the severe measures of the government- 
the conscription which enrolled for military service all able- 
bodied male persons between the ages of eighteen and liftv 
nve years, and the sweeping impressment of supplies-thai 
there was need of these expedients, or the government would 
never have adopted them, and that consequently the potential 
cause of failure produced the state of tin,,- from which 
originated the objectionable demands of the government Mr 

Davis and the Confederate Congress would never have ignored 

the rights of the states, for the maintenance of which they 
invoked the war, had it been possible to maintain the conflict 
without trenching upon the sovereignty of the individual 
states composing the Confederacy. It was a pleasant doctrine 
for days of harmony and peace, but unsuited to those of war 
The despotism of the government, then, was onlv a secondarv 
cause of the failure of the rebellion. 

The ruling cause was that the war on the part of the South 
was the expression of an insurrection and net a true revolu- 
tion; and the inherent vices of a false revolution may be 
traced from the very beginning of the despotic measures of 
the government. All true revolutions of popular expression 
have their foundation and force in the sentiments of the ma 
engaged in them, and will be maintained to the direst extrem- 
ity. No insurrection that is impressed upon a people by a 
few leaders or by an influential or powerful minority, can com- 
mand the perpetual support of the masses. The people may 
be deceived for a time by false issues and delusive hopes, anil 
the enthusiasm which may thus be called forth may take on 
the appearance of genuine revolutionary sentiment, hut ir will 
not survive the revelation of the real issues or the disappoint- 
ments that follow groundless hopes. To say that the ^outh- 



368 CAPTUEE OF THE CONFEDEEATE PEESIDENT. 

em people were deprived of their moral force and patriotism 
by their government, through mere errors in the conduct of 
the war or absolute despotism, is to attribute to them character 
too weak to warrant any movement which would involve a 
protracted war of immense proportions ; and the only suppo- 
sition that gives room for the existence of manhood and strong 
character in the Southern people is, that the masses were 
beguiled into insurrection against a good government by a few 
men of great influence, and that they abandoned it when they 
discovered the deception. 

The original opposition to secession by a party of great 
numerical strength, but of feeble and incomplete organization, 
may be cited as evidence that the movement toward disunion 
was not supported by the people generally with such hearti- 
ness and spontaneous purpose as indicated a true revolution. 
A fallacy, glaring in absurdity when strictly analyzed, yet sub- 
tle, imposing, and of momentous force, when accepted, swept 
a multitude of originally sincere Union men into the rebellion, 
inducing their allegiance to the several seceding states and to 
the Confederate government formed by them. The fallacy 
was that a. formal act of secession, though unconstitutionally 
enacted and pronounced, bound all citizens of a state to serve 
the state in the extreme consequences of the act. Its force 
prevented all organization in opposition to the resulting war 
in any stage of its progress, and long enforced its support ; but 
it did not and could not create the foundations of a true revo- 
lution, and when the awakening to the grand mistake did 
occur, the seeming revolution failed in default of the general 
support of the Southern people. 

The want of sympathy between the leaders and the masses 
was never so apparent as during the later campaigns of the 
war, especially during the last operations of the national cav- 
alry, when perhaps hundreds of millions of property might 
have been saved from destruction if the leaders of the rebel- 
lion had recognized the fact that the majority of the Southern 
people had abandoned it. 



CHAPTER XLIL 

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY— SUMMARY OF ITS ACHEBVBM] 

The surrender of the remaining Confederate armies 
forces east and west of the Mississippi river soon followed the 
capitulation of General Johnston and the capture of Mr. 
Davis. Preparations were then promptly made to disband the 
national armies, with the retention of such forces only as were 
necessary to prevent political and social chaos in the Southern 
States. 

The formal unity of the Army of the Cumberland was re- 
stored before its dissolution by the return of the Fourteenth 
and Twentieth Corps within the territorial limits of the De- 
partment of the Cumberland. This reunion of the grand 
units under their revered commander was eminently appro- 
priate as well as historically imperative. Their dismember- 
ment at Goldsboro, North Carolina, occurring after their last 
battle had been fought, did not really impair the historical 
unity of this great army. Still, there would have been a 
painful lack of complete roundness in its mere organic unity, 
had two corps been disbanded outside the territorial limits of 
the department. 

During the summer of 1865, the Fourth Corps was also tem- 
porarily detached, and sent upon a mission to Texas under 
General Sheridan. But it, too, was soon remanded to the De- 
partment of the Cumberland, to be disbanded, as were the 
Fourteenth and Twentieth, by General Thomas. 

From the 1st of June, 1865, to February 1, 1866, there were 
mustered out of the service of the United States, from the 
Army of the Cumberland, five thousand and eighty-three com- 
missioned officers and one hundred and thirty-seven thousand 
vol. n— 24 (369) 



370 DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY. 

five hundred and thirty-three enlisted men, exclusive of six- 
teen regiments of cavalry, whose strength was not definitely 
reported. Ahout twenty thousand volunteer troops were re- 
tained within the Military Division of the Tennessee, under 
the command of Major-General George H. Thomas, until a 
Liter period. From the data given, the strength of the Army 
of the Cumberland, at the close of the war, may he placed, 
with approximate correctness, at one hundred and seventy-five 
thousand men. And when these heroic citizen soldiers were 
remanded to the duties of civil life, the Army of the Cumber- 
land passed from organic existence to live in history as an 
army unsurpassed, if equaled, by any of the great armies which 
participated in our gigantic civil war— as one of the grandest 
that ever battled for country or freedom. 

This army fought, unaided, the battles of " Mill Springs," 
" Perryville," " Stone River," " Chickamauga," " Wauhatchee," 
and " Bentonville ;" gave essential aid to the Army of the 
Tennessee, at " Fort Donelson " and " Pittsburg Landing ;" in 
combination with that army, but in twofold strength, gained the 
decisive victories on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge ; 
furnished more than half the forces for the Atlanta campaign, 
placing upon its banners the historic fields of "Buzzard's 
Roost," " Resaca," " Rome," " New Hope Church," "Kenesaw 
Mountain," " Peachtree Creek," " Atlanta," and " Jonesboro ;" 
at Jonesboro, represented by the Fourteenth Corps, made the 
only successful assault, in force, during the Atlanta campaign, 
carrying intrenchments held by Hardee's corps ; formed the 
left wing of the army which marched from Atlanta to Savan- 
nah, and then swept through the Carolinas to Richmond and 
Washington ; divided the glory of " Franklin " with the Army 
of the Ohio, and that of " Nashville " with the Armies of the 
Tennessee and Ohio ; and, represented by the troopers of Gen- 
erals Wilson and Stoneman, rushed through Alabama, Geor- 
gia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, in swift and brilliant 
sequence to the great central battles of the war. This army, 
in its unity, never gave but one field to the enemy. But when 
it yielded the bloody ground of Chickamauga, it had revealed, 
under conditions of battle greatly unequal, its invincibility 
within fair terms of conflict. But even here it gained the 



DISSOLUTION OF THE A l;. MY. ;\~ [ 

fruits of victory, under the Bemblance of defeat, as it held 
Chattanooga, the objective of the campai 



[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 108.] 

War Department, Adjutant-General' i 
Washington, D. C, June J, I 

Soldiers of the Armies of (he Uni 1 

By your patriotic devotion to your country in the hour of danger 
alarm, your magnificent fighting, bravery, and endurance, 
maintained the supremacy of the Union and the ('(institution, over- 
thrown all armed opposition to the enforcement of the laws, and ol the 
proclamation forever abolishing slavery — th xt f the 

rebellion — and opened the way to the rightful authorities to 
order and inaugurate peace on a permanent and enduring basis, on i 
foot of American soil. 

Your marches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolution, and 
brilliancy of result, dim the luster of the world's past military ach 
ments, and will be the patriot's precedent in defense of liberty and right 
in all time to come. 

In obedience to your country's call, you left your homes and families, 
and volunteered in its defense. Victory has crowned your valor, and 
secured the purpose of your patriot hearts; and with the gratitude of 
your countrymen, and the highest honors a great and free nation ran 
accord, you will soon be permitted to return to your homes and fam 
conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens. 
To achieve these glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, \ our fellow- 
countrymen, and posterity, the blessings of free institutions, tens of 
thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen, and sealed the ; 
less legacy with their lives. The graves of these a grateful nation be- 
dews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and sup- 
port their stricken families. 

U. S. GRANT, 

].' "tenant-General. 



[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 76.] 
Headuqarters Military Division* of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Washington, D. C, May 30, 1865. 
The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee 
and Georgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is d 
and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your 
homes, and others will be retained in military service until further 
orders. 

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civil 



372 DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY. 

world, it becomes a pleasing duty to call to mind the situation of na- 
tional affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered 
about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in 
doubt and uncertainty. 

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate his- 
tories, yet bound by one common cause — the union of our country and 
the perpetuation of the government of our inheritance. There is no 
need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky Face Mountain 
.and Buzzard Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind. 

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but 
dashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to the 
Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw, and the heats of summer found us on the 
banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on a single 
road for supplies. 

Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed and 
fought four hard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. 
That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but 
we solved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State 
of Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and 
Christmas found us at Savannah. 

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a 
march, which, for peril, labor, and result, will compare with any ever 
made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps 
of the Combahee and Edisto, the high hills and rocks of the Santee, the 
flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear rivers, were all passed in mid- 
winter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy ; 
and after the battles of Averysboro and Bentonville, we once more came 
out of the wilderness to meet our friends at Golclsboro. Even then we 
paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, 
again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy, suing 
for peace instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of 
his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, 
nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold had checked us; but when 
lie who had fought us hard and persistently offered submission, your 
general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations fol- 
lowed, which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender. 

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final overthrow 
of the Confederacy, and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be 
judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all that men could 
do, has been admitted by those in authority, and we have a right to join 
in the universal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our 
government stands vindicated before the world, by the joint action of the 
volunteer armies and navy of the United States. 

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind you 
that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and that 
the same work and discipline are equally important in the future. To 
euch as go home, he will only say that our favored country is so grand, 



DISSOLUTION OF THE Ai;.My. ;;;•> 

so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions tl I 

man find h and ^ ^ £ ^£^^1 

y 6 ld to the natural impatience sure to result ft , our pas Se of ex 

c tement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adVen tU re a 
abroad; do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to d J 
disappointment. J «u»muq 

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief thai as in 

war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make g I .-;,.. 

zens; and if unfortunately, new war should arise i „■ c Sher- 

man s army will be the first to buckle on its old armor, and come forth 
to defend and maintain the government of our inheritance 
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. DAYTON, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

[GENEEAL OKDERS, NO. 30.] 

Headquarters Department ok the Cumberland, 
Nashville, Tenn., May 10, 1865 
The general commanding the department takes pride in conveying to 
the Fourth Army Corps the expression of his admiration, excited by 
their brilliant and martial display at the review of yesterday. 

As the battalions of your magnificent corps swept successively before 
the eye, the coldest heart must have warmed with interest in contei 
tion of those men who had passed through the varied and shifting scenes 
of this great modern tragedy, who had stemmed with unyielding bn 
the rebel tide threatening to engulf the landmarks of freedom, and 
who, bearing on their bronzed and furrowed brows the ennobling marks 
of the years of hardship, suffering, and privation, undergone in defense 
of freedom and the integrity of the Union, could still preserve the light 
step and wear the cheerful expression of youth. 

Though your gay and broidered banners, wrought by dear hands far 
away, were all shred and war-worn, were they not blazoned on every 
stripe with words of glory— Shiloh, Spring Hill, Stone River, Chicka- 
mauga, Atlanta, Franklin, Nashville, and many other glorious names, too 
numerous to mention in an order like this? By your prowess and forti- 
tude you have ably done your part in restoring the golden boon of 
peace and order to your once distracted but now grateful country, 
and your commander is at length enabled to give you a season of well- 
earned rest. 

But, soldiers, while we exult at our victories, let us not be forgetful 
of those brave, devoted hearts, which, pressing in advance, throbbed 
their last amid the smoke and din of battle, nor withhold our sym- 
pathy for the afflicted wife, child, and mother, consigned, far off at 
home, to lasting, cruel grief. 
By command of Major-Ge.veral Thomas. 

WM. D. WHIPPLE, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



374 DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY. 

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 15.] 

Headquarters Army of Georgia, 
Washington, D. C, June 6, 1865. 

With the separation of the troops composing this army, in compliance 
with recent orders, the organization known as " the Army of Georgia " 
will virtually cease to exist. Many of you will at once return to your 
homes. No one now serving as a volunteer will probably be retained in 
service against his will but a short time longer. All will soon be per- 
mitted to return and receive the rewards due them as the gallant de- 
fenders of their country. 

While I can not repress a feeling of sadness at parting with you, I con- 
gratulate you upon the grand results achieved by your valor, fidelity, and 
patriotism. 

No generation has ever done more for the permanent establishment of 
a just and liberal form of gevernment — more for the honor of their 
nation — than has been done during the past four years by the armies of 
the United States, and the patriotic people at home, who have poured 
out their wealth in support of these armies with a liberality never before 
witnessed in any country. 

Do not forget the parting advice of that great chieftain who led you 
through your recent brilliant campaigns. " As in war you have been 
good soldiers, so in peace be good citizens." 

Should you ever desire to resume the honorable profession you are 
now about to leave, do not forget that this profession is honorable only 
when followed in obedience to the orders of the constituted authority of 
your government. 

With feelings of deep gratitude to each and all of you for your uniform 
soldierly conduct, for the patience and fortitude with which you have 
borne all the hardships it has been necessary to impose upon you, and 
for the unflinching resolution with which you have sustained the holy 
cause in which we have been engaged, I bid you farewell. 

H. W. SLOCUM, Major-General Commanding. 



[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 17.] 

Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps, 
Washington, D. C, June 15, 1865. 
Soldiers of the Fourteenth Army Corps : 

Since he assumed command of the corps, your general has seen many 
occasions when he was proud of your endurance, your courage, and your 
achievements. If he did not praise you then, it was because your labors 
and triumphs were incomplete. Whilst the enemies of your country still 
defied you, whilst hardships and dangers were yet to be encountered and 
overcome, it seemed to him premature to indulge in unnecessary praise 
of deeds being enacted, or to rest upon laurels already won. But now, 
when the battle and the march are ended and the victory yours; when 
many of you are about to return to your homes, where the sound of the 
hostile cannon — now silenced, let us trust, forever in our land — will soon be 



DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY. 

forgotten amidst the welcoming plaudits of friend ; when theheavj armor 
of the soldier is being exchanged for the civic win 
it a happy occasion to congratulate you upon the part which you 
borne, in common with your comrades of the armies of the 
the mighty struggle for the maintenance of the unity and inl 
country. You will join heartily in the generel rejoicing • 
result and the termination of the nation's peril. While the • 
welcoming her defenders home, and their noble deeds are b 
memorated, you will over remember with proud satisfactii 
Chickamauga yours were the invincible battalions with which the un- 
3 ielding Thomas hurled back the overwhelming foe and saved the day , 
that at Mission Ridge you helped, with your brothers of the Armies of the 
Cumberland and of the Tennessee, to plan! the banners of your country 
once more on the doud-clad heights of Chattanooga ; thai at Jon< 
your resistless charge decreed the final fate of proud Atlanta; tl 
Bentonville you for hours defied the frenzied and determined 
the rebel hosts to crush seriatim (lie columns of the victorious Sherman. 
Years hence, in the happy enjoj ment oi 

country, whose preservation your valor on many hard foughl fiel< 
cured, it will be among your proudesl boasts thai vou fought with Th 
and marched with Sherman from the mountains to the sea; thai 
toiled and skirmished in midwinter through (lie swamps of Georgia and 
the Carolinas; that after years of bloody contest you witnessed (he sur- 
render of one of the enemy's proudest armies, no longer able to with- 
stand your irresistible pursuit. Now (he danger past, and tb 
won, many of you turn homeward. Let tl 3pirit, the 

same pure patriotism that prompted your entry into your country's serv- 
ice, be cherished by you, never forgetting that the true soldier is always a 
good citizen and Christian. 

Some remain yet for a time as soldiers. The same country thai 
called you needs your further services and retains you. Let your future 
record be a continuation of the glorious past, and such that as long as a 
soldier remains of the Fourteenth Co:-ps it shall continue bright and un- 
tarnished. 

Many of the noblest, bravest, and best who came out with us will not 
return. We left them on the hills and by the streams of the South, where 
no voice of mother, sister, or wife will ever wake them — where no kind 
hand will strew flowers upon their graves. But, soldiers, by us they will 
never be forgotten. Their heroic deeds and last resting-places will often 
be brought to mind in fond remembrance. Though dead, they will live 
in the affections of their countrymen and their country's history. Whilst 
passing events are fast changing our past associations and requirim- us to 
form new ones, let us seek to extend a warm greeting and the hi 
hand of congratulation to all who rejoice in our country's preservation 
and return to peace. 

By command of Brevet Major-General Jeff. C. Davis. 

A. C. McCLURG, 
Brevet Colonel A. A. G. and Chief of Staff. 



376 DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY. 

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 39.] 

Headquarters Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., 
Macon, Ga., July 2, 1865. 
To the Officers and Men of the Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi : 

Your corps has ceased to exist I The rebellion has terminated in the 
re-establishment of your country upon the basis of nationality and 
perpetual unity. Your deeds have contributed a noble part to the 
glorious result; they have passed into history and need no recital from 
me. In the nine months during wbich I have commanded you, I have 
heard no reproach upon your conduct — have had no disaster to chronicle 1 

The glowing memories of Franklin, Nashville, West Harpeth, Eben- 
ezer Church, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, West Point, and Macon 
may well fill your hearts and mine with pride. 

You have learned to believe yourselves invincible, and, contemplating 
your honorable deeds, may justly cherish that belief. You may be proud 
of your splendid discipline no less than your courage, zeal, and endur- 
ance. The noble impulses which have inspired you in the past, will be a 
source of enduring honor in the future. " Peace has her victories no 
less renowned than war." Do not forget that clear heads, honest hearts, 
and stout arms, guided by pure patriotism, are the surest defense of 
your country in every peril. Upon them depend the substantial progress 
of your race and order of civilization, as well as the liberty of all man- 
kind. 

Let your example in civil life be an incitement to industry, aood order, 
and enlightenment, while your deeds in war shall live in the grateful re- 
membrance of your countrymen. 

Having discharged every military duty honestly and faithfully, return 
to your homes with the noble sentiment of your martyr President deeply 
impressed upon every heart: " With malice against none and charity for 
all, strive to do the right as God gives you to see the right." 

J 3 . H. WILSON, 

Brevet Major- General. 



CHAPTER XLTTI. 

THE DEAD AND THEIR DISPOSITION. 

The history of the Army of the Cumberland would no1 be 
complete was the disposition of its heroic dead omitted ; for 
never, in the history of war, have the slain of any other army 
been so honored in burial. 

The first permanent National Cemetery for soldiers estab- 
lished by military order, was the one founded, by General 
George H. Thomas, near Chattanooga, Tennessee. The cir- 
cumstances under which this site was selected, have historic 
interest far transcending the mere fact of priority of estab- 
lishment. 

During the battle, which resulted in the dislodgment of 
General Bragg's army from Missionary Ridge, a reserve force, 
in line over a hill near the field position of General Thomas, 
revealed its beautiful contour and suggested its use as a Na- 
tional Cemetery. This hill, conical in general outline, but 
fruitful in lateral hillocks and varied in expression from every 
point of view, is located equidistant from Cameron hill, which 
rises abruptly from the Tennessee river, where it turns toward 
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge on the east, and is 
central between General Hooker's point of attack on Lookout 
Mountain, and General Sherman's, on the northern summit of 
Missionary Ridge. Thus it is the center of this complex 
battle-field. 

Soon after the battle, General Thomas issued the following 

order : 

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 296.] 

Chattanooga, Tenn., December 25, 1863. 
It is ordered that a National Cemetery be founded at this place, in com- 
memoration of the battles at Chattanooga, fought November 23d, 24th, 

(877) 



378 THE DEAD AND THEIR DISPOSITION. 

25th, 26th, and 27th, and to provide a proper resting-place for the remains 
of the brave men who fell upon the fields fought over upon those days, 
and for the remains of such as may hereafter give up their lives in this 
region in defending their country against treason and rebellion. 

The ground selected for the cemetery is the hill lying beyond the 
Western and Atlantic railroad, in a southeasterly direction from the 
town. 

It is proposed to erect a monument upon (lie summit of the hill, 
of such materials as are to be obtained in this vicinity, which, like all 
the work upon the cemetery, shall be exclusively done by the troops of 
the Army of the Cumberland. 

Plans for the monument are invited to be sent in to these headquarters. 
Winn the ground is prepared, notice will be given, and all interments of 
soldiers will thereafter be made in the cemetery, and all now buried in 
and around the town removed to that place. 

By command of Major-General George H. Thomas. 

(Signed,) WM. D. WHIPPLE, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

The exigencies of war prevented the execution of all the 
work upon this cemetery by the troops of the Army of the 
Cumberland, and the monument contemplated has never been 
erected. Neither was it subsequently practicable to obtain a 
brief history of the many thousands interred in this classic 
ground, as at first contemplated. However, while the war 
lasted, troops from the Army of the Cumberland continued the 
work of burial and embellishment. When the volunteers were 
mustered out of the service, employes of the quartermaster's 
department completed the enterprise as far as practicable. 

The establishment of the Chattanooga National Cemetery 
was followed, first, by one upon the battle-field of Stone River, 
and later, by one at Nashville, Tennessee, and another at Mari- 
etta, Georgia. Chaplain William Earnshaw was charged with 
the burial of the dead and the ornamentation of the grounds 
at Stone River and Nashville, and another chaplain sustained 
a similar relation to the cemeteries at Chattanooga and Mari- 
etta. In these four cemeteries were finally interred the remains 
of more than forty thousand soldiers. Many smaller ceme- 
teries were established within the limits of the Department of 
the Cumberland, within the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and more than one hundred 
thousand soldiers were interred in cemeteries commemorative, 



THE DEAD AXD THEIR DISPOSITION. 379 

often, of great battles, and always of the nation titude fco 

those who gave their lives to maintain the nation's life. 

In expression of the value of each citizen who fell in the 
war, the body of each was placed in a separate grave. A.nd 
so thorough was the search for the dead upon every battle- 
field and over the whole country, that their friends may !> 
sured that, whether identified or not, all rest in grounds co 
crated for their abode forever. 



[EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 8.] 

Bead-Quarters Akmy ov the Cumbi-rlaxd, 
< hattanooga, Tenn., January 8, 186 I. 
Commanding officers of regiments in this department will furnish, on 
the application of Chaplain Thomas B. Van Home, 13th 0. V. I., in 
charge of the Mortuary Record of the National Cemetery at this place, 
full information in regard to the full name, rank, company, native 
date, age, marital state, date of enlistment, address of nearest friends, 
number of engagements participated in, soldierly character, special cir- 
cumstances of death, if killed in action, and whatever else is worthy of 
their history of record, of all soldiers who may be interred in the National 
Cemetery at Chattanooga. 

By Command of Major-General Thomas: 

WM. D. WHIPPLE, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
Official: Wm. McMichael, Assistant Adjutant-General. 



APPENDIX. 



* 



ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

[official.] 

Organized August 15, 1861 (G. O. No. 57, TV. D.), embracing 
states of Kentucky and Tennessee. Brigadier-General Robert An- 
derson, U. S. A., to command. Discontinued November 9, 1SG1 (G. 
O. No. 97, TV. D.), and the states embraced therein assigned as fol- 
lows: Kentucky, west of Cumberland river, to Department of the 
Missouri ; Kentucky, east of Cumberland river, to Department 
of the Ohio; Tennessee, to the Department of the Ohio. 

Reorganized October 24, 1862 (G. O. No. 168, TV. D.), embracing 
State of Tennessee, east of the Tennessee river, and such parts of 
Northern Georgia and Alabama as are taken possession of by 
United States forces. 



ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, 
MILITARY DIVISION, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TENNESSEE, ETC. 

Department of the Cumberland. 

Organized, and Major-General TV. S. Rosecrans assigned to the 
command, October 30, 1862 (G. O. No. 168, TV. D., October 24, 
1862), consisted of the Fourteenth Army Corps, the troops of 
which were subsequently divided into three (3) army corps— the 
Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first— as follows : The " Cen- 
ter," under command of Major-General G. H. Thomas, to con- 
stitute the Fourteenth Army Corps; "Right Wing," under Major- 
General A. McD. McCook, the Twentieth; and the "Left Wing," 

(881) 



382 APPEXDIX. 

tinder Major-General T. L. Crittenden, the Twenty-first Army 
Corps. (See G. O. No. 9, W. D., February 2, 1863.) 

The Twentieth and Twenty -first Array Corps were consolidated 
October 9, 1863, to constitute one corps, to be known as the Fourth 
Army Corps. Major-General Gordon Granger to command (G. 
^ O. No. 228, D. C, 1863). 

Major-General Eosecrans relieved from command of the De- 
partment, October 19, 1863; General G. H. Thomas assumed com- 
mand October 20, 1863. General J. M. Palmer to command 
Fourteenth Army Corps, vice Thomas, assigned to command De- 
partment of the Cumberland, October 28, 1863 (G. O. No. 350, 
W. D., 1863). 

The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, consolidated, to constitute 
the Twentieth Corps, April 4, 1864. Major-General Joseph 
Hooker assigned to the command (G. O. No. 144, W. D., Series 
of 1864). 

By same order, General Gordon Granger relieved from com- 
mand of the Fourth Army Corps, and General O. O. Howard as- 
signed in his stead. 

Major-General J. Hooker relieved from, and Major-General 
Slocum assigned to, command Twentieth Army Corps ; and Gen- 
eral Howard transferred from, and General Stanley assigned to, 
command Fourth Army Corps (G. O. No. 238, W. D., July 30, 
1864). 

Brevet Major-General Jeff. C. Davis assigned to command the 
Fourteenth Army Corps (G. O. No. 241, W. D., August, 1864). 

The Twentieth and Fourteenth Army Corps accompanied Gen- 
eral Sherman on his march to the sea. 

By direction of the President (contained in telegram from W. 
A. Nichols, Assistant Adjutant-General, Januar}^ 17, 1865), the De- 
partment of the Ohio was united to the Department of the 
Cumberland, to embrace such parts of Mississippi, Georgia, and 
Alabama as were occupied by troops of General Thomas' com- 
mand. On the 12th of February, the Department was divided 
into the following Districts and Subdistricts, viz : 

District of West Tennessee, headquarters at Memphis, Ten- 
nessee, Major-General C. C. Washburne to command. 

District of Middle Tennessee, headquarters at Nashville, 
Major-General L. H. Eousseau. 

District of Northern Alabama, headquarters at Decatur, 
Brigadier-General E. S. Granger. 



APPENDIX. qoq 

First Shbdistrict of Middle Tennessee, headqnarte, 
Tullahoma, Major-General R. II. Milrot. 

Second Subdistrict of R ; Tennessee, headquartci 

Pulaski, Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson. 

Third Subdistrict of Middle Tennessee, headquarters at 
Kingston Springs, Colonel C. R. Thompson. 

Fourth Subdistrict of Middle Tennessee, Colonel James 
Gilfellan, Eleventh Minnesota Volunteers. 

Fifth Subdistrict of Middle Tennessee, headquarters at 
Clarksville, Colonel A. A. Smith, Eighty-third Illinois Volunl 

District of Etowah, Major-General J. J). Steedman ; and 

District of East Tennessee, Major-General Georgi Stoneman. 

By order of the Lieutenant-General commanding Armies of the 
United States, dated May 27, 1865, Northern Mississippi wa 
bodied in District of West Tennesski:. Department ok the Cum- 
berland discontinued, and Military Division- of the Tenn] 
organized, June 20, ISC'). 

The Military Division of the Tennessee 
Consisted at its organization of five (5) Departments viz : 

Department of Kentucky, Major-General J. M. Palmeb 
command, headquarters at Louisville. Kentucky. 

Department of Tennessee, Major-General George Stoneman 
to command, headquarters at Knoxville, Tennessee. 

Department of Georgia, Major-General J. B. Steedman to 
command, headquarters at Augusta, Georgia. 

Department of Alabama, Major-General C. H. Woods to com- 
mand, headquarters at Mobile, Alabama. 

Department of Florida and District of Key West, Maj 
General A. A. Humphreys to command, Tallahassc, Florida. 

The Department of Mississippi, Major-General II. W. Sloi 
commanding, added to the Military Division of the Ten.m - 
see, by direction of the President (G. 0. No. 2, M. D. T.. i ■ ■." 

By direction of the President, the orders annexing the Depart- 
ments of Florida and Mississippi were revoked, in General Or 
No. 4, M. D. T., 1865. 



384 APPENDIX. 



Department op the Tennessee. 



Organized August 13, 1866, consisting of the following Districts 
and Subdistriets, viz : 

District op the Cumberland, Major-General Stoneman, head- 
quarters at Memphis, to embrace Kentucky and Tennessee. 

Subdistrict of Kentucky, Brevet Major-General J. C. Davis. 

Subdistrict of Tennessee, Brevet Major-General C. B. Fisk. 

District op Mississippi, Major-General Thomas J. Wood. 

District op the Chattahoochee, Brevet Major-General C. R. 
"Woods, to embrace Subdistriets of Georgia and Alabama. 

Subdistrict of Alabama, Major-General W. Swayne. 

Subdistrict op Georgia, Brevet Major-General Davis Tillson. 

Military Division of Tennessee was divided into Department 
of the Cumberland, consisting of the Districts (late Departments) 
of Tennessee and Kentucky, Major-General George Stoneman to 
command, Memphis (organized by G. O. No. 36, W. D., June 5, 1866) ; 
Department op the South, consisting of the Districts (late De- 
partments) of Georgia and Alabama, Major-General C. E. 
Woods to command, Macon, Georgia (organized by G. 0. No. 32, 
W. D., May 19, 1866) ; Department op Mississippi annexed to 
Department by G. O. No. 142, W. D., October 7, 1865, Major- 
General H. W. Slocum to command. 

General T. J. Wood assigned to command of the Department 
November 3, 1865 (G. 0. No. 159, W. D.) 



APPENDIX. 3Q5 



ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO. 

[official.] 
Organized May 3, 1861 (G. 0. No. 14, W. D.), embracing Sti 
of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Major-General Geo. B. McClellam 

to command. Headquarters, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Extended May 9, 1861 (G. O. No. 19, W. D.), to embrace por- 
tions of West Virginia and Pennsylvania. 

Extended June 6, 1861 (G. O. No. 30, W. D.), to embrace State 
of Missouri. 

Reorganized September 9, 1861 (G. 0. No. 80, W. D.), embracing 
States of Ohio, Indiana, and so much of Kentucky as lies within 
fifteen miles of Cincinnati, Ohio. Brigadier-General Mitchell to 
command. 

Reorganized November 9, 1861 (G. O. No. 97, W. D.), embracing 
States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, east of the Cumber- 
land river, and Tennessee. Brigadier-General JD. C. Buell to & »m- 
mand. Headquarters, Louisville. 

Extended August 19, 1862 (G. O. No. 112, W. D.), to embi 
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Kentucky, east 
of the Tennessee river. Major-General H. G. Wright to command. 

Extended September 19, 1862 (G. 0. No. 135, W. D.), to embrace 
West Virginia. 

Major-General Burnside assumed command of the Department 
March 25, 1863. 

Major-General J. G. Poster relieved General Burnside from 
command December — , 1863. 

Department to embrace Kentucky, north of the Tennessee river, 
and -such portions of Tennessee as may be occupied by troops of 
the Department. 

Major-General J. M. Schofield assumed command February 9, 
1864. 

Department annexed to the Department of the Cumberland by 
direction of the President, contained in telegram from W. A. 
Nichols, dated January 17, 1865. 



386 APPENDIX. 



LIST OF OFFICEES OF AEMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 
WHO WERE KILLED IN ACTION OR DIED OF WOUNDS 
OR DISEASE DURING THE WAR, MAINLY COMPILED 
FROM THE "ARMY REGISTER." 



CONNECTICUT. 

Fifth Connecticut Infantry. 
First Lieut. James P. Henderson. Killed March 16, 1865. 

Twentieth Connecticut Infantry. 
Captain Oliver R. Post. Died, July 21, 1864, of wounds in action before 

Atlanta, Ga. 
First Lieut. Edward A. Doolittle. Died of disease, December 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Henry Lewis. Died December 26, 1864. 
First Lieut. Wellington Barry. Died March 17, 1865. 

ILLINOIS. 

Brigadier-General E. N. Kirk. Died , 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River, December 31, 1862. 

Battery B, Second Illinois Light Infantry. 

First Lieut. William Bishop. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Franklin Seeborn. Died, November 11, 1864, of wounds received 

in action. 

Battery C, Second Illinois Artillery. 

First Lieut. Elijah V. Moore. Died, February 5, 1863, of wounds received at 

Fort Donelson. 

Battery I. 

First Lieut. Alonzo W. Coe. Killed near Savannah, Ga., December 9, 1864. 

Tenth Illinois Infantry. 
First Lieut. William W. Rice, Adjutant. Died at Chattanooga, Tenn., June 
16, 1864, of wounds. 

Sixteenth Illinois Infantry. 

Major Samuel M. Hayes. Died, August 6, 1862, at Monticello, 111. 

Captain David Wells. Died of disease, at Macomb, 111., April 7, 1862. 

Captain Calvin H. Wilson. Died at Quincy, 111., June 16, 1864. 

Captain Eben White. Died, May 18, 1865, of wounds received at Averys- 

boro, N. C. 
First Lieut. James Donaldson. Died, July 17, 1864, of wounds received at 

Vining's Station, Ga. 



appendix. ;;s7 

Nineteenth Ulintm Infantry. 
Colonel Joseph Scott. Died, July 8, 1863, of wounds received at Stone I 
Captain Bushrod B. Howard. Killed by railroad accident, Septembi r V. 
Captain Charles H. Shepley. Died, March 23, L862, from accident with bis 

revolver. 

Captain Knowlton H. Chandler. Killed at Stone River, January 2, I 

First Lieut. Willington Wood. Died, January 5, 18C3, of wounds 'received at 

Stone River. 
Second Lieut. Thomas L. Job. Killed accidentally July is, L861. 
Second Lieut. John H. Hunter. Died, January 9, L863, of worn red at 

Stone River. 
Chaplain Augustus H. Conant. Died February 8, 1863. 

Twenty-first Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel John W. S. Alexander. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Benjamin F. Reed. Died, September 23, 1863, of wounds received at 
Chickamauga. 

Captain Andrew George. Died, January 15, 18C4, of wounds received at Chicka- 
mauga. 

First Lieut. Charles L. Smedel. Died at Nashville, Tenn., April 27, 1863, of 
disease. 

Second Lieut. Emanuel M. Weigle. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Second Lieut. John F. Weitzel. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Assistant Surgeon Carl Muntz. Died, January 31, 1862, at Ironton, Mo 

Twenty-second Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Harrison E. Hart. Died of disease at Alton, 111., July 25, 1862. 

Captain Milton French. Died, September 27, 1863, of wounds received at 
Chickamauga. 

Second- Lieut. Cyrus M. Galloway. Died, January 24 t 1863, of wounds received 
at Stone River. 

Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry. 

Colonel Geza Milialotzy. Died, March 11, 1864, of wounds received at Buz- 
zard's Roost, Ga. 

Captain Ernst F. Pletschke. Died, October 9, 1861, at Louisville, Ky. 

Captain Fred. Hartman. Died, November 9, 1862, of wounds received in 
action. 

Captain George Heinricks. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Ami Smith. Died, October 15, 1862, at Bowling Green, Ky. 

Twenty-fifth Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel Thomas D. Williams. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Charles A. Clark. Killed in quelling mutiny, November 25, 1863. 
Second Lieut. David M. Richards. Died, December 10, 1863, of wounds 

received in action. 
Second Lieut. James K. Weir. Died, June 21, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 



388 APPENDIX. 

Twenty-seventh Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel Fazelo A. Harrington. Died, January 1, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Captain William S. Bryan. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. "William Sbipley. Killed at Belmont, Mo., November 7, 1861. 
First Lieut. Joseph Voellinger. Died, October 18, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Hugh M. Love. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
First Lieut. Andrew J. Slides. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 
First Lieut. Alexander M. Boggs. Killed accidentally, near Atlanta, Ga., 

July 23, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Herbert Weyman. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

1863. 

Thirty-fourth Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Amos Bosworth. Died, April 23, 1862, of disease. 

Major Charles H. Levanway. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 

Captain Mabry G. Greenwood. Died of wounds received December 31, 1862, 

at Stone River. 
Captain John A. Parrott. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 
Captain Amos W. Hostetter. Died, July 26, 1864, of wounds received at 

Atlanta. 
First Lieut. Daniel Riley. Died at Nashville, January 20, 1863, of wounds. 
First Lieut. Henry D. Wood, Adjutant, Died, October 12, 1864, at Atlanta, of 

disease. 
First Lieut. Edward B. Hamer. Killed near Haywood, N. C, April 15, 1865. 
Second Lieut. Henry Miller. Died of wounds, May 1, 1862. 
Seeond Lieut. John M. Smith. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Thirly-ffth Illinois Infantry. 

Major John Mcllvain. Killed near Kenesaw Mountain, June 22, 1864. 

Captain Collins P. Jones. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

First Lieut. Joseph Moore. Died, April 7, 1862, of wounds received at Pea 
Ridge. 

First Lieut. Humphrey M. McConnell. Died, January 3, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

First Lieut. Moses C. Snook. Died, March 9, 1863, of disease. 

First Lieut. George F. Dietz. Died, July 8, 1863, of disease. 

First Lieut. John W. Snyder. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

First Lieut. Daniel H. Kagay. Died, February 10, 1864, of disease. 

Second Lieut. Joseph F. Clise. Died, October 7, 1861, of disease. 

Second Lieut. James P. Butler. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Benjamin F. Smith. Died, November 9, 1864, of disease. 

Thirty-sixth Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel Silas Miller. Died, July 27, 1864, of wounds received at Kenesaw 

Mountain. 
Lieut. Colonel Porter C. Olson. Died, November 30, 1864, of wounds received 

at Franklin. 



APPENDIX. 



389 



Captain Theodore G. Griffin. Died, November 24, 1862, of wounds received at 

Perr}-ville. 

Captain Aaron C. Holden. Died, December 1, 1862, of wounda received in 

action. 

Captain Sanford II. Wakeman. Died, September 20, 1863, of wounda r< c 

at Chickamauga. 

Captain James B. McNeal. Died, September 4, 1864, of wounds receiv. 

action. 
First Lieut. Edward S. Chappell. Died, October L6, L861, a( Rolla, Mo. 
First Lieut. Orison Smith. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 
First Lieut. Charles F. Chase. Died, December 18, 1864, of won,,., 

at Franklin. 
Second Lieut. Soren L. Olson. Killed at Stone River, December 31, ] 362. 
Second Lieut. Myron A. Smith. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 18C3. 
Second Lieut. Sidney M. Abbott. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 26 

1803. 

Thirty -eighth Illinois Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Daniel H. Gilmer. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20 
Lieut. Colonel William T. Chapman. Died, November 23, 1864, at Pu 

Tenn., of disease. 
Captain James P. Mead. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Thomas Cole. Killed at Chickamauga, September l!», 1863. 
Captain William C. Harris. Died, July 13, 1864, of wounds received at K< > > - 

saw Mountain. 
First Lieut, Arthur Lee Bailhache, Adjutant. Died of disease, January L' 
First Lieut. John L. Dillon. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
First Lieut. Benjamin G. Humes. Died, January 6, 1865, of wounds received 

in action. 
Second Lieut. Peter N. Scott. Died, January 8, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Chaplain William M. Brown. Died at Springfield, 111., November 23, 1863, of 

disease. 

Forty-second Ulinios Infantry. 
Colonel William A. Webb. Died, December 24, 1861, at Smithton, Mo. 
Colonel G. W. Roberts. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Major James Leighton. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Major D. Woodman Norton. Killed at New Hope Church, June 3, 1864. 
Captain George Varden. Died, September 19, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn., of 

disease. 
Captain Levi Preston. Died, at Chattanooga, Tenn., December 31, 1863. of 

disease. 
Captain Charles A. Seaver, Killed before Atlanta, C.a., August 3, 1864. 
Captain Gilbert A. Parshall. Died, December 3, 1864, of wounds received at 

Spring Hill, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Ezra A. Montgomerj^. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Edward H. Brown, Adjutant. Killed at Chickamauga, September 

20, 1863. 
First Lieut. George C. Smith. Died, December 7, 1S63, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 



390 APPENDIX. 

First Lieut. Alfred 0. Johnson. Died, December 8, 1863, of wounds received 

at Missionarj 7 Ridge. 
First Lieut. Edward Hurson. Died, May 18, 1864, of wounds received ;it 

Resaca. 
Second Lieut. Gilbert L. Barnes. Died, October 24, 1861, of disease. 
Second Lieut, Julius Lettman. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Jacob Y. Elliott. Died, December 7, 1863, of wounds received 

at Missionary Ridge. 

Forty-fourth Illinois Infantry. 
Captain Andrew I. Hosmer. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Ernst Moldenhauser. Died, February 27, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 
Captain Carl R. Harnisch. Killed, at Chattanooga, in action, November 25, 

1863. 
Captain Benjamin F. Knappen. Died, July 4, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Martin Reminger. Died, August 20, 1862, of disease. 
First Lieut. Peter Weyhrich. Died, July 6, 1864, of wounds. 
Second Lieut. Silas L. Parker. Died, January 19, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 

Fifty-first Illinois Infantry. 

Captain John T. Whitson. Died, July 15, 1862, at Chicago, 111. 

Captain George L. Bellows. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

First Lieut. Otis Moody. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

First Lieut. Thomas T. Lester. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 

First Lieut. Henry W. Ha\l, Adjutant. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Archibald L. McCormick. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Calvin H. Thomas. Killed at Franklin, November 30, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Albert G. Simmons. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 

1863. 

Fifty-ninth Flinois Infantry. 

Captain David M. Bailey. Died, October 10, 1864, of disease. 

First Lieut. Albert H. Stookey. Died, March 14, 1862, of disease. 

First Lieut. John Kelley. Died, September , 1862, at Iuka, Miss., of dis- 
ease. 

First Lieut. Charles F. Adams. Died, October 16, 1862, of wounds received at 
Perryville. 

First Lieut. Robert Gooding. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Andrew R. Johnson. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

Surgeon J. D. S. Haslett. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

Assistant Surgeon, James W. Gaston. Died, September 13, 1864, of disease. 

Sixtieth Illinois Infantry. 
Captain John Coleman. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
First Lieut. Amzi KnifFen. Died, May 17, 1864, of wounds received before 
Dalton, Ga. 



APPENDIX. 39] 

Seventy-third Illinois Infantry, 

Major William E. Smith. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, I 

Major Thomas W. Motherspaw. Died, December L8, L864, of 
in action. 

Captain Edwin Alsop. Killed at Stone River, December 31, I 

First Lieut, Julian R. Winget, Adjutant. Killed at Chickamauga, Septei 
20, 1863. 

First Lieut. William R. Wilmer, Adjutant. Killed al Franklin, November 30 
1864. 

Seventy-fourth Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel James B. Kerr. Died, July '.), 1864, of wounds, when prisoner. 

Captain Henry C. Barker. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, I 

Captain Frederick W. Stegner. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, ! 

Captain David 0. Buttolp. Died, June 29, 1864, of wounds received at 
saw Mountain. 

Captain Bowman W. Bacon. Died, July 21, 1864, of wounds rei i. rue- 

saw Mountain. 

First Lieut. Lewis Williams, R. Q. M. Died November 25, 1862. 

First Lieut. Cyrenius N. Woods. Died, August 12, 1863, at Winchester, 'I i an. 

Assistant Surgeon Sherman C. Ferson. Killed, October T, 1864, by railroad 

accident. 

Seventy-fifth lllinios Infantry. 

Captain Robert Hale. Killed in action, July 4, 1864. 

Captain Addison S. Vorrey. Died, August 13, 1864, of <li 

First Lieut. Franklin H. Eels. Killed at, Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

First Lieut. William H. Thompson. Died, February 25, 1864, of disease. 

Second Lieut. James Blean. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1 

Second Lieut. Ezekiel J. Killgour. Died, December 26, 13G2, of disease. 

Second Lieut. Thomas G. Bryant. Died, April 12, 18<r>, of disease. 

Second Lieut. Alfred K. Buckaloo. Died, March 14, 1864, of disease. 

Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel Carter Van Vleck. Died of wounds, August 23, 1864. 
Major William L. Broaddus. -Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1864. 
Captain Robert M. Black. Killed at JonesLoro, September 1. L864. 
First Lieut. Tobias E. Butler. Died, May 29, 18G4, of wounds. 
First Lieut. George A. Brown. Died, June 30, lbG-t, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Daniel W. Long. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1. 1864. 
First Lieut. George T. Beers. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1865. 
First Lieut. William E. Summers. Killed at Bentonville, March 21, 1S65. 

Seventy-ninth Illinois Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Sheridan P. Read. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 
Captain John H. Patton. Killed at Liberty Gap, June 25, 186:5. 
Captain Hezekiah D. Martin. Died, July 3, 1863, of wounds received at L!b- 

erty Gap. 
First Lieut. Martin L. Linninger. Killed by fall of tree, November 19, 1862. 



392 APPENDIX. 

Eightieth Illinois Infantry. 

Captain Edmund R. Jones. Killed at Sand Mountain, Ala., April 30, 1863. 

First Lieut. James C. Jones. Killed at Sand Mountain, Ala., April 30, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Alex. Van Kendle. Killed in action, October 8, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Samuel G. Andrews. Died. November 22, 1862, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Second Lieut. John A. Armour. Died, June 11, 1864, of wounds received in 
action. 

Second Lieut. Harvey Clendenin. Died, July 17, 1864, of wounds received in 
action. 

Eighty-second Illinois Infantry. 

First Lieut. Frederick Becbstein. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 

Eighty-third Illinois Infantry. 

Captain Philo. E. Reed. Killed in action at Fort Donelson, February 3, 1863. 

Captain John McClanahan. Died, February 23, 1863, of wounds received at 
Fort Donelson. 

Captain William W. Turnbull. Killed at Pine Bluff, Ark., in action, August 
20, 1864. 

First Lieut. H. D. Bissell, R. Q. M. Killed in action, Fort Donelson, Febru- 
ary 3, 1862. 

Second Lieut. John Morton. Died, June 19,1864, at Fort Donelson. 

Eighty-fourth Illinois Infantry. 
Captain Moses W. Davis. Died, January 20, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
Captain Thomas D. Adams. Died, September 21, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
First Lieut. Luther T. Ball. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Thomas F. Kendrick. Died, November 17, 1862, at Bowling 

Green, Ky., of disease. 
Second Lieut. Henry E. Abrocombie. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Eighty-fifth Illinois Infantry. 

Captain Charles H. Chatfield. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Captain John Kennedy. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 19, 1864. 

Captain Samuel Young. Died, November 22, 1864, of disease. 

First Lieut. Clark N. Andrews, Adjutant. Died, July 23, 1864, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Eighty-six Illinois Infantry. 

Colonel David D. Irons. Died, August 11, 1863, of disease, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Captain Edward Vanantwerp. Died, July 15, 1864, of wounds received in 
action. 

Captain John F. French. Killed at Averysboro, N. C, March 16, 1865. 

Captain William B. Bogardus. Died, April 13, 1865, of wounds received at 
Bentonville. 



APPENDIX. 393 

Eighty-eighth Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel George W. Chandler. Killed at Kenosaw Mountain, Jane 2? 

1864. 
First Lieut. Thomas F. W. Gullich. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 
First Lieut. Joshua S. Ballard, Adjutant. Died, April '.), 1863, of ( 

Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Charles H. Lane. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 26, 1863. 
First Lieut, John P. D. Gibson. Killed accidentally at Loudon, Tenn., April 

17, 1862. 
First Lieut. Noah W. Rae. Died, June 2, 1861, of wounds received at Adairs- 

ville, Ga. 
Second Lieut. Henry W. Meacham. Died, April 1, 1863, of disease, at Mur- 
freesboro, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Henry L. Bingham. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

1863. 
Surgeon George Coatsworth. Died, June 9, 1863, of disease, at Murfreesboro, 

Tenn. 

Eighty-ninth Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Duncan J. Hall. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Henry S. Willett. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Herbert M. Blake. Killed at Liberty Gap, June 25, 1863. 
Captain William H. Rice. Killed at Chickamauga, September 1!', L863. 
Captain Thomas Whiting. Killed at Chickamauga, September II", 1 
Captain John W. Spink. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, I- 
Captain Henry L. Rowell. Died, December 3, 1863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
First Lieut. Nathan Street. Died, August 6, 1964 (?), of wounds received in 

action at Nashville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Peter G. Tait. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Amory P. Ellis. Died, October 4, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Erastus 0. Young. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. William Harkness. Killed in action at Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., 

June 21, 1864. 
Captain James D. Hill. Died, January 14, 1863, of disease. 

Ninety-second Illinois Infantry. 
Captain William Stauffer. Died of disease, January 21, 1863, at Danville, Ky. 
First Lieut. David B. Colehour. Died, March 17, 1863, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
First Lieut. James Daubon. Died, September 21, 1864, of wounds received at 

Jonesboro. 

Ninety-sixth Illinois Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Isaac L. Clack. Died, September 22, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickmauga. 
Captain Evangelist J. Gillmore. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, Jnne 23, 1864. 
Captain David" James. Died, July 20, 1864, of wounds received at Kenesaw 

Mountain. 



394 APPENDIX. 

First Lieut. Caleb A. Montgomery. Died, January 28, 1863, of disease, at 

Danville, y. 
First Lieut. Nelson R. Sims. Died, September 29, 1863, of wounds received 

at Cbickamauga. 
Captain George F. Barnes. Died, October 3, 1863, of wounds received at 

Cbickamauga. 

Ninety-eighth Illinois Infantry. 

Captain Orville L. Kelley. Killed September 8, 1862, by railroad accident, at 

Bridgeport, 111. 
First Lieut. Lindsay D. Law. Died, January 26, 1863, of disease. 
First Lieut. William Tarrant. Died, April 19, 1863, of disease, at Murfrees- 

boro, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Silas Jones. Died, April 19, 1863, of disease, at Murfreesboro, 

Tenn. 
Second Lieut. George W. Boggess. Died, Marcb 3, 1864, at Charleston, Tenn. 

One Hundrcth Illinois Infantry. 

Colonel Frederick A. Bartleson. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 23, 1864. 

Major Rodney S. Bowen. Died, December 3, 1864, of wounds received at 
Franklin. 

Captain John A. Bunell. Killed near Dallas, Ga., in action, May 30, 1864. 

First Lieut. George W. Rouse, Adjutant. Died, August 3, 1864, of wounds re- 
ceived before Aslanta, Ga. 

First Lieut. George C. Sboonmaker. Killed before Atlanta, in action, August 
5, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Morris Wortbington. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Charles F. Mitchell. Died, January 4, 1863, of wounds received 
at Stone River. 

One Hundred and First Illinois Infantry. 

Captain Thomas B. Woof. Killed before Atlanta, July 20, 1864. 

First Lieut. William S. Wright. Died, October 6, 1862, at Franklin, 111. 

First Lieut. Ferdinand A. Dimm. Killed skirmishing near Kenesaw, June 27, 
1864. 

First Lieut. Josiah H. Belt. Died, June 29, 1864, of wounds received near 
Dallas, Ga. 

One Hundred and Fourth Illinois Infantry. 

Captain John S. H. Doty. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Captain David C. Rynearson. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Captain Joseph P. Fitzsimmons. Killed in action before Atlanta, August 7, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Moses M. Randolp. Died, December 9, 1862, of wounds received 

at Heartsville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. William E. Brush. Died, April 13, 1863, at Chicago, 111. 
First Lieut. Orrin S. Davidson. Died, December 5, 1863, of wounds received 

at Missionary Ridge. 
Assistant Surgeon Thomas B. Hamilton. Died, March 17, 1865, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 



APPENDIX. 

One Hundred and Fifth Tllinoia Tnfaniry. 
Second Lieut. August H. Fischer. Killed on picket line, befoi 

August 13, 1SG4. 
Surgeon Horace S. Potter. Killed near Acworth, Ga., June 2, 1864. 

One Hundred and Tenth Illinois Infantry. 
Captain John F. Day. Died, January 27, L863, of disease, at Na hville, Tenn. 
Captain James L. Parks. Died. March 8, 1863, of disease, Readyville, Tenn! 
Second Lieut. Jesse G. Payne. Killed at Stone River, December':;!, 1 

One Hundred and Fifteenth Win,, is Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel William Kinman. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 18C3. 
Captain S. Barlow Espy. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, I 
Captain Stephen M. Huckstep. Died, December 9, L863, of wounds r» 

in action. 
First Lieut. John Beauchamp. Died, March 26, 1SGL>, of disease. 
First Lieut. Jacob Porter. Died, May 14, 18G4, of wounds received in action. 
Second Lieut. Mathew Freeman. Died, March 30, 18G3, of disease. 
Second Lieut. David Reed. Died, September 27, 18G3, of wounds received in 

action. 
Assistant Surgeon James A. Jones. Killed by Guerrillas, July 9, 18G4. 

One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois Infantry. 
Colonel James Monroe. Killed at Farmington, October 7, 1863. 
Captain Samuel Coblentz. Died November 30, 1862. 
Captain Abram C. Van Buskirk. Killed in action, March 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Otho J. McManus. Killed at Selma, April 9, 1865. 

One Hundred and Tu-enty-ffth Illinois Infantry. 

Colonel Oscar F. Harmon. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Captain William W. Fellows. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 18G4. 

Captain Marion Lee. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 186 I. 

Captain Edward B. Kingsbury. Died, August 19, 1864, of wounds received 
before Atlanta, Ga. 

Captain Jackson Charles. Killed at Jonesboro, September 2, 1SG4. 

Captain Andrew W. Ingraham. Died, February- 15, 1SG5, of disease, at Savan- 
nah, Ga. 

Second Lieut. William Hart. Died, April 2, 1863, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Second Lieut. James A. McLean. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Second Lieut. John L. Jones. Killed in action before Atlanta, July L9, L864 

Second Lieut. John J. White. Killed in action before Atlanta. August 7, 1 364. 

Chaplain Levi W. Sanders. Killed in action at Caldwell's Ford, Tenn., No- 
vember 17, 1863. 

Chaplain George K. Buesing. Died, October 13, 18G4, at Atlanta, Ga. 

One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Hlinois Infantry. 
First Lieut. John Haldeman. Died, November 15, 18G4, prisoner, at Colum- 
bia, S. C. 
Second Lieut. Stephen K. Kyle. Died, December 1, 1862, at Bowling Green, 

Ky. 



396 APPENDIX. 

INDIANA. 

Second Indiana Cavalry. 

Major Samuel Hill. Died, April 6, 186:5, of disease. 

Captain Levi Ross. Died, March 8, 1863, at Louisville, Ky. 

First Lieut. Henry H. Dunlap. Died, May 25, 1863, of disease. 

First Lieut. William D. Stover. Killed in action at Indian Creek, Tenn., July 
28, 1864. 

First Lieut. Asa S. Smith. Killed near Scottville, Ala., April 2, 1865. 

Second Lieut. John G. Myers. Killed in action at Vinegar Hill, Ky., Septem- 
ber 22, 1862. 

Second Lieut. William C. Blaine. Killed in action, June 11, 1863. 

Third Indiana Calvary. 
Second Lieut. Thomas G. Sheatfer. Killed at Resaca, Ga., August 25, 1864. 

Fourth Indiana Cavalry. 

Major Joseph P. Leslie. Killed in action, at Fair Garden, Tenn., January 27, 
1864. 

Captain Jesse Keethley. Died at Madisonville, Ky., March 3, 1863. 

Captain Christopher C. Mason. Killed in action at Fayetteville, Tenn., No- 
vember 1, 1863. 

First Lieut. George Lydick. Died, February 3, 1863, of disease, at Munfords- 
ville, Ky. 

First Lieut. John Jackson. Died, in prison, at Columbia, S. C, November 20, 
1864. 

Second Lieut. Edmund J. Davis. Died, September 24, 1862, of disease, at 
Louisville, Ky. 

Second Lieut. Johnson M. Webb. Killed in action at Madisonville, Ky., Octo- 
ber 5, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Enoch S. Boston. Died, November 7, 1862, of disease, at Bowl- 
ing Green, Ky. 

Eighth Indiana Cavalry. 

Captain Joseph C. Potts. Died, October 5, 1S63, of wounds received in action. 
First Lieut. John A. Stockdell. Died, April 1, 1862, of disease, at Columbia, 

Tenn. 
First Lieut. William R. Phillips, Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 
First Lieut. William H. Garboden. Died, October 28, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 
First Lieut. Wiley Baker. Killed in action at Puluski, Tenn., September 27, 

1864. 
First Lieut. James A. Gray. Died of wounds, October 2, 1864, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
First Lieut. Clinton Lennen. Killed in action at Black River, N. C, March 

16, 1865. 
Second Lieut. Gabriel Woodmansee. Died, January 9, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 
Second Lieut. Moses M. Neal. Died, January 8 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 



•\ri'i:.\i)i\. 397 

Fifth Indiana Battery. 
Captain Peter Sitnonson. Killed al Eenesaw Mountain, June 16,1864 

Seventh Indiana Battery. 
Second Lieut. Frank W. Backmar. Died.Januarj 16, 1863, of wound 

at Stone River. 

Eleventh Indiana Battery. 
Second Lieut. Charles R. Scott. Died January 5, 1864. 

Twelfth Indiana Battery. 
First Lieut. Moody C. Dustin. Died March 16, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Benjamin F. Lutz. Died April 18, 18G2. 

Eighteenth Indiana Battery. 
First Lieut. Martin J. Miller. Killed in action, near Selma, Ala., April 2, 1865, 

Nineteenth Indiana Battery. 

First Lieut. Samuel W. Webb. Died, May 20, 1S65, of wounds received in 
action. 

Sixth Indiana Infantry. 

Colonel Philomen G. Baldwin. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Captain Samuel Russell. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Captain Frank P. Strader. Died, December 15, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
Captain Andrew F. Connor. Killed in action near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864. 
Captain Andrew J. Newland. Killed in action near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1 36 1. 
Captain Samuel F. McKeehan. Died cf wounds, July 15, L864. 
First Lieut. Alanson Solomon. Died, May 11, 1802, of disease, at Washington, 

Ind. 
First Lieut. George B. Green. Died, October 28, 1863, of wounds. 
First Lieut. William A. Cummings. Killed at Allatoona Ridge, Ga., May 27, 

1864. 
Second Lieut. Jerome P. Holcomb. Died, June 12, 1863, of accidental wounds. 
Second Lieut. Charles Neal. Died June 22, 1864. 

Ninth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain James Houghton. Died, April 8, 1802, of wounds received at Shiloh. 

Captain Isaac M. Pettit. Died, March 19, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 
River. 

Captain De Witt C. Hodsden. Died, July 27, 1864, of wounds received in 
action. 

First Lieut. Thomas J. Patton, Adjutant. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 

First Lieut. Joseph S. Turner. Died, April 16, 1862, of wounds received at 
Shiloh. 

First Lieut. James J. Drum, R. Q. M. Died May 31, 1863. 

First Lieut. Lewis S. Nickerson. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

First Lieut. William H. Criswell. Died, September 23, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Second Lieut. Henry Kessler. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Seth B. Parks. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 



398 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. Benjamin Franklin. Died, October 17, 1863, of wounds received 
in aclion. 

Second Lieut. Leander C. Shipherd. Died, October 20, 18G3, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Assistant Surgeon Alexander W. Gilrnore. Died, May 13, 18G3, of disease, at 
Nashville, Term. 

Tenth Indiana Infantry. 

Colonel William B. Carroll. Died, September 20, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain Samuel H. Sbortle. Died, October 13, 1863, of disease, at Frankfort, 

Ind. 
Captain John W. Perkins. Died, November 16, 1863, of accidental wounds at 

Chickamauga. 
First Lieut. James H. McAdams. Killed at Mill Springs, January 19, 1862. 
First Lieut. Martin T. Jones. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Israel H. Miller. Died, March 7, 1862, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Jeremiah Batterton. Died, September 27, 1862, of disease, at 

Bowling Green, Ky. 

Fifteenth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain Robert J. Templeton. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862 

Captain Joel W. Foster. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain John F. Monroe. Died, November 26, 1863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
Second Lieut. William D. Sering. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

1S63. 

Seventeenth Indiana Infantry. {Mounted.) 

Captain James D. Taylor. Killed near Plantersville, Ala., April 1, 1865. 
First Lieut. James T. Mooreland. Died, July 12, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
First Lieut. George B. Covington, Adjutant. Died, June 1, 1864, of wounds. 
Chaplain John L. Craig. Died, July 11, 1865, of disease. 

Twenty-second Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Squire Isham Keeth. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain Robert K. Smith. Killed at Perryville, October, 8, 1862. 
Captain Alonzo J. Moss. Died, June 29, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
First Lieut. Lewis W. Daily. Died. March 2, 1862, of wounds. 
First Lieut. Samuel H. McBride. Died, December 9, 1862, of wounds received 

at Perryville. 
Second Lieut. Tyrus Tolbert, Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Francis L. M. Sibbitt. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Second Lieut. George R. Ridlen. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Second Lieut. David G. Linson. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. David R. Runzan. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Nicholas Moser. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1865. 



APPENDIX. 

Twenty-seventh Indiana Infantry. 
First Lieut. George T. Chapin. Killed at Resaca, May 16, 18C4. 

Twenty-ninth Indiana Infantry. 

Major Joseph P. Collins. Died, October 5, 1864, of disease, at Chattan 

Term. 
Captain Frank A. Hardman. Died March 5, L862. 
Captain Frank Stebbins. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 
Captain Thomas J. Henderson. Died, July 6, 1863, at Murfn i ml 

Captain N. Palmer Dunn. Killed at Chickamauga, - 
First Lieut. Asa H. Mathews, R. Q. M. Died April 21, 1862. 
First Lieut. John Cutler. Killed at Chickamauga, September L9, L863, 
Second Lieut. Elijah A. Macomber. Died, September L9, 1864, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Thirtieth Indiana Infantry. 

Colonel Sion S. Bass. Died, April 7, 1862, of wounds received at Sliiloh. 
First Lieut. Edwin B. Scribley. Killed at Si, me River, December 31, 1862. 
First Lieut. Douglas L. Phelps. Died, September ID, 1863, of wonnda re( 

in action. 
First Lieut. Joshua Eberly. Died, September 20, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
Assistant Surgeon Delos W. Rupert. Died, October 2, 1862, of disease. 

Thirty-first Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Francis L. Neff. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 25, 1864. 
Major Frederick Arn. Killed at Shiloh, April (i, 1862. 
Captain John S. Welch. Died December 26, 1861. 
Captain George Harvey. Killed at Shiloh, April 6, 18G2. 
Captain William I. Leas. Killed at Chickamauga, September ID, 1863. 
Captain Jeremiah Mewhinney. Died, June 24, 1864, of disease, at Chicago, 111. 
Captain Richard M. Waterman. Died, August 23, 1864, of disease. 
Second Lieut. James W. Peckins. Died, January 7, 1863, of wounds received 

at Stone River. 
Second Lieut. John N. Pike. Died. April 16, lei;:), of disease. 
Second Lieut. Lucien Ray. Died, April 11, 1SG4, of disease. 

Thirty-second Indiana Infantry. 
Colonel Henry Von Trebra. Died, August 6, 1863, of disease, at Areola, 111. 
Major Jacob Glass. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
Captain Fred. A. Mueller. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 
Captain Frank Kodalle. Killed at Sliiloh, April 7, 1S62. 
Captain John D. Ritter. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1S63. 
Captain Henry Seyffert. Killed at Allatoona, Ga., May 27, 1864. 
First Lieut. Max Sachs. Killed in action, at Rowlett's Bridge, Ky., December 

17, 1861. 
First Lieut. Max Hupfauf. Killed at Allatoona Ga., May 27, 1864. 



400 APPENDIX. 

Thirty-third Indiana Infantry. 
Captain Israel C. Dille. Killed by Guerrillas, at Fosterville, Term., July 17, 

1863. 
Captain James L. Banks. Died, June 22, 1864, of wounds received at Dallas, 

Ga. 
Captain George L. Scott. Killed on picket, before Atlanta, July 23, 1864. 
First Lieut. Estees Wallingford, Adjutant. Died, April 21, 1864, of disease. 
First Lieut. Charles H. Porter, Adjutant. Killed near Kenesaw Mountain, 

June 22, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Eli M. Adams. Died, December 8, 1861, of disease. 

Thirty-fifth Indiana Infantry. 
Major John P. Dufficy. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 20, 1864. 
Captain Frank Baggot. Died, January 5, 18C3, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
Captain Henry Prosser. Died, January 9, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
First Lieut. Bemald R. Mullin, Adjutant. Killed near Nashville, in action, 

December 9, 1862. 
First Lieut. William Kilroy. Died, January 10, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 

Thirty-sixth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain Abram D. Shultz. Killed at. Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain James H. King. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain George M. Graves. Died, September 28, 1863, of wounds. 

First Lieut. Addison M. Davis. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 

First Lieut. Joseph W. Connell, R. Q. M. Died, May 26, 1862, of disease, near 

Corinth, Miss. 
First Lieut. William H. Fentress. Killed at Dallas, Ga., May 31, 1864. 
First Lieut. George W. Bowman. Killed before Atlanta, Ga., July 19, 1864. 
First Lieut. Mahlon Hendricks. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 23, 1864. 
First Lieut. George 0. Williard. Killed before Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864. 
Second Lieut. William Butler. Died, September 24, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. James Patterson. Died, September 24, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Salathiel D. Colvin. Died, October 9, of wounds. 

Thirty-seventh Indiana Infantry. 
Captain James H. Burk. Died, July 9, 1864, of wounds, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Captain Frank Hughes. Died, July 28, 1864, at Nashville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Isaac N. Abernethy. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
First Lieut. Jesse B. Holman. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. James M. Hartley. Died, April 26, 1862, of disease. 
Second Lieut. William Speer. Killed in action, at Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864. 



appendix. 401 

Thirty-eighth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain John Sexton. Died, November 10, 1862, of wounds received at Perry- 
ville. J 

Captain James E. Fouts. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 

Captain Joshua B. Jenkins. Died, November 13, 1864, of woundfl received at 

Jonesboro. 

Captain James H. Low. Died, March 20, 18C5, of wounds received at Benton- 
ville. 

First Lieut. Rufus H. Peck. Killed at Chiekamauga, September 20, 

First Lieut. John B. Southern. Died, October 13, 1863, oi ived at 

Chiekamauga. 

First Lieut. Joseph H. Reeves. Died, March 15, 1864, of disease. 

First Lieut. Adam Osborn. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 

First Lieut. Charles S. Deweese. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1 

Second Lieut, Thomas S. W. Hawkins. Died, January 23, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived at Stone River. ' 

Fortieth Indiana Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel James N. Kirkpatrick. Drowned near Iuka, Miss., June 8, 18C2. 

Captain James K. Kiser. Died, May 17, 1802, of disease, near Corinth' Mlos. 

Captain Charles T. Elliott. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Captain Absalom Kirkpatrick. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Captain William L. Coleman. Killed April 27, 1865, by explosion of steamer 
" Sultana." 

Captain Henry L. Hazelrigg. Killed April 27, 1865, by explosion of Steamer 
" Sultana." 

First Lieut. Jeremiah C. Brower. Killed at Franklin, November 30, 1864 

Second Lieut. John H. Holmes. Died, June 24, 1864, of wounds, at Chat- 
tanooga, Tenn. 

Chaplain Allen D. Beaseley. Died. June 30, 1864, of disease, at Murfreesboro, 
Tenn. 

Forty-second Indiana Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel James M. Shanklin. Died, May 23, 1863, at Evansville, Ind. 
Captain Charles G. Olmsted. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

First Lieut. Edmund M. Knowles. Killed, January , 1864, when prisoner 

of war, at Augusta, Ga. 
First Lieut. John D. A. Steel. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1865. 
First Lieut. Ephraim Rutledge. Died, March 22, 1865, of wounds. 
Second Lieut. Emory Johnson. Killed, before Atlanta, July 22, 1864. 

Forty-fourth Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Baldwin J. Crosswait. Died, February 18, 1862, at Angola, Ind. 
Lieut. Colonel Simeon C. Aldrich. Died, August 15, 1864, of disease. 
Lieut. Colonel Joseph C. Hodges. Died, September 28, 1864, of injury by 

railroad. 
Captain John Murray. Died, April 9, 1862, of wounds received at Shiloh. 
Captain William H. Cuppy. Died July 15, 1862. 

Captain John Gunsenhouser. Killed at Chiekamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Marcus W. Bayless, R. Q. M. Died June 9, 1862. 



402 APPENDIX. 

First Lieut. Sedgwick Livingston. Died, January 25, 1S64, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. J. Delta Kerr. Died, March 25, 1862, at Evansville, Ind. 
Second Lieut, Charles M. Hinman. Died April 27, 1863. 
Second Lieut. David K. Stopher. Died, January 18, 1864, of disease, Knox. 

ville, Tenn. 
Assistant Surgeon Edward B. Speed. Died, September 14, 1864, of disease. 

Fifty-first Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel James W. Sheets. Died, June 30, 1863, of wounds. 
Captain Samuel Lingeman. Died, March 18, 1864, at Danville, Ind. 
Captain Adolphus H. Wonder. Died, September 24, 1862, at Charleston, S. C. 
First Lieut. Albert Light. Died, February 24, 1862, at Lebanon, Ky. 
Second Lieut. Harvey Slavens. Died, March 21, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Samuel C. Owen. Died, February 26, 1863, at Murfreesboro 

Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Jeremiah Sailor. Died, March 19, 1863, near Murfreesboro, 

Tenn, 

Fifty-seventh Indiana Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel George W. Lennard. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 

Captain William S. Bradford. Died May 16, 1862, 

Captain Joseph S. Stidham. Killed in action, June 23, 1864. 

Captain Addison M. Dunn. Killed at Franklin, November 30, 1864. 

First Lieut. Benjamin F. Beitzell. Killed in action, June 18, 1864. 

First Lieut. Robert F. Callaway. Died, July 4, 1864, of wounds received in 

in action. 
First Lieut. Charles W. T. Minesinger. Died, September 13, 1864, of wounds 

received in action. 
Surgeon Issac S. Collings. Died, September 10, 1865, of disease. 

Fifty-eighth Indiana Infantry. 
Captain Charles H. Bruce. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. William Overlin. Died, March 19, 1862, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
First Lieut. James D. Foster. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut.. George Raffan, R. Q. M. Died, May 13, 1864, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Francis B. Blackford. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 

1862, 
Second Lieut. Hugh J. Barnett. Died, September 24, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickamauga. 

Sixty-eighth Indiana Infantry. 
Colonel Edward A. King. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Charles C. Wheeler. Died, August 22, 1864, of wounds, at Dalton, Ga. 
First Lieut. Robert J. Price. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. John Reese. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

Seventieth Indiana Infantry. 
First Lieut. Edward B. Colestock. Died, May 30, 1864, of wounds, at Resaca, 

Ga. 
Second Lieut. Jeptha F. Bunta. Died, May 14, 1863, at Gallatin, Tenn. 



APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. Josiah E. Lewes. Killed before Atlanta, Julj 20 
Assistant Surgeon John M. White. Died, Augusl SI, 1863, of 

Seventy-second Indiana Infantry. 
Captain William II. McMurtry. Killed al Etocfc Spring, September 12, I 

First Lieut. Liews C. Priest. Died June 24, 1864. 

Second Lieut. John W. Gaskill. Killed at Boover'a Gap, in action Ji 

1863. 
Chaplain John R. Eddy. Killed in action, at Hoover's Gap, June 24, 18C3. 

Seventy-third Indiana Infantry. 
Colonel Gilbert Hathaway. Killed at Blount's farm, Ala., May 2, 18C3. 
Captain Miles H. Tibbitts. Killed at Stone River, December 31, L862. 
Captain Peter Doyle. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1 

Seventy-fourth Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Myron Baker. Killed before Atlanta, August 5, 1S64. 
Captain Philip F. Davis. Died, February 6, 1863, of disease. 
Captain Everett F. Abbott. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
First Lieut. Stephen Hamlin. Died, December 27, 1862, of disease, at Galla- 
tin, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Thomas Bodley. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Ananias Davis. Died, October 11, 1863, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Richard H. Hall. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1S63. 

Seventy-fifth Indiana Infantry. 
Captain Francis M. Bryant. Died, December 2, 1863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
Captain William McGinness. Died, August 31, 1864, at Savannah, Ga. 
First Lieut. John B. Frazer. Died, July 4, 1S63, near Tullahoma, Tenn. 

Seventy-ninth Indiana Infantry. 

First Lieut. Thompson Dunn, Adjutant. Killed at Lovejoy's Station, Septem- 
ber 2, 1864. 

Second Lieut. John S. McDaniels. Died, December 2, 1862, of disease, at 
Nashville, Tenn. 

Second Lieut. Benjamin T. Poynter. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 

Second Lieut. George W. Clark. Died, September 28, 1863, of wounds received 
at Chattanooga, Tenn. 

Chaplain Perry T. Hall. Died, October 26, 1862, of disease, at Indianapolis, 
Ind. 

Eightieth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain Thomas J. Brooks, Jun. Died, February 26, 1863, of wounds received 
at Perryville. 

Captain Russell J. Showers. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 

Captain William S. Emery. Died, May 28, 1864, of wounds received at Resaca. 

First Lieut. William Archer. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1S64. 

.Second Lieut. Alexander Anderson. Died, October 13, 1862, of wounds re- 
ceived at Perryville. 



404 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. James F. Ruark. Died, October 24, 1862, of wounds received 

at Perryville. 
Second Lieut. Lewis C. Turbett. Died, December 31, 1862, of accidental 

wounds. 

Eighty-first Indiana Infantry. 

Captain Elijah R. Mitchell. Died, September 20, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain Eugene M. Schell. Killed at Nashville, December 15, 1864. 
First Lieut. William M. Morgan. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Samuel Wilde. Died, January 1, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Second Lieut. John Felkner. Died March 13, 1863. 

Eighty-second Indiana Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Paul P. Slocum. Died, May 3, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
Captain George W. Kendrick. Died, January 23, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
Captain Harrison McCallister. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. John W. Walker. Killed at Rasaca, May 14, 1864. 
First Lieut. Jackson Woods. Died, May 27, 1864, of disease, at Macon, Ga. 
First Lieut. Joseph Fraker. Died, September 30, 1864, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Samuel Guy. Died, May 22, 1863, of disease, at Triune, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Thomas V. Webb. Died, March 3, 1864, at Madison, Ind. 
Assistant Surgeon Mathew Kelley. Died, August 23, 1864, of disease. 

Eighty-fourth Indiana Infantry. 
Major William A. Boyd. Died, July 11, 1864, of wounds received at Rocky 

Face Ridge. 
Captain John H. Ellis. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. George C. Hatfield. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Noble B. Gregory. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 
First Lieut. Frank M. Flickenger. Killed accidentally, March 13, 1865. 
Second Lieut. William L. Steele. Died at Franklin, Tenn., May 16, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Jerome B. Mason'. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1864. 

Eighty-fifth Indiana Infantry. 
Major Robert E. Craig. Died, April 2, 1862, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
Captain Abner Floyd. Killed at Thompson's Station, Tenn., March 5, 1865. 
Captain Wilson T. Stark. Died, March 28, 1863, at Franklin, Tenn. 
Captain Caleb Nash. Died, May 20, 1863, at Annapolis, Md. 
First Lieut. Mortimer Denny. Died, August 19, 1864, of wounds. 

Eighty-sixth Indiana Infantry. 

Captain William M. Southard. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1864. 
First Lieut. George W. Smith. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. James T. Doster. Died, December 10, 1863, of disease. 



APPENDIX. 406 

Eighty-seventh Indiana Infantry. 
Captain James M. Holliday. Killed at Chickamauga, September 10, I 
Captain George W. Baker. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1 
Captain Lewis Hughs. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 
First Lieut. Sloan D. Martin. Killed at Chickamauga, Si | 63. 

First Lieut. Fredus Ryland, Adjutant. Killed at Chickamauga Septemb 

1863.. 
First Lieut. Burr Russell. Died, November 29, 1863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
First Lieut. John Demuth. Killed at Atlanta, August 22, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Franklin H. Bennett. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. Abram C. Andrew. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 
Second Lieut. Elisha Brown. Died, September 24, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickamauga. 

Surgeon Samuel Higiubotham. Died, 29, 1863, at Triune, Tenn. 

Chaplain Joseph K. Albright. Died, December 5, 18C2, at Gallatin, Tenn., of 

disease. 

Eighty-eighth Indiana Injantry. 

Major George W. Stough. Died, October 28, 1863, of wounds at Richmond, Va. 

Captain Isaac H. LeFevre. Died, September 21, 1S63, of wounds received at 
Chickamauga. 

Captain James H. Steele. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

First Lieut. Samuel L. Stough. Died, April 20, 1863, at Waterloo, Ind. 

First Lieut. William Forrest. Died, September 20, 1863, of disease, at Nash- 
ville, Tenn. 

First Lieut. David Caston. Killed in action at Resaca, May 1.3, 1864. 

First Lieut. Walter E. Boley. Killed in action at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 

First Lieut. Thomas E. Kimball. Died, October 1, 1864, in Libby Prison, Rich- 
mond, Va. 

First Lieut. George W. Seelye. Died, March 23, 1865, of wounds received at 
Bentonville. 

First Lieut. Isaac A. Slater. Died, April 26, 1865, of wounds received at Ben- 
tonville. 

Second Lieut. John G. Goheen. Died, January 24, 1863, of wounds received at 
Stone River. 

Second Lieut. Daniel Little. Died, December 15, 1S63, of wounds received at 
Chickamauga. 

One Hundred and First Indiana Infantry. 
Fi'-it Lieut. John H. Ellis. Died, October 20, 1S63, of disease, at Chattanooga, 

Tenn. 
First Lieut, Andrew J. Barlow. Died, September 16, 1864, of wounds received 

in action, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Richard BT. Busick. Died, October 16, 1863, of wounds re< 

at Chickamuaga. 
Second Lieut. Henry W. Waterman. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 

25, 1863. 



406 APPENDIX. 

IOWA. 

Fifth Iowa Cavalry. 

Major William Kelsay. Died, February 28, 1862, of disease, at Ft. Heiman, Kjv 

Major Shaeffer DeBoernstein. Died, May 7, 1862, of wounds. 

Captain William Curl. Killed in skirmish at Coosa River, July 13, 1864. 

First Lieut. Milton S. Summers. Died, August 28, 1862, of wounds received in 
action. 

First Lieut. Michael Gallagher. Killed in action at Garrettsburg, Ky., Novem- 
ber 6, 1862. 

First. Lieut. Andrew Guler. Killed in action near Chattahoochee River, August 
3, 1864. 

Second Lieut. John W. Watson. Killed at Nashville, December 15, 1864. 

Eighth Ioioa Cavalry. 
Colonel Joseph B. Dorr. Died, May 28, 1865, of disease, at Macon, Ga. 
Major H. Isett. Died, April 6, 1865, of disease, at South Bend, Ind. 
First Lieut. James Horton. Killed at Lovejoy's Station, Ga., July 29, 1864. 
Second Lieut. John B. Loomis. Killed at Newnan, Ga., July 30, 1864. 

KANSAS. 

Eighth Kansas Infantry. 
Captain Edgar P. Trego. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. John L. Graham. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Zacharias Burckhardt. Died, October 28, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 
Second Lieut. William Becker. Died of disease, November 21, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Seth Foot. Died of disease, at Famesburg, Iowa, May 14, 1864. 
Assistant Surgeon Samuel E. Beach. Died of disease, at Nashville, Tenn., 

November 4, 1863. 

KENTUCKY. 

First Kentucky Cavalry. 

Brigadier-General James S. Jackson. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862, 
commanding division. 

Captain Jarrett W.Jenkins. Killed in action, at Perryville, Ky., October 8, 
1862. 

Captain Jesse M. Carter. Killed at Columbus, Ky., July 3, 1863. 

Captain Francis M. Wolford. Killed in action near Hillsboro, Ga., July 31, 
1864. 

First Lieut. Jonathan P. Miller. Killed in action at Mill Springs, Ky., Jan- 
uary 19, 1862. 

First Lieut. James Humphrey. Died, September , of wounds. 

Second Lieut. Alexander Thompson. Died, October 30, 1861, of disease. 

Second Kentucky Cavalry. 
Major William H. Eifert. Killed in action, September 3, 1864. 
Captain Miller R. McCullock. Killed in action at Stone River, Tenn., Decem- 
ber 30, 1862. 
First Lieut. William G. Jenkins. Killed in action, June 29, 1863. 



APPENDIX. jo; 

First Lieut. George A. Hosmer. Died October 6, I 

First Lieut G. W. L. Batman. Died of disea e, April 23, 1864. 

First. Lieut. William Bradney. Killed in action, Julj 30, 1864. 

Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, 

Captain Basil N. Hobbs. Died April 30, L864. 

First Lieut. Frank N. Sheets. Killed in action at Chickamauga, Sept< 
20, 1863, 

Fifth Kentucky Cavalry. 

Colonel William P. Sanders. Died of wounds received in action Novemb 

1863. 

Captain John W. Forrester. Lied of wounds, November 29, 1864. 

First Lieut. W. L. Mitchell, Adjutant. Killed in action, March L0, 1865. 

First Lieut. Amos M. Griffin. Killed in action, March , 1865. 

Second Lieut. Edward Hughes. Died July 17, 1862. 

Second Lieut. James Funk. Died, December 4, 1862, of 

Second Lieut. Francis B. McAllister. Died of disease, at Huntsville Ala 
July 28, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Joseph G. Hardin. Died of disease, at Nashville, Tcnn., Sep- 
tember 29, 1863. 

Second Lieut. George M. Vandover. Died July 9, 1864. 

Sixth Kentucky Cavalry. 

Colonel D. I. Halisey. Killed in action near New Market, Ky., December 31, 

1862. 
Major William H. Fidler. Died, April 28, 1865, from injuries by explosion of 

steamer " Sultana." 
Captain Edmund H. Parish. Died, April 28, 1865, from injuries by explosion 

of steamer "Sultana." 
First Lieut. James I. Surber. Died, April 28, 1865, from injuries by explosion 

of* steamer "Sultana." 
First Lieut. William Murphy. Killed in action, July 4, 1863. 
Second Lieut. William C. Hunter. Died at Louisville, Ky., December 7, 1S64. 

Seventh Kentucky Covalry. 
Lieut. Colonel Thomas T. Vincent. Died at Dandridge, Tenn., June 16, 1864. 
Captain Jesse H. Berry. Died of disease, at Carlisle, Ky., September 18, 
Captain Seneca P. Goulding. Drowned at Benton. Ala., April 10, 1865. 
First Lieut. John S. Stodgill. Died of disease, at Nashville, Tenn., March 2, 

1864. 
Second Lieut. Samuel H. Royce. Killed in action, at Big Hill, Ky., August 

23, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Alfred Mitchell. Died at Maysville, Ky., September 29, 1 - 
Second Lieut. Lewis B. Vimont. Died of disease, at Chattanooga, Tenn., 

October 28, 1864. 

Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry. 

First Lieut. Elza C. Smith. Killed by guerrillas while sick at Saltville, Va., 

October 7, 1S64. 
Second Lieut Joseph W. Cartwright. Drowned at Burksville, June 22, L86 I. 



408 APPENDIX. 

Battery A. 
Second Lieut. William K. Irwin. Died at Nashville, Tenn., August 15, 1864. 

First Kentucky Infantry. 
First Lieut. Courtland W. King. Drowned in Bear Creek, Ala., June 15, 1562. 

Second Kentucky Infantry. 

Captain John H. Spellmeyer. Killed at Shilob, Tenn., April 7, 1862. 

Captain James M. Bodine. Killed in action at Chickamauga, Tenn., Septem- 
ber 21, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Daniel W. Finch. Died of disease, at Camp Lookout, Va., Sep- 
tember 26, 1861. 

Second Lieut. James A. Miller. Killed in action, at Shilob, April 7, 1862. 

Third Kentucky Infantry. 

Colonel Samuel McKee. Killed in action, at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain Henrj' S. Taylor. Killed in action, at Chickamauga, Ga., September 
20, 1863. 

First Lieut. Daniel Severance. Died of wounds received at Stone River, Janu- 
ary 10, 1863. 

First Lieut. Alban D. Bradshaw. Died of wounds received at Chickamauga, 
Ga., October 8, 1863. 

First Lieut. G. D. Hunt, Adjutant. Died of wounds received at Missionary 
Ridge, November 30, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Matthew Cullen. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Fourth Kentucky Infantry. {Mounted.) 
Captain John L. Williams. Died of disease, at Paris, Ky., April 28, 1864. 
Captain E. R. Harrington. Died of disease, at Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864. 
First Lieut. N. M. Kellej'. Died of disease, at Lebanon, Ky., January 12, 

1862. 
Second Lieut. James M. Kelley. Killed in action near Logan's Cross Roads, 

January 19, 1862. 
Chaplain John W. Jacobs. Died at Lebanon, Ky., January 20, 1862. 

Fifth Kentucky Infantry. 

Major Charles L. Thomasson. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Captain Alexander B. Ferguson. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain Upton Wilson. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

Captain John P. Hurley. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

Captain Jqseph E. Miller. Killed at Resaca, Ga., May 15, 1864. 

First Lieut. Richard Jones. Died of disease, near Corinth, Miss., June 9, 1862. 

First Lieut. John W. Huston. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

First Lieut. Frank Disscll. Died of wounds received at Stone River, May 12, 
1863, 

Second Lieut. Milton W. Curray. Died November 20, 1861. 

Second Lieut. John Ryan. Died of wounds received at Chickamauga, Sep- 
tember 25, 1863. 



APPENDIX. 4Q9 

Sixth Kentucky Infantry. 
Lieut Colonel George T. Cotton. Killed at Stone River, December 3] 18C2 
Captain Peter Enge. Died of disease, at Louisville, Ky., May 17, I 
Captain Charles S. Todd. Killed at Stone River, December 31, l 
Captain Peter Marker. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19,1863. 
Captain John McGraw. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 
Captain Frederick Nierdoff. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, Ga.', June 23 L864 
First Lieut. Sundsford D. Carrington. Died of di ea e January I. I 
First Lieut. William II. Middletown. Died of disease, March I, L863. 
.First Lieut, Richard Rockingham. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20 

1863. 
Second Lieut. William B. Dunlap. Died of disease, March 10, ; 
Second Lieut. Anton Hund. Died of wounds received at Shiloh Mav 23 

1862. ' ' ' J ' 

Second Lieut. Thomas Eubanks. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Frederick V. Lochman. Killed at Chickamauga, September 1!) 

1863. 
Second Lieut. William W. Furr. Killed near Dallas, May 27, 1864. 
Assistant Surgeon Abner B. Coone. Died of disease, March 4, 1862. 

Eighth Kentucky Infantry. 

Captain Robert B. Hickman. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Captain John H. Benton. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Captain Landon C. Minton. Died of wounds received at Stone River, Febru- 
ary 15, 1S63. 

First Lieut. Wade B. Cox. Died of wounds received at Stone River, January 
12, 1863. 

First Lieut. Newton J. Hughes. Died of disease, Murfreesboro, Tenn., Febru- 
ary 9, 1863. 

Ninth Kentucky Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Allen J. Roark. Died of disease, April 10, 1862. 

Captain William T. Bryan. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Captain Demetrius B. Coyle. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

First Lieut. Moses L. Norvell. Died March 31, 1862. 

First Lieut. Charles R. Tate. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 

First Lieut. Henry W. Jenkins, Died of disease, July 9, 1862. 

First Lieut. Algernon S. Leggett, Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

First Lieut. Turner Hestand. Killed at Lovejoy's Station, Ga., September 2, 
1864. 

First Lieut. Fred. F. Carpenter. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Second Lieut. William S. Barton. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 
1863. 

Tenth Kentucky Infantry. 

Major Henry G. Davidson. Died of disease, at Louisville, Ky., November 21, 

1864. 
Captain Seth P. Bevill. Died of wounds received at Chickamauga, September 

21, 1863. 
Captain Henry Waller. Died March 13, 1864. 



410 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. John H. Myers. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 18G3. 

Surgeon Will. Atkinson. Died April 9, 1862. 

Assistant Surgeon Thomas M. Knott. Died April 5, 1862. 

Assistant Surgeon Charles Hardesty. Died July 7, 1863. 

Eleventh Kentucky Infantry. 
Captain Elijah C. Phelps. Died at Columbus, Tenn., March 29, 1862. 
Captain Isaac W. Sketoe. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 
Captain Joseph S. Willis. Died February 10, 1863. 
Captain Columbus H. Martin. Died of wounds received at Philadelphia, Tenn., 

December 18, 1863. 
First Lieut. Vincent S. Hay, R. Q. M. Died in prison at Atlanta, Ga., March 

, 1863. 

Thirteenth Kentucky Infantry. 
Captain Wallace Victor. Died, July 13, 1864, of wounds received at Chicka- 

mauga. 

Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry. 
Colonel Curran Pope. Died, November 5. 1862, of wounds received at Perry- 

ville. 
Colonel James B. Foreman. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Lieut. Colonel George P. Jouett. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Major William P. Campbell. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain William T. McCure. Died of disease, July 12, 1862. 
Captain Aaron S. Bayne. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain E. Irvine McDowell. Killed at Resaca, Ga., May 14, 1864. 
First Lieut. James A. T. McGrath. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
First Lieut. L. Frank Todd. Died, of wounds received in action, January 20, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. Joseph L. McClure. Died, of wounds received in action, Octo- 
ber 18, 1862. 

Seventeenth Kentucky Infantry. 
Captain Henry S. Barnett. Died March 22, 1862. 
Captain Preston Morton. Killed at Shiloh, April 6, 1862. 
Captain John V. Boyd. Died at Murfreesboro, Tenn., March 22, 1863. 
Captain James W. Anthony. Died, October 10, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain Robert L. Beckham. Died April 13, 1864. 
Captain William J. Landrum. Killed at Cassville, Ga., in action, May 19, 

1864. 
Captain Robert C. Sturgis. Died, August 9, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. John M. Williams. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. Isaac S. Condit. Died December 18, 1861. 
Second Lieut. Albert E. Brown. Died, May 18, 1862, of wounds received at 

Shiloh. 



APPENDIX. .||1 

Eighteenth Kentucky Infantry. 

Major Abram G. Wileman. Killed at Pendleton, K v., by (tuerrilli 1 1 

5, 18G5. 

Captain Orb M. Lewis. Killed in action at Richmond, Kv \u-v 
Captain W. W. Culbcrtson. Died, September 22, L862, of w 

action. 
Captain Charles S. Williams. Died of dis< ase, January I I, I 
Eirst Lieut, James Dunlap. Killed in action at Richmond, Kv Anjra 

18G2. 

Second Lieut. John W. Washburn. Killed in action at Richmond Kv 5 
30,1802. 

Nineteenth Kentucky Infantry. 
Captain Aaron Blakeman. Died, July 11, 1861, at Cumberland Gap, Tenn. 

Twenty-first Kentucky Infantry. 

Colonel Ethelbert Dudley. Died of disease, February 20, 18G2 at Colnmbu's 

Ky. 
Captain Williamson Irvin. Died of disease, January 21, 18G2. 
Captain William C. Edwards. Died of disease, January 27, 1862, at Cam] 

ville, Ky. 
Captain Zachariah Taylor. Died of disease, February 7, 1SG2. 
Captain G. W. Twyman. Died at Lexington, Ky., February 16, 18G5. 
First Lieut. Sebastian Stone. Killed at Stone River. January L'. 1 
First Lieut. Hugh A. Hedger. Killed at Nashville, Decern ber 15, 1 
First Lieut. James I. Bolton. Died at Indianola, Texas, July 17, 18G5. 
Second Lieut. John H. Bevill. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Twenty-third Kentucky Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel James C. Foy. Died of wounds received at Vining's Station, 

July 24, 1864. 
Captain Ephraim P. Mavity. Died at Chattanooga, Tenn., September 17, 

of wounds received in action. 
First Lieut. John B. Konnan. Died, July 26, 1864, of wounds received in action, 

at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Joseph C. Hoffman. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 18G3. 

Twenty-eighth Kentucky Infantry. 
First Lieut. Granville J. Sinkham. Killed at Franklin, Tenn., in action, No- 
vember 30, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Isaac Everet, Died, January 8, 1S63, at Louisville, Ky. 

MARYLAND. 

TJiird Maryland Infantry. 
First Lieut. Frederick Pringey. Died January 3, 1863. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

Thirty-third Massachusetts Infantry. 
First Lieut. William P. Mudge, Adjutant. Killed in action, Lookout Valley, 
October 29, 1863. 



412 APPENDIX. 

First Lieut. Edgar L. Bumpers. Killed in action at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
First Lieut. Henry J. Parker. Killed in action at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Joseph P. Burrage. Killed in action, Lookout Valley, October 

29, 1863. 
Second Lieut. James Hill. Killed in action, Lookout Valley, October 29, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Oswego Jones. Died, November 12, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 

MICHIGAN. 

First Michigan Mechanics and Engineers. 
Captain James W. Sligh. Died by railroad accident, November 15, 1863. 

Second Michigan Cavalry. 

Captain Philo. W. Rodgers. Died, May 17, 1862, at Evansville, Ind. 

Captain James Hawley. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

First Lieut. Russel T. Dawon. Killed in action, at Florence, Ala., October 7, 
1864. 

First Lieut. James. P. Scott, R. Q. M. Shot himself accidentally, at Cleve- 
land, Tenn., May 15, 1865. 

Fourth Michigan Cavalry. 
First Lieut. Edward L. Tucker. Died, October 7, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Theodore W. Sutton. Killed in action, at Noonday Church, June 

20, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Charles F. McKenzie. Died November 18, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Aaron F. Ismon. Died, December 21, 1863, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Smith Randolp. Died, May 30, 1864, of wounds received at 

Kingston, Ga. 

Battery "A," Michigan Light Artillery. 
First Lieut. George W. Van Pelt. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Ninth Michigan Infantry. 
Captain Albert Nye. Died, June 23, 1862, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Joseph H. Jott. Died, March 16, 1862, at Elizabethtown, Ky., of 

disease. 
First Lieut. Charles T. Fox. Died, September 22, 1862, of wounds received 

in action. 
Second Lieut. Lambert Barshite. Died, February 19, 1862, of disease, at 

Elizabethtown, Ky. 
Second Lieut. Alpheus Chase. Killed at Murfreesboro, Tenn., in action, July 

13, 1862. 

Tenth Michigan Infantry. 

Major James J. Scarritt. Died, November 16, 1863, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Major Henry S. Burnett. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Captain Bradford Cook. Died, June 29, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
Captain Hannibal H. Ninus. Died, September 3, 1864, of wounds received at 

Jonesboro. 
First Lieut. Sylvester D. Cowles, Adjutant. Died May 26, 1862. 



APrEXDIX. 



:{ 



First Lieut. Daniel Leach. Died, July T, 1862, of disease. 

First Lieut. Frank M. Vanderburgh. Died, April L8, 1863, of worn, I . 

in action. 
Second Lieut. Richard Teal. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1 
Second Lieut. John Knox. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1,1864. 

Eleventh Michigan Infantry. 
Major Benjamin G. Bennet. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 
Captain David Oakes, Jun. Died, January 30, 1863, of disease, at Mui 

boro, Tenn. 
Captain Charles W. Newbury. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20. 1 
First Lieut. Christopher C. Haight. Died, February 5, 1862 

Bardstown, Ky. 
First Lieut. Joseph Wilson. Killed at Stone River, December 30, 1 
First Lieut. Thomas Flynn. Killed at Stone River, December :'.!, 1 
First Lieut. Edward U. Catlin. Died, August 7, 1864, of wounds received be- 
fore Atlanta, Ga. 

Thirteenth Michigan Infantry. 
Major Williard G. Eaton. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1865. 
Captain Clement C. Webb. Died, February 4, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
Captain Clark D. Fox. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Captain Daniel B. Hosmer. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Jerome S. Bigelow. Died, May 28, 1862, of disease. 

Fourteenth Michigan Infantry. 
Captain John C. Lind. Died, August 8, 1863, of disease, at Saginaw, Mich. 
Captain James J. Jeffres. Died, July 10, 1864, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Joseph Kirk. Killed before Atlanta, Ga., August 8, 1864. 

Nineteenth Michigan Infantry. 
Colonel Henry C. Gilbert. Died, May 24, 1864, of wounds received at Resaca 
Major Eli A. Griffin. Died, June 16, 1864, of wounds received at Golgotha 

Church, Ga. 
Captain Charles H. Calmer. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Captain Charles W. Bigelow. Died, May 29, 1864, of wounds received at New 

Hope Church. 
Captain Leonard Gibbon. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 
First Lieut. Charles G. Parsel. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 
Second Lieut. Charles Mandeville. Killed at New Hope Church, May 25, 

1864. 

Twenty-first Michigan Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel William L. Whipple. Died November 16, 1862. 
Lieut. Colonel Morris B. Wells. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Leonard O. Fitzgerald. Died, January 8, 1863, of wounds. 
Captain Edgar W. Smith. Died, October 16, 1863, of wounds received at Chick- 
amauga. 
First Lieut. Herman Hunt. Died, December 16, 1862, of disease. 



414 APPENDIX. 

Twenty-second Michigan Infantry. 
Colonel Moses Wisner. Died, January 5, 1863, at Lexington, Ky. 
Captain Henry Carlton. Killed on railroad, June 6, 1863. 
Captain Elijah Snell. Died, September 25, 1863, of wounds received at Chick- 

amauga. 
Captain William Augustus Smith. Died, October 11, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 
Captain Alexander G. Golbraith. Died, April 1, 1865, of disease. 
Second Lieut. John Sackett. Died, January 1, 1863, at Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Second Lieut. Joseph R. Nute. Died, October 8, 1864, in prison, at Millen, 

Ga. 

MINNESOTA. 

Second Minnesota Battery. 
First Lieut. Albert "Woodbury. Died, October 29, 1863, of wounds received at 
Chickamauga. 

Second 31innesota Infantry. 

First Lieut. Henry C. Simpson. Died December 1, 1861. 

First Lieut. Charles Haven. Died, March 4, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn. 

First Lieut. Samuel G. Trimble. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

1863, 
Second Lieut. John C. Jones. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 18, 1864. 

MISSOURI. 

Battery " G," Missouri Light Artillery 
First Lieut. R. C. M. Taliaferro. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1865. 

Second Missouri Infantry. 
Colonel Frederick Schaefer. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Walter Hoppe. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain Charles Deyhle. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Herman Hartmann. Died, December 7, 1863, of wounds. 
First Lieut. William Aulbach. Killed accidentally, at St. Louis, Mo., Decem- 
ber 31, 1863. 

Fifteenth Missouri Infantry. 

Captain M. Zimmermann. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain John V. Krebs. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Captain John G. Rees. Died, December 19, 1863, of wounds received at Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

Captain William Hark. Killed at Franklin, November 30, 1864. 

Captain Joseph B. Vourdon. Killed accidentally, June 12, 1865. 

First Lieut. Martin Schroeder, Adjutant. Died, January 19, 1863, of wounds 
received at Stone River. 

First Lieut. Hermann C. Koerner. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Christian Guinzius. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Charles Kellner. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 



APPENDIX. 415 

Twenty-third Missouri Infantry. 
Major John McCullough. Died, October T, 1863, of di ea e. 
First Lieut. William P. Harlbut. Died, November 24, 1862, of disi 

First Lieut. William 0. Seaman. Died, July 31, L864, of wounds. 
First Lieut. N. Judson Camp. Killed accidentally, Augusl 1, 1864 
Chaplain James M. Oyler. Died, December :!0, 18CL', of disease. 

NEW JERSEY. 

Thirteenth, New Jersey Infantry. 

First Lieut. Peter M. Ryerson. Died, July 1, 18G4, of wounds received in 
action. 

Thirty-third Neio Jersey Infantry. 

Captain Samuel F. Waldron. Killed in action, November 23, 1863. 

Captain William G. Boggs. Died, I>eeeml>er ID, ISC,:;, of wounds received in 

action. 
Captain Henry C. Bartlett. Killed, May 8, 1864, at Rocky Face Ridge, Ga. 
Captain Charles J. Field. Died, June 5, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
First Lieut. Joseph L. Miller. Killed May 8, 1864, at Rocky Face Ridge, Ga. 
First Lieut. William H. Cochrane. Killed, June 25, 18G4, before Kenesaw 

Mountain. 

Battery "I," New Jersey Light Artillery. 

Captain Nicholas Sohm. Died, May 1, 1864, of disease. 

Second Lieut. Francis Henchew. Killed before Atlanta, July 27, 1S64. 

Thirteenth New Jersey Battery. 
Captain William Wheeler. Killed at Culp's Farm, June 22, 1864. 

NEW YORK. 

Fifty-eighth New York Infantry. 

Captain Albert Von Rosenburg. Died May 3, 18G4. 

Chaplain Anthony Zyla. Died, April 5, 1865, of disease, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Sixtieth New York Infantry. 
First Lieut. John E. Wilson. Killed near Golgotha, Ga., June 18, 1864. 

One Hundred and Second Neio York Infantry. 

Major Gilbert M. Elliott. Killed in action at Lookout Mountain, November 24, 

1863. 

One Hundred and Seventh New York Infantry. 

Major Lathrop Baldwin. Died July 30, 1864. 

Captain John F. Knox. Died, May 29, 1864, of wounds received near Dallas, 

Ga. 
Second Lieut. John D. Hill. Killed, near Dallas, Ga. (New Hope Church) 

May 25, 1864. 

One Hundred and Nineteenth New York Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Edward F. Lloyd. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 18G4. 



416 APPENDIX. 

One Hundred and Twenty-third New York Infantry. 
Colonel Archibald L. McDougall. Died, June 23, 1864, of wounds received at 

New Hope Church. 
Captain Henry O'Wily. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
First Lieut. John H. Daicy. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 

One Hundred and Thirty-fourth New YorJc Infantry. 
Captain Edwin Forrest. Died, May 20, 1S64, of wounds received at Rocky 

Face Ridge. 
First Lieut. C. P. Hunter. Accidentally drowned in North River, March 11, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Charles A. Ahreetz. Killed at Savannah, Ga., December 13, 1864. 

One Hundred and Thirty-sixth New Fork Infantry. 
First Lieut. Charles F. Tresser. Died, December 16, 1863, of wounds received 

in action at Chattanooga. 
First Lieut. William C. Hall. Died, May 27, L864, at Nashville, Tenn. 

One Hundred and Thirty-seventh New York Infantry. 
Colonel David Irelaud. Died, September 10, 1864, of disease, at Atlanta, 6a. 
First Lieut. George C. Owen. Killed at Lookout Mountain, November 24, 1864. 
Assistant Surgeon Taylor Elmore. Died, May 25, 1864, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 

One Hundred and Forty-first New York Infantry. 
Colonel William K. Logie. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
First Lieut. Alfred E. Barber. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
First Lieut. Theodore M. Warren. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
First Lieut. Eugene Egbert. Died, December 18, 1864, of disease. 

One Hundred and Forty-third New York Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Joseph B. Taft, Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
First Lieut. William M. Ratcliff, Adjutant. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 

20, 1864. 
First Lieut. Peter L. Waterbury. Died, July 24, 1864, of wounds received at 

Peach Tree Creek. 
First Lieut. R. M. J. Hordenbough. Died, March 15, 1865, of wounds received 

in action. . 
Second Lieut. Edward Carrington. Killed in action at Natural Bridge, Fla., 

March 6, 1865. 

One Hundred and Forty-ninth New York Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Charles B. Randall. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Captain David J. Lindsay. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 

One Hundred and Fiftieth New York Infantry. 
First Lieut. Edgar P. Welling. Died, October 21, 1863, at Tallahoma, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Henry Gridley. Killed in action at Culp's Farm, June 22, 1864. 
First Lieut. David B. Sleight. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 
Second Lieut. John Sweet. Died August 13, 1864. 



APPENDIX. 



117 



One Hundred and Fifty-fourth New York- Infantry. 
Captain Alanson Crosby. Died, July 9, 1864, of wounda received in action. 

OHIO. 

Brigadier General Robert L. McCook. Killed in ambulance, April 1 

near New Market. Term. 
Brigadier General J. W. Sill. Killed at Stone River, December 31, I 
Brigadier General W. H. Lytle. Killed at Chickamauga, Sep! 
Brigadier General C. G. Harker. Killed at Kenesaw, June 27, L864 

First Ohio Cavalry, 
Colonel Minor Millilcin. Killed in action at Stone River, December 31, 18C2. 
Lieut. Colonel Valentine Cupp. Died, September 20, 1S63, of wounds rei 

at Chickamauga. 
Major David A. B. Moore. Killed in action, December 31, 1862, at Stone I: 
Captain Andrew B. Emery. Died, July 15, 1SG2, of wounds received in a 
Captain Jobn H. Robinson. Died October 31, 1862. 
Captain William H. Scott. Died, September 22, 1S64, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut, John M. Renick. Died, May 28, 1862, at Corinth, Miss. 
Second Lieut. Ira Stevens. Died, October 31, 1862, at Danville, Ky. 
Second Lieut. Timothy L. Condit. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Third Ohio Cavalry. 
Captain Daniel Gotshall. Died, June 17, 1862, of disease. 
Captain William B. Amsden. Died, June 19, 1862, at Fremont, Ohio. 
Captain Richard B. Wood. Killed, February 23, 1S64, in action, at Dalton, 

Ga. 
Captain J. Samuel Clock. Died, July 2, 1865, of wounds received at Macon, 

Ga. 
Second Lieut. William G. Goodnow. Died, May 27, 1862, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Ralf Devereaux. Died, June 21, 1S62, of disease. 

Fourth Ohio Cavalry. 
Lieut. Colonel George W. Dobb. Killed, April 2, 1865, at Selma, Ala. 
Captain Jesse P. Wilson. Killed, February 20, 1862, on picket, near Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Captain John C. Stewart. Died, November 18, 1864, at Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Captain Frank Robie. Killed, April 2, 1865, in action, at Selma. 
First Lieut. Richard W. Neff. Killed, September 20, 1863, at Chickamauga. 

Tenth Ohio Cavalry. 
Captain Samuel E. Norton. Died, December 5, 1864, at Waynesboro, Ga. 
First Lieut. Henry H. Crooks. Killed in action, August 30, 1864. 
First Lieut. James S. Morgan. Killed in action, at Bear Creek, Ga., Novem- 
ber 16, 1864. 
Surgeon James W. Thompson. Died, November 25, 1864, at Wrightsville, Pa, 



418 APPENDIX. 

First Ohio Light Artillery. 
Lieut. Colonel W. E. Lawrence. Died, November 26, 1864, of disease, at Mur- 
freesboro, Tenn. 

Battery " B." 

Second Lieut. George D. Eldridge. Died, March 24, 1863, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Battery "F." 
Second Lieut. John Lynch. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Battery "I." 
Second Lieut. Charles Kotzebue. Died, Juby 16, 1864. of wounds received at 
Kenesaw Mountain. 

Sixth Ohio Battery. 

First Lieut. Oliver H. P. Ayres. Died, July 8, 1864, of wounds. 

Twentieth Ohio Battery. 
First Lieut. Charles F. Nitschelm. Died, August 15, 1864, at Chattanooga, 

•Tenn. 
First Lieut. John S. Burdick. Killed in action, at Franklin, Tenn., November 
30, 1864. 

First Ohio Infantry. 

First Lieut. John W. Jackson. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

First Lieut. Sylvanus S. Dixon. Killed in action, near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 
1864. ' 

First Lieut. George J. Grove. Killed in action, near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864. 

First Lieut. Alexander Varian. Died, June 2, 1864, of wounds received at 
Resaca. 

Second Lieut, Christopher Wollenhaupt. Killed at Missionary Ridge, Novem- 
ber 25, 1863. 

Second Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel John Kell. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain Alexander S. Berryhill. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

Captain John Herrel. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

Captain John C. Hazlett. Died, June 7, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 

Captain Jacob Fotrel. Killed in action, at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 

First Lieut. Richard S. Chambers. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

First Lieut. Lafayette Van Horn. Died, January 14, 1863, of wounds received 

at Stone River. 
First Lieut. George W. Landrum. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. John W. Thomas, Adjutant. Killed in action before Atlanta, Ga., 

July 20, 1864. 

Third Ohio Infantry. 

Captain Leonidas McDougal. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain Henry E. Cunard. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
First Lieut. C. L. Starr. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
First Lieut. James St. John. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Surgeon R. R. McMeens. , 1862. 



APPENDIX. 419 

Fifth Ohio Infantry 
Colonel John H.Patrick. Killed at New Hope Church, Ga., Maj 25 l 

Major Henry L. Symmes. DiedJnly 9, 1864 
First^Lieut. Henry A. Fortman, Adjutant. Died, Sept, , 

Sixth Oh in Infantry, 
Major Samuel C. Erwin. Killed a, Missionary Ridg, , November 25, I 
Captain Ezekiel H. Tatem. Killed b, railroad accident, July 1. ! 
Captain Henry McAlpin. Died, December 31, L862, of wounds , 
btone River. 

FirSt ^ i ?^- Albert G - Willi —, Adjuumt. Killed a, Stone River, De, 
Second Lieut. Charles H. Foster. Killed at Stone River, December 3] 

Seventh Ohio Infantry. 
Colonel William R. Creighton. Killed at Ringgold, Ga., Novemb. r 27 I 
Lieut. Colonel Orrin J. Crane. Killed at Ringgold, Ga., November .7, 

Ninth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain Gustav Richter. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863 
Captain Ferdinand Mueller. Died, September 25, 1863, of wounds receiv, d at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain John Gansen. Died. October 28, 1863, of disease. 
First Lieut. Henry Liedke. Died, September 22, 1863, of wounds receiv, I in 

action at Chickamauga. 
First Lieut. Theodore Lammers. Died, October 7, 1S63, of wounds received in 

action at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Raymond Hermann. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19 

1863. 
Assistant Surgeon James Davenport. Died March 29, 1863. 

Tenth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain Charles F. Nickel. Died, November 3, 1862, of wounds. 
Captain James M. Fitzgerald. Died, November 17, 1863, of di 
First Lieut. John S. Mulroy. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 18G2. 
Second Lieut. Sebastian Eustachio. Died, August 1, 1861, of disease. 
Second Lieut. William Porter. Killed at Penyville, October 8, 181 

Eleventh Ohio Infantry. 
Captain David K. Curtis. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 2."). 1S63. 
First Lieut. George E. Peck. Died, November 26, 1863, of wounds received at 
Missionarjr Ridge. 

Thirteenth Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel Joseph G. Hawkins. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Lieut. Colonel Elhanon M. Mart. Killed at Chickamauga, September l: 1 
Captain Isaac R. Gardner. Died, May 31, 1862, of wounds received at Shiloh. 
Captain Thomas F. Murdock. Killed, September 20, 1863, at Chickamauga. 
Captain Thomas J. Loudon. Drowned, September 29, 1863, in Mississippi 
River. 



420 APPENDIX. 

Captain Samuel McCulloch. Died, May 28, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
First Lieut. James A. Leisure, R. Q. M. Died, October 17, 1SG1, at Gallipolis r 

Ohio. 
First Lieut. John Murphy. Died, January 10, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Second Lieut. James C. Whittaker. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Second Lieut. John Fox. Died, January 1, 1863, of wounds receivedat Stone 

River. 

Fourteenth Ohio Infantry. 

Major John W. Wilson. Died October 3, 1864. 

Captain Wilbur F. Spofford. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Walter B. Kirk. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Ebenezer C. Tillotson. Died, September 24, 1864, on Lookout 

Mountain, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Charles B. Mitchell. Died September 28, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Nathaniel 0. Cobb. Died, October 3, 1864, of wounds received 

at Jonesboro. 

Fifteenth Ohio Infantry. 

Captain James C. Cummins. Died, February 19, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Thomas N. Hanson. Killed at Nashville, Tenn., December 16, 

1864. 
Fist Lieut. Charles J. Rodig. Killed at Nashville, Tenn., December 16, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Andrew E. Smiley. Killed in action, June 24, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Nicholas M. Fowler. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. Frank W. Sanders. Died November 26, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Andrew L. Hadden. Killed in action, June 14, 1864. 
Surgeon Henry Spellman. Died, June 9, 1862, of disease. 

Sixteenth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain William Spangler. Died, January 19, 1862, of disease. 
Captain Joseph Edgar. Killed near Tazewell, Tenn., August 6, 1862. 

Seventeenth Ohio Infantry. 
Major Benjamin F. Butterfield. Died, December 16, 1863, of wounds received 

at Missionary Ridge. 
Captain Ezra Ricketts. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Jacob Humphreys. Died, December 21, 1861, of disease. 
First Lieut. Theodore C. Stewart. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 
First Lieut. Lyman W. Barnes. Killed in action, August 5, 1864. 
First Lieut. Jacob M. Rufl'ner, Adjutant. Killed before Atlanta, August 9, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Richard T. Foster. Died June 15, 1864. 

Eighteenth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain George Stivers. Died, January 4, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
Captain Philip E. Taylor. Died, January 5, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 



APPENDIX. 42] 

Captain Ashbel Fenton. Died, April 11, is.;:;, f wounda ,,.„:,,.,, ; „ 

River. 
Captain George W. Dunkle. Died, June 0, 1863, of di 
Captain Ebenezer Grosvenor. Killed at Nashville, 
•Second Lieut. William W. Blacker. Killed at Stone Riv< i 
Second Lieut. Samuel W. Thomas. Killed at Nashville, Tenn 1 

1864. 

Nineteenth, Ohio Infantry. 
Major Timothy D. Edwards. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, I 
Captain W. Rakestraw. Died, December 17, 1861, at Co . K'v. 

Captain Franklin E. Stowe. Died, April 30, L862,al Pittsburgh Landing, Tenn. 
Captain Urwin Bean. Killed at Stom' River, January L', L863. 
Captain Uriah W. Irwin. Died, December 6, L863, of wounds received at I 

amauga. 
Captain Charles Brewer. Killed in action at Picket, Mills, May 27, I 
First Lieut. Samuel F. Lentz. Died, February 1G, 18G2, of disease. 
First Lieut. Daniel Donovan. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 18C2. 
First Lieut. Job D. Bell. Killed at Stone River, December 31, L862. 
First Lieut. William F. McHenry. Killed before Atlanta. August 24, ! 364 
Second Lieut. D. W. Heldenbrand. Died, July 21, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. J. Stanley Cochran. Died, May G, 1865, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Assistant Surgeon James H. Biteman. Died, September 2.">, 1865, Dear San 

Antonia, Texas. 

Twenty-first Ohio Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Dwella M. Stoughton. Died, November 19, 1SG3, of wounds re- 
ceived at Chickamauga. 

Captain Daniel Lewis. Killed before Atlanta, July 21, 1864. 

First Lieut. Amos E. Wood. Died. June 14, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 

First Lieut. Robert S. Dilwortb. Killed June 27, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Enoch B. Wiley. Died, June 5, 18G3, of wounds received at 
Stone River. 

Second Lieut. Asa C. Spaflbrd. Died, October 14, 1864, at Columbia, S. C. 

Twenty-fourth Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel Frederick C. Jones. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Major Henry Terry. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Captain Enoch Weller. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 

Captain Dewitt C. Wadsworth. Died, September 21, 18G3, of wounds received 
at Chickamauga. 

Captain Isaac N. Dryden. Died, October 1, 18G3, of wounds received at Chick- 
amauga. 

First Lieut. Charles R. Harman. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

Twenty-sixth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain William H. Ross. Died, September 20, of wounds received at Chick- 
amauga. 
First Lieut. David McClelland. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
First Lieut. Francis M. Williams. Killed at Chickamauga, September L9, 1863. 
First Lieut. James W. Burbridge. Killed at Chickamauga, September 1 L>, l^o:). 



422 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. John W. Ruley. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Samuel G. Piatt. Killed near Dallas, Ga., June 4, 1864. 

Twenty-ninth Ohio Infantry. 
Major Myron T. Wright. Died, January 7, 1SC5, of wounds received before 

Savannah, Ga. 
First Lieut. Winthrop H. Grant. Killed at Rocky Face Ridge, May 8, 18C4. 
First Lieut. John W. Dice. Died, June 17, 1864, of wounds received at Kene- 
saw Mountain. 

Thirty-first Ohio Infantry. 

Captain David C. Rose. Died, December 26, 1861, of disease. 
Captain James A. Cahill. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 23, 1864. 
First Lieut. James K. Rochester. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 
1863. 

Thirty-third Ohio Infantry. 

Major Joshua V. Robinson. Died, March 23, 1862, at Portsmouth, Ohio. 
Major Ephraim J. Ellis. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Samuel A. Currie. Died, April 16, 1862, at Shelbyville, Tenn. 
Captain William McKain. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 
First Lieut. Charles R. Pomeroy, Jun. Killed, before Atlanta, August 13, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Enos A. Holmes. Died, December 24, 1861, at Elizabethtown,. 

Ky- 

Second Lieut. Joseph H. Cole. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Edgar J. Higby. Killed at Resaca, May 14, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Francis M. Campbell. Died, July 22, 1864, of wounds. 
Second Lieut. John E. Sjdces. Killed in action, September 6, 1864. 

Tliirty-ffth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain John S. Earhart. Died, August 10, 1863, at Winchester, Tenn. 
Captain Oliver H. Parshall. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Captain Joel K. Deardorf. Died, October 8, 1863, of wounds received at Chick 

amauga. 
Captain David M. Gans. Died, November 25, 1863, of disease. 
First Lieut. Thomas M. Harlan. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863.- 
First Lieut. James Sabin. Died, June 16, 1864, of wounds received in action. 

Thirty-sixth Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel William G. Jones. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Captain James C. Selby. Died, September 14, 1864, of wounds. 

Second Lieut. William A. Rhodes. Died, October 11, 1863, of wounds received 

in action. 

Thirty-eighth Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel Edward H. Phelps. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 

Colonel William A. Choate. Died, September 12, 1864, of wounds. 

Captain John H. Adams. Died, December 10, 1862, of disease. 

Captain Edgar M. Denchar. Died, September 4, 1864, of wounds. 

Captain John Crosson. Died, September 10, 1864, of wounds. 

First Lieut. James C. Betts. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Alphonso L. Braucher. Died, January 29, 1S62, of disease. 



AITKMUX. )_»:> 

Second Lieut. John Lewis. Killed al Mi sionarj I: 

Second Lieut. Joseph Newman. Died, December 12, L863, of wounds. 

Second Lieut. James McQuillan. Died, October 2, 1864 of wounds, 

Fortieth oh in Infantry. 
Major Thomas Acton. Killed at Lookout Mountain November 24 I 
Captain Clements P. Snodgrass. Killed before Atlanta, Julj I 
Captain John C. Meagher. Died, Augusl 15, L864, al Li lertj 
First Lieut. Cyrenius Van Mater. Killed al Chickamauga, Si pt< mb< r 20 
First Lieut. Daniel Collett. Died, May SO, L864, of wound 

out Mountain. 
First Lieut. Charles Converse. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 30, 1864. 

Forty-first Ohio Infantry. 
Captain William W. Munn. Died, December 2, L863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
Captain William Hansard. Died, January !), 1865, of wounds. 
First Lieut. Franklin E. Pancoast. Died, May 16, 1862, of wound- i 

Shiloh. 
First Lieut. Calvin C. Hart. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1 
First Lieut. Lester T. Patchin. Died, January 18, 1863, of wound- receivi 

Stone River. 
First Lieut. Samuel B. Asdel, Adjutant. Died, November IT, 1863, ol di 
First Lieut Henry S. Dirlam. Died, December 18, 1863, of wounds received at 

Missionary Ridge. 
Second Lieut. Chauncey H. Talcott. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 
Second Lieut. William W. Watson. Killed at Missionary Ridge, Noveml 

1863. 

Forty-ninth Ohio Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Levi Drake. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Captain Amos Keller. Died, January 1, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
Captain Hiram Chance. Killed at Liberty Gap, June 2 1, 1.863. 
Captain Shepherd Green. Died, November 27, 18G4, of wounds receh 

action. 
First Lieut. Aaron H. Keller. Died, January 27, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Jacob C. Miller. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
First Lieut. Silas W. Simons. Killed in action, at Pickett's Mills May '27, 

1864. 
First Lieut. John C. Ramsey. Killed in action, at Pickett's Mills. May 27, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Theodore A. Pesso. Killed, August 25, 1S64, at Vining's Station. 
First Lieut. John K Gibson. Died, January 25, 18G5, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut. Henry F. Arndt. Killed at Missionary Kid--, Novem ler 25, 

1864. 
Second Lieut. Issac H. White. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 

18G3. 



424 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. Jacob Wolf. Died, December 16, 1S63, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut. William F. Gibbs. Killed at Pickett's Mills, May 27, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Charles Wallace. Died, June 23, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 

Fifty-first Ohio Infantry. 

Captain William Patton. Died, April 14, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Captain Benjamin F. Heskett. Died, January 4, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Captain Samuel Stephens. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 20, 1864. 
First Lieut. Frank Shriver. Died, July 9, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
Second Lieut. Willis C. Workman. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 22, 

1864. 

Fifty-second Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel Daniel McCook. Died, July 17, 1864, of wounds received at Kenesaw 

Mountain. 
Captain Salathiel M. Neighbor. Died, July 7, 1864, of wounds. 
Captain Peter C. Schneider. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 19, 1864.- 
Captain James M. Summers. Died, April 16, 1865, of wounds. 
First Lieut. Ira H. Pool. Died, July 30, 1864, of wounds received at Kenesaw 

Mountain. 
Second Lieut. James H. Donaldson. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 19, 

1864. 
Second Lieut. David F. Miser. Died, August 2, 1864, of wounds received at 

Kenesaw Mountain. 
Assistant Surgeon Arthur J. Rosa. Died February 20, 1864. 

Fifty-fifth Ohio Infantry. 
Colonel Charles B. Gambee. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Major Rodolphus Robbins. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Captain Albert E. Peck. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 
Second Lieut. Edward Bromley. Killed in action, at Missionary Ridge, No- 
vember 24, 1863. 

Fifty-ninth Ohio Infantry. 

First Lieut. Frank H. Woods. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. John W. Shinn. Died, June 17, 1863, at Stone River Ford, 

Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Jesse Ellis. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

Sixty-first Ohio Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel William H. H. Brown. Died, September 5, 1864, of wounds, at 

Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Major David C. Beckett. Killed in action, June 22, 1864. 
Captain William H. McGroarty. Killed in Lookout Valley, October 28, 1863. 
Captain Edward H. Newcomb. Killed July 21, 1864. 



APPENDIX. !_•:, 

Sixty-fourth Ohio Tnfantry. 
Colonel Alexander Mcllvaine. Killed at Rocky Face Ridge, May 9, 1864 

Captain Joseph B. Sweet. Killed al Stone River, December 31, I 

Captain John K. Ziegler. Died, September 20, L863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain Henry II. Kling. Killed at Missionary Ridge, Nov< d 
First Lieut. Thomas H. Ehlers. Killed at Rocky Face Ridge, May 9, 1864. 
First Lieut. George C. Marshall. Killed near Dallas, Ga., May 27, L864. 
Second Lieut. Thomas McGill. Died, March 30, L862, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Sixty-fifth Ohio Infantry. 
Major Samuel C. Brown. Died, September 22, ISO: 1 ., of wounds received nt 

Chickamauga. 

Captain Jacob Christophel. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1 

Captain Nahan L. Williams. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, July 27, 1864. 

First Lieut. Horace H. Justice, Adjutant. Died, February 14, 1862, ofdisi 

First Lieut. Clark S. Gregg. Died, May 11, 1862, of disease, at Si. Louis, Mo. 

First Lieut. WilKam n. Massey, Adjutant. Died, April 7, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived at Stone River. 

First Lieut. Nelson Smith. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1SG3. 

First Lieut. Jonas Smith. Died, June 10, 18G5, from accidental injury. 

First Lieut. John T. Hyatt. Died, December 16, 1861, of disease. 

Second Lieut. George N. Huckins. Died, April 2, 18G2, of disease. 

Second Lieut. John R. Parish. Died July 31, 1862. 

Second Lieut. Dolsen Van Kirk. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1- 

Second Lieut. Samuel C. Henwood. Killed at Chickamauga, September 10, 
1863. 

Second Lieut. Eben Bingham. Killed at Big Shanty, Ga., in action, June 18, 
1864. 

Sixty-sixth Ohio Infantry. 

First Lieut. Harrison Davis. Killed at Ringgold, Ga., November 27, 1863. 
First Lieut. Joseph W. Hitt. Killed at Dallas, Ga., May 25, 18G4. 
First Lieut. John R. Organ. Killed before Atlanta, July 20, 1864. 

Sixty-ninth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain Leonard Counselled Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 
First Lieut. Joseph W. Boynton. Died, June 5, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Jacob S. Pierson. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 18G4. 
First Lieut. Martin V. Bailey. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. John S. Scott. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863i 

Seventy-frst Ohio Infantry. 
Major James W. Carlin. Perished on Steamer Sultana, April 24, 1865. 
First Lieut. Nicholas Eidemiller. Died, May 1G, 18G2, at Cincinnati, ( Ihio. 
First Lieut. Eliah A. Widener. Killed at Nashville, Tenn., December 16, 1864. 
Second Lieut. William S. Hamilton. Drowned August 10, 1862. 
Second Lieut. John M. Simmons. Died, August 24, 1SG3, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Everah C. Le Blond. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 18G4. 



426 APPENDIX. 

Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. 
Captain Lnther M. Buchwalter. Killed in Lookout Valley, October 29, 1863. 

Seventy-fourth Ohio Infantry. 
First Lieut. W. H. H. Moody. Died, September 28, 1864, of disease. 
First Lieut. Geosge W. Bricker. Died, September 15, 1864, of wounds received 

in action. 
Second Lieut. John A. McKee. Drowned, February 1, 1864, at Cincinnati, 0. 
Second Lieut. John Scott. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 

Seventy-ninth Ohio Infantry. 
First Lieut. Isreal D. Compton. Died, December 31, 1862, of disease. 

Eighty-second Ohio Infantry. 
Captain William J. Dickson. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Captain William Ballentine. Died, March 19, 1865, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut, Asa H. Gary. Killed at, Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 

Eighty-ninth Ohio Infantry. 
Captain George H. DeBolt. Died, February 3, 1865, at Savannah, Ga. 
First Lieut. J. Riley Dixon. Died, December 18, 1862, of disease. 
First Lieut. George W. Penn. Died, January 21, 1863, at Moscow, 0. 
First Lieut. Granville Jackson. Killed at Chickainauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Stephen V. Walker. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Dudly King. Died, August 13, 1864, of wounds received in 
action. 

First Lieut. Otho P. Fairfield. Died, October 8, 1864, at Columbia, S. C, a 

prisoner of war. 
Second Lieut. Clement Thomas. Died, February 20, 1863, of disease. 

Ninetieth Ohio Infantry. 

Major George Angle. Killed near Marietta, Ga., July 2, 1864. 

Captain Robert D. Caddy. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Captain Thomas Rains. Killed before Atlanta, August 19, 1864. 

First Lieut. Daniel N. Kingery, Adjutant. Killed at Chickamauga, September 
20, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Nelson A. Patterson. Died, October 10, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived at Chickamauga, 

Ninety-second Ohio Infantry. 

Captain John Brown. Died, October 7, 1863, of wounds received at Chicka- 
mauga, 

Captain William B. Whittlesey. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 
1863. 

Captain Edward Grosvenor. Died, November 27, 1864, of disease. 

First Lieut. George B. Turner, Adjutant. Died, December 1, 1863, of wounds 
received at Missionary Ridge. 

Second Lieut. Hugh Townsend. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25-, 
1863. 



\ri'i:\iu\-. |_>7 

Ninety-third Ohio Infantry. 

Colonel Hiram. Strong. Died, October 7; 1863, of wound 

muaga. 
Major William Birch. Did, November 25, 1863, of 

sionary Ridge. 
Captain John Eastman. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 23 
First Lieut. John M. Patterson. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

Ninety-fourth Ohio Infantry. 

Captain John C. Drury. Killed at Perryville, I > 

Captain David Steel. Died, January 5, 1863, of wounds received in action. 

First Lieut. John A. Beall. Died, January 2, 1863, of dis< 

Ninety-seventh Ohio Infantry. 
Captain William Berkshire. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, Juno 27, 1864. 
Second Lieut. William P. Gardner. Died, November 30, L862 al - tsville 
Ky. 

Ninety-eighth Ohm Infantry. 

Colonel George Webster. Killed at Perryville, October 3, 1 362. 

Lieut. Colonel James M. Shane. Killed at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. 

Captain William C. Lochary. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 

Captain Armstrong J. Thomas. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20 

Captaid Robert F. Williams. Died, August 10, 1864, of wounds received at 
Vining's Station, Ga. 

First Lieut. Samuel A. Rank. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 

First Lieut. William McMillen. Died, October 27, L862, of wounds receive,] at 
Perryville. 

First Lieut. John H. Reeves, Adjutant. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1. 
1864. 

First Lieut. John M. Banum. Killed at Bentonville. March 19, 1865. 

Second Lieut. Richard B. McGuire. Died, October 15, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived at Chickamauga. 

Surgeon P. W. Marseilles. Died April 23, 186 1. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry. 
Captain James Bryson. Died April 1, 1862. 
Captain David G. May. Killed at Missionary Ridge, Tenn., September 21, 

1863. 
Captain James G. Taylor. Killed in action at Lovejoy's Station, Aug;! 

1864. 
Captain Robert McCormick. Died, December 29, 1864, at Bardstown, Ky. 
First Lieut. Joseph Castles. Died, March 13, 1862, at Munfordsville, Ky. 
First Lieut. Amos B. Rhoads. Killed at Sbelbyville, Tenn., June 27, 1863. 
First Lieut. Chauncy C. Hermans. Killed in action at Lovejoy's Station, 

August 21, 1864. • 
First Lieut. Jacob Sigman. Killed in action at Selma, April 2, 1865. 
Second Lieut. Harvey H. Best. Died, March 5, 1862, of disease, at Bardstown, 

Ky. 



428 APPENDIX. 

Second Lieut. Nicholas Wynkoop. Killed in action at Gallatin, Tenn., August 

21, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Henry W. Lutz. Died, November 29, 1862, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. James Henderson. Died, April 17, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Henry D. Calkins. Died October 7, 1864. 
Surgeon John L. Sherk. Killed by guerrillas at Bardstown, Ky., December 

29, 1864. 

Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry. 
Lieut. Colonel Thomas C. James. Died, January 13, 1863, at Philadelphia, Pa. 
Captain Hugh W. McCullough. Killed in action near Tompkinsville, Ky., 

June 6, 1862. 
Captain Gilbert Waters. Killed in action at Shelbyville, Tenn., June 28, 1863. 
Captain John Boal. Killed in action, March 16, 1865. 
First Lieut. Theophilus J. Mountz. Killed at Dandridge, Tenn., December 24, 

1863. 
Second Lieut. Isaac B. Kauffman. Died June 7, 1862. 
Second Lieut. David Nissley. Died, July 5, 1862, at Bowling Green, Ky. ' 
Second Lieut. Aarou Sullivan. Killed in action at Tompkinsville, Ky., July 

9, 1862. 

Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. 

Major Adolph B. Rosengarten. Killed at Stone River, December 29, 1862. 
Major Frank B. Ward. Died, January 11, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
First Lieut. Harvey S. Lingle. Killed in action at Mossy Creek, December 29, 

1863. 

Battery " B," Independent Pennsylvania Artillery. 
Captain Alanson J. Stevens. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 1863. 
Captain Samuel M. McDowell. Killed in action, May 27, 1864. 

Battery " U," Independent Pennsylvania Artillery. 
Captain Charles A. Atwell. Died, November 2, 1863, of wounds received at 

Wauhatchie. 
First Lieut. Edward R. Geary, Killed at Wauhatchie, October 29, 1863. 

Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Major Peter A. McAloon. Died, December 7^1863, of -wounds received at Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry. 

First Lieut. Peter Kaj'lor. Died, December 5, 1863, of wounds received at 

Ringgold, Ga. 
Second Lieut. Isaiah B. Robison. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 

Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Second Lieut. William Harrington. Killed by railroad accident, March 4, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Ethan 0. Fulce. Killed in action, near Fayetteville, N. C, 
March 14, 1865. 



APPENDIX. !_•:> 

Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Captain Dennis H. Cbeesbro. Killed al New Hope Church, Mi 
Captain Sefrer T. Kettrer. Died, July 21, 1864, of wounda r. c« iv< d al 
Tree Crook. 

First Lieut. John II. Knipe. Died, May 15, 1864, of wounda received at 

Resaca. 

First Lieut. Luther R. Witman, Adjutant. Died, July 20, L864, of woun 

ceived at Poach Tree Crook. 
First Lieut, David C. Sclheimer. Died, September 21, L864,ofwouD 

at Peach Tree Creek. 
Second Lieut. John W. Phillips. Killed a< New 11,.,,,. Church, Mi 
Second Lieut. Samuel Wolf. Killed at Poach Tree Creek, July 20, I 
Second Lieut, Howell J. Davis. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, I 

Seventy-third Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Captain Heury Hess. Died, June 19, 1SG4, of wounds received at 

Knob, Ga. 

Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel Peter B. Housum. Died, December 31, 18G2, of wounds rea'm 1 

at Stone River, 
Captain John E. Walker. Killed before Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1804. 
First Lieut. William H. Thomas. Killed in action at Liberty Gap, Juno 25, 

1863. 
First Lieut. Henry B. Thompson. Killed at Lovejoy's Station, September 3, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Alexander T. Baldwin. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

Seventy-eight Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Captain William S. Jack. Died, February 5, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
First Lieut. Adam Lowry, R. Q. M. Died, September 28, 1863, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Matthew J. Halstead. Killed at Stone River, January 2, 1863. 
Assistant Surgeon William Morrow Knox. Killed accidentally, at Louisville, 

Ky., April 27, 1862. 
Assistant Surgeon T. P. Tomlinson. Died September 7, 1865. 

Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Captain John H. Dysart. Died, February 8, 1862, of disease, at Louisville, Ky. 
Captain Samuel J. Boone. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain Lewis Heidegger. Killed at Chickaraauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Henry J. Test. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Second Lieut. Frederick Strasbaugb. Died, September 20, 1863, of wounds re- 
ceived at Cbickamauga. 

One Hundred and Ninth Pennsijlvania Infantry. 
First Lieut. James Glendening. Killed at Wauhatchie, October 29, 1863. 



430 APPENDIX. 

One Hundred, and Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Colonel George A. Cobham, Jun. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Major John A. Boyle. Killed at Wauhatchie, October 29, 1863. 
Captain Charles Woeltge. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
Captain Martellus H. Todd. Killed at New Hope Church, May 25, 1864. 
Captain Hiram L. Blodget. Died, August 5, 1864, of disease. 
Second Lieut. Marvin D. Pettit. Killed at Wauhatchie, October 29, 1863. 

One Hundred and Forty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry. 
Captain Charles S. Davis. Died, November 28, 1863, of wounds received at 

Taylor's Ridge. 
Captain Samuel F. McKee. Died, June 25, 1864, of wounds received in action. 

TENNESSEE. 

First Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain Alfred J. Lane. Killed in action, July 1, 1863. 
Captain Elbert J. Canon. Died, January 3, 1864, of wounds received at Mossy 

Creek. 
Captain Nelson Bowman. Died, October 22, 1864, of wounds, at Bull's Gap, 

Tenn. 

First Lieut. Adam L. Whitehead. Died, , 1862. 

First Lieut. George W. Cox. Died, December 30, 1863, of wounds received at 

Mossy Creek. 
Second Lieut. John Roberts. Died, July 29, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut. Thomas T. Hull. Died, February 9, 1865, at Memphis, Tenn. 

Second Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain James H. Morris. Killed at Stone River, January 1, 1863. 
Captain Aaron G. McReynolds. Died, October 27, 1864, of w T ounds received 
in action. 

Third Tennessee Cavalry. 

Major Albert C. Catlett. Died, March 24, 1864, of disease, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Captain Gid. R. Griffith. Died, July 11, 1863, at Nashville, Tenn. 

First Lieut. John W. White. Died, March 16, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 

First Lieut. George E. Curton. Killed in action, September 25, 1864. 

First Lieut. Robert B. Hunter. Died, December 22, 1864, at Nashville, Tenn. 

Assistant Surgeon Frederick Wagner. Killed in action, September 25, 1864. 

Fourth Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain Daniel Meader. Drowned bathing, August 8, 1863. 

Captain Henry C. Kerner. Died, October , 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
Captain Robert W. Ragon. Died, June 4, 1865, of disease. 
Second Lieut. John P. Harper. Died April 14, 1865. 

Fifth Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain A. T. Julian. Killed in action, March 18, 1863. 
Surgeon Joseph B. Moore. Killed by guerrillas, September 5, 1864. 



APPENDIX. |.;i 

Eighth Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain Willey Galyou. Died, al Nashville, Tenn., March 25, I 

First Lieut. Pryor L. Mason. Killed in action, July 29, ! 

Ninth Tennessee Cavalry. 
Captain William J. Trotter. Died June 28, 1854. 

Tenth Tennessee Cavalry. 

Major William P. Story. Died, December 27, 1864, of wounds received in 

action. 
First Lieut. Judson Wise. Died, June 3, 1864, of disease. 

Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry. 

Major Sater Boland. Died, December 31, 1864, of wounds received in action 

at Franklin. 

Captain Andrew J. Sullivan. Killed by guerrillas, April 20, 1864. 

Captain John C. Rodders. Killed in action, June 14, 1864. 

Captain John C. Penoyer. Died, July 11, 1864, at Pulaski, Tenn. 

First Lieut. Chauncey Cunningham. Killed in action, at Florence, Ala., August 
10, 1864. 

First Lieut. William T. Ford. Killed near Shoal Creek, Ala., November 8, 
1864. 

Second Lieut. William J. Rankin. Died, December 18, 1864, of wounds re- 
ceived in action. 

Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry. 

Lieut. Colonel William H. Ingerton. Died. December 8, 1864, of wounds. 
Captain Richard H. Luttrell. Died, January 21), 1864, at Camp Nelson, K\. 
Captain James B. Wyatt. Killed in action, December 12, 1864. 
Captain William M. Gourley. Killed in action, in Marion, Ya., December 13, 

1864. 

First Tennessee Infantry. 

Lieut. Colonel Milton L. Phillips. Died December 2.3, 1863. 

Second Lieut. Thomas Pierce. Died, January 17, 1863, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 

Second Tennessee lnfantri 
Captain William H. Cowan. Died April 12, 1862. 
Captain Elihu E. Jones. Died, May 21, 1862, of disease. 
Captain John L. Sneed. Died, February 14, 1863, of wounds received at Stone 

River. 
Captain Francis M. Skaggs. Died, May 19, 1862., of disease. 
First Lieut Abraham Meyrs. Died, March 25, 1862, of wounds received in 

action. 
Second Lieut. John Brown. Died February 13, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Charles 0. McBee. Killed in action, October 14, 1863. 

Tenth Tennessee Infantry. 
First Lieut. William C. Shelbey. Killed accidentally, August 26, ! 
Second Lieut. Patrick Sullivan. Died, September 16, 1862, of wounds. 
Assistant Surgeon Charles Johnson. Killed by a fall from his horse, April 6. 
1863. 



432 APPENDIX. 

WISCONSIN. 

First Wisconsin Cavalry. 
Second Lieut. Charles Clinton. Died, March 29, 1864, at Murfreesboro, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Sheldon E. Vosburg. Died, April 16, 1865, of wounds received 
in action. 

Fifth Wisconsin Battery. 

Captain Oscar F. # Pinney. Died, February 17, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Second Lieut. Almon Smith. Died, August 23, 1862, of disease. 

Eighth Wisconsin Battery. 
Captain Stephen J. Carpenter. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 1862. 

First Wisconsin Infantry. 
Captain WiHiam S. Mitchell. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Captain Abner 0. Heald. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Robert J. Nickles. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Charles A. Searles. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Jarius S. Richardson. Died, October 5, 1863, of wounds received 

at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Collins C. McVean. Died, June 22, 1864, of wounds received 

in action. 
Assistant Surgeon Egbert Jamieson. Died, June 17, 1863, of disease. 

Third Wisconsin Infantry. 
Captain James W. Hunter. Died, June 8, 1864, of wounds received in action. 
Captain Thomas E. Orton. Died, July 25, 1864, of wounds received before At- 
lanta, Ga. 
First Lieut. John H. Meigs. Died May 7, 1865. 
Chaplain John M. Springer. Died, May 29, 1864, of wounds received at Resaca. 

Tenth Wisconsin Infantry. 
Lieut. Colonel John H. Ely. Died, October 4, 1863, of wounds received in 

action. 
Major Henry 0. Johnson. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain William Moore. Killed by guerrillas, July 4, 1862. 
Captain George M. West. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Robert Rennie. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Chester A. Burdick. Died, September 17, 1864, of disease, at 

Charleston, S. C. 

Tliirteenth Wisconsin Infantry. 
Colonel David E. Wood. Died, June 17, 1862, of disease. 
Captain George E. Waldo. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 
Captain Levi W. Vaughn. Killed at Corinth, Miss., October 3, 1862. 
Captain Samuel Harrison. Died of wounds received at Corinth, Miss. 



APPENDIX. 433 

Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry. 

Colonel Hans C. Heg. Died of wounds received a1 Cbickamauga 

20, 1863. 

Lieut. Colonel David McKee. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 
Captain John Ingmandson. Killed at Stone River, December 30, 1862. 
Captain John M. Johnson. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, 1863 
Captain Haus Hansen. Died, October 13, 1863, of wound I at < 

amauga. 
Captain Henry HaufF. Killed at Chickamauga, September 19, ' 
First Lieut. Andrew Clement. Died, September 23, 1864, of disease, at Bi 

ville, Wis. 
Second Lieut. Oliver Thompson. Killed at Chickamauga, September 20, 

Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry. 
Major Frederick Schumacher. Killed at Perryville, October 8, I 
Captain George Bently. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Captain Hiram M. Gibbs. Died, October 15, 1862, of wounds received al 

ryville. 
Captain John Jewett, Jun. Died, November 21, 1862, of disease, at Mitchells- 

viile, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Edward T. Midgley. Killed at Bentonville, March 19, 1865. 
Second Lieut. David Mitchell. Killed at Perryville, October 8, 1862. 
Second Lieut, Henry C. Taylor. Died, December 12, 1864, at Charleston, S I '. . 

a prisoner. 
Surgeon Samuel J Carolin. Died, November 4, 1862, at Cowling Green, Ky. 

Twenty-second Wisconsin Infantry. 
Captain Gustavus Goodrich. Died, March 17, 1863, at Racine, Wis. 
Captain Marshall W. Patton. Died, May 19, 1864, of wounds received at 

Resaca. 
First Lieut. John E. Holmes, R. Q. M. Died, May 8, 186:'., at Annapolis, Md. 
Second Lieut. Ephraim K. Newman. Died, December 25, 1862, as Nicholas- 

ville, Ky. 

Second Lieut. David Flint. Died, May 27, 1864, at Chattanooga, Tenn., of 

wounds. 

Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry. 

Captain Gustavus Goldsmith. Died, October 3, 1863, of wounds received at 

Chickamauga. 
Captain Howard Greene. Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
Captain Frederick A. Root. Died, December 2, 1863, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Captain Alvah Philbrook. Killed at Franklin, November 30, 186 I. 
First Lieut. Robert J. Chivas- Killed at Missionary Ridge, November 25, 1 B63. 
First Lieut. Thomas T. Keith. Killed in action at Adairsville, Ga., May 17, 

1864. 
First Lieut. Frederick Schlenstedt. Killed at Jonesboro, September 1, 1864. 
Second Lieut. Christian Nix. Died, January 1, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 
Second Lieut. George Bleyer. Died, January 25, 1863, of wounds received at 

Stone River. 



434 APPENDIX. 

Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry. 
Captain John P. Seeman. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Captain Eobert Mueller. Killed at Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864. 
Captain Carl Schmidt. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 
First Lieut. Christian Phillip. Killed at Resaca, May 15, 1864. 
First Lieut. Nicholas Wolmer. Died, August 21, 1864, of wounds received at 

Peach Tree Creek. 
First Lieut. Francis Rudolph Klein. Killed at Averysboro, March 16, 1865. 

Thiriy-frst Wisconsin Infantry. 
Major William J. Gibson. Died, September 9, 1863, of disease, at Columbus, 

Ky. 
Captain James B. Mason. Died, October 17, 1863, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Gilbert N. Rodgers. Died, August 12, 1864, of disease. 



Twelfth Colored Infantry. 
Captain Robert Headin. Died, January 1. 1865, of wounds received at Nash 

ville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. William L. Clark. Killed, November 21, 1864. 
Second Lieut. David G. Cook. Killed near Murfreesboro, Tenn., December 24, 

1864. 
Second Lieut. Dennis Dease. Died, December 25, 1864, of wounds received at 

Nashville. 

TJiirteenth Colored Infantry. 

First Lieut. George Taylor. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

First Lieut. J. W. Woodruff. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

Second Lieut. James A. Trom. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Luther L. Parks. Killed at Nashville, December 16, 1864 

Fourteenth Colored Infantry. 
First Lieut. George W. Apthorp. Died, October 28, 1864, of wounds received 

at Decatur. 
Second Lieut. Frank Gillett. Died, October 28, 1864, of wounds received at 

Decatur. 
Second Lieut. Charles Woodworth. Ktlled in action at Decatur. 

Fifteenth Colored Infantry. 

Assistant Surgeon Eli M. Hewitt. Killed by guerrillas, near Springfield, Tenn., 

July 24, 1864. 

Second Lieut. Edward Long. Died, March 15, 1866, of disease, at Nashville, 

Tenn. 

Seventeenth Colored Infantry. 

Captain Gideon V. Ayres. Killed in action at Nashville, December 15, 1864. 

Captain Job H. Aldrich. Killed in action at Nashville, December 15, 1864. 

First Lieut. George L. Clark. Died of wounds received at Nashville, January 

7, 1865. 



APPENDIX. 435 

Eighteenth Colored Infantry 
First Lieut. Leander Martin. Killed in action at Sand Mountain, Ala Janu- 
ary 27, 1865. 

Forty-fourth Colored Infantry. 
Captain Charles G. Penfield. Murdered, after capture, by Forrest's Command 
December 22, 1864. 

One Hundredth Colored Infantry 
Assistant Surgeon Edward M. Wash. Died, September 20, 1865, of disease at 
Columbus, Tenn. 

One Hundred and First Colored Infantry. 
Captain Stephen H. Eno. Died, December 16, 1865, of disease, at Nashville, 
Tenn. 

One Hundred and Eleventh Colored Infantry. 
Colonel Wm. H. Lathrop. Killed in action at Sulphur Branch Trestle \la 
September 25, 1864. 



NAMES OF OFFICEES APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, 
IN THE VOLUNTEER SERVICE, WHO FELL IN THE 
WAR, QR DIED FROM WOUNDS OR SICKNESS. 

Major-General William Nelson, U. S. N. Died at Louisville, Ky., September 

29, 1862. 
Brigadier-General Wm. R. Terrill, Captain U. S. A. Killed at Perryville, Oc- 
tober 8, 1862. 
Lieutenant-Colonel George E. Flint, A. A. G., Chief of Staff, Fourteenth 

Corps. Died, 1864. 
Surgeon Abraham L. Cox. Died on Lookout Mountain, Tenn., July 28, 1864. 
Surgeon R. W. S. Jackson. Died on Lookout Mountain, Tenn., January 18, 

1865. 
Captain Henry Clay, A. A. G. Died, June 5, 1862, at Louisville, Ky. 
Captain Richard Stevenson, A. Q. M. Died, October 5, 1862, at Louisville, 

Ky. 
Captain William C. Russell, A. A. G. Killed at Chickamaugua, September 20, 

1863. 
Captain Edward D. Saunders, A. A. G. Killed in action at Allatoona Creek, 

June 2, 1864. 
Captain R. J. Waggener, A. A. G. Killed at Dallas, Ga., May 28, 1864. 
Captain Oscar 0. Muller, A. A. G. Killed at Jonesboro, Ga., September 2, 

1864. 
Captain John A. Irvine, C. S. Died, March 1, 1865, at Nashville, Tenn. 
Captain Samuel A. Bonsall, A. Q. M. Died at Gallatin Tenn., July 19, 1865. 
Captain S. H. Sunt, A. Q. M. Died, July 28, 1865, at Mobile, Ala. 



436 APPENDIX. 

NAMES OF OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY, SERV- 
ING ACCORDING TO ARMY RANK, WHO FELL IN 
BATTLE OR DIED FROM WOUNDS OR DISEASE 
DURING THE WAR. 

Colonel Edward A. King, 6th U. S. Infanty. Killed at Chickamauga, Septem- 
ber 20, 1863. 
Colonel Julius P. Garesche, Chief-of-Staff to General Rosecrans. Killed at 

Stone River, December 31, 1862. 
Major S. D. Carpenter, 19th IT. S. Infantry. Killed at Stone River, December 

31, 1862. 
Major Sidney Coolidge, 16th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Stone River, December 

31, 1862. 
Captain Wm. H. Acker. Killed at Shiloh, April 7, 1862. 
Captain Patrick T. Kayes, 16th U. S. Infantry. Died, May 3, 1862, of wounds 

received at Shiloh. 
Captain J. B. Bell, 15th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Stone River, December 31, 

1862. 
Captain Charles L. Kneass, 18th Infantry. Killed at Stone River, December 

31, 1862. 
Captain Wm. W. Wise, 15th U. S. Infantry. Died, January 3, 1863, of wounds 

received at Stone River. 
Captain Charles E. Dennison, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, June 15, 1863, of 

wounds received at Stone River. 
Captain John A. Thompson, 18th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Hoover's Gap, 

June, 1863. 
Captain David Ireland, 15th U. S. Infantry. Died at Atlanta, Ga., September 

10, 1864. 
Captain Wm. H. Ingerton, 16th U. S. Infantry. Died at Knoxville, Tenn., 

December 8, 1864. 
First Lieut. Irwin W. Wallace, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died at Pittsburgh, Pa., 

February 19, 1862. 
First Lieut. William W. Stevenson, 16th U. S. Infantry. Died, February 27, 

1862, at Louisville, Ky. 
First Lieut. Edward L. Mitchell, 16th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Shiloh, April 

7, 1862. 
First Lieut. James W. Bingham, 16th U. S. Infantry. Died at Bardstown Ky., 

November 9, 1862. 
First Lieut. Herman G. Radcliffe, 18th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Stone River, 

December 18, 1862. 
First Lieut. James L. Simonds, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, June 14, 1863, of 

wounds received at Stone River. 
First Lieut. Joseph McConnell, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, January 14, 1863, 

of wounds received at Stone River. 
First Lieut. Howard M. Burnham, Battery H, 5th U. S. Artillery. Killed at 

Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 
First Lieut. Charles L. Truman, 18th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Chickamauga, 

September 20, 1863. 



APPENDIX. 437 

First Lieut Michael B. Fogarty, 19th U. S. Enfantry. Kill,,] .,, Cbickan 

September 20, 1863. 
First Lieut. Lucius P. Brown, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died at Chatl , 

tober 10, 18G3, of wounds received at Chickamauga 
First Lieut. Homer II. Clarke, 16th U. S. Infantry. Died at Na bvill. I 

ber 21, 1863, of wounds received at Chickamauga. 
First Lieut. Tillinghast L'Hommedicu, 4th U. S. Cavalry. Died at P 

Tenn., December 31, 1863, of disease. 
First Lieut. William II. Loamy, 19th U. S. Infantry. Died, .1,1-, II.! 

disease, at Chattanooga, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Samuel J. Dick, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, December 28 

of disease, at Nashville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Edward Fitzgerald, 4th U. S. Cavalry. Died, February 16, 

of disease, at Nashville, Tenn. 
First Lieut. Elbridge G. Roys, 4th U. S. Cavalry, Killed at Selma Ala Ami] 

2, 1865. 
First Lieut. Arthur N. Thompson, ICth U. S. Infantry. Died July 13, 1865, at 

New Orleans, La. 
First Lieut. George II. Burns, 15th U. S. Infantry. Died, October 15, 1865, of 

disease, at Mobile, Ala. 
First Lisut. William A. Garland, 19th U. S. Infantry. Died, Decern! 

1865, of disease, at Augusta, Ga. 
First Lieut. Charles M. Reed, 19th U. S. Infantry. Died, December 8, 1865, 

of disease, at Augusta, Ga. 
First Lieut. Douglas Edwards, 19th U. S. Infantry. Died, December 24, 18G5, 

of disease, at Augusta, Ga. 
Second Lieut. John F. Hitchcock, 18th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Stone River, 

December 31, 18G2. 
Second Lieut. Thomas Healey, 4th U. S. Cavalry. Died of wounds, at Frank- 
lin, Tenn., April 23, 1SG3. 
Second Lieut. Francis C. Wood, 4th U. S. Cavalry. Died, May 23, 18G3, of 

wounds received at Middleton, Tenn. 
Second Lieut. Charles F. Miller, 19th U. S. Infantry. Died of wounds re- 
ceived at Chickamauga, September 22, 1863. 
Second Lieut. John Lane, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, October 15, 1SC3, of 

wounds received at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Robert Floyd, 3d U. S. Artillery. Died, September 23, 18G3, of 

wounds received at Chickamauga. 
Second Lieut. Henry C. Pohlman, 18th U. S. Infantry. Died, October 15, 18G3, 

at Richmond, Va. 
Second Lieut. Peter J. Covenzler, 16th U. S. Infantry. Killed at Missionary 

Ridge, November 25, 1863. 
Second Lieut. Joseph C. Forbes, 15th U. S. Infantry. Killed at. New Hope 

Church, Ga., May 31, 1864. 



BLOCK-HOUSES, ETC. 



THE ENGINEER SERVICE IN THE ARMY OF THE CUM- 
BERLAND. 

(By Brevet-Colonel W. E. Merrill, Major Engineers, late Chief Engineer Army 

Cumberland.) 

The peculiarities of the country in which the Army of the 
Cumberland campaigned, developed novel modifications of 
many of the engineering appliances in general use by all fully 
equipped armies, and some of these are deserving of record, 
especially in a work that aims to be a complete history of the 
gallant army by whom they were used and for whom they 
were devised. In the present article, I will briefly call at- 
tention to three points of military engineering in which the 
experience of this army may be valuable to others that in the 
future may have to tread in similar paths of difficulty and 
danger. The three subjects to which I would invite attention 
are block-houses for railroad defense, canvas pontons, and 
military maps. 

BLOCK-HOUSES FOR RAILROAD DEFENSE. 

Among all the American armies that fought in the long 
civil war, the Army of the Cumberland was exceptional in 
being the only one that from the beginning to the end of its 
career fought exclusively along lines of railroad, was supplied 
wholly by railroad, had its depots at prominent railroad cen- 
ters, fought for the possession of the railroad centers of the 
enemy, and in general was compelled to adapt its strategy and 
its tactics to the novel conditions imposed by the invention of 
railroads, and the total change in methods of transportation 
that had occurred since the great Napoleonic wars, from 
whose records students of the military art had hitherto derived 

(439) 



440 APPENDIX. 

their knowledge. No other American army acquired so great 
an experience in the art of defending railroads through hos- 
tile territory, and therefore it is believed that a brief state- 
ment should be made of the means by which these results 
were attained. 

Supplies for the depot at Nashville were mainly received 
by rail from Louisville (one hundred and eighty -five miles), 
but whenever the stage of water permitted, the Cumberland 
and Tennessee rivers (the latter with the aid of the railroad 
from Johnsonville to Nashville — seventy-eight miles) were 
used as auxiliaries. South of Nashville, the only communi- 
cation was by railroad. When the army was at Chattanooga, 
its only line of supply was the single-track railroad to Nash- 
ville (one hundred and fifty-one miles), and when, with the 
sister armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio, it pressed 
southward to Atlanta, the narrow iron band that connected 
them with their main depot at Louisville was lengthened out 
to four hundred and seventy-three miles, the whole distance 
being in territory either wholly or partly hostile. The success 
of the Southern campaigns depended entirely on holding this 
line with such tenacity that no serious break in it could be 
made by cavalry raids, or by the disaffected population of the 
district through which it passed. The destruction of a single 
important bridge would have made matters in front look very 
serious. The destruction of a number would have compelled 
the army to retrace its steps. It was therefore a vital matter 
to hold the railroads at all hazards, and it was almost equally 
important to arrange a system of railroad defenses that would 
require but few men at any one place, otherwise the invading 
army would soon become too much reduced to continue the 
offensive. 

When, in January, 1864, I was appointed chief engineer of 
the Army of the Cumberland, which position I held from that 
time until the close of the war, the headquarters of the Army 
of the Cumberland was in Chattanooga, that of the Army of 
the Ohio in Knoxville, and that of the Army of the Tennessee 
in Huntsville — General Sherman being in chief command at 
Nashville. As Middle Tennessee, Northern Alabama, and 
Georgia, and the southern part of East Tennessee composed 



APPENDIX. 4 II 

the Department of the Cumberland, the defenses of the rail- 
roads and fortified towns in this territory properly fell to my 
charge. A very interesting report could be made on the de- 
fenses of the three chief towns of Nashville, Murfree boro, 
and Chattanooga; but though the works at the firs1 two 
very elaborate and highly creditable to the professional skill 
of General St. Clair Morton, Captain of Engineers, who de- 
signed them, there were no marked novelties in construction, 
and the influence of the works themselves on the campaigns 
was only indirect. Lack of space unfortunately prevents 
more than this passing mention. During the long hall of the 
Army of the Cumberland at Murfreesboro, the seven bridges 
on the thirty miles of railroad between it and Nashville were 
defended by heavy stockades built in the form of a Greek 
cross. These stockades were block-houses in all respects, ex- 
cept the possession of a roof. During the campaigns that cul- 
minated in the capture of Tullahoma and Chattanooga, de- 
tachments were left at various points on the railroad, but ao 
systematic effort was made to erect engineering structures for 
railroad defense. The army was so busily occupied in endeav- 
oring to maintain itself east of the Cumberland mountains, 
that it had no time to pay much attention to perfecting its 
conquests by permanently holding the country gained. Be- 
sides the main line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, 
the course of events had given us possession of the line from 
Nashville to Decatur (along which the Army of the Ten- 
nessee was supplied), the portion of the Memphis and 
Charleston railroad between Decatur and Stevenson, the North- 
western railroad to Johnsonville, the railroad to Clarksville, 
and portions of the railroads extending northeast to Knox- 
ville and southeast toward Atlanta. There was thus suddenly 
thrown on my hands for defense about six hundred miles of 
railroad, every foot of which lay in hostile territory, and was 
exposed to injury, not only from raids of regularly organized 
commands, but was also in danger from guerilla bands and 
from nominally peaceful citizens. 

A similar problem had fallen to my lot, when, in the fall of 
1862, the Army of Kentucky, commanded by General I tordon 
Grander, advanced from Cincinnati to Lexington, and had to 



442 



APPENDIX. 



rebuild all the bridges on the Kentucky Central railroad, ex- 
cept the trestle-work at Paris. General Granger ordered rne 
to plan such fortifications as would prevent a recurrence of 
such a disaster. A brief examination showed me that the 
bridges as a rule were located at points where the land rose 
gradually on both sides for long distances, thus making it 
very difficult to place a fort near enough to protect the bridge, 
and at the same time to secure its occupants from plunging or 
reverse fires. Safety from this kind of attack necessitated 
cover over head, and as the requirements of the service called 
for the minimum garrisons at bridges which would be con- 
sistent with their adequate protection, I was naturally led to 
select the block -house as the only available means of defense. 
It did not seem at all probable that any cavalry command 
that would be likely to get over the mountains into Central 
Kentucky would be accompanied by artillery, and therefore 
the block-houses were only planned to resist attack by mus- 
ketry. I believe that some of them were captured in 1864 by 
a cavalry command, but I have the impression that the garri- 
sons either evacuated the block-houses, or else surrendered 
them without a fight. I was with the army in Georgia at the 
time, and news from Central Kentucky was very meager. 
The plans of these Kentucky block-houses are shown in fig- 
ures 1, 2, and 3, with the exception that the walls were of one 
thickness of timber, and there were no towers. 




Fig. 1. Plan of Rectangular Block-house. 



APPENDIX. 



443 




llVlll!llll'lll!!lf 



Fig. 2. Elevation of Rectangular Blocs boxtsx. 




Fig. 3. Section* ox A. B. (Fig. 1.) 

When General Buell was campaigning in Kentucky and 
Tennessee his engineers constructed stockades for defending 
railroad bridges — a favorite form being that of a square re- 
doubt with four circular bastions, the diameter of the latter 
being made the same as that of a Sibley tent, so that the bas- 
tions could be covered by these tents and used as men's quar- 
ters. These stockades answered a good purpose against 
infantry, but were worse than nothing against artillery, be- 
coming at such times mere slaughter-pens. With this expe- 
rience before me, I determined to endeavor to make my 1 dock- 
houses proof against such light artillery as cavalry might be 
expected to take with them. The Michigan Engineers (C< >1< ►nel 
Innes) were assigned by General Thomas to the work of build- 
ing the necessary block-houses, and accordingly I started out 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Huntoon (then commanding the reg- 
iment) on a tour of location, stopping at every bridge and 
selecting the most favorable sites for block-houses. While al 
Lavergne, I decided to change the location of the heavy 
stockade which had been built there while the army was at 
Murfreesboro, and therefore took advantage of the opportu- 



444 APPENDIX. 

nity to try some experiments on its power to resist artillery. 
After bitting it a number of times witb solid sbot from a six- 
pounder, it became apparent tbat even tbe heavy timbers 
(from twenty to twenty-four inches in diameter) of which it 
was built, would not answer the purpose. I then decided to 
double the walls, so as to secure at least forty inches of timber. 

The tower, or second story of the block-house, was valua- 
ble as giving a more elevated point from which to see the 
enemy, and, if necessary, to look over the railroad bank. It 
was set diagonally to the lower story so as to cover more 
thoroughly all the country around. To avoid excessive weight 
it was made log-house fashion of one thickness of logs, the 
expectation being that it would be vacated in case of artillery 
attack. Owing to the amount of work to be done, the con- 
struction of towers was left to the garrisons after the engineer 
troops had finished. As a matter of fact but few were built. 
The usual course was to employ engineer troops to build the 
block-houses of a single thickness of timber, without cellar 
or tower, and to employ the garrisons to finish the work 
under the direction of the inspectors of railroad defenses. 

To resist plunging fire, the roof of the block-house was 
made of a layer of logs laid side by side and covered with 
earth. On top of all was a roof of shingles (when they could 
be procured), or of boards and battens — it being very impor- 
tant to keep the block-house dry, so that the garrison might 
always live in it. With the same view the block-houses were 
supplied with ventilators, cellars, water-tanks, and bunks. 

It was foreseen from the first that a rectangular plan was 
not the best for a block-house, but the extra cost and difiiculty 
of making the best form, the octagonal, and the great num- 
ber that had to be built immediately, made it necessary to use 
the simplest plan that could be made to answer. Late in the 
war the octagonal plan, shown in Figs. 4 and 5, was adopted, 
and the result of my experience is, that this form is the best for 
an independent block-house. In the rectangular block-house 
each corner has but one loop-hole, and therefore the block- 
houses are of little offensive power along the diagonals through 
the corners. In the octagonal these corners are cut off, and 
the angles of the loop-holes are such that the fire of two faces 



APPENDIX. 



! I.', 




Fig. 4. Elevation of Octagonal Block-house. Bank removed pbom lb 
Front of Entrance. 




Fig. 5. Plan of Octagonal Block-house wiTn Tower. 

can always be concentrated on the diagonal through their in- 
tersection ; the former weak points are thus made the strong- 
est. I would therefore earnestly advise the use of octagonal 



446 APPENDIX. 

block-houses for railroad defense. So much time was con- 
sumed in making mortises and tenons, that I would advise for 
future block-houses a greater simplicity of joints and the lib- 
eral use of spikes, abolishing, as far as possible, all work re- 
quiring skilled labor. Spikes answered admirably on the 
Kentucky Central block-houses, but I was induced to try 
tenons in Tennessee, on account of having skilled labor avail- 
able. I am now satisfied that the first method of construc- 
tion was greatly preferable. 

As a rule, the small railroad bridges had one block-house, 
and the larger ones two, on opposite sides of the track. At 
the very high and long trestle-work across the Running Water 
gorge at Whiteside, four small block-houses were built. For 
the protection of the east bridge over the Tennessee, at Bridge- 
port, I thought it best to establish two block-houses for artil- 
lery. The design of these works are given in Figs. 6 and 7. 




Jig. 6. Elevation of Artillery Block-hoose. 

An upper story (not shown in the figure), resting diagonally on 
the corners of the inner square, was added to the west block- 
house as quarters for the garrison. To avoid an excess of 
weight, this story was only made musketry-proof. On top of 
all was a small lookout. The construction of these block- 
houses reflected great credit upon the Michigan Engineers by 
whom they were built. An artillery block-house was also 
commenced in 1865, at Larkinsville, Alabama, but it was never 
completed. It was intended to' answer as a fort for the gar- 
rison at this important point, which was much exposed to 
attack from the south side of the Tennessee. It is proper to 
add that my first idea .of building a block-house for artillery 
came from seeing a rude, half-finished work of this kind, 
which was begun by the Confederates in 1863, at Strawberry 
Plains, above Knoxville. 

An artillery block-house is difficult and costly to build, and 
is only justifiable in very exceptionable localities. I think 



APPENDIX, 



■I 17 




Fig. 7. Plan of Artillery Block-house. 

that Bridgeport was such, a locality, as the vital importance 
to the army of the two long bridges over the Tennessee called 
for defense by artillery, as well on the island as on the main 
land, and the latter so thoroughly commanded the island that 
artillery could only remain on it while thoroughly under cover. 
It may he well to mention that an artillery block-house after 
my designs was built in 18G4, near Alexandria, Virginia, to 
protect from cavalry raids down the valley of Hunting < •: 

The enemy soon found that our block-houses were proof 
against any ordinary attack, and small bodies never molested 
them. Injury to the track of the railroad was repaired almost 
as soon as made, and after a while such annoyances ceased. 
The only serious assaults received by our block-houses were 
as follows : 



448 APPENDIX. 

Iii August, 1864, General Wheeler, with a division of 
cavalry, left Atlanta, traveled north to near Knoxville, 
thence west to near Nashville, thence southwest to Northern 
Alabama. During this raid he swept along a large portion of 
the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and tore it up in 
some places, but destroyed no bridge and attacked no block- 
house. He struck the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad 
between Nashville and Murfreesboro, and attacked block- 
house No. 5, commanded by Lieutenant John S. Orr, One 
Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio. The artillery fire killed or 
wounded one-third of the garrison (the garrison was probably 
thirty men in all), but the gallant lieutenant did not surren- 
der, and his bridge was not injured. One of the neighboring 
block-houses was commanded by a sergeant, who got demor- 
alized and surrendered after a slight show of resistance. His 
bridge was burned, but I believe no other was damaged on 
this railroad, and no bridge at all on the railroad to Decatur. 

In October, 1864, General Hood started north from Atlanta 
with his army, and General Sherman after him. All the block- 
houses south of Dalton (except the one at Allatoona creek, 
which was captured) were evacuated by order and burned by 
his forces. After the capture of Dalton he wished to go west 
through Buzzard Roost Gap. In this gap, and at the bridge 
over Mill creek, was a block-house containing about thirty 
men. This block-house commanded the wagon-road through 
the gap, and no wagons or artillery could get through until it 
was captured. Bate's division of infantry, with three bat- 
teries of artillery, were detailed to capture the block-house. 
The infantry kept up an ineffectual musketry fire, and the 
artillery, after being driven from many positions, finally got on 
the diagonal through one corner and concentrated their shot 
on this corner. The weight of metal thrown soon made a 
breach in the block-house, but the garrison did not surrender, 
and at the close of the day they still held their position. 
During the night it was decided to organize a storming party, 
part of whom should stop the loop-holes with fence rails, while 
the other portion were to leap on the roof of the block-house 
and dig down to the garrison below. At daylight the storm- 
ing party crept as near the block-house as possible; but before 



APPENDIX. Jj<j 

giving the command to charge, the colonel, desirous to 
further bloodshed, in a loud voice Bummoned thi •, to 

surrender. A white handkerchief was waved inreply,aud 
the block-house surrendered. Fully one-half of the small 
garrison were killed orwounded, and it seems that during the 
latter part of the preceding day, after many lives had 
lost and the block-house had become entirely untenable, they 
had tried to surrender, but their signals were nol seen and 
they had concluded that the Confederates were enri 
their obstinacy and were determined to kill them all. I re- 
gret that I can not give the names of this heroic garrison, ;i^ 
they were of course sent south with other prisoners, and I 
never had the fortune to meet any of them afterward. The 
details given above were obtained long after the war, from 
Confederate sources. 

In a series of articles published in the Xcw Orleans Times 
in the spring of 1874, General Hood reviews "Johnson's 
^Narrative," and speaks as follows of the block-house in 
Buzzard Roost Gap : 

"When en route to Tennessee, during the campaign in 
the fall of 18G4, our army, having captured the tro 
stationed in Dalton, attempted to march through Mill- 
creek Gap, but was prevented from so doing by a squad of 
men posted within a little fort, covered with railroad iron 
and constructed of logs of large size, around which was thrown 
up an embankment of earth to protect the troops against field 
artillery ; port-holes were cut so as to allow the men to lire in 
all directions, and especially upon the liue of railroad. 

"It was reported to me that field artillery had little or no 
effect upon this impromptu fortification, and that when the 
men charged up to it, they could not find an entrance ; there- 
fore it could not be taken without much loss of time and con- 
siderable cost. 

" Major Kinlocke Falconer was, I think, severely wounded 
while experimenting with this little fortress, which obliged 
me to march some twenty miles around it." 

This account differs somewhat from the one which 1 have 
given, but I think that General Hood is slightly in error in 
some of the details. He leaves the impression that the block- 



450 APPENDIX. 

house was not captured, while I know that it was. He also 
speaks of it as an " impromptu " fortification, which it was 
not, having been carefully built by the Michigan Engineers, 
and finished before the capture of Atlanta. 

It may be proper to add in explanation that the block-houses 
were not designed to defend bridges against a fully equipped 
army, but only against cavalry raids, and that a raiding band 
of cavalry is always too scantily supplied with artillery am- 
munition to indulge in the luxury of battering down a block- 
house. 

The most serious destruction of block-houses occurred in 
September, 1864, during a raid made by General Forrest on the 
road leading south from Nashville to Decatur. The following 
account of this raid I afterward obtained from General For- 
rest himself. He first attacked an unfinished block-house near 
the southern end of the road, and the first shell fired from 
his battery entered the block-house and injured some of its 
occupants. They at once surrendered, and the block-house 
was burned. At the next block-house he ostentatiously pa- 
raded the captured commander of the first one ; and on this 
convincing proof that block-houses could be taken, quite a 
number of them surrendered without a fight, and their bridges 
were burned. One German captain refused to surrender, but 
General Forrest had with him several bottles of a kind of 
Greek fire, and some of his men crept up behind the railroad 
embankment, and suddenly breaking the bottles on the ends 
of the bridge, set it on fire, and it was destroyed. The gallant 
captain and his command held their block-house, but un- 
fortunately lost the bridge which it was to defend. 

In all, General Forrest captured and destroyed eleven block- 
houses. 

When General Hood, with his army, advanced to Nashville, 
the block-houses on the Nashville and Decatur railroad were 
very sensibly abandoned. Fortunately for us, the Nashville 
and Decatur railroad was not our main line, and the destruc- 
tion of its bridges caused no serious loss. 

From the time that the block-houses were built until the 
close of the war, but six bridges (all small) were burned on 
the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, our main line of 



APPENDIX. 46] 

supply. These were the six nearesl NTashville, one of them, 
as recorded above, having been previously burned bj I 
Wheeler, and rebuilt. They were abandoned by order; bul 
the seventh, at Overall's creek, five miles north of Murfi 
boro, was ordered to be held, [ts garrison consisted ofaboul 
thirty men of the 115th 0. V. L, commanded by Lioutenanl 
II. II. Glosser. Bate's division of infantry (the 3ame thai 
fought the Buzzard Roosl block-house), with a large force of 
cavalry and three twelve-pound guns, operated in its vicinity 
for two weeks, and fired seventy-two cannon-shol againsl it. 
Once during this time, a sortie was made from Murfreesboro, 
and the garrison's supplies of ammunition and provisions were 

replenished. The block-house was no1 captured 'the bridge 

burned. 

To keep the block-houses and their garrisons thoroughly 
efficient, I organized a special corps of block-house inspec 
and placed at their head Major J. It. "Willett, of my own regi- 
ment, the First U. S. Vet. Vol. Engineers. To his professional 
skill, zeal, and efficiency, the excellent results attained were 
mainly due. 

In his Memoirs (vol. 2, pp. 146 and 398), General Sherman 
thus alludes to this system of railroad defense : 

" All the important bridges were likewise protected by good 
block-houses, admirably constructed, and capable of a strong 
defense against cavalry or infantry." 

" The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible 
without the use of the railroads from Louisville to Nashville, 
one hundred and eighty -five miles; from Nashville to Cha 
nooga, one hundred and fifty-one miles ; and from Chattani »< iga 
to Atlanta, one hundred and thirty-seven miles. Every mile of 
this ' single track' was so delicate that one man could in a min- 
ute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually carried 
along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, 
however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each im- 
portant bridge or trestle, the destruction of which would 
have necessitated time for rebuilding. For the protection of 
abridge, one or two log block-houses, two stories high, with 
apiece of ordnance and a small infantry guard, usually sufficed. 
The block-house had a small parapet and ditch aboul it. and 
the roof was made shot-proof, by earth piled on. These points 



452 APPENDIX. 

could usually be reached only by a dash of the enemy's cavalry, 
and many of these block-houses successfully resisted serious 
attacks by both cavalry and artillery. The only block-house 
that was actually captured on the main [line] was the one 
described, near Allatoona." 

General Sherman is mistaken about the piece of ordnance 
in each block-house. He was too far in front to be familiar 
with all these details. 

He describes the capture of the block-house near Allatoona 
as follows (Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 149) : 

" Before finally withrawing [from the attack on Allatoona], 
General French converged a heavy fire of his cannon on the 
block-house at Allatoona creek, about two miles from the 
depot, set it on fire, and captured its garrison, consisting of 
four officers and eighty-five men." 

The usual garrison of a block-house was from twenty to 
thirty men. 

Besides their use in railroad defense, block-houses were freely 
employed in the defenses of Nashville, Murfreesboro, Steven- 
son, McMinnville, Chattanooga, and other fortified positions, 
occasionally as independent works, but usually as citadels or 
keeps for earthern forts, so that the garrison might have a 
secure place of retreat should the main work be carried by 
assault. 

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, 151 miles. Fifty block- 
houses were built on this road, two being large block-houses 
for artillery. The majority of the block-houses had double 
walls, the chief exceptions being along Crow creek, where the 
probability of attack by artillery was very slight. One block- 
house near Nashville was captured by General "Wheeler, three 
by General Hood (one being the first mentioned that had been 
rebuilt), and three were evacuated. These six had been joartly 
rebuilt at the close of the war. 

Nashville, Decatur and Stevenson Railroad, 200 miles. Fifty- 
four block-houses were built on this road, almost all of which 
had double walls. Eleven were surrendered to General For- 



APPENDIX. 453 

rest, in October, 18G4, and burned, the greater number having 

made no attempt at defense. When General II I marched 

north to Nashville, the remaining block-houses, exci pt thi 
near Stevenson and four built in L865, were abandoned, and 
the majority were burned by the enemy. Three, near Decatur, 
were not burned, but they were probably overlooked. When 
the war closed, a large number of the burned block-hot] 
had been rebuilt on the octagonal plan, and work was under 
way on the others. 

Chattanooga and Atlanta liailroa I, 137 miles. Twenty-two 
block-houses were built on this road, all of which had double 
walls. Thiee of these were captured by General Eood's army, 
in October, 18G4, and burned. Six others, south of Dalton, 
were abandoned, b}^ order, when General Sherman tore up the 
railroad below Dalton, and left Atlanta for the sea. The 
others were held until the close of the war. 

Chattanooga and Knoxville Railroad to Charleston. 42 miles. 
The only bridge on this road (within the limits of the \ ) >- 
partment of the Cumberland) that required defense was at the 
crossing of the Hiawassee river. Two block-houses were built 
here, which were held until the close of the war. 

Nashville and Johnsonville Railroad, 78 miles. Twen I y-three 
block-houses were commenced on this road, but only a few <>t 
them were finished. When Hood's army appeared before 
Nashville, the road was abandoned and the block-houses were 
burned, except the one nearest Johnsonville. At the close i >i 
the Avar twenty-five block-houses were under construction. 

Louisville and Nashville Railroad to Kentucky line, 44 , 
One single-wall block-house was built at Edgefield Junction. 
The remainder of the road was protected by redoubts and 
stockades, built in 1862 and 1863. No serious damage was 
done on this line after Bragg's Kentucky campaign. 

Nashville and Clarksville Railroad, :rl mil s. Thi- line began 
at Edgefield Junction, went to the Kentucky Stat.' line, by 
the Edgefield and Kentucky Railroad, and thence to Clarks- 



454 APPENDIX. 

ville, by the Memphis Branch of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad. It was opened, as a supply route, in 1864, but was 
but little used. It was designed to connect at Clarksville 
with steamboats on the Cumberland River, that were unable 
to get over Harpath shoals. Eight single-wall block-houses 
were built on this line, but three of them were never fully 
completed. No damage was done to this road by the enemy. 

CANVAS PONTON-TRAINS. 

The canvas ponton-train used by the Army of the Cum- 
berland was somewhat peculiar. The ordinary canvas ponton 
has long been in use in European armies, especially in Russia, 
and is made by putting together a skeleton-boat a*id drawing 
canvas over it. The usual length of such a boat is twenty- 
one feet, and this is the length of the two side-frames. These 
frames are usually carried on very long wagons, specially de- 
vised for the purpose ; but as the Army of the Cumberland 
had to campaign in a country where the only dependence was 
upon a single-track railroad, it was of the utmost importance 
to devise some way of carrying their pontons in the ordinary 
army-wagon so as to avoid the cost of keeping up an inde- 
pendent ponton-train, whose services would only occasionally 
be required. 

I believe that General Rosecrans first suggested cutting the 
frames in two for transportation, and uniting them when 
needed for use. At all events, when I became chief engineer I 
found that one such boat had been prepared, and seemed to do 
well. The two parts were connected by keys. After a care- 
ful examination, I decided to adopt such a boat for our army, 
but to replace the keys by permanent strap-hinges on the out- 
side of the frames. I sent Captain O'Connell, of the Pioneer 
Brigade, to Nashville, with a detachment of pontoniers, to 
build a train of such boats, giving him authority to make any 
additional improvements that he or any one else could suggest. 
The result was the boat shown in the drawings (Fig. 8), 
excepting that the framing of the sides has been changed so 
as to conform more to the usual model. Some minor changes 
have also been made, but the boat is in essentials the same 
that was so successfully used to cross General Sherman's army 



aim- i:\dix. 



l.v 



H ra 



I 




IE 



CE 



J_i_ 



i - . • 



I 



\2J 



_j 






Fig. 8. Frame oe Hinged Canyas Ponton, with Enlarged View of Hinge, 
and of Middle Brace. 

over all the rivers between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and 
which afterward accompanied the army in its march to the 
sea and through, the Carolinas. It answered its purpose ad- 
mirably. So many persons contributed their mite toward tin' 
development ot this boat that it is impossible to apportion the 
credit properly; but I think that Captain (afterward Major) 
O'Connell and Lieutenant (afterward Major) Willett desi 
special mention. 

General Sherman (Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 401) thus speaks of 
canvas pontons, his reference to the hinge showing that he 
had specially in mind the pontons of the Army of the Cum- 
berland, as the frames of the other canvas ponton-train had 
no hinges : 

"For the passage of rivers each army corps had a ponton- 
train with a detachment of engineers, and on reaching a 
river, the leading infantry division was charged with the labor 
of putting it down. Generally, the single ponton-train 
could provide for nine hundred feet of bridge, which sufficed ; 
but when the rivers were very wide, two such trains would 
be brought together, or the single train was supplemented by 



456 APPENDIX. 

a trestle-bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, out of the tim- 
ber found near the place. The pontons in general use were 
skeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and 
constitute a wagon-body. In this same wagon were carried 
the cotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due pro- 
portion of the balks, chesses, and lashings. All the troops 
became very familiar with their mechanism and use, and we 
were rarely delayed by reason of a river, however broad. 
I saw recently, in Aldershot, England, a very complete 
ponton-train ; the boats were sheathed with wood and felt, 
made very light ; but I think they were more liable to chafing 
and damage in rough handling than were our less expen- 
sive and rougher boats. On the whole, I would prefer the 
skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of ponton that 
I have ever seen." 

MAPS. 

The topographical department of the Army of the Cumber- 
land consisted of the acting topographical engineers on each 
brigade, division, and corps staff, and the topographical en- 
gineers at department headquarters. The army was so far 
from Washington that it had to have a complete map estab- 
lishment of its own. Accordingly, the office of the chief topo- 
graphical engineer contained a printing press, two lithographic 
presses, one photographic establishment, arrangements for 
map-mounting, and a full corps of draughtsmen and assist- 
ants. 

During the first year of the war, maps for field use were 
reproduced by photography ; but these maps were objectionable 
on many accounts. Unless a very fine and expensive lens 
was used they were inaccurate at the borders, and sections of 
a large map would not join properly ; they faded when ex- 
posed to sunlight ; copies could not be made at night nor on 
rainy days ; nor could a sufficient number be made even on 
the best days. For these reasons photography was gradually 
set aside for lithography ; but as lithographic stones and 
presses were too heavy for an active campaign, they were left 
at the depot nearest to the front, and replaced by a fac-simile 
photo-printing device invented by Captain Margedant, chief 
assistant. This consisted of a light box containing several 



APPENDIX. 157 

india-rubber baths, fitting into one another, and the proper sup- 
ply of chemicals. Printing was done by tracing the required 
map on thin paper and laying it over a sheel coated with 
nitrate of silver. The sun's rays passing through the ti 
paper blackened the prepared paper excepl under the ink 
lines, thus making a white map on black ground. By this 
means copies from the drawing-paper map could be made as 
often as new information came in, and occasionally there 
would be several editions of a map during the Bame da v. The 
process, however, was expensive, and did n«»t permit the print- 
ing of a large number of copies; therefore these maps were 
only issued to the chief commanders. 

The map of Northern Georgia, on which the Atlanta cam- 
paign was based, was made by first enlarging the besl printed 
map attainable, to the scale of one inch to the mile. This 
being used as a basis, the details were elaborated by cross- 
questioning refugees, spies, prisoners, peddlers, and any and 
all persons familiar with the country in front of us. It was 
remarkable how vastly our maps were improved by this pro- 
cess. The best illustration of the value of this method is the 
fact that Snake Creek Gap, through which our whole army 
turned the strong positions at Dalton and Buzzard Roosl < kip, 
was not to be found on any printed map that we could get. and 
the knowledge of the existence of this gap was of imm 
importance to us. Sergeant Finnegan, of the Fourth Ohio 
Cavalry, bad charge of this branch of the office, and became 
exceedingly expert in extracting information in this manner. 

Two days before the army started from Chattanooga on the 
Atlanta campaign I received notice of the intended march. 
Up to this moment there was but one copy of the large map 
of Northern Georgia, and this was in the hands of the 
draughtsmen. I kept it back until the last moment so; 
get on it the latest information that Sergeant Finnegan might 
be able to extract from the motley crew turned over by the 
Provost-Marshal General for examination. 

The map was immediately cut up into sixteen sections and 
divided among the draughtsmen, who were ordered to work 
night and day until all the sections had been traced on thin 
paper in autographic ink. As_ soon as four adjacent sections 



458 APPENDIX. 

were finished they were transferred to one large stone, and two 
hundred copies were printed. When all the map had thus 
been lithographed the map-mounters commenced their work. 
Being independent of sunlight the work was soon done — the 
map-mounting requiring the greatest time; but before the 
commanding generals left Chattanooga, each had received a 
bound copy of the map, and before we struck the enemy, every 
brigade, division, and corps commander in the three armies 
had a copy. 

The copies for the cavalry were printed directly on muslin, 
as such maps could be washed clean whenever soiled and could 
not be injured by hard service. Many officers sent handker- 
chiefs to the office and had maps printed on them. 

Although our map became less and less accurate as we ad- 
vanced south from Chattanooga, it was still valuable even 
where its information was defective, because every subordinate 
commander had the same map as the commanding general, and 
therefore knew at once from the nature of his orders what he 
was expected to do. If a road could not be found, still the 
general direction and the general object of his march could be 
divined, and the spirit of the general's orders could be faith- 
fully carried out. 

I think that I am warranted in saying that the army that 
General Sherman led to Atlanta was the best supplied with 
maps of any that fought in the civil war. 



INDEX. 



Ackwobth, Ga., U. S. forces at, ii, 82. 

Adams, Gen., driven from Rodgers- 
villeby U. S. forces, i, 131. i 
ed by Col. Ilambright, i, 132. Re- 
pulsed at Stone River, i, 242. 

Alabama, expedition of Gen. 0. M. 
Mitchell into, i, 130. Gen. J. II. 
Wilson's campaign in, ii, 3 17. 

Alexander, Gen. .). W. S., ch 
upon a battery at Stone River, 
i, 224. Operations of, in Alabama 
and Georgia, ii, .549. 

Alesi-iire's Bat'tery, i, 291. 

Allatoona Pass, the turning of, 
ii, 75. 

Altamont, concentration of Buell'a 
forces at, i, 1">6. 

Ammon, Gen. J., commands Tenth 
Brigade, Army of the Ohio, i, 69. 
In action at Shiloh, i, 107. < Ipera- 
tionsof, in East Tennessee, ii, 273. 

Andicrson Cavalry, charge of, upon 
the enemy, i, 222. 

Anderson, Gen. P., at battle of Mis- 
sionary Pidge, i, 425. 

Anderson, Gen. Robert, assigned to 
command Department of Ken- 
tucky, i, 20. Invokes Kentuckians 
to arm for expulsion of rebel in- 
vaders, i, 31. Proclamation of, i, 
134. Believed at his own request, 
i, 31. General orders of, i, 35. 

Andrews, J. J., secret expedition of, 
to destroy railroad bridges in 
Georgia, i, 136. 

Army of the Cumberland, under An- 
derson, i, 22. Under Sherman, i, 
35. Designation of, changed to 
"Army of the Ohio," under Buell, 
i, 46. Assumed its original name 
under Bosecrans, i, 207. Concen- 
tration of, at Nashville, i, 207. 
Boster of organization of, at battle 
of Stone Piver, i, 281. Re-equip- 
ment of, at Murfreesboro, i. 288. 
Boster of organization of, at the 
battle of Chickamauga, i, 378. 



Thoma - a igned I • • mmand of, 

i. 39 I. Alt it ude and o indil i 
earlj in L864 ii, 1 • [mj 

ehang.'-; m ide in. at I liattai 

ii, 28. Strength of, at < Ihnttai 
ii, 30. i Irganization of, Vpril 
ii, 31 . Loss of, during J une I 
ii, 95. < Casualties of, during t he 
Atlanta campaign, ii, 149. During 

tie- campaign againsi II I in 

Tennessee, ii, 248. 1 'issoluti f, 

and summary "I its achieve] 
ii, 369. I disposition of it - I 
dead, ii, 077. See also ippen I 
to organization of, ii, 381. I 
its officers killed in bat! le, or who 
died in the service, ii. 386. En- 
gineer sen ice in i 

Army of Kentucky, under Gen. G. 
Granger, i, 290. 

Army of the < >n i< >. constituti d under 
Buell, i, 16 Strength of, i 
Discipline a ad valor of, al th 
tie of Shiloh, i 116. 1 'esignation 
of, changed back to " Army of the 
Cumberland," i. 207. 

Army of the Tennessee, arrives at 
Chattanooga, i. 410. McPherson 
assigned to command of, ii. 24. 
Howard succeed- McPherson in 
command of, ii. 124. 

ASHBOI II. < rEN. A., at siege oi 

irith, i. 126. 

Athens, Ala., occupied bv Mitchell, 
i, 132. 

Atlanta. Ga., campaign to, com- 
menced, ii. 41. Advance upon, ii, 
109. Siege of, ii, 123. Shellingof, 
ii, 1 10. Siege of, raised, ii. 
Abandoned by Hood, ii. 1 17 Ef- 
fects of the fall of, ii. 148. A 
portion of, destroyed by Sherman, 
ii, 279. 

Averysboro, battle of, ii, 31 1. 

Baird, Gen. A., at Steven-' ' rap, i. 
320. Joins Negley, i, 322. AtChick- 
amauua, i, 334. At Missionary 



460 



INDEX. 



Ridge, i, 428. In movement toward 
Dalton, ii, 20. Advance toward 
Tunnel Hill, ii, 26. At Ringgold, 
ii, 45. At New Hope Church, ii, 82. 
Before Kenesaw Mountain, ii, 88. 
Before Atlanta, ii, 127. At battle 
of Jonesboro, ii, 144. At battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 321. 

Baker, Lieut. Col. M., killed before. 
Atlanta, ii, 128. 

Baldwin, Maj. L., mortally wounded 
at Peachtree Creek, ii, 116. 

Baldwin, Col. P. P., at battle of 
Stone River, i, 231. Report of the 
battle, i, 264. At Chickamauga, i, 
335. 

Bate, Gen. W. B.,at battle of Chick- 
amauga, i, 362. On Missionary 
Ridge, i, 430. At Buzzard Roost, 
ii, 49. Driven from Overall's Creek, 
ii. 223. 

Barnes, Col. S. M., at battle of Chick- 
amauga, i, 337. 

Barxet, Capt., at battle of Perry- 
ville, i, 187. 

Barton, Gen., commands rebel forces 
at Cumberland Cap, i, 133. 

Bardstowx, Kt., camp of instruction 
at, i, 72. 

Battle Creek, Gen. Mitchell at, i, 
144. 

Baum, Gen., refuses to surrender 
Resaca, ii, 162. 

Beatty, Gen. J., drives the enemy 
at battle of Stone River, i, 261. 
At battle of Chickamauga, i, 345. 
At Missionary Ridge, i. 429. 

Beatty, Gen. S., commands Eleventh 
Brigade in Kentucky, i, 71. At 
battle of Stone River, i, 236. At 
battle of Chickamauga, i, 336. 
At battle of Nashville,"^, 229. 

Beauregard, Gen. G T., succeeded 
A. S. Johnston in command at 
Shiloh, i, 108. Sends jubilant dis- 
patch to Richmond, i, 108. De- 
feated, i, 114. Extract from report 
of battle of Shiloh, i, 125. At 
Corinth, i, 126. Withdraws his 
army, i, J 29. Dispatches of to 
Hood and Cobb, ii, 208. To the 
people of Georgia, ii, 291. To 
Hardee at Savannah, ii, 303. 
Movements of at Charleston, ii, 
307. 

Becket, Maj. D. C, killed near Ken- 
esaw Mountain, ii, 92. 



Bentonville, N. C, battle of, ii, 316. 

Big Hill, engagement at, i, 179. 

Big Shanty, a depot of supplies for 
Sherman's army, ii, 88. 

Blackburn, Dr., pledges Kentucky 
to the rebels, i, 10. 

Blair, Gen. F. P., at Missionary 
Ridge, i, 426. On the Knoxville 
campaign, ii, 1. Ordered to Kings- 
ton, ii, 74. Reaches Ackworth, ii, 
83. On the march to the sea, ii, 
278. 

Block-houses, illustrations of, rec- 
tangular, ii, 442 ; octagonal, ii, 445 ; 
designs for artillery block-houses, 
ii, 446, 447 ; effectiveness of against 
Hood's forces, ii, 449. For e ailroad 
defense, ii, 452-454. 

Bloodgood, Lieut. Col., at Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 113. 

Board of Trade Battery, at the bat- 
tle of Selma, ii, 351. 

Boone, Col., raid into Georgia, ii, 17, 

Bowling Creex, Kt., capture of by 
Gen. O. M. Mitchell, i, 68. 

Boyle. Gen. J. T., opposed neutrality 
in Kentucky, i, 15. Placed in 
command at Columbia, i, 52. Re- 
sists Morgan in Kentucky, i, 146. 

Bradley, Gen. L. P., report of battle 
of Stone River, i, 270. At battle 
of Chickamauga, i, 337. Engage- 
ment near Spring Hill, ii, 19;. 

Bragg, Gen. B., repulsed at Shiloh, 
i, 107. Succeeds Beauregard, i, 
139. Puts his army in motion for 
Tennessee, i, 140. Invades Ken- 
tucky, i, 158. Strength of, i, 158. 
Moves toward Nashville, i, 158. 
Gives battle at Perry ville, i, 186. 
Failure of his campaign in Ken- 
tucky, i, 198. Extract from report 
of, i, 204. Line of battle and attack 
at Stone River, i, 228. Checked at 
all points, i, 245. Retreat of, i, 251. 
Strength and losses of at battle of 
Stone River, i, 252. Report of the 
battle, i, 255. Evacuates Tulla- 
homa, i, 307. Retreats to Chatta- 
nooga, 1, 308. Evacuates Chatta- 
nooga, i, 316. Combination of 
against Negley, i, 320. Position 
of and plan of attack at Chicka- 
mauga, i, 327. Strength of at 
Chickamauga, i, 360. Losses of, i. 
362. Before Chattanooga, i, 38o. 
Part of army driven from Look- 



I \ I > I : \ . 



461 



out Mountain by Booker, i, ::99. 
Detaches Longstreet'a cor 
40s. Entire army on Missi >nary 
Ridge, i, 42.">. Defeat of, i i 
Strength and loss at Chattan 
i, 437. Removed from command 
in Georgia, ii, 14. Operations of 
in North I Jarolina, ii, 307. At 
battle of Bentonville, ii, 317. 

Bramlette, < lor.. T. E., takes arms to 
Camp Dick Robinson, i, 22. Moves 
to Lexington, i, 31. 

Brannan, Gen. J. M., at Chicka- 
mauga, i, 333. Chief of artillery, 
i, 406. At Missionary Ridge, i, 
430. Report of gun- captured on 
Atlanta campaign, ii. 150. 

Breckinridge, Gen. J. »'., disloyalty 
of, in Kentucky, i, 6. Entered 
Kochester and Bowling Green, i, 
71. Demands .surrender of Nash- 
ville, i, 207. At the battle of Stone 
Kiver, i, 227. At Chickamauga; i, 
340. On Missionary Ridge, i, 425. 
Drives Gillem from Bulls Gap, ii, 
272. 

Bridge's Battery, on Orchard Knob, 
i, 41G. 

Bridgeport, Ala., capture of, i, 131. 

Brown, Gen., cavalry operations of, 
in North Carolina, ii, 342. 

Brown, Lieut. Col. W. H. II., mor- 
tally wounded at Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 116. 

Brown's Ferry, operations at, by 
Gen. W. F. Smith, i, 396. 

Brownlow, Col., engagement of, at 
Sparta, ii, 6. 

Bruce, Col. S. D., commands 
Twenty-second Brigade, Army of 
the Ohio, i, 70. Bouts a rebel 
force, i, 212. 

Buckxer, Gen. S. B., disloyalty of, 
i, 3. Inspector-General of militia 
in Kentucky, i, 9. At Camp 
Boone, Ky., i, 23. Attempt of to 
capture Louisville, i, 28. With- 
drawal to Bowling Green, i, 29. 
Surrenders Fort Donelson to 
Grant, i, 86. At Perry ville, i, 192. 
Moves against Negley in Mc- 
Lemore's Cove, i, 320. At battle 
of Chickamauga, i, 364. At Mis- 
sionary Bidge, i, 42"). 

Buell, Gen. D. C, assigned to com- 
mand Department of the Ohio, 
i, 46. Early operations of, in 



Kentucky, i. 17. Advance 

Na nville, i. ■ I 

Granl 'w ithoul 

Movement of to h i, 

L00 Re 

A.1 the battle of Shiloh, i 

!•" i of, at Shiloh, i, 114 

to Halleck, i, 120, L21. I. 

from report i I 

124. Ai i. r i lorinth, i 

Moving to Bupport Pope, i. I 10 
ins transfers oi 

Easi Tenoe see, i. I 12 i 

army to Murfi 

- to offer batl I nont, 

i, 15 ». Moves tov 

i, L59. Lette 's to LIall< 

Letters to Tho 

Campai »n ,184. 

Loss at battle of Perryville, 
i tches relative to his rem 

i, 200. Short reportof, i, 2 I] 

tract of Letters to Hall 

Superseded by R 
Buell, Col. G. P., at Chickamauga, 

i, 337. Operations on 

Mountain, ii, annah. ii. 

283. At battle of Bentonville, ii 

316. 

i>, Gen. A., at Duck Kiver. ii. 

191. 
Bull's Gap, Gillem d 

Breckinridge, ii. 272. 
Burbridge, Gen., operations of, in 

Fast Tennessei 
Burke, Lieut. Col., at Stewart's 

Creek, i, 217. 
Burnside, Gen. A. E., urged I 

operate with Ros< ainst 

Bragg, i. 365- 367. 1 □ critical po- 
sition at Knoxville, i, , 
Burnt Hickory, ii, 71. 
Bush's Battery, at Perryville, i, l ss; . 

Two guns i >f captured, i. 237. 

BUSCHBECK, < !0L. A., at Missi man' 

Ridge, i, 427. Near Dallas, ii, 76. 

BUTTERFIELD, GEN. I'., cxatui: 
of railroads by, ii, 22. At I 
of Resaca, ii, 65. At N 
Church, ii, 76. Before Ken 
Mountain, ii, 91. 

Buzzard's Roost, operations 
ii, 47. Hood's attack of 11 
house at, ii, 452. 

Camp Clay, established near Cincin- 
nati, i, 14. 

Cairo, strategic importan a 



462 



INDEX. 



Camp Dick Robinson, Ky., established 
i, 16. Efforts to prevent transmis- 
sion of arms to, i, 21. 

Camp Joe Holt, established by Rous- 
seau, i, 10. 

Campbell, Col. A. P., expedition 
against Wheeler, i, 388. Action 
of at Mossy Creek, ii, 16. 

Canbt, Gen. E. R. S., intercepts 
President Davis' order to Smith 
and Magruder, ii, 157. Dispatch 
of, to Sherman, ii, I 79. 

Candy, Col. C, near Dallas, ii, 76. 

Carlin, Ge.v. W. P., at Perrvville, i, 
191. At Nolensville, i, 220. Re- 
port of battle of Stone River, i, 
267. At Chickamauga, i, 336. At 
Lookout Mountain, i, 421. At 
Missionary Ridge, i, 429. Ex- 
pedition toward Dalton, ii, 19. At 
Buzzard Roost, ii, 49. At battle 
of Resaca, ii, 66. At battle of 
Jonesboro, ii, 144. At battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 315. 

Carman, Col., at Savannah, ii, 2S7. 
Extract from report of the cap- 
ture of Savannah, ii, 302. 

Carter, Gen. S. P., ordered to join 
Thomas in Kentucky, i, 46. At 
battle of Mill Springs, i, 56. At 
Cumberland Gap, i, 78. Raid into 
East Tennessee, i, 216. 

Chalmers, Gen. J. R., demands the 
surrender of Munfordsville, i, 160. 
At Duck River, ii, 191. 

Charleston, S. C, evacuated, ii, 309. 

Charlotte, N. C., threatened by 
Slocum, ii, 301. 

Chattahoochee River, Johnston re- 
treats across, ii, 111. 

Chattanooga, Tenn., Negley's de- 
monstration against, i, 132. 
Buell's advance toward, i, 139. 
Importance of, i, 140. Occupied 
by Bragg, i, 310. Evacuated by 
Bragg, i, 316. Occupied by Crit- 
tenden, i, 318. Battles of, i, 386. 
Fortiiications and topography of, 
406. National Cemetery estab- 
lished at, by Thomas, ii, 377. 

Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad, 
defenses of, ii, 453. 

Chattanoi.ga and Kloxville Rail- 
road, defenses of, ii, 453. 

Chattooga Mountain, ii, 48. 

•Cheatham, Gen. B. F., at Perry ville, 
i, 193. At battle of Stone River, i, 



227. At Chickamauga, i, 33 r x At 
Missionary Ridge, i, 427. In South 
Carolina, ii, 309. At battle of Ben- 
tonville, ii, 317. 

Ciieraw, S. O, entered by the Seven- 
teenth Corps, ii, 311. 

Chickamauga Campaign, and battle of, 
i, 310-385. 

Childs, Lieut. J. W., captures rebel 
general .1. P. M. Maury, i, 136. 

Childs, Col., i, 177. 

Church's Battery, i, 245. 

Cincinnati, O., Anderson's head- 
quarters at, i, 120. Threatened 
by Gen. E. K. Smith, i, 183. 

Cleburn, Gen. P. R., at Stone River, 
i, 227. At Chickamauga, i, 337. 
On Missionary Ridge, i, 423. At 
Dalton, ii, 21. At New Hope 
Church, ii, 79. Killed at Frank- 
lin, ii, 201. 

Cobb, Gen. H., routed near Macon 
by Walcutt, ii, 280. Communica- 
tion of, to Wilson, ii, 360. 

Cobham, Col., at Lookout Mountain, 
i, 420. Killed at Feachtree Creek, 
ii, 116. 

Coburn, Col. J., attacks Van Dorn, 
i, 201. Surrenders, i, 292. Ex- 
peditions against guerrilla bands, 
ii, 6. At battle of Resaca, ii, 68. 
Enters Atlanta, ii, 147. 

Cockerill's Battery, at Chicka- 
mauga, i, 339. 

Cogswell, Gen., at battle of Benton- 
ville, ii, 319. 

Columbia, S. O, capture and burning 
of, ii, 309. 

Columbia, Tenn., occupied by U. S. 
troops, i, 131. 

Columbus, Ga., captured by Wilson's 
forces, ii, 355. 

Columbus, Ky., occupation of, by 
Gen. Polk, i, 33. 

Conkling, Maj., killed, i, 181. 

Connell, Col. J. M., at London and 
Rock Castle Hills, i, 381. At 
Chickamauga, i, 334. 

Conrad, Col., at battle of Franklin, 
ii, 198. 

Coon, Col., engages the enemy at 
Shoal's Creek, ii, 188. Charge of 
at battle of Nashville, ii, 232. 

Cooper, Surgeon G. E., report of on 
Atlanta campaign, ii, 150. 

Cooper, Gen., at battle of Nashville, 
ii, 332. 



INDEX. 



l<;:: 



Corinth, importance of position of, 
i, '.'7. Siege and lall of, i. 126. 

Corse, Gen. J. M., at Missionary 
Ridge, i, 427. < hdered to Rome, 
ii, L58. Attacked at Allatoona, 
ii. L61. Destroj a foundries, mills, 
etc., t at Rome, ii, 278 

Coi ch, Gen. D. N., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 229. 

( 'ox's Battery, i, 243. 

Cox, Gen. .J. D., takes Kentucky 
regiments to West Virginia, i, 15. 
At Lynnville, ii, 188. Intercepts 
Hood near Columbia, ii, 189. Re- 
pulsed enemy's attacks, ii. I'.il. 
At battle of Franklin, ii. L96. At 
battle of Nashville, ii, 229. 

Craighill, Lieut. W. P., constructs 
fortifications, i, 176. 

Crawfish Springs, i, 340. 

Creightox, Col., at Lookout Moun- 
tain, i, 420. Killed near Ring- 
gold, i, 436. 

Crittenden, Gen. George, in com- 
mand of Confederates at battle of 
M ill Springs, i, 55. 

Crittenden, <4ex. T. L., brigadier- 
general of Kentucky militia, i, 9. 
Urges members of the State 
Guard to enter the l\ S. service, i, 
31. Proclamation of, i, 34. As- 
signed to command of Fifth Divis- 
ion, i, 71. Moves to Nashville, i, 
72. At battle of Shiloh. i. L09. 
At Corinth, i, 126. Assigned to 
command of a corps, i, 184. At 
Perry ville, i, 186. Hotly engaged 
at Stone River, i, 242. Report of 
the battle, i, 275. Occupies Chat- 
tanooga and Rossville, i, 318. At 
the battle of Chickamauga, i, 348 

Crook. Gen. G., at Carthage, Tenn., 
i, 290. At Dougherty Crap, i, 327. 
Expedition against Wheeler, i, 
387. Saves Murfreesboro, i. 389. 

Cuoxton, Gen. J. T., at the battle of 
Chickamauga, i, 334. Attacks 
Pillow at Lafayette, ii, 95. Near 
Florence, Ala., ii, 170. Covers 
movement from Pulaski, ii, 189. 
At Rally Hill, ii, 100. At battle 
of Nashville, ii, 229. Operations 
of in Alabama and Georgia, ii, 
348. 

Cruft, Gen. C, commands Thir- 
teenth Brigade. Army of the Ohio, 
i, 71. Reinforces General Grant 



•■' Fori 1 Lson i, 72. At I 

of Richmond, K u 

battle of Stone Ri 

port of the battl \t 

Chickamauga 

Mountain, i, 41" \t " 

Ridge, i 128 Expediti 

Dalton, ii. 19. At battli 

ville, n 
< itJMBi rlaxd ' i \r. occupied I., rebel 

forces, i, 133. Evacual 

eral Morgan, i, 178 
Coshing's Batti i:v a< battl 

< Chickamauga, i, 3 
Cotter, ( Capt., contest of \\ itb 

rilla band, ii. 6. 

DAHLGRI EX, \ DMIR.VL JoiIN \ 

operates with Sherman, ii, 

Dallas, Ga., engagements at, ii. 76. 

Dalton, <!a.. movement agaii 
18. Turning of, ii. 1 1. Captured 
b) Hood, ii, L62. 

Daw, Gen. N. J. T., dispatch to 
Sherman, ii, 206. 

Davi President Jeff., extract from 
message on battle of Shiloh, 
i, 125. Announces " grave re- 
verses," ii, L0. Disr< garded John- 
ston's suggestions, ii. 26. Inca- 
pacity of, ii, 27. Relieves John- 
ston, ii, I L3. • Confers with '• ■ 
ern generals, ii, 156. Orders 
Smith and Magruder to co-oper- 
ate \\ ith IN- id, ii. 157. < Capture 
of by Wilson's lore.'-, ii. 

Davies, Gen. J. A., at siege of < Cor- 
inth, i. 126. 

Davis, Gen. Jeff. C, joins Buell at 
Murfreesbi >ro, i. 15 i. \t NTolens- 
ville. i, 2J0. At battle of - 
River, i, 221. Reporl of the tat- 
tle, i, 266. At battle of Chicka- 
mauga, i, 336. Sent to Hooker 
at Lookout .Mountain, i. 401. ' »n 
the Knoxville campaign, ii, I. At 
Buzzard Roost, ii. 49. At battle 
of Resaca, ii. 66, ( Captures ' ' 
( la., ii. 73. Assault < f, near Kene- 
saw, ii, 93. At Peachtree I !re< k, 
ii, 112. before Atlanta, ii. 128. 
Assigned to command of the 
teenth Corps,ii, 140. At batt 
Jonesboro, ii, 143. On the march 
to the sea, ii, 278. At Werysboro, 
ii, 314. At battle ,,f Bentonville, 
ii. 318. Congratulatory order i f, 
ii, 374. 



464 



INDEX. 



Decatur, Ala., capture of, by Tur- 
chin, i, 130. Hood's demonstra- 
tion against, ii, 1G9. 

De Courcy, Col. J. S., at Cumberland 
Ford, i. 133. Defeats Stevenson, i, 
177. 

Delph, J. M., mayor of Louisville, 
commander of " Home Guard," i, 
1 1 . Demands the keys of state 
magazine, i, 13. 

Dick, Col. G. F.,at Chickamauga, i, 
336. 

Department of TnE Cumberland, con- 
stituted, i, 22. Designation of, 
changed, i, 46. Its original name 
assumed, i, 207. 

Department of Kentucky, consti- 
tuted, i, 20. 

Department of the Ohio, constituted, 
i, 46. Discontinued, i, 207. 

Dobbs, Col., killed at the battle of 
Salem, ii, 351. 

Dodge, Col. J. B., at Chickamauga, 
i, 335. 

Donaldson, Gen., garrisons Nashville, 
ii, 206. At battle of Nashville, ii, 
227. 

Doolittle, Col., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 240. 

Dilwokth, Col., near Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, ii, 94. At Peach tree Creek, 
ii, 111. At Jonesboro, ii, 144. 

Duffield, Col., in command at Mur- 
freesboro, i, 99. Pursues Morgan, 
i, 13o. Captures rebel detach- 
ments, i, 136. Captured at Mur- 
freesboro, i, 147. 

DcNn.\M, Col., surrenders Munfords- 
ville, i, 160. 

Dunlap, Lieut., hung as a rebel spy 
at Murfreesboro, i, 298. 

Dumont, Gen. E., commands Seven- 
teenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, 
i, 67. In command at Nashville, 
i, 99. Pouts Morgan, i, 136. 
Moves against E. K. Smith, i, 184. 

Edg arton's Battery, captured, i, 230. 

Edgefield, Tenn., occupied by Buell, 
i, 69. 

Edie, Col., at Jonesboro, ii, 144. 

Elizaisetiitown, Ky., captured by J. 
H. Morgan, i, 216. 

Elliott, Gen. W. L., on the Knox- 
ville campaign, ii, 1. At Athens, 
ii, 5. Engagement at Mossy 
Creek, ii, 16. At battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 228. 



Elliott, Lieut. Col., finds rebel cav- 
alry near Florence, ii, 158. 

Ellsworth's Battery, i, 237. 

Este, Col. G. P., at Jonesboro, ii, 
144. 

Estep's Battery, i, 243. 

Etowah River, advance to, ii, 71. 

Etowah, District of, created, ii, 95. 

Fayetteville, N. C, entered by the 
U. S. forces, ii, 311. 

Fearing, Gen. B. D., at battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 316. 

Fisher, Oapt., at Perryville, i, 189. 

Fitzgibbon, Maj., defeats guerrilla 
bands, ii, 6. 

Flat Rock, Ga., engagement at, ii, 
124. 

Foote, Com. A. H., at Fort Henry, 
i, 85. 

Fort Donelson, surrender of, i, 86. 
Transferred to Rosecrans' com- 
mand, i, 288. Attacked by 
Wheeler, i, 289. 

Fort Henry, surrender of, i, 85. 
Transferred to Rosecrans' com- 
mand, i, 288. Abandoned, i, 294. 

Fort IIeiman, transferred to Rose- 
crans, i, 288. Gunboat No. 55 
captured at by Forrest, ii, 171. 

Fort McAllister, captured by Ha- 
zen's division, ii, 2^4. 

Fort Tyler, captured by La Grange, 
ii, — . 

FouRTn Army Corps, formed by con- 
solidation of the Twentieth and 
Twenty-first Corps, assigned to 
Howard, ii, 30. Assigned to Gen. 
D. S. Stanley, ii, 129. Fame and 
glory of, ii, 323. See also Appen- 
dix, ii, 382. 

Fourteenth Army CoRrs, first de- 
signation given to troops in the 
Department of the Cumberland 
under Rosecrans, i, 207. Desig- 
nated as the " Center," and 
Thomas assigned to command 
of, i, 210 Palmer succeeds 
Thomas in command of, i, 411. 
Davis assigned to command of ii, 
140. Fame and glory of, ii, 323. 
See also Appendix, ii, 382. 
Forman, Col. J., killed, i, 252. 
Forrest, Gen. N. B., cavalry dash to 
Murfreesboro, i, 145. Captures 
Murfreesboro, i, 147. Captures 
Athens, Ala., ii, 163. At John- 
sonville, Tenn., ii, 171. Moving 



i N 1 1 1 : x . 



!•;., 



toward Franklin, ii, 191. Held 
by Wilson at battle of Franklin 

ii. 198. Defeated by Wilson at 
Selma, ii, 352. 
Foster, Gen. J. G., at Savannah ii 
284. 

Fox, Capt. P. V., at Brown's Ferry 

i, 398. J 

Frankfort, Ky., secret meeting of 
Union men at, i, J 2. 

Franklin, Tekn., battle of, ii, 198 

French, Gen., S. G., attacks Alla- 
toona, ii. 161. 

Fry, Col. J. B., at battle of Perry- 
ville, i, 201. 

Fry, Gen. S. 8., at Camp Dick Rob- 
inson, i, 17. Kills Zollicofi'er at bat- 
tle of Mill Springs, i, 57. (V 
river at Decatur, i, 148. At Over- 
all's Creek, i, 245. 

Ftfpe, Col. J. P., at the battle of 
Stone River, i, 236. 

Galhraith, Col., at Fayetteville, i, 
309. 

Garfield, Gen. J. A., Eighteenth 
Brigade organized for, i, 76. Move- 
ments in Eastern Kentucky, i, T * > . 
Defeats Marshall, i, 77. Drives 
enemy from Eastern Kentucky, 
i, 78. At battle of Chickamauga, 
i, 355. 

Garrard, Col. T. T., at Camp Dick 
Robinson, i, 17. Sent to oppose 
Zollicoffer's advance, i, 30. 

Garrard, Gen. K., on right of Sher- 
man's army, ii, 71. Engagement 
of at Flat Rock, ii, 124. At Chat- 
tooga Vallev, ii, 162. At battle of 
Nashville, i'i, 228. 

Garesche, Liect. Col., killed, i, 251. 

Gardener, Gen. W. M., routed by 
Stoneman, ii, 341. 

Gardner's Battery at Jonesboro, ii, 
144. 

Gay, Capt. E., commanding cavalry 
brigade at Perryville, i, 185. 

Geary, Gen. J. W., at Wauhatchie, 
i, 400. At Lookout Mountain, i. 
419. At Missionary Ridge, i, 42^. 
Attempt to scale Chattooga Moun- 
tain, ii, 4^. NearKenesaw Moun- 
tain, ii, 87. At battle of Resaca, 
ii, 68. Engagements near Dallas, 
ii, 70. At Peachtree Creek, ii, 114. 
At Savannah, ii, 287. Extract 
from report of the capture of Sa- 



vannah ii 302 Mov< i tfa 
from Savannah, ii 307. 

Gbni ral View at clo 

' rEOROi \. expedition t.. de troj rail- 
road in, i, 1 3(5 

Gibson, Col W. II . report of battle 
of Stone River, i, 26 i. 

<; " Bi i:i, Gek C I , a l i , com- 
mand of a corps i I - I. \' 
ryville, i I 36 I ictra I fi m n - 
port of. i, 203. Moves to Frank- 
lin, Tenn., i, 290. 

Gildersleeve, Capt., captun 
steamer on Savannah River i 

Cn, i. km. i ri \. a. < , repulsed ii Bull's 
Gap, ii, 272. i fperations ofin Bast 
Tennessee, ii. 273. In Tenn 
and North Carolina, ii, 338 De- 
feats Mc< !own, ii. ;; \- 

1 ri r. i Ien. S. 1.'., at Missionary Kidge, 
i, 42~>. 

Gleason, < !ol., before Atlanta, ii. L27. 

Goldsboro, N. C, occupied I 
S. forces. ii, 322. 

Gooding, Col,, at Perryville, i. 190. 

Goodspeed, Maj., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii. 238. 

Gordon. Ga., entered bv Howard, ii, 
280. 

Gracie, Gen., at Chickamauga, i, 353. 

Granger, Gen. G. at Corinth, i, 127. 
Defending Cincinnati, i. 183. At 
battle of Chickamauga, i. 253. 
Commands Army of Kentucky, i, 
290. Drives Van Dora, i, 293. ' At 
Missionary Ridge, i. 432. Report 
of the battle, i, 453. On the Knox- 
ville campaign, ii, 1. 

Granger, Gen. It. S., at Decatur, ii, 
132. Makes a sortie on Bood, ii, 
169, 

Grant, Gen. U. S., captures Fort 
Donelson, i. 85. At battle of Shi- 
loh, i, 103. Order to Nelson, i. 123. 
Letters to Buell, i. 121. Extract 
from official report of battle of 
Shiloh, i, 125. Second in com- 
mand at Corinth, i, 127. Assigned 
to command Military Division of 
Mississippi, i, 3'J4. First order to 
Thomas, i, 395. Reaches Chatta- 
nooga, 395. Lotto:- and orders 
to Thomas at Chattanooga, i 
Report of battle n inoo- 

ga, i, 448. Projected campaign of 
ii, 14. Directs an advance toward 



466 



INDEX. 



Dalton, ii, 18. Dispatches and 
orders to Thomas, ii, 39. Appoint- 
ed lieutenant-general, ii, 40. Or- 
ders to advance on Georgia cam- 
paign, ii, 45. Extract from official 
report of, etc., ii, 54. Dispatch to 
Sherman, ii, 120. Dispatch on fall 
of Atlanta, ii, 153. Advises against 
a backward movement, ii, 155. 
Discussion of Sherman's projected 
march, ii, 172. Dispatches to Sher- 
man, ii, 173, 183, 11S4. T o llalleck, 
ii, 177. Urges Thomas to attack 
Hood, ii, 224. On his way to Nash- 
ville to relieve Thomas, ii, 235. 
Dispatches to Thomas during De- 
cember, 1864, ii, 251, 252, 254, 257, 
259, 261, 262. To Halleck, rela- 
tive to relieving Thomas, ii, 253- 
255. To Thomas, relating to Breck- 
inridge's movements, ii, 276, 277. 
Letters of to Sherman, relating to 
the march to the sea, ii, 293, 294. 
Congratulatory order of, ii, 371. 

Green, Gen., wounded at Wau- 
hatchie, i, 401. 

Green, Maj., captured by Col. Mc- 
Cook, i, 388. 

Greenville, Tenn., occupied by reb- 
els, i, 71. 

Grensel, Col. N., succeeds Sill at 
battle of Stone River, i, 232. Re- 
port of the battle, i, 269. 

Grose, Gen. W., at Chickamauga, i, 
336. At Lookout Mountain, i, 419. 
At Buzzard Roost, ii, 49. 

Grosvexok, Col. C. II., at battle of 
Nashville, ii, 230. 

Groter, Col. W. W., fell at Jones- 
boro, ii, 145. 

Gunboats Tyler and Lexington at 
Shiloh, i, 107. 

Gunther's Battery, i, 238. 

Guthrie, Col. James V., authorized 
to raise a regiment, i, 14. Takes 
bis regiment to West Virginia, i, 
15. 

Hall, Col. A. S., defeats J. H. Mor- 
gan, i, 294. 

Halleck, Gen. II. W., assigned to 
command of the Western armies, 
i, 98. Letters to Buell, i, 120, 121. 
At Pittsburg Landing, i, 126. Or- 
ganization of army at Corinth, 
i, 126. Commander-in-chief at 
Washington, i, 160. Dispatch to 



Buell, i, 161. Assigns Thomas to 
command of Armv of the Ohio, i, 
184. Letter to Buell, i, 205. Re- 
lieves Buell of command, i, 206. 
Orders an advance against ( 'hatta- 
nooga, i, 310. Ordered Burnside 
to support Rosecrans, i, 387. Au- 
thorizes Thomas to call on West- 
ern States for troops, ii, 212. 
Places officers and troops at 
Thomas' disposal, ii, 214. Dis- 
patches to Thomas, ii, 177, 178. 
Dispatch to Sherman, ii, 120. Dis- 
patch of December 31, 1864, to 
Thomas, ii, 344. Dispatches to 
Grant relating to relieving Thomas 
at Nashville, ii, 253, 256. Dis- 
patches to Thomas, ii, 254, 258, 
261. Letter to Sherman at Savan- 
nah, ii, 304. 

Hambright, Col. A., defeats Adams 
at Jasper, i, 132. In movement 
toward Dalton, ii, 20. 

Hamilton, Gen. S., at Corinth, i, 127. 

Hammond, Gen. J. H, fight at Brent- 
wood, ii, 204. At battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 237. 

Hampton, Gen. W., surprises Kilpat- 
rick, ii, 311. 

Hatch, Gen., drives enemy at Shoal 
Creek, ii, 187. Attacked by Hood 
at Lawrenceburg, ii, 188. Covers 
movement from Pulaski, ii, 189. 
Withdraws to Columbia, ii, 190. 
At battle of Nashville, ii, 231. 

Hardee, Gen. W. J., at Bowling 
Green, Ky., i, 41. At Chattanooga, 
i, 152. At battle of Perrvville, i, 
193. At Stone River, i, 227. On 
Missionary Ridge, i, 427. At Dal- 
ton, ii, 47. Defeated at Jones- 
boro, ii, 142. Retreats to Lovejoy 
Station, ii, 146. At Savannah, ii, 
283. Letter to Sherman, refusing 
to surrender Savannah, ii, 298. 
Withdraws his forces from Sa- 
vannah, ii, 287. Movements of at 
Charleston, ii, 307. Defeated at 
Averysboro, ii, 314. At battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 317. 

Harding, Col. A. C, repulses Wheel- 
er, i, 289. 

Harker, Gen. C. G., assigned to com- 
mand Twentieth Brigade, in Ken- 
tucky, i, 73. At battle of Stone 
River, i, 225. At Chickamauga, i, 



[\l»l'\. 



K 



>> 



348. Before Rocky Face Ridge, ii, 
47. Assault at Kenesaw, and 
mortally wounded, ii, l J4. 

Harlan, James, i, 12. 

Harman, Cor,., killed, near Kenesaw 
Mountain, ii, '.)4. 

Harnden, Col., in pursuit of Davis, 

ii, 365. 
Harris, Col., at Perryville, i. 90. 

Harris' Battery, at Chickamauga 
i, 336. 

Harrison, Cor,. T. J., expeditions 
against guerrillas, ii, 17. In move- 
ment toward Dalton, ii, 20. 

Hascall, Gen. M. S., assigned to 
command Fifteenth Brigade, in 
Kentucky, i, 72. Position at Stone 
River, i, 225. Report of battle <»i' 
Stone River, i, 278. Before At- 
lanta, ii, 127. 

Hart, Maj. J. TI., repulsed enemy 
at Fort Donelson, i, 151. 

Hartsville, Ky., captured by J. II. 
Morgan, i, 214. 

Haugiitaling's Battery, captured, i, 
237. 

Hatvkixs, Col. J. G., killed, i, 252. 

Hawley, Col., at Savannah, ii, 282. 

Hazen, Gen. W. B., commands Nine- 
teenth Brigade, in Kentucky, i, 0'.). 
Captures rebel battery, i, 112. At 
Stone River, i, 224. Report of 
battle of Stone River, i, 277. At 
Chickamauga, i, 33G. At Mission- 
ary Ridge, i. 415. At New Hope 
Church, ii, 79. Captures Fort Mc- 
Allister, ii, 284. At battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 321. 

Hazel Green, Ky., occupied by U. S. 
troops, i, 74. 

Heckkr, Col., on the Knoxville cam- 
paign, ii, 2. 

Heg, Col. H. C, at Chickamauga, i, 
336. Killed, i, 363. 

Helm, Gen., killed, i, 346. 

Hescock's Battery at Perryville, i, 
187. 

Hepcock, Capt., report of battle of 
Stone River, i, 271. 

Hill. Col., at battle of Nashville, ii, 
232. 

Hixdman, Gen. T. C, defeated at 
Rowlett's Station, i, 66. Threatens 
Columbia, i, 52. Moves against 
Negley, i, 320. At Chickamauga, 
i. 340. 



Hobart.Gen II 
tonville ii 316. 

Ilnia.M/i.i.i, I lAPT . at Pel : I ille i 

I -'.I 

lb , Gen. .1- B . at Dalton, ii, 17. 

At battle of Re aca ii, I 

ing Marietta, ii, 88 

Kulp's house, ii. 92 

( reneral Johnston, ii, 113, I >e- 

feated at Peaohtrei i 1 15, 

Abandons Atlanta, ii, I 17 < 

ing th.> I liai tab hi e in i 

m. -lit north, ii, I ncing 

upon Allatoona, ii. 161. Dei i 
ill.' surrender "I' I.'.- ica, ii, 162. 
KHeci and «.lij.-et of movement 
north, ii, L67. Makes an attack 
on Decatur, ii. 168. Withd 
from I 'ecatur, ii. 169. • Crossing the 
Tennessee River, ii, 170. Strength 
of before Thomas, ii, I •>'•. Chi 
at Franklin, ii, 198 Broken and 
route, l at Nashville, ii, 227 240. 
Fragments of his army move to- 
ward the < !arolinas, ii. 308. 

Eooeer, i ii:\. Jos., joins armj o 
I lumberland, at Bridgeport, i 
I »efeats Longstreet al wauhatchie, 
i, 39S. Atbattleof Lookout Moun- 
tain, i, 117. At Missionary Ridge, 
i, 42'.'. Assigned to command of 
Twentieth Corps, ii, 28 At Snake 
Creek (lap. ii, 50. Advane 
ward Buzzard's Roost, ii, 17. At 
battle of Resaca, ii. 64. At 

Hope I 'liui'i-li, ii. 76. At bat tie of 
Peachtree I !reek, ii, 1 12. 

Hoover's Gap, captured by Wilder, 
i, 304. 

Hotchkiss' Battery, at Knob's Gap, 
i, 220. At battle of Stone River, 
i, 234. 

Hoskins, Coi.., skirmish of his pickets 
at Mill Spring-, i, 18. 

IlnWAiu), Gen. 0. 0., at Lookout 
Creek, i, 399. At Missionary Ridge, 
i, 426. On the Knoxville cam- 
paign, ii, 1. Assigned to com- 
mand of Fourth Corps, ii. 28. Ex- 
tract from report of, ii, 62. At 
battle of Resaca, ii, 64. At New 
I lope ( ihurch, ii. 78. Before Kene- 
Baw .Mountain, ii, 87. Engagement 
near Jonesboro. ii, 142 Assigned 
to command of Army of the Ten- 
nessee, ii, 124. Repulses II I'sat- 



468 



INDEX. 



tack before Atlanta, ii, 125. On the 
march to the sea, ii, 278. At Sa- 
vannah, ii, 284. Extract from re- 
port of the capture of Savannah, 
ii, 301. Movement north through 
the C'arolinas, ii, 309. 

Hubbard, Col., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 232. 

Hurlbut, Gen. S. H., at battle of 
Shiloh, i, 104. At Corinth, i, 120. 

Huntsville, Ala., capture of, i, 130. 

Innis, Col. W. P., defends La Vergne, 
Tenn., i, 247. 

Ireland, Col. D., at Lookout Moun- 
tain, i, 420. At battle of Resaca, 
ii, 68. Near Dallas, ii, 76. 

Jackson, Gen. J. S., at Perryville, i, 
186. Killed, i, 189. 

Jackson, Gex. N. J., at Savannah, ii, 
287. At Averysboro, ii, 314. 

Jackson, Gen. W., at Duck River, ii, 
191. 

Joiixsonville, Tenn., engagement at, 
ii, 171. 

Johnston, Gen. A. S., in command 
of rebel forces at Bowling Green, 
i, 41. Retreat from Bowling 
Green, i, 68. Killed at Shiloh, i, 
115. 

Johnston, Gen. J. E., relieves Bragg, 
ii, 14. Position and forces of at 
Dalton, ii, 21. Extracts from re- 
ports of, ii, 42, 62. At battle of 
Resaca, ii, 64. Moves to Allatoona 
Pass, ii, 73. At New Hope Church, 
ii, 78. At Kenesaw and Lost Moun- 
tain, ii, 86. Withdraws across the 
Chattahoochee, ii, 96. Relieved 
by Hood, ii, 113. Extract from 
official report of, ii, 118. Opera- 
tions of against Sherman in the 
Carolinas, ii, 309, 312. Defeated 
at battle of Bentonville, ii, 315. 
Retreats through Raleigh, ii, 324. 
Surrenders to Sherman, ii, 325. 

Johnson, Gen. R. W., commands 
Sixth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, 
i, 63. Defeated by Morgan, i, 151. 
At battle of Stone River, i, 224. 
Report of the battle, i, 263. En- 
gagement at Liberty Gap, i, 304. 
At Chickamauga, i, 335. At Mis- 
sionary Ridge, i, 429. In move- 
ment toward Dalton, ii, 20. At 
Ringgold, ii, 45. At battle of Re- 
saca, ii, 66. At New Hope Church, 



ii, 79. Before Atlanta, ii, 127. 
Near Columbia, ii, 190. At battle 
of Nashville, ii, 229. 

Jones, Col. F. C, killed at Stone 
River, i, 252. 

Jones, Col. J. G., commands Four- 
teenth Brigade in Kentucky, i, 72. 

Jonesboro, Ga., battle of, ii, 144. 

Jordan, Col. T. J., charges the rebels 
at Thompson Station, i, 291. 

Judah, Gen. II. M., at Corinth, i, 127. 

Kenesaw Mountain, operations near, 
ii, 86. 

Kennett, Col., enters Huntsville, i, 
130. Routs rebel force, i, 213. At 
Gallatin, i, 207. Recaptures a 
train, i, 245. 

Kentucky, legislature affirms armed 
neutrality, i, 4. Timidity of loyal 
citizens, i, 4. Opposition to seces- 
sion, i, 6. Militia organized in, i, 
8. Recruiting in for Union and 
rebel armies, i, 15. Rebel citizens 
plan the removal of loyal troops 
from the State, i, 21. Efforts to 
prevent arms reaching Camp Dick 
Robinson, i, 21. Abandons neu- 
trality, i, 23. Legislature directs 
the Governor to order Confeder- 
ate troops out of the State, i, 24. 
Committed to support of the Na- 
tional, Government, i, 24. Opera- 
tions in Eastern Kentucky, i, 74. 
Operations of armies in, i, 159, 218. 

Kentucky Legiox t , recruit of, i, 16. 

Knights of Golden Circle, propose 
to control Louisville, i, 21. 

Kilpatrick, Gen. J., advance toward 
Tunnel Hill, ii, 26. Wounded 
near Resaca, ii, 64. Engagements 
at Fairburn and Lovejoy, ii, 133. 
On march to the sea, ii, 279. At 
Savannah, ii, 283. Movements of 
in the Carolinas, ii, 309. Sur- 
prised by Hampton, ii, 311. At 
Averysboro, ii, 314. At battle of 
Bentonville, ii, 320. 

Kilpatrick, Col. R. L., at battle of 
Resaca, ii, 68. Fifth Ohio near 
Dallas, ii, 76. 

Kimball, Gen. N., at New Hope 
Church, ii, 80. Assault of, a t Ken- 
esaw, ii, 94. At Lovejoy Station, 
ii, 146. At Lynnville, ii," 188. At 
battle of Franklin, ii, 199. At bat- 
tle of Nashville, ii, 226. 



i n ; 1 1 1 : \ . 



tG9 



King, Col. E. A., killed, i, 363. 

King, Gen. J. II., at Chickam 
i, 334. At battle of Resaca, ii. 86. 

Kibby, Col., near Kenesaw Moun 
tain, ii, 39. 

Kirk, Gen. E. N., defeats Wheeler, 
i, 213. Position at Stone River, i, 
226. Mortally wounded, brigade 
dislodged, i, 230. Report of the 
battle, i, 265. 

Knipe, Gen. J., at battle of Re aca 
ii, OS. At Kulp's house, ii, 91. At 
Peachtree Creek, ii, 114. At bat- 
tle of Nashville, ii. 229. 

Knob's Gap, engagement at,i,220. 

Knoxville Campaign, ii, 1. 

Kulp's House, engagement at, ii, 91. 

La Grange, Col. < >. E., action of, at 
Mossy Creek, ii, lf>. Repulsed at 
Poplar Place, ii, 50. Routs Gen. 
Lyon in Kentucky, ii, 271, Opera- 
tions of, in Alabama and Georgia, 
ii, 349. Receives the surrender oi 
Montgomery, ii, 354. Captures 
West Point, Ga., ii, 356. 

Laiboldt, Col. B., at battle of Perry- 
ville, i, 187. Report of battle of 
Stone River, i, 270. At Chicka- 
mauga, i, 337. Routs Wheeler, ii, 
7. Holds Dalton against Wheeler, 
ii, 131. 

Landrcm, Lieut. Col., defends Cyn- 
thiana, Ky., i, 146. 

Lane, Col., routed at Franklin, ii, 
198. 

La Vergne, cavalry engagement at, 
i, 247. 

Lebanon, Ky., captured by Morgan, 
i, 146. 

Lebanon, Tenn., Dumont defeats 
Morgan at, i, 136. 

Lee, Gen. R. E., surrender of, ii, 324. 

Lee, Gen. S. L\, at Jonesboro, ii, 142. 
At battle of Bentonville, ii, 317. 

Lester, Col., captured at Murfrees- 
boro, i, 147. 

Lexington, Ky., i, 22. 

"Lexington," gunboat, at battle of 
Shiloh, i, 107. 

Liberty Gap, engagement at, i, 304. 

Liddell, Gen., at Chickamauga, i, 
334. 

Lincoln, President, first call for 
troops, i, 3. Reply to Magoffin's 
letter, i, 18. Issued congratulatory 
order to Thomas for victory at Mill 
Springs, i, 57. War order No. 3, i, 



122. Dispatoh of, on fall of \t 

lanta, ii, 15 I. \t the 

"1 ( Irani issm 

Thomas, ii. 

dispatch to Thomas for the •. i 

at Nashville, ii 

1 ' " • I-'. W., i. pui ea .1. II 
Morgan, i, 212. 

Logan, Gi \. John \ , at i 
ii, 307. At Bentonville, ii, 322 I in 
his way to relieve Thorn 
Louisville, ii. 235. 

Logie, Col., killed at i 
1 'reek, ii. 1 16. 

Long, Gen, !'. ch irgea of, on Whi 
i. 389, Raid in Ea t Tenne 
437, ( »n the Knoxville cam] 
ii. '-'. I ii mo; ement toward I »alton, 
ii, 2 ». < iperations of, in Alabama 
and I reorgia Li, 3 17. I I 
the battle of Selma, ii 

Longstri ii.i.i • i Ihicka- 

mauga, i, 343. D< Wau- 

hatchie, i 100, Sei I lurn- 

side, i, 108. Retreats from K 
ville, ii. 3. Sei i, 26. 

Lookoi t Mountain, held by B 
i, 386 Battle of, i, 418. 

Loomis, Col. < '. < ».. commands artil- 
lery in Kentucky, i 68. At Per- 
ryville, i, 187. At Missionary 
Ridge, 1, 427. 

Loring, Gen. W. W., at Rock} 
Ridge, ii. 52. At battle of R 
ii, 64. Holding Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, ii, 88. 

Lost Mountain, operations near, 
ii, 86. 

Louisville, Ky., citizens raisi 
tional flag, i, 2. Loyal eh : 
mayor of, i, 5. Union club, i. 5. 
Home guard, i. 11. Primal base 
of supplies, i, 140. Organi. 
of troops at. i, 184. 

Louisville and Nashville Railboad, 
defenses of, ii, 453. 

Love-joy's Station, engagement at, 
ii, 146. 

Lowe, Col. W. W., at the Etowah, 
ii, 74. 

Lu.m, Col., at Jonesboro, ii, 11 1. 

Lyon, Hen., expedition of into Ken- 
tucky, ii, 271. Captured at Red 
Hill, ii, 272. 

Lytle, Gen. W. 1L, at Athens, Ala., 
i, 132. At Perryville, i. 190. At 
battle of Chickamauga, i, 340. 



470 



INDEX. 



McArthub, Gen. J., at battle of 
Nashville, ii, 228. 

McClebnakd, Gen. J. A., at battle 
of Shiloh, i, 10-1. At Corinth, i, 
121. 

McCook, Gen. A. McD., assigned to 
command of Second Division, 
Army of the Ohio, i, 63. At battle 
of Shiloh, i, 111. AtCorintb, i, 126. 
Assigned to command of a corps, 
i, L84. At battle of Perryville, i, 
189. Extract from report of the 
battle, i, 203. At battle of Stone 
River, i, 224. Report of battle, i, 
262. At battle of Chickamauga, 
i, 348. 

McCook, Col. A. G., at Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 115. 

McCook, Col. D., at Perryville, i, 
186. At the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, i, 361. At New Hope 
Church, ii, ?0. Assault at Kene- 
saw Mountain, ii, 93. Mortally 
wounded, ii, 94. 

McCook, Gen. E. M., expedition 
against Wheeler, i, 389. Destroys 
cotton at Rodgersville, i, 390. En- 
gagement with Longstreet, ii, 15. 
At battle of Resaca, ii, 67. En- 
gagement with Stevenson, ii, 73. 
Cavalry movements in Georgia, ii, 
124. At McLemore's Cove, i, 327. 
Burns Reed's bridge, i, 331. Op- 
erations of in Alabama and 
Georgia, ii, 347. Moves to Talla- 
hassee, Fla., ii, 364. 

McCook, Gen. R. L., assigned to 
command Twelfth Brigade, Army 
of the Ohio, i, 51. Wounded at 
Mill Springs, i, 57. Advances to 
Athens, i, 149. Killed by guerril- 
las, i, 149. 

MoCown, Gen., at Stone River, i, 227. 

McGowan, Maj., routed enemy at 
Duck River, i, 151. 

McKean, Gen. J. J., at Corinth, i, 
126. 

McKee, Col. S., captures rebel force, 
i, 212. Killed at Stone River, i, 
242. 

McLemore's Cove, engagement in, 
i, 324. 

McMillan, Col., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 232. 

McMixnville, Reynolds' expedition 
to. i, 297. Captured by Wheeler, 
i, 389. 



McPherson, Gen. J. B., in command 
of Army of the Tennessee, ii, 24. 
At New Hope Church, ii, 81. Near 
Kenesaw Mountain, ii, 87. Passes 
through Snake Creek Gap, ii, 50. 
At battle of Resaca, ii, 65". Killed 
near Atlanta, ii, 117. 

Mack, Capt. O. A., at Perryville, i, 
186. 

Macon, Ga., surrendered to Wilson's 
forces, ii, :!~>7. 

Magoffin, Gov. B., recommends 
arming militia of Kentucky, i, 2. 
Reply to President's proclamation, 
i, 3. Proclamation of, i, 7. De- 
manded removal of Camp Dick 
Robinson, i, 17. Letter to the 
President, i, 17. Proclamation of 
to rebel authorities, i, 33. 

Manderson, Col., at Orchard Knob, 
i, 416. 

Mansox, Gen. M. D., assigned to 
command Second Brigade, Army 
of the Ohio, i, 51. At battle of 
Richmond, Ky., i, 180. 

Marshall's Battery, at battle of 
Stone River, i, 237. 

Mason, Col. R., surrendered at 
Clarksville, i, 151. 

Marshall, Gen. H., invaded Ken- 
tucky, i, 74. Defeated by Garfield, 
i, 77. 

Martin, Gen. W., defeated at Mossy 
Creek, ii, 16. 

Matthews, Col. Stanley, defeats 
Gen. Wheeler near La Vergne, i, 
215. 

Maury, M. T., London Times article 
of, ii, 10. 

Maury, Gen. J. P. M., capture of, i, 
136. 

Mendexhall, Capt. J., battery of 
supports Nelson, i, 110. At battle 
of Stone River, i, 249. Report of 
the battle, i, 280. At Brown's 
Ferry, i, 397. 

Merrill, Col. W. E., examination 
of railroads by, ii, 22. Fortifies 
Chattanooga, ii, 166. 

Metcalfe, Col., engagement of at 
Big Hill, i, 179. 

Mihalotzy, Col. G., mortally wound- 
ed, ii, 21. 

Miles, Col., at battle of Bentonville, 
ii, 316. 

Military Division of Mississippi, 
constituted, i, 394. 



INDEX. 



471 



Mil i. Springs, battle of, i, 56. 

Milledgeville, Ga., entered bj 
Fourteenth and Twentieth < lorps 
ii. 280. 

Mil i.' b, Col. A < >., charges thi 
Wheeler's line, i. 390. Defeal 
rebel brigade, ii, 16. ( >perationsof 
in Tennessee and North ( larolina, 
ii, 341. At the battle of Selnia, ii, 
351. 

Mil ler, Gen. J. F., at La Vergne i 
210. Position at Stone River, i, 
225. Charges across Stone River, 
i, 250. Report of the battle, i, 273. 
At battle, of Nashville, ii, 227. 

Milliken, Col. M., killed at battle 
of Stone River, i, :M4. 

MlLROT, Gen., drives Late from » >ver- 
all's Creek, ii, 223. 

Mintt, Cor.. R. II. G., captures rebel 
regiment, i, '2 19. Routs rebels at 
Unionville, i. 290. Charges into 
Shelbyville, i, 306. Delays Bragg 
at Reed's bridge, i, 331. At the 
battle of Selnia, ii. 351. Advances 
toward Macon, Ga., ii, 356. 

Mitchell, Gen. J. G., at Chicka- 
mauga, i. 353. At the battle of 
Resaca, ii, 66. At Jonesboro, ii, 
144. At Kenesaw, ii, 93. At bat- 
tle of Nashville, ii, L'::7. At battle 
of Bentonville, ii, 216. 

Mitchell, Gen, 0. M., assigned to 
command of Third Division, Army 
of the Ohio, i, G7. Operations of 
in Tennessee and Alabama, i, L30. 
Moves against < lhattanooga, i, 132. 
Organized expedition to destroy 
bridges in Georgia, i, 130. At 
Athens, i, 142. 

Mitchell, Gen. R. B., joins Buell, i, 
153. At Perryville, i, 185. In 
command of Nashville i,217. Ex- 
pedition of against Wheeler, i, 389. 

Mitciiellsville, a depot of supplies, 
i, 211. 

Missionary Ridge, held by Bragg, i, 
380. Battle of, i. 433. 

Moccasin Point, i, 397. 

Monroe, Col., killed at Fannington, 
i, 392. 

Montgomery, Ala., surrendered to 
Wilson's forces, ii, 354. 

Moore, Col. A. B., surrenders to J. 
H. Morgan, i, 214. 

Moore, Col. J. B., at battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 228. 



at l •. ■ 



Moor , i !oi I. P 
i, 74. 

Morgan, Gem W .,• I umberland 
Ford, i, 133, Demo 
against Cumberland Gap, i 

I''. V.l, 

< Iperationa of in Kent u< 1. i I 76 

is:;. 

Morgan, < Ien. J. D., in movement 
toward Dalton, ii, 20. At I:., I 

R t, ii. 19. Before Kei 

Mountain, ii, 93. Before At] 
ii, 1-!^. \t battle of Jon< 
ii. III. At battle of Bentonville. 
Li, 316. 

v, < rEN. John II, 
"State ( ruards" at armor\ . i, '_'•_'. 
.loins Buckner, i. 31. M 
toward Lebanon, Tenn i 
( 'avalry in Kentucky, i. I 15. I de- 
feats Jordan at Tompkinsville 
captures Lebam m, i, I 15. R< - 
pulsed bj Col. Li ster, i, 212. I •■- 
feated by Reynolds, i. 216 
feated by Stanlej and Hall ; 
K illed by < > illem a tro ips, ii, 272, 

Morg in, ( !ol. T. J., captures 
battery, ii, 169. At battleof Nash- 
ville, ii, 230. 

Morton, < 'aim-. St. < '.. at Flo 
and Decatur, i, L42 Po ted on 
Stone River, i, 225. 

Mower, » Ien. •'. A., ai Bentonville, ii, 
322. 

Mdldraugh's Hill, captured by J. II. 
Morgan, i, 216. 

Mundy, Col., at Cumberland 
i, 177. 

Munfordsvtlle, capture of. by B 
i, 160. 

Murfreesboro, Ti nn., occupied by 
Cen. A. S. Johnston, i, 8 ' 
Col. Duffield, i, 99. Captured by 
Forrest, i, 147. Fortified by Nel- 
son, i, 1 19. < Occupied by Rose- 
crans, i, 251. Fortification of, i, 288. 

Nashville, a base of Confe 
supplies, i, 37. < 'ccupii il by 
Army of the < Ihio, i. 97. I tader 
command of Dumont, i, 99. ET< Id 
against Breckinridge bj 
i, 207. Fortified 1». I owei i 
Battle of, ii, 222. 

Nashville AND CHATTANOOGA RAIL- 
ROAD, defenses of, ii, 452 

Nashville, Decatdr and Stei 
Railroad, defenses of, ii, 452. 



472 



INDEX. 



Nashville axd Johxsonville Rail- 
road, defenses of, ii, 453. 

Nashville and Clarksville Rail- 
road, defenses of, ii, 453. 

Nayi.or, Capt., on Moccasin Point, 
i, 421. 

Negley, Gen. J. S., commands Sev- 
enth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, 
i, 63. Captures Rodgersville, Ala., 
i, 131. Bombards Chattanooga, i, 
132. In command of Nashville, i, 
207. Victory of, at La Vergne, 
i, 210. At battle of Stone River, 
i, 224. Report of the battle, i, 
273. On the Tullahoma cam- 
paign, i, 306. Seizes Cooper's and 
Stevens' Gaps, i, 316. Moves into 
McLemore's Cove, i, 318. Skillful 
movements of against overwhelm- 
ing forces, i, 322. At battle of 
Chickamauga, i, 331. Letter of to 
Baird, i, 368. 

Nelson, Gen. W., obtains arms for 
the Home Guards of Kentucky, 
i, 11. Advice to President Lin- 
coln, i, 12. Made agent for trans- 
mission of arms to Kentucky, i, 
12. Assigned to command of 
Fourth Division, Army of the 
Ohio, i, 69. Movements in East- 
ern Kentucky, i, 74. At battle of 
Shiloh, i, 113. Circular of, i, 123. 
At Corinth, i, 126. Fortifies Mur- 
freesboro, i, 149. At battle of 
Richmond, Ky., i, 182. Opera- 
tions of in Kentucky, i, 176-183. 

New Hope Church, engagements at, 
ii, 76. 

Newton, Gex. J., at Rocky Face 
Ridge, ii, 52. At battle of Resaca, 
ii, 66. At New Hope Church, ii, 
80. Before Kenesaw Mountain, 
ii, 88. At battle of Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 113. At Lovejoy's Sta- 
tion, ii, 146. 

Nolensville, Texx., i, 220. 

Opdycke, Col. E., drives back enemy's 
cavalry at Spring Hill, ii, 192. He- 
roic charge at the battle of Frank- 
lin, ii, 200. Brave actions of, ii, 
. 203. 

Orchard Kxob, captured, i, 416. 
Grant's position on, i, 426. 

Orr, Lieut. J. S., defends bridge on 
N. & C R, R., ii, 448. 

Osterhaus, Gex. P. J., at Lookout 
Mountain, i, 417. At Missionary 



Ridge, i, 428. On the march to 
the sea, ii, 278. 

Overall's Creek, effectiveness of 
block-house at, ii, 223. 

Owen, Col., at Munfordsville, Ky., i, 
160. 

Paixe, Gex. E. A., at Corinth, i, 127. 

Palmer, Gex. J. M., at La Vergne, i, 
210. At battle of Stone River, 
i, 235. Report of the battle, i, 
276. At Chickamauga, i, 335. At 
Missionary Ridge, i, 434. Recon- 
noissance toward Dalton, ii, 19. 
Drives enemy from Tunnel Hill, 
ii, 47. At battle of Resaca, ii, 64. 
Before Kenesaw Mountain, ii, 89. 
At Peachtree Creek, ii, 111. Be- 
fore Atlanta, ii, 127. Relieved of 
command at his own request, ii, 
128. 

Palmer, Col. W. J., captures two of 
Hood's trains, ii, 271. Operations 
in Tennessee and North Carolina, 
ii, 342. Attempts to intercept- 
Davis, ii, 365. 

Parkiiurst, Gex. J. G., reports men 
captured on Atlanta campaign, ii, 
150. 

Parrott, Johx, captured and flogged 
by rebels, i, 137. 

Parsoxs' Battery, captured at Perry- 
ville, i, 191. 

Patrick, Lieut. Col., engagement of 
at Sugar Creek, i, 390. 

Payxe, Gex., expeditions against 
guerrilla bands, ii, 6. 

Peachtree Creek, battle of, ii, 113. 

Pembertox, Col. J. C, routed by 
Stoneman, ii, 341. 

Perrvville, Ky., campaign of, i, 
184-206. 

Pillow, Gex. G., attacks Lafavette, 
ii, 95. 

Pine Mouxtain, operations near, ii, 
86. 

Pixney's Battery, at Perrvville, i, 
190. At Nolensville, i, 220. 

Pittsburg Laxdixg, U. S. forces at, i, 
101. 

Pocotaligo, occupied by Howard, ii, 
307. 

Polk, Gen. L., in Tennessee and 
Kentuckv, i, 23. At Perrvville, i, 
193. At* battle of Stone River, 
i, 227. Report of the battle, i, 258. 
At Chickamauga, i, 324. Defends 
Rocky Face Ridge, ii, 52. At bat- 



IXDEX. 



473 



tie of Resaca, ii, G5. Position at 

New Hope Church, ii, 78. Killed 

on Pine Mountain, ii, 76. 
Ponton-trains, description of, ii, 454. 

Designs of boat of, ii, 455. 
Pope, Gen. J., at siege of Corinth, i, 

126. 
Post, Col. S., at Nolensville, i, 220. 

At battle of Stone River, i, 233. 

Report of the battle, i, 266. Near 

Columbia, ii, 192. At battle of 

Nashville, ii, 232. 
Prentiss, Gen. B. M., breaks up 

Confederate camp in Kentucky, 

i, 20. At battle of Shiloh, i. L04. 
Prescott's Battery, at Jonesboro, ii, 

144. 
Preston, Gen., at battle of Stone 

River, i, 242. At Chickamauga, i, 

340. 
Prestonville, occupied by rebel 

forces, i, 74. 
Prescott's Knob, Bragg confronting 

Buell at, i, 161. 
Price, Col. S. W., at battle of Stone 

River, i, 236. 
Prime, Capt., sent to superintend 

fortifications, i. 48. Captured, i, 

52. 
Pritchard, Col., captures Jefferson 

Davis, ii, 365. 
Pulaski, Tenn., repulse of Forrest at 

by Rousseau, ii, 164. 
Raleigh, N. C, occupied by U. S. 

forces, ii, 322. 
Randall, Lieut. Col., killed at 

Peach tree Creek, ii, 116. 
Rains, Gen., at Baptist Gap, i, 135. 
Reed, Col. S. P., killed, i, 252. 
Reilly, Col., at Franklin, ii, 199. 
Resaca, battle of, ii, 64. Surrender 

of demanded by Hood, ii, 162. 
Reynolds, Gen. J. J., defeats J. H. 

Morgan, i, 216. Expedition of to 

McMinnville, i, 297. At Chicka- 
mauga, i, 335. 
Richmond, Ky., battle of, i, 18L 
Ringgold, Ga., engagement at, i, 436. 
Roberts, Col. G. W., killed at battle 

of Stone River, i, 237. 
Robinson, Col. J. S., at Kulp's house, 

ii, 91. At Peachtree Creek, ii, 

114.- At battle of Bentonville, ii, 

318. 
Rock Castle Hills, battle of, i, 39. 
Rocky Ifc.CE Ridge, ii, 47. 
Rodgersville, Ala., capture of, i, 



132. Rebel ootton di 

i, 390 

Roddy, I tan , 
River, ii, I 
ii, 349. 

Rodney's Batti rt, at ■ .. 
Selma, ii, .';"> I. 

Rome, < >.\ , foundries, null 
destroyed, ii, 378. 

Rosi crans, Gen. W. s , in command 
of Department of the I nmbi i 
i, 207. I 

210. Restricts non mi 
mies, i, 217. Orders 
Bragg, i. 218. Defeats 
StoiH- l;i i and 

loss of, i, 251, Kntcrs Mm: 
boro, i, 251. Orders :it and r< 
of battle of St >ne River, 
255'. Reasons for nol 
against Bragg, i. 298. Ord 
forward movement, i, 300. Tulla- 
homa campaign of, t, 302. Sti 
of successful, i, 306. B un 
the advance of, i, 310. Mam 
to dislodge Bragg, i, 213. I • 
Tennessee River, i, 314. At 1 
of Chickamauga, i, 328. & 
gate loss of, at Chickamauga i 
Report of the battle, i. 377. Aim 
of at ( lhattanooga, i, :; s 6. Relieved 
by order of the President, 
Farewell order of, i. I 11 I 

Rosengarten, Maj., killed, i. 22 

Rossville, occupied by Crittenden, i, 
318. 

Rousseau, Gen. L. It., 

brigadier-general of militia, i, 11. 
Requests authority to raise U. 8. 
troops in Kentucky, i, 15. In com- 
mand of Fourth Brigade under 
Gen. McCook, i, 63. Repul 
charge at Shiloh, i. 113. At Per- 
ryville, i, 186. At battle of Stone 
River, i, 225. Report of th 
tie, i, 272. Operations of in Ala- 
bama, ii, 110. Arrives at Mari 
ii, 117. Drives Bu ford from Mur- 
freesboro, ii. 224. Drives Forrest 
from Pulaski, ii, 164. 

Rugee, Gen. T. II., at battle of Re- 
saca, ii, 68. Before Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, ii, 91. At battleof l'< i 
Creek, ii, 114. At < !oluml 
190. At battle of Franklin, ii. 199. 

Russell's Battery, at Chickam 
i, 339. 



474 



INDEX. 



Salem, N. C, public property at, de- 
stroyed, ii, 341. 

Saltville, Va., captured and de- 
stroyed by Stonenian, ii, 374. 

Salt River, bridge of burned, i, 159. 

Savannah, Ga., capture of, by tbe U. 
S. forces, ii, 287. 

Selma, Ala., battle and capture of, 
by Wilson, ii, 352. 

Schaefer, Col. F. C, at battle of 
Stone River, i, 232. Killed, i, 243. 

Schoepf, Gen. A., camp of bom- 
barded, i, 49. Assigned to com- 
mand of First Brigade, Army of 
tbe Obio, i, 51. Moves toward 
Zollicoffer's position, i, 53. Crosses 
river at Florence, i, 148. At 
battle of Perryville, i, 189. 

Schultz's Battery, at Stone River, i, 
237. 

Schurz, Gen. C, at battle of Wau- 
. batcbie, i, 400. At Missionary 
Ridge, i, 426. 

Schofield, Gen. J. M., relieves Foster 
at Knoxville, ii, 18. At turning 
of Dalton, ii, 50. At battle of Re- 
saca, ii, 64. Near Kenesaw 
Mountain, ii, 88. Before Atlanta, 
ii, 127. Assumes command at 
Pulaski, ii, 172. Operations of, at 
Columbia, ii, 192. At battle of 
Franklin, ii, 196. Dispatches to 
Tbomas during retreat before 
Hood, ii, 210-218. Extract from 
report of battle of Franklin, ii, 
219. At battle of Nashville, ii, 
226. Extract from report of battle 
of Nashville, ii, 267. At Golds- 
boro, ii, 322. 

Scott, Col., rebel cavalry of, at Mun- 
fordsville, i, 159. 

Scribner, Col. B. F., at battle of 
Chickamauga, i, 334. At New 
Hope Church, ii, 79. 

Sculley, Lieut. Col., defeats Haw- 
kins, ii, 6. 

Shane, Lieut. Col., wounded near 
Kenesaw, ii, 94. 

Sheerer, Capt., at Nolensville, i, 
220. 

Shelby ville, Tenn., a depot of sup- 
plies, i, 130. Sacked by Wheeler, 
i, 390. 

Shepherd, Col. 0. L., at battle of 
Stone River, i, 238. 

Sheridan, Gen. P. H., at Perryville, 
i, 185. At battle of Stone River, 



i, 224. Report of the battle, i, 
268. At Chickamauga, i, 337. At 
Missionary Ridge, i, 415. 

Sherman, Gen. T. W., at Corinth, i, 
126. 

Sherman, Gen. W. T., assumes com- 
mand of Department of the Cum- 
berland, i, 31. Relieved by Buell, 
i, 46. At battle of Sbiloh, i, 104. 
Arrives at Chattanooga, i, 410. 
At th embattle of Missionary Ridge, 
i, 423. Report of battle of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, i, 448. On the 
Knoxville campaign, ii, 1. As- 
signed to command of Military 
Division of the Mississippi, ii, 24. 
Campaign of from Chattanooga to 
Atlanta, ii, 25-155. Operations of 
from Atlanta to Gaylesville, ii, 
160-166. March from Atlanta to 
the coast, ii, 168-305. Letter to 
Gen. Webster at Nashville, ii, 264. 
Operations of in the Carolinas, ii, 
309-325. Dispatch of to Wilson 
at Macon, ii, 361. Congratulatory 
order of, ii, 371. 

Shiloh, battle of, i, 106. Rebel 
loss at, i, 114. National loss at, i, 
114. 

Slocum, Gen. H. W., assigned to 
command of Twentieth Crops, ii, 
141. On the march to the sea, 
ii, 278. Dispatch to Sherman, ii, 
179. At Savannah, ii, 282. Ex- 
tract from report of the capture 
of Savannah, ii, 301. At Averys- 
boro, ii, 314. At battle of Ben- 
tonville, ii, 316. Moves through 
Richmond to Washington, ii, 325. 
Congratulatory order of, iii, 374. 

Sill, Col. J. W., commands Ninth 
Brigade, Army of the Ohio, i, 67. 
Captures Stevenson, i, 130. Moves 
against Kirby Smith, i, 184. At 
battle of Stone River, i, 226. 
Killed, i, 232. 

Simonson's Battery, enters Hunts- 
ville, i, 130. At Perryville, i, 188. 
At battle of Resaca, ii, 67. A shot 
from kills Lieut. Gen. Polk, ii, 86. 

Sirwell, Col. W., at Chickamauga, 
i, 348. 

Sister's Ferry, on Savannah river, 
ii, 307. 

Slade, Lieut. Col., repulses Buford 
at Huntsville, ii, 164. 

Smith, Gen. A. J., at Corinth, i, 126. 



i.M'i:\. 



475 



Defending Cincinnati, i. 183. At 
battle of Nashville, ii, 22 >. 

Smith, Gen. C. !•'., enterprise of a 
failure, i, L01. Debarks at Pitts- 
burg Landing, i, 101. At battle 
ol' Shiloh, i, 104 

Smith, Gen. E. K., at Bridgeport, i, 
131. .Moves to relieve* lhattanooga, 
i, 132. At Knoxville, i. 152. Mov- 
ing to ' Jentral Kentucky, i, I."):;. 
Defeats Nelson, i, 182. Advances 
toward Cincinnati, i, IS,'!. 

Smith, Gen. G. C, in pursuii of J. 
If. Morgan, i. 136. ( ipposes Mor- 
gan in Kentuckj , i, I 16. At 
Brentwood, Tenn., i, 290. 

Smith, Gen. M. L., assault of at 
Fort Donelson, i, 8'). At Mission- 
ary Ridge, i, 426. 

Smith. Gen. J. E., at Missionary 
Ridge, i, 426. At Chattanooga, 
ii, 95. 

Smith, Gen. W. F., operations of at 
Chattanooga, i, 396. Success of at 
Brown's Ferry, i, 39X. Activity 
of at Chattanooga, i, 421. 

Smith, Gex. W. S., at Perryville, i. 
196. 

Smithfieed, N. C, occupied by U. S. 
forces, ii, 322. 

South Carolina, desolate track 
through, ii, 312. 

Southern States, character of legis- 
latures of, i, 2. 

Spalding, Col., successful charge of 
at Nashville, ii, 241. 

Speed, Gen. Jas., patriotic address 
of, i, 2. Appointed brigadier- 
general of militia in Kentucky, 
i, 11. 

Speed, Joshua F., i, 12. 

Speers, Gen. J. G., at Cumberland 
Ford, i, 1 33. At Stone River, i, 25 1. 
On the Knoxville campaign, ii, 2. 
Engagement with Wheeler, ii, 7. 

Stand lRt's Battery, at Stone River, 
i, 240. At Chickamauga, i, 339. 

Stanley, Gen. D. S., at Corinth, i, 
127. At battle of Stone River, i, 
224. Engagement of at Overall's 
Creek, i, 245. Attacks Van Dorn 
at ilarpeth River, i, 296. Defeats 
forces at Middleton, i, 297. Cap- 
tures Wheeler's artillery, i, 306. 
Movements in Alabama, i, 309. At 
Buzzard Roost, ii, 49. At battle of 
Resaca, ii, 66. Engagement near 



• ill.-, ii, 72. Bi 
Mountain, ii. -- \i p, 

L12 \ 
tnand of the 1 iurth i 
II Bel Ulanta, ii. 

inent at Lov< 
I to At Pulaski, ii, 170 
Lumbia, 

into a charge at Prank] 
Wound.'. I at battl 
ii, 201. Extract linn rep< 
battle of Franklin, ii. 221. I 
Fourth < lorps into East L'enm 
ii. 339. 

Stanley, Col. T. R . at batt] 

River, i, 250. Report of the bat- 
tle, i, 27:;. At i Ihickamau • 
J. At Brown's Fei i 
'■ i vim a, Coi J. C., al . 
ville. i. 188. At I 
River, i, 221. At Chickam 
i, 334. 

Stanton, E. M., dispatches to Grant, 
relating to Thomas at Nashville, 
ii. 270. 253. Dispatches to Tl. 
ii. 279. 262. Directs Thom 
disregard all ordei I hose 

c iming from I Irant and himself, 
ii, 363. 

m in, < Ien. J. B., at Perryville, 
i, 190. Defeats Roddy, i, 293. At 
Chickamauga, i. 353. In com- 
mand of District of Etowah, ii, 
95. Drives Wheel dton, 

ii, 131. At battle of Nashville, ii, 
227. 

Steinwehr, Gen. A. V., at Wau- 
hatchie, i, 400. At Missionary 
Ridge, i, 420. 

Stern, Col. L., killed, i, 2 

Stevenson, Gen. C. I... near Baptist 
Gap, i, 13.7. Near Cui 
Gap, i. L76. Defeated b 
Courcv, i. 177. At Missionary 
Ridge, i, 127. At Buzzard R 
ii, 49. At battle of Resaca, ii 67. 
-on. Ala., capture of, i, 130. 
Works of defense construct 
i, 148. 

Stewart, Gen. A. P., at Chicka- 
mauga, i, 346. At Missionary 
Ridge, i, 434. At Buzzard's R 
ii, 49. At Resaca, ii. 67 R< 
from Atlanta, ii. 1 17 i >n railroad 
near Marietta, ii, 160. 

Stone's Battery, at Perryville, i, 
188. 



476 



INDEX. 



Stoke River, campaign of, i, 219-286. 

Stoneman, Gen. G. D., at Rocky Face 
Ridge, ii, 52. Movement toward 
Macon, and capture, ii, 124. Opera- 
tions in East Tennessee, ii, 273. 
Cavalry operations in Tennessee 
and North Carolina, ii, 337. 

Stouchton, Col., at Missionary 
Ridge, i, 434. 

Straight, Col. A. D., expedition from 
Decatur, i, 148. Expedition into 
Alabama, i, 295. Surrendered to 
Forrest, i, 296. At battle of Nash- 
ville, ii, 232. 

Strickland, Col., at Franklin, ii, 
199. 

Swallow's Battery, at Chickamauga, 
i, 336. 

Tafel, Col., surrenders to J. H. 
Morgan, i, 214. 

Tennessee, importance of holding, 
i, 139. 

Terrell, Gen., at Perryville, i, 188. 

Terrell's Battery, at Shiloh, i, 112. 

Thomas, Gen. Geo. H., in command 
of Camp Dick Robinson, i, 26. 
Organized First Brigade. Army of 
the Cumberland, i, 27. Opera- 
tions of, in Kentucky, i, 30-54. 
Victory of, at battle of Mill 
Springs, i, 56. Moves his com- 
mand" to Nashville, i, 58. Com- 
mands the center at Corinth, i, 
126. In the movement from Cor- 
inth toward Kentucky, i, 139. 
Letters of, to Buell, i, 164-173. 
Assigned to command of the Armv 
of the Ohio, i, 184. At the battle 
of Perryville, i, 186. Report of 
the battle, i, 202. Commands the 
center at battle of Stone River, i, 
224. Report of the battle, i, 272. 
On the Tullahoma campaign, i, 
302. Operations of, in moving 
army over the mountains, i, 310. 
Position of, at battle of Chicka- 
mauga, i, 328. Left chief in com- 
mand, i, 348. Saved the army, i, 
358. Assigned to command of 
the Army of the Cumberland, i, 
394. Operations of, at Chatta- 
nooga, i, 395, ii, 13. Assaults 
Bragg's center on Missionary 
Ridge, i, 429. Orders and reports 
of, at Chattanooga, i, 445, 451. 
Suggests movement of his army 
through Snake Creek Gap, ii, 24. 



Dispatches of to Grant, ii, 40. Ex- 
tract of report of, ii, 43. Opera- 
tion of in the turning of Dalton, 
ii, 44. Begins movements of At- 
lanta campaign, ii, 45. Operations 
of on the Atlanta campaign, ii, 
45-152. Congratulatory order of, 
at Atlanta, ii, 1">3. Ordered north 
to secure communications, ii, 159. 
Placed in command of all troops 
not in Sherman's presence, ii, 165. 
Strength of army left with him to 
defeat Hood, ii, 186. Dispositions 
of to repel Hood, ii, 186. With- 
draws army from Franklin, ii, 191. 
Dispatch to Sherman, ii, 181. To 
Halleck, ii, 182. Dispatches from 
Nashville in November, 1864, ii, 
206-218. Extract from report of 
battle of Franklin, ii, 219. Prepa- 
rations of for battle of Nashville, 
ii, 222. Attacks Hood before Nash- 
ville, ii, 227. Routs Hood and 
drives him from Tennessee, ii, 
22S-247. Extract from report of 
battle of Nashville, ii, 266. Dis- 
patches from Nashville to Grant, 
ii, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257, 261. To 
Halleck. ii, 25.°.. 255, 257, 258, 261. 
To President Lincoln, ii, 260. Gen- 
eral order of at Pulaski, ii, 265. 
Dispatches to Grant in relation to 
East Tennessee movements, ii, 
276. Extract from report of, ii, 
344. Dispatches from Clifton and 
Eastport to Halleck, ii, 345. Dis- 
patches to Grant in relation to 
Hood's movements, ii, 345. Com- 
munications of to Wilson, ii, 359. 
Dispatch to Grant, ii, 359. Dis- 
patch to Stoneman, ii, 360. Di- 
rected to disregard all orders ex- 
cept those of Grant and Secretary 
Stanton, ii, 363. Congratulatory 
order of, ii, 373. Order of, estab- 
lishing a national cemetery at 
Chattanooga, ii, 377. 

Thompson, Col. C. R., engages For- 
rest at Johnsonville, ii, 171. At 
battle of Nashville, ii, 242. 

Topping, Lieut. Col., mortally wound- 
ed, i, 181. 

Tower, Gen., fortifies Nashville, ii, 
206. 

Triune, Tenn., i, 221. 

Tullahoma Campaign, i, 302. 

Turchin, Gen. J. B., commands 



i\Di:\. 



177 



Eighth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, 

i, G7. Occupies Bowling Green, i. 
68. Brigade (Miters Huntsville, i. 
130. < laptures Decatur and Tus- 
cumbia, i, 130. At Brown's Ferry, 
i. 397. At Chickamauga, i. 336. 
Charges and routs the enemy, i, 
355. At Missionary Ridge, i, 429. 
In movement toward Dalton, ii, 
20. At battle of Resaca, ii, 66. 

Tuscumbia, Ala., capture of, i, 130. 

Twelfth Army Corps, joins Army of 
the Cumberland at Bridgeport, i, 
392. See also Appendix, ii, 3S2. 

Twentieth Army Coin's, organization 
of, see Appendix, ii, 381. 

Twenty-first Army Corps, organiza- 
tion of, see Appendix, ii, 381. 

"Tyler," gunboat, at battle of Shi- 
lob, i, 107. 

Tyler, Gen\, killed at West Point, 
Ga., ii, 356. 

Tyndale, Gen. II., at Wauhatchie, i, 
400. 

Underwood, Col. A. B., at battle of 
Wauhatchie, i, 401. 

Upton, Gen. E., operations of in Al- 
abama and Georgia, ii, 347. At 
the battle of Selma, ii, 351. Cap- 
tures Columbus, Ga., ii, 355. At 
Augusta, ii, 364. 

Van Cleye, Gen. H. P., at battle of 
Stone River, i, 224. Engaged at 
Lee & Gordon's Mills, i. 325. At 
Crawfish Springs, i, 327. At Chick- 
amauga, i, 336. 

Vanderveer, Col. F., at Chickamau- 
ga, i, 334. At Missionary Ridge, 
i, 429. Advance toward Tunnel 
Hill, ii, 26. At battle of Benton- 
ville, ii, 317. 

Van Porn, C4ex., engagement of, near 
Spring Hill, i, 292. 

Vauohan, Gen., evacuates London, 
ii, 2. 

"Veteran Volunteers," grand name 
of, ii, 29. 

Von Schrader, Lieut. Col. A., sys- 
tem of pickets, i, 210. Sent to 
Nashville to organize detached 
troops, ii, 189. 

Wagner, Gen. G. D., assigned to 
command of Twenty-first Brigade, 
i, 73. At Perryville, i, 192. At 
battle of Stone River, i, 243. Re- 
port of the battle, i, 279. At Mis- 
sionary Ridge, i, 432. Assault at 



Kenesaw, ii 94 U '..•■. [lope 

Church, ii, 30 At I. -.>■■ 

188 \t battle of Franklin ii, 

I '.is 

Walcutt, •;> \ < '. C, engagement 
of, uear Macon, ii. 278. 

Walker, Col. M. B 
boro, i, 224. 

Wali loi Gen. I... ai Fori Doi 
i, 86. At battle of Shiloh,i, I 1 
Corinth, i. r_'7. Defend in ■ 
cinnati, i I 33 

W lllace, Gen W. II I. , ai battle 
of Shiloh, i, 1<M. Mortally wound- 
ed i. 108. 

Ward, Gen. W. T., at battle of Re- 
Baca, ii, 68. At Peachtree I !reek, 
ii, 1 13. Moves northward from 
Savannah, ii. 307. At A 
ii, 314. 

W atkins, Col. I.. D., captures part of 
Texas Legion, i. 2 '7. Posb 
Rossville, ii, ■"). I lash of upon La- 
fayette, ii, 7. Eolds Lafaj ette, ii, 
95. 

W \m LTCH! f, i. 400. 

Webster, i !ol., at Perryville, i 

Wells, i !ol., attacked at Campbells- 
ville, ii. 189. 

West Liberty, Ky., occupied by 
U. S. troops, i, 74. 

West Point, Ga., captured by Col. 
La I rrange, ii. 356. 

Wii lrton, i i-EN. J. A., raid of in Ten- 
nessee, i, 

Wheeler, Gen. J., defeatedby Kirk, 
i, 213. Defeated bj Col S 
thew s, i. 215. < 'aptures ( loburn, 
i, 292. Artillery of captured i. 
306. Expedition of in Tenne 
i, 387. Defeats of, 1, 391. De- 
feated at Calhoun, ii, 7. Driven 
by Palmer, ii, 19. Attack of on 
Dalton repulsed, ii, 131. At Savan- 
nah, ii, 285. < iperations of in the 
Carolines, ii, 308. 

Wickliffe, < '. A., i. 12. 

WicKLiPPE, CAPT.,at Perryville, i, 187. 

Whipple, Gen. W. P., at battle of 

Nashville, ii. 230. 

White, Col., receives the Burre 
of Macon, ii. 357. 

Whitaki b, Gen. W. C, at Chicka- 
mauga, i, 353. At Lookout Moun- 
tain, i. 419, Near Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, ii, 89. 

Wilder, Col. J. T., declines to but- 



478 



INDEX. 



render Munfordsville, i, 160. 
Drives enemy from Hoover's 
Gap, i, 304. Captures Manchester, 
i, 306. Delays Bragg at Alex- 
ander's bridge, i, 331. Engage- 
ment at Leet's tanyard, i, 325. 
At Chickamauga, i, 337. 

Williams, Gen. A. S., at battle of 
Resaca, ii, 08. At New Hope 
Church, ii, 76. Before Kenesaw 
Mountain, ii, 89. At Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 114. On the march to 
the sea, ii, 278. At Savannah, ii, 
285. Report of on the capture of 
Savannah, ii, 302. At Averys- 
boro, ii, 314. 

Williams, Col. L. A., hung as a 
rebel spv, i, 298. 

Williams, Col. T. D., killed, i, 252. 

Willich, Gen. A., defeats enemy at 
Rowlett's Station, i, 65. At battle 
of Shiloh, i, 113. At Stone River, 
i, 226. At Chickamauga, i, 335. 
At Missionary Ridge, i, 415. 

Wilson', Gex. J. II., at Chattanooga, 
i, 422. Chief of cavalry, Military 
Division of the Mississippi, ii, 192. 
At Hart's Cross-roads, ii, 191. 
Covers retirement of the infantry, 
ii, 192. At the battle of Frank- 
lin, ii, 198. Dispatches of from 
Hart's Cross-roads and Franklin, 
ii, 216. Extract of report of No- 
vember 29, 1864, ii, 221. At bat- 
tle of Nashville, ii, 222, 226. Pur- 
sues retreating enemy, ii, 241. 
Cavalry campaign of in Alabama 
and Georgia, ii, 347. Captures 
Selma, Ala., ii, 353. Moves toward 
Montgomery, ii, 353. Advance 
of upon Macon, Ga., ii, 356. Dis- 
patch of, from Macon, to Sher- 
man, ii, 361. Suspends operations 
in compliance with the Sherman- 
Johnston armistice, ii. 357. 
Adopts measures to capture Da- 
vis, etc., ii, 364. Congratulatory 
order of, ii, 376. 

Winegak's Battery, at Kulp's house, 
ii, 91. 

Wixslow, Gen. E. F., at the battle of 
Selma, ii, 352. At Columbus, Ga., 
ii, 355. Operations of, in Alabama 
and Georgia, ii, 349. 



Withers, Gex., at Stone River, L 
227. 

Wolf, Col., at battle of Nashville, 
ii, 232. 

Woiiford, Col. Frank, organizes First 
Kentucky Cavalry, i, 17. Wound- 
ed at Lebanon, Ky., i, 136. 

Wood, Col. J., at battle of Resaca, 
ii, 68. 

Wood, Gen. T. J., assigned to com- 
mand Sixth Division, i, 72. At 
battle of Shiloh, i, 114. At Cor- 
inth, i, 126. At Perryville, i, 192. 
At Stone River, i, 24L At Chick- 
amauga, i, 347. Drives enemy 
from Orchard Knob, i, 415. At 
Rocky Face Ridge, ii, 52. At bat-* 
tie of Resaca, ii, 66. At New Hope 
Church, ii, 78. Before Kenesaw 
Mountain, ii, 88. At Peachtree 
Creek, ii, 112. Wounded at Love- 
jov's Station, ii, 146. At battle of 
Franklin, ii, 199. At battle of 
Nashville, ii, 226. 

Wood, Lieut. Col., of Morgan's rebel 
command, captured, i, 136. 

Woodbury's Battery, at Kulp's 
house, ii, 91. 

Woodruff, Col. W. E., loyalty of, i, 
3. Authorized to raise a regiment, 
i, 14. Takes regiment to West Vir- 
ginia, i, 15. At Nolensville, i, 220. 
At battle of Stone River, i, 231. 
Report of the battle, i, 267. 

Wright, Gen. H. G., relieves Nel- 
son, i, 153. 

Wyncoop, Col., Seventh Pennsylva- 
nia Cavalry, i, 136. 

Wytheville, Va., captured and de- 
stroyed by Gillem, ii, 274. 

Yarger, Ma.i. J., wounded near 
Kenesaw, ii, 94. 

Youxg, Lieut. Com., at Fayetteville 
with gunboat Eolus, ii, 311. 

Zahm, Col. L., at battle of Stone 
River, i, 244. 

Zollicoffer, Gen. F. R., occupies 
Cumberland Gap, i, 23. Advanced 
to Cumberland Ford, i, 30. Re- 
pulsed by . Gen. Schoepf 's com- 
mand, i, 39. Retreated to London, 
i, 39. Issues proclamation to Ken- 
tuckians, i, 53. Killed at battle 
of Mill Springs, i, 57. 



